arizona-asphalt-blur-2199293-1024x684Sometimes accidents at work happen. But what happens when an accident could have been prevented by an employee? It is a common question to wonder whether an employer is still liable for the actions of an employee, especially in cases where a defect may be open and obvious. A Louisiana delivery driver confronted this very situation after he was injured on a loading dock.

Saia Motor Freight employee Ethan Rose was delivering to Doerle Food Services, LLC, in December 2010. Because the delivery was so large, a temporary bridge made of a metal docking plate, which extended from the truck and across the gap in the floor from the truck and the warehouse floor, was required to move it off of Rose’s truck and into Doerle Food Services’ warehouse. On December 22, the makeshift bridge did not lie flat, but instead had a bump where the flap hinged. The conditions on the bridge were also muddy and wet. As Rose tried to move a pallet of delivery goods over the bump and hinge, he fell onto the ground, injuring his neck and back.

Rose brought a lawsuit for damages from his injury against Doerle Food Services and its insurance company, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, eleven months later. In 2015, Doerle Food Services and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Rose could not prove there was an “unreasonable risk of harm” on the loading dock bridge plate because the defect was open and obvious.

boy-elastic-rope-exercise-equipment-176794-683x1024Typically, the scary aspect of surgery is over when the procedure ends and the person wakes up from the anesthesia. The last thing most people expect is to get injured after the surgery is already over. Unfortunately for one Iberia Parish woman, her troubles were only beginning even though she had a successful surgery. That being said, can you claim medical malpractice while you are recovering?

Mrs. Rachel Broussard underwent a surgery replacing her left knee, and was subsequently to be transferred to Lafayette Rehab following the surgery. A Lafayette Rehab employee arrived in a company van to transport her from the hospital, and Mrs. Broussard was loaded into the van in her wheelchair by the employee. On the ride to the rehabilitation center, the driver suddenly braked to avoid a car wreck, whereon Mrs. Broussard allegedly fell out of the wheelchair and on the floor of the vehicle, causing severe pain.

After the incident, Mrs. Broussard filed a lawsuit for the damages of the injury, naming Lafayette Rehab as defendant. Further, her husband, Mr. Broussard, sought money from loss of consortium. Lafayette Rehab responded with a Dilatory Exception of Prematurity, arguing that the lawsuit was filed too soon. Lafayette Rehand contended that the Broussards’ allegations had to be reviewed by a Medical Review Panel before they could bring the lawsuit, because they fell under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act.

2-picture-5-30-2019When you go to the hospital, you expect to be taken care of by a qualified physician who properly diagnoses you. If that doesn’t happen, tragedy can strike. And if tragedy strikes, you want the responsible partie(s) to be held responsible by being liable for damages. But does the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) limit liability in these cases?

Tragedy struck for the Billeaudaus, whose daughter Brandi suffered a stroke and ultimately died.  When Brandi Billeaudau collapsed, her parents transported her to Opelousas General Hospital in Opelousas. There, the emergency room doctor, who lacked the required experience and training required by the hospital, improperly diagnosed Brandi with a focal motor seizure instead of a stroke. Her parents knew better and requested a transfer to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital (OLOL) in Lafayette, where she got the necessary treatment, but that was too little too late.

The Billeaudau’s brought a lawsuit against Opelousas General to hold them liable for giving credentials to the doctor. They contended that since granting credentials is an administrative rather than a medical decision, it should not be subject to the limits set in the MMA. In order to determine whether the wrong in this case was medical (and subject to limits in the MMA) or administrative (and not subject to the MMA), the court analyzed:

abandoned-abandoned-building-architecture-1687067-819x1024State of Emergency conditions and evacuations seem to have become increasingly more common in this state over the years. Floods, hurricanes, and other extreme weather conditions can force a whole neighborhood to relocate for a few weeks. At times the evacuation protocols remain voluntary, meaning you may stay in your home at your own risk. Residents choose to weather the storm for a number of reasons, be it to avoid an expensive relocation or to protect their property from looters. Whatever the reason you stay behind, be aware that a State of Emergency prompts law enforcement to be more vigilant in their safety patrols.

One late night Neil Rabeaux was walking down the side of the road in Butte La Rose when he was stopped by police officers. There was a State of Emergency in effect at the time, and many residents had voluntarily evacuated the town due to a looming flood warning. While speaking with Rabeaux, officers noted Rabeaux appeared intoxicated and that his waistband contained a handgun. A radio call to dispatch erroneously indicated Rabeaux had multiple felony convictions on his record. They arrested Rabeaux for Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and Illegal Carrying of a Firearm. Officers later discovered Rabeaux did not have a record, and dropped all charges. Rabeaux then filed a lawsuit against the two officers for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.

