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revolt-368925-unsplash-1024x683Imagine you are driving home from work and you collide with another vehicle. Would your employer be liable for the damages? For most commuters, the employer is not accountable for any accidents that occur on the way to or from the place of work and the employee’s residence. But in certain cases, such as where an employee is traveling with a specific business purpose under the direction of the employer, the employer may be on the hook under a theory known as vicarious liability. Effectively, vicarious liability holds an employer liable for an employee’s negligence when the employee is acting within the scope of the employer’s business. La. C.C. art. 2320.

On December 20, 2009, James Richards was traveling from Texas to his home in Florida along Interstate 10. In Bienville Parish, Louisiana, Richards collided with a van, causing the death of the driver and severe, paralyzing injuries to the passenger, Ricky Winzer. In 2010, Winzer filed a lawsuit against Richards and Richards’s employer, Certified Constructors’ Service, Inc. (“CCSI”). Winzer alleged that Richards was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, making CCSI liable through the doctrine of vicarious liability. CCSI filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Richards was not employed at the time of the accident and therefore CCSI could not be liable for his negligence. The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing in which depositions, interrogatories, and payroll documents were submitted, granted CCSI’s motion. Winzer appealed to Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal.

Upon review, the Court reiterated the general rule under Louisiana jurisprudence that an employer is not liable for an employee’s negligence when they are driving to and from work unless the employer provides the transportation, pays expenses or wages for the time spent traveling, or has assigned the employee a specific  task to perform for the employer. See Woolard v. Atkinson, 988 So. 2d 836 (La. Ct. App. 2008). To determine if the employee’s actions fall within one of the above exceptions, courts must examine the following factors:  the employer’s power of control; the employee’s duty to perform the act in question; the time, place, and purpose of the act in relation to the employment; the relationship between the employee’s act and the employer’s business; the benefits received by the employer from the act; the employee’s motivation for performing the act; and the employer’s reasonable expectation that the employee would perform the act. See Orgeron v. McDonald, 639 So. 2d 224 (La. 1994).

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akira-hojo-502567-unsplash-1024x683Most Louisiana residents understand the liability they may incur if they do not properly fence a backyard pool. But what about other, less obvious drowning hazards, such as a church’s baptismal pool? Who is held accountable for the failure to protect children from falling in? Typically, a church is part of a diocese and must meet the general guidelines established by the diocese in order to maintain its affiliation. For instance, the First Assembly Church of God (“First Assembly”) in Ruston, Louisiana is affiliated with the  Louisiana District Council of the Assemblies of God (the “DC”) and the General Council of the Assemblies of God (the “GC”). After a tragic accident involving the toddler of a First Assembly family, Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal was called upon to determine whether the DC and the GC had sufficient control over First Assembly to be liable for the church’s negligence.

In 2013, Irene Che and her 22-month-old daughter attended services at First Assembly. At some point during the service, the child was found submerged in the church’s baptismal pool. Although she survived, Che’s daughter suffered brain damage that left her unable to walk, talk, or feed herself. In her lawsuit, Che alleged that First Assembly was negligent in leaving the baptismal pool unguarded, and named the church, the DC, and the GC as defendants. Che argued that the DC and the GC were liable under the theory of respondeat superior, which establishes that a person or business is responsible for the damages caused by the acts or omissions of persons over whom it exercises control. La. C.C. art. 2317. The rule has been extended by the Louisiana Civil Code to include employers, who are responsible for the damage caused by their employees in the exercise of the functions within the scope of their employment. La. C.C. art. 2320, The DC and the GC filed a motion for summary judgment contesting the application of respondeat superior to the relationship between themselves and First Assembly. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the DC and the GC as defendants; Che appealed.

The Second Circuit analyzed the relationship created by First Assembly’s contracting with the DC and the GC to gain the right to affiliate with the Church of God.  The Court, noting that the single most important factor when determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists — a step necessary to invoke respondeat superior — is whether the “employer” has the right to control the work or actions of the “employee,” found that there was no evidence that the DC and GC maintained such right over First Assembly and its employees. The Court further analyzed the DC’s and the GC’s Constitutions and By-laws, concluding that those operating documents failed to establish a relationship between the two bodies and First Assembly that could support the invocation of respondeat superior. As a result, the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the DC and the GC as defendants in the case, leaving Che to pursue her negligence claim against First Assembly alone.

