Property disputes can be complicated and confusing, so it is important to hire an excellent lawyer capable of untangling all of the issues involved in the case. Plaintiff Don Whitlock owns property in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana and brought a petition against Defendant Fifth Louisiana District Levee Board and its lessee, Jamie Isaac, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from trespassing on his property when they travelled across to access a hunting lease owned by the defendant Levee Board that is located west of Plaintiff’s property. Mr. Whitlock farms on the three lots of land at issue and alleged Issac caused damage as he crossed all three lots, creating ruts in the soil, damaging crops, and changing the flow of water. The defendants, however, argued that the land was conveyed to plaintiff’s ancestor with a public right of passage in the deed, and thus there could be no suit for trespass. The Trial Court agreed and with the defendants and held that there was no cause of action. It also held that since Mr. Whitlock was not the sole owner of the land (there were other owners on two of the three lots), he failed to join all the parties and further lacked the capacity to sue in a representative capacity for the other owners. Finally, it took a “strange” step in ruling on the merits of the preliminary injunctions despite the fact that it had sustained the exceptions raised by the defendants. It held that preliminary injunction could not be granted because Mr. Whitlock failed to show irreparable harm. Thus, the Trial Court dismissed the case. On appeal, Mr. Whitlock argued that the Trial Court’s rulings were improper.
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the Trial Court’s dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeal found that the exceptions were improperly sustained and the Trial Court applied the wrong burden of proof in ruling on the preliminary injunction. Mr. Whitlock is the sole owner of Lot 3 and is an owner “indivision” of Lots 1 and 2. Whitlock’s ancestor had purchased all three lots in 1973 and the lots were burdened by a “right of way twenty feet wide across the lands . . . to serve as a road for the use of the public and which right of way shall hereafter be located by said vendee.” This public right of way eventually became a gravel road named Parish Gravel Road No. 1205 or 1285. It ran across the east side of the property, entirely located within lot 1. However, when defendant Issac became the lessee of the Swan Lake property owned by the defendant Levee Board, he began crossing Whitlock’s property in various places because the Swan Lake property was located directly behind lot 3. Whitlock alleged that he told Issac to stop and attempted to address the issues with the Levee Board because of the ruts being created as Isaac and his friends drove vehicles across the property, damaging his crops and changing the natural flow of water. Whitlock argued that Issac was not taking the shortest route across the property nor was he taking a route that would cause the least disruption. The Levee Board refused to take any action and Issac continued crossing against Whitlock’s wishes. Eventually, Whitlock filed a lawsuit seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction and damages for the loss of 2.2 acres of land that he could not use.
The Defendants asserted that the case should be dismissed because of the right of way included in the deed. Further, they alleged that Whitlock was not the sole owner of all of the property and thus, was required to join his co-owners in the lawsuit. The Trial Court agreed with these exceptions. It also looked at the merits of the preliminary injunctions and ruled that Whitlock could not meet the burden of proof of irreparable injury. The exceptions were sustained and the case was dismissed.