Perhaps one of the biggest fears when going under anesthesia for a surgery is not waking up when the procedure is over. For a Louisiana man, this fear was realized when a trip to the emergency room for stomach pain resulted in him being woken up from an opiate overdose. So what happens when your doctor gives you an overdose of a medicine?

Donald Ray Seaux, Sr. went to Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center in July 2002 when he began experiencing stomach pain and vomiting. The doctor diagnosed him with a dysfunctional gallbladder and scheduled surgery to remove his gallbladder. When it came time for him to have surgery, his surgeon, Dr. Juan Paredes, chose to perform an “open cholecystectomy,” which is an invasive surgery requiring a large incision across the abdomen. In choosing this option, Dr. Paredes determined that the less-invasive laparoscopic surgery was not appropriate for Mr. Seaux.

Because the surgery chosen was more serious and would likely be more painful to recover from, the hospital anesthesiologist utilized a patient-controlled analgesic morphine pump (PCA), which was a device that delivered pain medication in timed doses. Two days after he entered the hospital and had the surgery, Mr. Seaux was found unresponsive, and was given the drug Narcan, which reverses opiates in the body. Mr. Seaux and his wife state that he was injured as a result of the overdose of morphine from the PCA.

70-picture-1024x683When someone is injured on the job, sorting out liability can be complex. It can be doubly so when a prisoner is temporarily released so he or she can work and is subsequently injured on a job that was approved by the prison system and the sheriff managing that prison, but completely run by a private party. In such a situation, it will take an excellent lawyer to sort out the liability issues and advise whether a lawsuit is worth bringing. So, who is liable for injuries on a work release program?

Sheriff Mike Tubbs found himself named in a lawsuit by an inmate who was injured in just such a situation. Ronnie Thomas was a prisoner in a jail in Morehouse Parish, Louisiana when he was approved for work release. His work release was assigned to the waste management department, where he worked as a “hopper” on the back of a garbage truck. He would jump off the back at each stop and grab the trash and throw it into the truck. During one of his jumps he fell and was injured. He sued several defendants, including Sheriff Tubbs, for their failure to provide a safe work environment. The trial court dismissed the case after the Sheriff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he owed Mr. Thomas no duty to provide a safe work environment. The trial court held that Mr. Thomas was an employee of the waste management company and thus his only remedy was workers’ compensation. Mr. Thomas appealed, but the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

The work release program that is run by the Morehouse Parish jail requires that the prisoner fill out an application for a job that seems suitable. In this case, Mr. Thomas applied for a job with the Morehouse Parish Police Jury, who reviewed his application and determined that he could work for the waste management company, Morehouse Parish Solid Waste, which is a third-party company. He was then assigned duty as a “hopper” by the company. He was injured in the course of his employment. According to the Court of Appeal, an employee’s exclusive remedy when injured in the course of his employment is workers’ compensation. However, Mr. Thomas argued that his situation was unique because he was a prisoner and out only due to the work release program. In his view, the sheriff was also responsible because he had assigned him to work, arranged what hours he would work, and was the one who negotiated how much he would be paid. He also pointed out that he received his payment through the inmate banking system. Thus, he argued that this level of participation by the sheriff also bound the sheriff with a duty of care to provide a safe work environment. The trial court and the Court of Appeal did not agree. They pointed to substantial case precedent for the settled principle in Louisiana that when a prisoner is released through a work release program they are an employee of the private company that provides employment, and that private employer enjoys immunity provided by the workers’ compensation program. The factual situation, wherein the prisoner applies for a job and is solely supervised by the employer during the release period, also backed up this finding,

23-Email-04-02-19-pictureA wrongful death action lawsuit can be difficult for an individual to have to deal with. But what happens when a clerk that stamps the lawsuit stamps a date that does not exist? What do you do when the Clerk makes this error? The Third Circuit Court of Appeal for Louisiana recently addressed the issue.

Linda Roberts (“Linda”) was diagnosed with bronchiolitis obliterans organizing pneumonia and passed away on July 28th, 2009. Linda’s son, Jeffrey Buelow, (“Jeffrey”) filed a wrongful death lawsuit on August 2nd, 2010, against his stepfather, Donald Roberts (“Donald”). The stamp on the lawsuit showed “10 JUL 33 A:40” and the Clerk wrote “Aug 2” above the stamp. Jeffrey alleged in his lawsuit that Donald wrongfully signed a consent form to withdraw Linda’s life support while under the influence of alcohol because BOOP could have still been cured. In response to the wrongful death suit, Donald filed a peremptory exception of prescription and a document that provided when Linda passed away. A peremptory exception of prescription is a defense by the defendant that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by not being filed within the prescribed period of time. The provided that Linda passed away on July 28th, 2009, and not July 28th, 2010, as Jeffrey stated in his lawsuit. Jeffrey confirmed in his testimony that Linda did in fact pass away on July 28th, 2009, and evidence in form of a certificate of death verified such. Jeffrey then opted to represent himself at trial and argued that the wrongful death lawsuit should have been carried out because tort lawsuits are subject to a prescription of one year from the day that injury or damage occurs. La. C.C. art. 3492. Jeffrey alleged that the wrongful death lawsuit was faxed by his former attorney before July 28th, 2010 but failed to provide any evidence that demonstrated such. The Ninth Judicial District Court granted Donald’s peremptory exception of prescription because Jeffrey failed to file his lawsuit within one year from when Linda passed away. Jeffrey appealed the decision of the District Court.