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dog-1534524-1024x768Litigation between family members can be uncomfortable for everyone involved. But what happens when a plaintiff sues a relative, then passes away, and the relative then becomes the plaintiff? Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal recently addressed this unusual situation in a case involving a vicious dog attack.

In May of 2011, Evelyn Goers, 89, was visiting her daughter Laureen Mayfield in Simsville, Louisiana. Goers was attacked and injured by four of Mayfield’s large Tibetan Mastiffs. In May 2012, Goers filed a lawsuit for damages against Mayfield and her homeowner’s insurance company, State Farm. Goers passed away in February 2015, after which Goers’s other daughter, Cheryl Goers, filed a petition to substitute herself as a plaintiff in the lawsuit against Mayfield. The next month, Mayfield made a motion to substitute herself as a plaintiff. The trial court granted both motions. State Farm then filed an exception based on the theory that there was no right of action because Mayfield was both plaintiff and a defendant, thus extinguishing the obligation by confusion. La. C.C. art. 1903. Cheryl Goers filed a response requesting that State Farm’s exception be sustained without a hearing but did not include a proposed judgment to that effect. State Farm then submitted a proposed order granting the exception. Cheryl Goers raised no objection to this action by State Farm. The trial court signed State Farm’s order, dismissing Goers from the lawsuit entirely as both defendant and plaintiff. Cheryl Goers then filed an appeal arguing that the trial court’s order was improper because it extinguished her right of action against Mayfield; an exception for no right of action, she argued, can dismiss a plaintiff, but not a defendant from an action.

Under Louisiana law, an appeal cannot be made by a party who voluntarily and unconditionally accepted without protest a judgment rendered against that party. La. C.C.P. art. 2085. State Farm conceded that under the Direct Action Statute, Cheryl Goers could still maintain a claim against State Farm. La. Rev. Stat. 22:1269 (2012), The Direct Action Statute requires that insurance policies issued in the state provide that the heirs or survivors of any claimant under the policy can maintain the claim. However, as for Cheryl Goers’s action against her sister, the Court of Appeal noted that she voluntarily and unconditionally accepted the trial court’s order without protest because she agreed with the exception and did not oppose the order when the trial court approved it. Therefore, reasoning that Cheryl Goers lacked a basis for the appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

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metal-1314941-1-1024x680It is all too easy to forget just how dangerous driving can be. In addition to human factors such as sleepiness, being distracted, and stress, there is also the unpredictability of the road. Uncontrollable circumstances such as the weather or wild animals that dart into traffic can turn a regular commute into a devastating experience. But who is to blame when something unforeseeable, such as a force of nature, causes a highway catastrophe? This issue was addressed after a multi-vehicle accident on Interstate 10 near the Michael Boulevard exit in New Orleans on December 29, 2011.

Randall White’s car was the 25th of the 40 vehicles involved in the accident. White and his wife filed a lawsuit against the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”), the City of New Orleans, and the Little Pine Limited Partnership “Little Pine.” The Whites claimed that the pile-up was caused by thick fog combined with smoke from a marsh fire that had been burning since August 2011 on land owned by Little Pine. According to the Whites, the fog and smoke, in combination with faulty street lights, compromised visibility on the highway and caused the accident.

The DOTD filed a motion for summary judgment, a motion for judgment as a matter of law rather than on the merits of the case. La. C.C.P. art. 966. The DOTD argued that it had no notice of the fog in the area, had no responsibility for the street lighting issue, had no duty to protect the Whites from the fog or smoke, and it was shielded by governmental immunity. To support the motion, the DOTD relied on affidavits from DOTD engineers, the New Orleans Public Works Director, and the New Orleans City Council, as well documents such as the New Orleans Police Accident Report and the National Weather Service Report from the date of the accident. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the Whites’ claims. In response, the Whites appealed to Louisiana’s Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit.

