35-753x1024What does the common phrase “you got served” mean? You may have heard it in movies, or read it in books, and it is usually associated with the situation where someone shows up to a person’s house to hand them papers that give legal notice of a hearing. In fact, the United States Constitution requires proper service in order to guarantee fair due process. In the case of Brian Lewis versus the Baton Rouge General Medical Center (“BRGMC”), the notice procedure was complicated by the fact that Mr. Lewis failed to provide his current physical address. Mr. Lewis decided to bring a lawsuit pro se, which means that he represented himself instead of hiring an attorney. This is generally inadvisable, as Mr. Lewis proved, because it can result in not following the correct protocols, such as including his physical address

Mr. Lewis filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against BRGMC, alleging a number of claims including physician negligence and not proving him with proper medical care after blood was found in his urine. In the lawsuit, Mr. Lewis provided his P.O. box to BRGMC instead of his physical address, causing him to not be properly notified.  In the initial hearing at the 19th Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the trial court dismissed Mr. Lewis’ claims because he had failed to provide a valid address to receive notice. The official language the court used was that the malpractice lawsuit was dismissed due to “a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action,” which is a complicated way of saying that Mr. Lewis failed to provide a valid physical address. From this judgement Mr. Lewis appealed.

On appeal to the State of Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, Mr. Lewis did not state any errors from the District Court ruling, but due to his pro se status, the Court used its discretion from Putman v. Quality Distribution, Inc., 77 So.3d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 2011) to determine if the dismissal was valid. La. C.C.P. article 891(A) requires a petitioner to file a claim with a valid physical address and not a P.O. box. Service is typically made by a sheriff at a person’s physical address, but if a plaintiff fails to provide a physical address, then service could be made either via registered or certified mail under La. C.C.P. art. 1313(C), or to the plaintiffs last known address under La. C.C.P. art. 1571(B). Further, for plaintiffs who bring suit pro se, La. C.C.P. art. 1314(A)(2)(a) allows for service to the clerk of court instead of directly to the plaintiffs address. The Court noted that the purpose of the provisions under 1313 and 1314 is to allow for full constitutional due process notice to take place. Adair Asset Management, LLC/US Bank v. Honey Bear Lodge, Inc., 138 So.3d. 6, 11 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

56Sometimes, a single witness can make the difference between winning and losing at trial. This is especially so when you are fighting for reasonable medical compensation. Since insurance companies generally try to give patients the least amount of money as possible, they look for all sorts of ways to do so. One way is to prevent a patient’s physician from testifying and giving an opinion of what he or she believes is causing the patient’s current pain. In the following case, the defendant attempted to do just this, but fortunately for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal found error in the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff’s physician. 

Jasmine Jones and Keith Morgan were in opposite lanes of travel waiting for the traffic light to turn green. Morgan was driving a pickup truck while Jones was driving a compact car. When the light turned green, Jones headed straight, but Morgan made a turn and collided with Jones. Morgan struck Jones’s front tire, but Jones’s vehicle suffered only minor damage. However, Jones felt pain in her back and went to the Rapides Regional Hospital later that day. Dr. Gerald LaGlue, Jones’s initial physician, was unsuccessful in relieving Jones’s pain, and so he referred Jones to Dr. George Williams. Dr. Williams then referred Jones to Dr. Melanie Firmin who performed an epidural steroid spinal injection, which only increased Jones’s pain. 

After examining Jones further, Dr. Williams opined that the cause of her pain was radiculopathy, which likely originated from her car accident. However, Dr. Williams never actually performed a diagnostic test to determine if Jones’s pain was caused by radiculopathy. However, he was prevented from testifying about his opinion of Jones’s pain because the defendants succeeded in their Daubert motion, which essentially asks the court to exclude expert witness testimony because it is not reliable. As a result, Jones did not succeed in obtaining as much compensation as she desired because Dr. Williams was not able to testify. 

55For some people, getting fired from work is like receiving the death sentence.  In the following case, an employee was fired without any reason by his employer. The employer also tried to shortchange him by not giving him his earned wages. However, the employer fought back and, more or less, was vindicated under Louisiana law.

Ralph J. Hanks worked at Louisiana Companies as an insurance producer for more than two decades. However, on November 10, 2009, his employer terminated him without any explanation. As part of his termination, he was given a Separation Agreement (“Agreement”) to sign, which stated that Louisiana Companies would pay the wages he had thus far earned. The Agreement also stated that Hanks would sell his Louisiana Companies stocks to Louisiana Companies. Furthermore, Hanks would agree not to sue Louisiana Companies or solicit current Louisiana Companies employees. If Hanks were to sue or solicit customers, then Louisiana Companies stated that it would not pay the wages he had earned.

Hanks signed the Agreement on December 1, 2009. In February 2010, Hanks began working for another employer, First Federal. First Federal shared that it had hired Hanks through a local billboard and newspapers. As a result, some of Louisiana Companies’ customers moved to First Federal for their business. Soon after, Louisiana Companies notified Hanks that he had violated the Agreement and stated that it would not pay his earned wages. Hanks sued Louisiana Companies. The district court found that Louisiana Companies’ Separation Agreement was null and void because Louisiana Companies, by making Hanks sign the Agreement, violated Louisiana’s wage payment statute. Louisiana Companies appealed. 

54Slip and falls are one of the most common accidents in the United States.  Though some slip and falls may only lead to a sense of embarrassment, others can lead to permanent and serious damage to the body. Thus, it makes sense that an establishment owner should ensure that his or her establishment is safe. However, it is also important that people who visit an establishment should be responsible and not behave recklessly. In order to achieve this through law, Louisiana has an “open and obvious” doctrine, which states that an establishment is not responsible for people who were injured due to an open and obvious defect at the establishment. 