On appeal, Jeffrey argued that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim his claim based on the evidence that was presented. For prescriptive periods that are one year or more, expiration of the prescription accrues on the day of the last year in which the date of the alleged wrongful death occurred. La. C.C. art. 3456. The Court of Appeal determined that the prescriptive date was July 29th, 2010, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3456. The Court of Appeal noted that an employee from the clerk’s office obviously had failed to change the date on the stamp, as the non-existing date of July 33rd would have correctly been August 2nd. The Court of Appeal affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss Jeffrey’s claim due to the basis of prescription. The Court of Appeal came to this decision because the record from the District Court showed that the date of the filing was August 2nd, 2010 and Jeffrey failed to produce any letter from his previous counsel or a check paid for the filing fee that would have shown that the wrongful death lawsuit was filed within one year from the date that Linda passed away. This case demonstrates the importance of filing lawsuits in a timely manner.

39-Email-04-02-19-picture-1024x683The death of a loved one is always a traumatic experience for family and friends, especially if the death could have been prevented or is at the fault of the hospital. When someone feels as if medical malpractice has occurred, Louisiana has strict guidelines regarding filing a medical malpractice lawsuit and someone unfamiliar with the legal process can easily be confused or frustrated by this complex process. For example, in Louisiana you have one year following a death to file a medical malpractice suit, however, is that filing due at by the close of business at the one year or is the filing due by midnight? The Louisiana Supreme Court recently consolidated two cases that answered such questions on when you have to file a medical malpractice lawsuit. 

The facts of these two cases are similar, which is exactly why the Louisiana Supreme Court decided to consolidate these cases. In the case of Rose Tillman, who sadly passed away on May 22, 2012, her surviving children’s request for a medical malpractice claim was sent to the Louisiana Division of Administration (DOA) on May 22, 2013 after 5 pm, after the DOA office had closed. As a result, the  DOA’s filing system received the request on the following business day, May 23. In the case of Peighton Miller she received a shoulder injury on April 4, 2012 while in the care of a hospital. Again, a malpractice claim was sent to the DOA on April 4, 2013 after the DOA’s 5pm closure. The facts in these cases are undisputed, and at trial, the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson court ruled in favor of Tillman, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Peighton Miller.

In response, Tulane Lakeside Hospital and Durga Ram Sure (the plaintiffs) appealed the decision. Per  La. C.C. art. 3492, defendants have one year to file a malpractice claim and that is one-year prescription begins the day the injury was received. In addition, La. R.S. 9:5628 describes how actions against healthcare providers must commence within 1 year of the sustainment or the discovery of the injury. Moreover, Section 1231.8(a)(2)(b) of the Medical Malpractice Act states how the request for a malpractice review “shall be deemed filed on the date of receipt of the request stamped and certified by the division of administration.” On appeal, the plaintiffs insisted the statute was too vague because it was the DOA’s understanding that a malpractice claim has not been received until it had been “stamped and certified,” which happens during the business day meaning any documents received after 5pm have technically not been received by the DOA until the following business day. However, according to La. C.C. art. 12 when the words of a law are ambiguous or confusing, the words should be evaluated to fit the purpose of the law.

59-Email-04-02-19-picture-1024x683When you go to work each morning, the last thing you want to think about is: “What happens if I get hurt?” Unfortunately for many, workplace accidents are a real concern. The following case shows just how real, and complicated, workplace injuries can be.     

Carlos Cordon sustained multiple injuries while working one day for Parish Glass of St. Tammany (“Parish Glass”). He was at a warehouse loading mirrors into a truck when the mirrors fell on him, resulting in a broken leg, lacerations to his right arm, and aggravation of a preexisting neck injury. These injuries required multiple surgeries and resulted in permanent scarring.  After the accident, Cordon was required to take a drug test, which revealed prescription drugs and marijuana in his bloodstream. The Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) found, under La. R.S. 23:1081(13), that Cordon was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Due to the intoxication, the OWC decided that Cordon forfeited his rights to all workers compensation and medical benefits. Cordon then brought this case to court. The following case is on appeal from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, District 6.