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StockSnap_Q6ZI86R637-1024x678After an injury, it is natural to feel entitled to physical, mental, and financial recovery. Unfortunately, the road to recovery can be full of detours and roadblocks. Without the help of a good lawyer, it can be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to understand and adhere to the many rules of the legal system. What seems like an unfair technicality could be the result of an easily avoidable mistake.

On May 1, 2013, Detrand Lloyd, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair, boarded the Monroe City Bus. Some ways into the trip the bus braked suddenly, sending Lloyd out of his wheelchair and onto the floor, fracturing his tibia. One year later, Lloyd attempted to file a lawsuit against the Monroe Transit Authority and its insurer. Lloyd’s attorney attempted to file the petition via facsimile (“fax”) at 4:24 p.m. on May 1, 2014, just before the end of the court’s business day at 5:00 p.m. Despite more attempts that day, the clerk of court did not receive the petition until the morning of May 2, 2014, which is the day it was officially filed. The defendants filed an exception of prescription, requesting that the petition be dismissed because it was not filed in a timely manner. In their motion, the defendants argued that the lawsuit was filed more than one year after the accident. According to the defendants, the filing of the suit occurred on May 2, 2014, or one year plus one day from the date of Lloyd’s injury. Lloyd argued that his attorney tried to file the petition by fax on May 1, 2014, but “due to circumstances beyond the control of counsel,” receipt of the petition by the clerk of court could not be made until the next morning. A busy signal on the fax line was reflected on the attempted fax transmissions.

At the hearing, the trial court found that the operation of the clerk’s office fax machine was beyond Lloyd’s control and dismissed the exception of prescription. The defendants appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, arguing that the trial court erred when it held as a matter of law that the clerk was required to keep the fax machine operating after hours. In addition, the defendants argued the trial court erred in denying the exception because prescription is interrupted only when the fax is received by the clerk, not simply by any attempt to fax the document.

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tyler-butler-691603-unsplash-1024x683It is one thing to own land, but it is another thing to know what rights come with that ownership. Without the help of a good lawyer, a misunderstanding of property rights could put you in court for trespassing–or worse. For instance, it might be important to understand if installing a pipeline on land protected by conservation restrictions is allowed. This issue was addressed in 2016 when some land in Iberville Parish because of the subject of a dispute between two companies.

The land at issue referred to as “Section 12,” which was located in a Mitigation Bank. Before 1999, Lago Espanol, LLC (“Espanol”) owned the rights to excavate the land for minerals and rights to the property’s surface. In 1999, Espanol entered into an agreement with several state regulatory bodies to form the Mitigation Bank. As part of the agreement, Espanol placed certain restrictions on the use of the land through a conservation servitude. In Louisiana, a conservation servitude requires the owner to “retain or protect the property’s natural, agricultural, scenic, or open-space values through the protection of its natural resources, air, and water quality, and historical, archaeological, or cultural aspects.” La. R.S.9:1272.

In 2006, Rio Bravo Energy Partners, LLC (“Rio Bravo”) obtained a lease for the mineral rights of Section 12 from Espanol. In 2009, Spanish Lake Restoration, LLC (“Spanish Lake”) obtained Section 12’s surface rights. Two years later, Petrodome St. Gabriel II, LLC (“PD”) acquired Section 12’s mineral rights and a wetland permit from Rio Bravo, which allowed Petrodome to board the pre-existing, unimproved roads in Section 12. PD boarded the roads, and made other improvements to the plot of land.

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competition-1024x683A non-compete clause is a common feature in many employment agreements in Louisiana. The clause is a way for an employer to restrict an employee from going to work for a competitor and thus potentially harming the original employer. Most non-compete clauses, in order to be enforceable, must contain some limitation as to time and geographical location.