The officers filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (“the Act”). They asserted that since there was a State of Emergency at the time, their actions were immune from suit. The Trial Court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. Rabeaux appealed.

couple-investment-key-1288482-1024x684Carrying a great deal of debt is a liability, and it may lead to some disastrous consequences. In the event of a default, your creditors can take you to court to recover the amount owed. If a judgment is made against you, your finances come under a microscope. Large transfers of money or property are strictly monitored and may even be reversed if your creditor feels the loss of the property may lead you to become more insolvent. So, what do you do when you have a large debt but need to transfer property? You need a good lawyer to navigate high debt situations, and to help you decide whether bankruptcy is the best way to avoid misfortune.

In the case of River Parish Financial Services, LLC v. London and B.W. Gill, River Parish won a money judgment against London Gill for a past due debt. River Parish was displeased to learn that London had gifted some of her property to B.W. Gill. Consequently, River Parish filed a revocatory action. The “revocatory action” entitles a creditor to annul a gift made by a debtor, if that creditor believes making that gift increases the debtor’s insolvency. See La. Civ. Code art. 2036. B.W. Gill claimed the action was barred by preemption. This simply means the period in which to contest the gift had lapsed. The gift was made in 2005, and River Parish did not file its action until late 2011. The trial court agreed, dismissing the action. River Parish appealed, arguing the prescriptive period should not have begun until the gift was recorded, and here the gift was not recorded in the public record until September of 2010.

On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal had to determine whether River Parish’s claim was indeed time-barred or not. The court looked at La. Civ. Code art. 2041, which states that the creditor must take action within one year of learning of the transaction, but no more than three years from the time of the transaction. River Parish’s argument was that the prescriptive period should begin running on the date the transfer was recorded, rather than the date it actually occurred.

animal-brown-horse-6468-1024x683Horses are majestic animals but can be dangerous depending on the nature of the activities they are performing. The Equine Immunity Statute provides certain immunities to equine sponsors that own with horses that engage in certain equine activities. See La. R.S. 9:2795:3. “Participants” in equine activities cannot sue equine sponsors but mere “spectators” can, with limited exceptions. While the Equine Immunity Statute gives broad protections, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that a horse bite accident should proceed to a jury trial and not be settled as a matter of law by a trial judge. So, what are your legal steps after being bit by a horse in Louisiana?

The plaintiff visited the defendant’s facility and inquired about feeding and visiting the defendant’s horses. The defendant owned several horses and provided educational opportunities to New Orleans residents who were interested in learning and interacting with horses. The defendant also provided boarding services for outside horse owners. On September 23, 2013, a few days after her first visit, plaintiff returned with carrots to feed the defendant’s horses. While the main office was closed that day, she encountered two outside horse owners who told her that a “pony” had been known to have bitten a child recently. Plaintiff went to the boarding area and fed three of the defendant’s horses. While she was feeding the third horse, she was bit on her hand.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding that the defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The court held that the trial court applied an overly broad definition and interpretation of “participant.” Determining whether someone qualified as a participant must be done by a jury, or trier of fact. Statutes that provide immunity must be strictly construed against the party claiming said immunity. See Medine v. Geico Gen. Ins. Inc., 748 So.2d 532, 535 (La. App. Ct. 1999).

apartment-architectural-design-architecture-1693946-1024x736Lease agreements are important documents that specify the rights and obligations of both lessor and lessee. Specifically, termination of leases must follow specified procedures and the tenant must be given adequate notice before leases can be terminated. That being said, does a letter from the lessor to the lessee constitute proper notice for termination of a lease? The Fourth District Court of Appeals of Louisiana recently held that a tenant was not given proper notice for termination of his lease and therefore, the termination was not valid.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Kenneth Lobell, plaintiff, suffered extensive damage to property that he leased from Cathy Rosenberg and 2025 Canal St., L.L.C. On December 28, 2007, Rosenberg sent a letter to Lobell stating that he had defaulted on certain lease payments for a three-story building located on 2025 Canal Street. Rosenberg subsequently sent letters on January 31, 2007 and February 12, 2008 regarding these defaulted payments. The letters also stated her desire to terminate the lease. After a bench trial, the trial court judge held that there was a proper termination of the lease and Mr. Lobell owed certain costs and back payments to Rosenberg and 2025 Canal St., L.L.C.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals of Louisiana disagreed with the trial court and held that the lease was not properly terminated. Because leases are contracts between lessor and lessee, they afford certain rights and obligations to each party. See La. C.C. 2668. Lessees must pay rents for the property according to the terms of the lease agreement, among other obligations. See La. C.C. 2683. When a lessee does not pay rent, a lessor has two options: 1) obtain a money judgment based on the amount owed or 2) cancel the lease. See Richard v. Broussard 495 So.2d 1291, 1293 (La. 1986). To terminate a lease, the lessor must follow specific eviction procedures. These procedures include giving a five-day notice to vacate, followed by judicial procedures to effectuate an eviction. See La. C.C.P. art. 4701; see also La. C.C.P. 4731; see also La. C.C.P. 4733.