At the first trial, Cordon was ordered to pay LUBA Insurance Company restitution of $140,491.71 for indemnity benefits and $145,536.99 for medical payments. After Cordon appealed, the court held that he still forfeited his rights to all workers compensation and medical benefits under La. R.S. 23:1081(1)(b); however, the court also found that Parish Glass was responsible for reasonable emergency medical care until his condition stabilized. After this finding, Parish Glass and LUBA agreed to pay $43,742.91 for Cordon’s emergency medical care. As Cordon’s total medical expenses were $145,536.99, he was required to reimburse LUBA the difference of $101,794.08. Cordon agreed to and signed this stipulation.

12-Photo-4_2_19-1024x683Ms. Sayre was a guest at the L’Auberge Casino Resort in Lake Charles when she tripped and fell while walking in front of the hotel restaurant. Based on the video footage of the accident, there were witnesses to the slip and fall; however, the hotel failed to document anything or take statements from any of the witnesses. Ms. Sayre reported a sticky substance on the floor, and subsequently suffered injuries to her knee, hand, neck, and abdomen. Later, Ms. Sayre learned she also had three fractured ribs and a full rotator cuff tear that would require surgery. So, what happens if you slip and fall in a restaurant?

Ms. Sayre filed a suit for negligence against the resort asserting that the clear, sticky substance caused her fall. She also stated that a restaurant employee told her three other people had fallen in the same spot. When Ms. Sayre attempted to find evidence of the accident, she couldn’t find any and never received an accident report from the resort. She later amended the petition asserting claims that the resort purposely failed to properly secure and preserve evidence to prevent people from bringing suit.

During trial, Ms. Sayre’s counsel requested that the court instruct the jury that failure to preserve evidence raises a presumption that the evidence would’ve been detrimental to the case absent a reasonable explanation. So, if the jury  finds that the defendant could have reasonably preserved the evidence and failed to do so without explanation, the jury can presume that the evidence wouldn’t favor the party. Ms. Sayre was informed by the court that they wouldn’t give the jury those instructions. Sayre’s counsel objected, the trial proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Ms. Sayre appealed the decision, claiming that the trial court erred by not giving the jury the instructions she requested.

45-Photo-4_2_19This case drives home the important reality that sometimes the justice system punishes innocent people, but also shows that in the end true justice can prevail.


Plaintiff-Appellee Darrin Hill was accused of being a rapist and kidnapper, but turned out to be a victim of the criminal justice system rather than a criminal needing justice, as DNA exonerated him nearly 20 years later. So, what can happen next after DNA exonerates you from a crime?


In the 1990s, a couple (names redacted for privacy) was assaulted. The boyfriend was forced off at gunpoint and the girlfriend brutally raped. With little evidence at the time, the police relied solely on an unknown notebook left in her car that included the name “Darrin Hill” and an address. While the address itself was unoccupied, police now know that the adjoining apartment was being rented out by the sister of who is now known to be the real rapist. The Detective had canvas the area around the apartment which included a car that matched the getaway car from the day of the crime, but did nothing with this information.

40-Email-4_2_19-photo-1024x576When you are injured or ill and need treatment, you turn to a hospital and put your trust in the doctors and healthcare providers at that hospital. Normally, healthcare providers are diligent and provide top-notch care, however, occasionally a hospital fails to live up to the trust given to them by the patient. When this occurs, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”) protects the patient. Nonetheless, there are cases in which it is disputed whether or not the incident falls under the MMA – for example is the failure to clean surgical instruments an incident of malpractice? The Supreme Court of Louisiana recently decided such a case from the Parish of East Baton Rouge and upheld that the MMA is a wide umbrella that covers various types of claims.

On April 14, 2014, Richard Dupuy went to the Spine Hospital of Louisiana for a spine surgery. Following the operation, Dupuy developed a post-operative infection called osteomyelitis caused by mycobacterium fortuitum. Dupuy and his wife allege that he received this infection because the hospital failed to sterilize or clean surgical instruments properly and thoroughly. As a result, Dupuy and his wife sued the hospital for Richard Dupuy’s medical expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of earnings capacity, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life. They also sued the hospital seeking damages for Mrs. Dupuy for she maintains a loss of society, support, and companionship.

The Hospital responded by filing an exception of prematurity (meaning the case had not evolved enough to need the court to step in) and asserting that the Dupuy’s have incorrectly gone about the situation. In support of this defense the hospital cites La. R.S. 40:1231.8 that states how Dupuy’s claims must first be presented to a medical review panel. Moreover, the hospital had the infectious disease specialist that treated Mr. Dupuy testify that she was unable to pinpoint specifically what caused the infection and she maintains there could have been many causes for the infection.

hospital-photo-1024x768The emergency room is supposed to provide lifesaving care, quickly, to those who need it the most. No one wants to wait around in the emergency room, especially when their life is in danger. Nonetheless, sometimes emergency rooms simply cannot operate as quickly as they should. In a lawsuit against Savoy Medical Center in Mamou, Mitch Benson challenged delays in critical care in emergency rooms answering the question: can you sue an emergency room for acting too slowly?