Katie Urban-Kingston was hired by Billedeaux Hearing Center (“Billedeaux”) in Lafayette in May of 2014. Urban-Kingston and Billedeaux entered into an employment agreement containing a non-compete clause that applied to certain areas of Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Mississippi, and allowed for the collection of any costs incurred by Billedeaux for legal enforcement of the clause. Less than a year later, Urban-Kingston left Billedeaux and became employed by Williamson Hearing Center (“Williamson”), just outside of Baton Rouge. Billedeaux sought and was granted a temporary restraining order in February 2015 to enjoin Urban-Kingston from working for Williamson, and a show-cause hearing for a preliminary injunction was set for early March.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Urban-Kingston was trained by Billedeaux, that she left Billedeaux’s employ and worked for Williamson at the time of the trial, and that Williamson is in direct competition with Billedeaux. Urban-Kingston claimed as a defense against the issuance of a preliminary injunction, however, that the non-compete clause in her employment agreement with Billedeaux was too broad. The trial court determined that the only issue to decide based on Urban-Kingston’s defense was whether the two hearing centers were actually in competition. But since the parties had already stipulated that point, the court rejected the defense, issued the preliminary injunction in Billedeaux’s favor, and ordered Urban-Kingston to pay Billedeaux’s attorney fees of approximately $6,000.

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trucking-in-snow-1357665-1024x681The viewing of a dead body can be traumatic for many people. If that viewing is caused by the negligence of another an excellent attorney may help you secure compensation for the emotional anguish experienced from that event. Shortly after midnight on February 4, 2011, Ronnie Rodd Davis was operating a tractor-trailer, owned by Superior Carriers, on eastbound Interstate 10 near the Atchafalaya Basin Bridge in Baton Rouge. Mr. Davis noticed that a collision had recently occurred in front of him and was able to stop before joining the other cars in the collision. Due to the abrupt stop to avoid the collision Mr. Davis’ tractor-trailer was rear-ended by another tractor-trailer operated by John V. Scott, and owned by Service Transport Company. The collision caused Mr. Davis’ tractor-trailer to move forward and strike a Ford F-150 pickup truck that was involved in the initial collision. Mr. Davis exited his tractor-trailer and upon exiting saw the deceased driver of that Ford F-150, Jonas T. Richmond, under or near Mr. Davis’ trailer axle.

Mr. Davis filed a lawsuit for damages and named John V. Scott, Service Transport, and Service Transport’s insurer, National Interstate Insurance Company (National Interstate), as defendants. The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment and sought to dismiss Mr. Davis’ claims of mental anguish and/or emotional distress due to Mr. Davis’ viewing of the deceased body of Mr. Richmond. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. This dismissed any claims Mr. Davis had related to any alleged mental and/or emotional injuries.

Mr. Davis then filed a motion to designate the judgment as final so he could immediately appeal. The defendants opposed this motion. After a hearing, the Trial Court designated the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal and determined there was no just reason for delay. On appeal, the Appellate Court had both procedural problems and issues of causation regarding the accident. First, the Appellate Court dealt with the procedural issues created by the order of final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal. Only after the issue of whether the final judgment order was proper could the court consider the underlying factual issues of whether it was appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The main issues were whether the issuing of a final judgment was proper, whether to convert the appeal to an application for a supervisory writ, and whether the Trial Court erred in granting Mr. Scott’s motion for partial summary judgment.

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back-to-school-1416942-1024x681People seek assistance from the courts for a number of reasons. Some may demand a monetary payment after suffering a loss due to another’s wrongful conduct. Others may aim to prevent harm resulting from the wrongful conduct of another by petitioning the court for protective action. In Louisiana, a court has several ways to prevent harm. One way is the injunction, a court order requiring a person or entity to act in a certain way or to avoid specified conduct. This is generally in the form of a permanent injunction, issued after a formal trial. However, before or during such a trial, the court may hold a hearing to consider a preliminary injunction, which acts to achieve the petitioner’s objective temporarily, until a full judgment can be made. Another way is a temporary restraining order. This order is similar to a preliminary injunction but is utilized in emergency situations where the delay due to a hearing could result in irreparable harm to the petitioner.      