59-032619-photoEvery business which opens its doors to the public owes a duty of care to their patrons, a duty to make sure the patron is safe and free from harm. Often, this is as simple as keeping walkways clear and ensuring spills and other hazards are cleaned up in a timely fashion. But what most businesses have never contemplated is a possibility that the duty of care would be owed to something other than a real, live, breathing person. Could the persons to which a merchant owes a duty of care include “juridical” personhood, such as a corporation or a limited liability company (L.L.C.)? In this instance, the answer was, “no.”

In April of 2013, Deborah Norred slipped and fell in the bathroom of the New Orleans Hamburger and Seafood restaurant on South Clearview Parkway in Jefferson Parish. She filed a lawsuit against the restaurant for negligence. Mrs. Norred was also the only member of American Rebel Arms, an L.L.C. on the verge of opening a firearms store in Holden. American Rebel Arms also filed a lawsuit against New Orleans Hamburger and Seafood for Mrs. Norred’s injury, claiming the injuries postponed the opening of the store, causing economic losses.

The restaurant argued that it had no duty of care to American Rebel Arms. It moved for a peremptory exception for no cause of action. A “peremptory exception” is a court motion which requests the court dismiss the lawsuit. Filing a peremptory exception for no cause of action means that there is no valid claim for which the plaintiff can demand relief. In short, the Defendant did nothing wrong, or at least nothing actionable under law. The Trial Court granted the exception, and American Rebel Arms appealed.

33-032619-photoTrials are decided solely upon the evidence presented. A judge cannot read a book on the subject, or do extraneous research on the internet, to aid her decision-making process. In this case, the Defendant claimed that the judge did just that, by calling a city official to confirm some data. The appellate court thought otherwise. So, what do you do when you feel as if the Judge made a decision unfairly?

Plaintiff Vicke Mosley was driving down Mansfield Road in Shreveport when she was struck by Jacob Griffin’s vehicle at the intersection of Valley View. The crash rendered Mosley unconscious and he had to be hospitalized for three days. Mosley claimed Griffin ran the red light, while Griffin claims the light had turned green as he entered the intersection. Mosley filed a lawsuit against Griffin and his insurer.

Witness accounts depicted Mosley entering the intersection on a yellow light, and Griffin edging out into the intersection before his light turned green. Mosley’s attorney also entered a traffic signal inventory (“TSI”) into evidence, which logged the amount of time traffic signals stay certain colors. The only problem with the TSI was that it was from 2011, nearly 3 years before the accident. The Trial Court notified the attorneys for both parties that it would contact the city to confirm the TSI’s veracity. The plaintiff’s counsel was vocal in his support of this action, while defense counsel said nothing.

34-Email-3-13-19-1024x683In the Parish of Plaquemines in Louisiana, the oyster business can be quite profitable. Anywhere in the state, land can be a method of maintaining a person’s livelihood, whether it be through oil, tourism, or even an oyster lease. When a person with valuable land passes away, especially if that person is your relative, you may be curious as to how the death will affect claims to the land and its profits. One family found out when the courts were forced to interpret the law of community property as it relates to oyster leases.

Sometime in the 1960s, Antoinette Bernice Cognevich Barrois (“Bernice”) and her husband, Mancil Barrois (“Mancil”) executed oyster leases. Mancil died in 1975 and left Bernice all of his property in his will. Because Mancil had children outside of the marriage, some children could benefit from Mancil’s estate with no claim to Bernice’s estate. Bernice maintained the oyster leases, including renewing them, for six years after Mancil’s death. When Bernice died in 1981, the administrators of her estate continued to maintain and renew the oyster leases. Neither Mancil’s nor Bernice’s estates were ever closed after their deaths, and in 2014, the administrator of Bernice’s estate, Helen, received a damage award from the 2010 BP oil spill as it damaged the oyster lease property. Mancil’s estate then filed motions seeking to declare the oyster leases as community property and seeking some of the award money pursuant to this decision. Although there were multiple procedural complications with this case, the only issue the Appellate Court was concerned with was whether or not the oyster leases obtained during the marriage of Mancil and Bernice are community property under Louisiana law.

Generally, property acquired during the existence of a legal marriage is considered community property, unless there are special circumstances that make the property separate property belonging to only one spouse. La. C.C. art 2338. This includes any “natural and civil fruits” of all community property. The spouse arguing against community property requirements does have the ability to rebut this presumption. La. C.C. art. 2340. Crucial here is also the Louisiana statute barring a renewal or extension of existing oyster leases to be considered “‘new” leases. La. R.S. 56:426.

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