Mr. Benson was doing yardwork with his neighbor on October 21, 2017 when he began to suffer from chest pain. In response to his pain, Mr. Benson was then taken to the ER at Savoy Medical Center in Mamou. After arriving at 4:05pm, Mr. Benson was examined by Dr. Clifford Godfrey who confirmed that Mr. Benson had suffered a heart attack and as a result his right coronary artery was 100% blocked. At 5pm, Dr. Godfrey consulted the hospital’s interventional cardiologist, Dr. Charles Monier, who instructed Dr. Godfrey to go ahead and implement a thrombolytic agent that could possibly dissolve the clot. Dr. Monier was not an employee of Savoy Medical Center, but he was the director of Savoy’s catheterization laboratory. Dr. Monier also informed Dr. Godfrey that he would know within 20-25 minutes if the thrombolytic therapy was successful, however, if the therapy was not successful Dr. Godfrey would have to transfer Mr. Benson to a different hospital that had a cath lab open because Savoy’s was closed on the day of Mr. Benson’s procedure. Unfortunately, the thrombolytic therapy failed and at 7:02pm Savoy called Arcadian Ambulance to take Mr. Benson to the Heart Hospital of Louisiana where a cath procedure was successfully completed at 10:31pm that evening. Thankfully, Mr. Benson survived the heart attack. 

Following this incident, Mr. Benson filed suit against Savoy, Dr. Godfrey (as an employee of Savoy), and Dr. Monier. Once litigation began, Dr. Godfrey was shown to not have been employed by Savoy at the time. Moreover, Mr. Benson settled his claim against Savoy for less than $100,000 dismissing Savoy from the litigation. However, under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act Mr. Benson has the right to proceed litigation against the Louisiana Patient’s Fund Oversight Board (PCF) for damages. In this litigation, Mr. Benson asserted a claim against PCF damages in excess of $100,000 caused by Savoy’s negligence. 

When you are injured on the job, you expect for your medical expenses to be covered through worker’s compensation. However, when your employer denies your recommended medical treatment to recover from your injury, what do you do? First, you file a disputed claim for medical treatment form (Form 1009) with the Medical Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration. If that claim is denied administratively, then you are entitled to a hearing before a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). However, sometimes the process does not go as planned. For example, in this instance a Workers Compensation Judge ordered the defendants claim be paid but the employer appealed the WCJ’s decision.

Robert Friedman was an employee of Ecolab, Inc. when he injured his back on the job in October 2007. At first, his course of treatment was mild and done by a primary care physician, then a pain specialist. However, his symptoms persisted into 2011, when he was referred to an orthopedic surgeon. That surgeon first did a lumbar interbody fusion, which is a surgical procedure where a damaged disc is removed and replaced with bone graft material.  Symptoms persisted into 2013 when the orthopedic surgeon referred Friedman to a neurosurgeon, who ran additional tests. The neurosurgeon’s tests revealed loosened screws/hardware from the initial lumbar interbody fusion. Eventually, the neurosurgeon suggested a new lumbar interbody fusion that would both fix the initial procedure as well as provide additional support. EcoLab approved the portion that would fix the initial procedure but denied the portion that would provide additional support as they did not feel it was medically necessary. Friedman then filed a Form 1009 with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, which was denied due to insufficient clinical information. Friedman then re-filed his Form 1009 to get a hearing before a WCJ in Ouachita Parish, who granted Friedman to get his entire prescribed procedure, as well as legal fees covered once evidence was submitted. Ecolab appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.

Workers’ Compensation Claims are determined under guidelines in Title 40 of the Louisiana Administrative Code. At issue is whether the evidence supports that extended lumbar interbody fusion is medically necessary. Workers’ Compensation is supposed to cover the costs of medical treatment that is reasonably necessary for treating medical conditions caused by a workplace injury. See La. R.S. 23:1203. Medically necessary treatment is supposed to be that which is consistent with the diagnosis and treatment of a specific condition rather than solely based upon a patient’s preference. A claimant’s appeal of the Medical Director’s decision to a WCJ is based upon clear and convincing evidence, which means evidence has to be substantially more likely to be true than not true. 40 LA ADC Pt. I, §2715 sets the criteria about what evidence is necessary. As this procedure was a follow-up to his 2011 surgery, Friedman did not need to send inasmuch documentation.  For that reason, the Appeals Court determined that the Medical Director erred in their judgment and thus upheld the WCJ’s ruling in favor of Friedman, as well as awarded attorney fees.

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