Michael Delesdernier and Cedric Floyd were both elected to membership of the Jefferson Parish School Board in 2014. At a meeting of the board in July of 2014, the school board’s attorney offered a legal opinion on a matter before the board. Apparently disagreeing with the attorney’s statement, Floyd responded in an aggressive manner using strong words. Delesdernier advised Floyd to calm down, which suggestion Floyd did not well. Floyd began yelling and shoved Delesdernier against the wall. Multiple board members intervened to separate Floyd from Delesdernier, who did not fight back. Following this altercation, Delesdernier filed a petition for an injunction and temporary restraining order from the Jefferson district court.  He asked the court to prevent Floyd from coming within three feet of him and to order him not to threaten or intimidate him. In the interval before the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court issued multiple temporary restraining orders, which Floyd opposed. In October of 2014, the district court conducted a hearing to consider issuing a preliminary injunction. After considering the testimony of eyewitnesses to the altercation, the court dismissed Floyd’s motion opposing the temporary restraining order and issued the preliminary injunction. Floyd appealed this decision to Louisiana’s Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.

Under Louisiana law, a party cannot appeal a decision involving a temporary restraining order. La. C.C.P. art. 3612.  However, a preliminary injunction is subject to appellate review. For an injunction to be issued by the court, the petitioner must prove that without it, he would be irreparably harmed. La. C.C.P. art. 3601(A).  Irreparable harm is an injury or loss that a money judgment would not remedy. However, there is an exception to the requirement of irreparable harm:  if the petitioner can show that the conduct he seeks to prevent is unlawful, then he no longer must prove irreparable harm. Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So.2d 597 (La. 1999). Here, Floyd’s threatening and violent conduct during the school board altercation would be considered unlawful assault under Louisiana law. La. R.S. 14:36. The same unlawful conduct is what Floyd sought to prevent through his petition. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had acted properly in granting the preliminary injunction, and affirmed the judgment.

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thinking-out-of-the-box-3-1237519-1024x1024Accidents involving children are difficult for everyone involved. When the accident results in extensive, life-changing injuries, the situation becomes even more tragic and often results in multiple lawsuits. A person cannot recover damages unless he or she has a recognized claim to do so under law. This concept is known as “standing.” Calvernia Reed, maternal aunt to an injured minor child, Geneva Marie Fils, got a glimpse into how strictly Louisiana courts construe that standing requirement.

On January 2, 2006, Geneva Marie Fils (“Geneva”) was born to John and Demitria Fils. She was almost immediately taken out of the biological parents’ care by the Department of Children and Family Services and placed in the foster home of Mayola Calais. On March 22, 2006, Geneva was involved in an automobile accident and suffered multiple injuries, including a fractured skull, an intracerebral hematoma (brain bleeding), and other traumatic brain injuries. Geneva’s biological parents first filed suit against multiple parties involved in the incident, their insurance companies, and the Department of Children and Family Services itself. Calvernia Reed was not named in the petition, but she was included as a plaintiff in the body of the petition as Geneva’s then-current guardian. The biological parents of Geneva sought damages both on behalf of Geneva, and for their own loss of consortium. In early 2011, Demitria Fils passed away. In February of 2011, Ms. Reed was substituted as the proper plaintiff in the proceedings after being granted custody of Geneva, as well as judicially appointed as Geneva’s “tutor.” Tutorship is the legal status of guardianship under Louisiana law. In late 2013, Ms. Reed amended the petition to include her own claim for loss of consortium with Geneva as a result of her injuries. The trial court dismissed Ms. Reed’s claim for loss of consortium because Ms. Reed was not the parent or guardian of Geneva at the time of the accident. Ms. Reed appealed.

Under Louisiana law, a person may recover loss of consortium, service, and society if the person could recover under “a cause of action for the wrongful death of an injured person.” La. C.C. art. 2315(B). The wrongful death statute allows for a cause of action by “[t]he surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.” La. C.C. art. 2315.2. The statute also includes adoptive kin as named in the statute.  La. C.C. art. 2315.2. It does not, however, specifically include a maternal aunt. The list is considered exclusive under Louisiana law, meaning that if the kin is not mentioned in the statute, then the kin cannot recover damages for the claim. Leckelt v. Eunice Superette, 555 So.2d 11 (La. App. 1989). Outside of including adoptive kin under the statute, the terms “mother” and “father” are not defined in La. C.C. art. 2315.2. The Louisiana Children’s Code currently defines “parent” as “any living person who is presumed to be a parent under the Civil Code or a biological or adoptive mother or father of a child.” La. Ch. C. art. 116(17). Notably, the Children’s Code does not give tutorship, custody, or a guardian the legal status of a parent.

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