While out for some exercise at the Acadiana Mall in Lafayette, Wilson Trahan slipped and fell on a sidewalk, fracturing his right fibula. Trahan apparently slipped on a buildup of algae while trying to avoid a surface of water on the sidewalk. Trahan sued Acadiana Mall, but the district court dismissed his lawsuit. Trahan appealed, and the Court of Appeal ordered the district court to retake Trahan’s case for further proceedings. However, the district court ruled in favor of Acadiana Mall, holding that the algae buildup was open and obvious and that Trahan did not have a legitimate claim. Trahan appealed once more to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing that the district court erred in using the open and obvious doctrine to rule in favor of Acadiana Mall. 

Under Louisiana law, an owner or custodian is responsible for a thing under his or her control and that an owner or custodian is responsible for any damage that the thing causes due to the negligence of the owner or custodian. La. C.C. art. 2317.1. For a plaintiff to successfully prove their claim, he or she must show: (1) that the defendant owned the thing that caused the damage; (2) that the thing had a defect and presented an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the defendant should have known about the defect; (4) that the defect could have been prevented if the defendant had taken reasonable care; and (5) that the defendant did not take reasonable care. Riggs v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Trust Auth., 997 So.2d 814 (La. App. Ct. 2008). However, if the defect is open and obvious, there is not an unreasonable risk of harm. Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So.3d 175 (La. 2013)

58-Email-6-24-19--1024x681Lawsuits are typically thought of as only between two parties.  Frequently however, a lawsuit will involve multiple parties, such as with automobile accidents.  In these cases, it is common to assume that a large number of those involved are insurance companies.  The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal recently grappled with these multiparty lawsuits in a recent auto accident lawsuit out of Sulphur.   

In September of 2013, Amanda Douga was driving her car in Sulphur, Louisiana when she was rear-ended by Teenishia Powell.  Ms. Powell was driving a loaner vehicle while her personal vehicle was repaired by All Star Dealership (“All Star”). Ms. Douga sustained physical injuries from the accident and filed a lawsuit against Ms. Powell, her insurance company Progressive, as well as All Star and its insurance company Tower National.  Progressive admitted to providing Ms. Powell with the statutorily required minimums for liability coverage. Tower National and All Star denied that Ms. Powell was covered by Tower National’s policy and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu agreed with All Star and Tower National and granted the motion thus dismissing them from the case.  All remaining parties appealed.   

Tower National’s coverage denial centered on their definition and interpretation of who could be an insured party under the contract.   Tower National argued that the policy expressly excepted customers from the definition of an “insured” unless the customer did not have insurance or if their insurance did not meet the minimum legal requirements. The policy also provided however that exclusions did not apply when a vehicle was rented to a customer while their personal vehicle at the dealer for repair.   The appealing parties all agreed the policy was ambiguous on who exactly could be counted among the insureds.  

62-Email-06-24-19-picture-1024x768Running a small business is a challenging endeavor that can prove even more difficult if someone publishes false information about your company.  This is situation is exactly what happened to husband and wife Robbie and Susan Arnaud, owners of Robbie’s Wrecker Service, a towing business located just outside Eunice, Louisiana.

In fall 2010, Ronald Dies was elected Police Chief for City of Eunice, effective January 1, 2011.  Eunice Police Department’s rotation list for situations needing a wrecker service had previously included Robbie’s Wrecker Service. However, after being elected, Dies took action to remove Robbie’s Wrecker Service from the list. In a letter dated December 31, 2010, Dies told the Arnauds that their business would be removed from the list effective January 1, 2011, and that only wrecker services headquartered inside Eunice City limits could be on the list. On January 3, 2011, Dies spoke with a reporter for a local newspaper, The Eunice News, and stated that there had been numerous complaints about the company’s selective response to calls. This claim of “numerous complaints” formed the basis of Arnauds’ defamation claim. 

The required elements in a defamation claim are (1) a false and defamatory statement involving another, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault (at least at the level of negligence) of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury. See Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129 (La. 2004).  At trial, the court held that the Arnauds had not proven either defamation or damages and dismissed all of the Arnauds’ claims against Dies. The Arnauds appealed.

49-Email-06-24-19-pictureUPDATE:

The following case is no longer good law. For the current law on this matter see, https://www.insurancedisputelawyerblog.com/ choice-in-pharmacy-for-a-work-related-injury-belongs-to-the-employer

If you suffer an injury on the job, you will likely face a mess of medical bills. The last thing you want to think about is how you are going to pay for the expenses, including prescription medications. Although navigating the Louisiana workers’ compensation system can prove challenging and frustrating, it is essential that you understand its nuances in order to ensure you are reimbursed for your expenses. 

40-Email-06-24-19-pictureDetermining liability in any car accident is frequently a challenging endeavor. This is especially true if one of the vehicles is owned by a city, but a state employee was driving the vehicle. In one such case involving the City of DeRidder, Louisiana, numerous questions arose about who was the liable party after a car accident resulted in multiple injuries. 

Joseph Tatney was an inmate at the Vernon Parish Detention Center. Tatney was being transported as part of an Interagency Agreement between the State of Louisiana and the City of DeRidder, which required the City of DeRidder to provide vehicles to transport inmates to sites for labor. During this trip, Tatney injured his back and neck when the transportation van got into an automobile accident. The van was owned by the City of DeRidder and driven by a Louisiana state employee. 

Tatney first filed a lawsuit against the City of DeRidder, the sheriff of the Vernon Parish Detention Center, and the state employee driving the van at the time of the accident. He subsequently added the State of Louisiana into his claim. The City of DeRidder filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the terms of the agreement, the state was liable for its employees’ negligent acts. Neither the state or Tatney opposed the motion for summary judgment. Thus, the trial court granted the motion. 

nrd-D6Tu_L3chLE-unsplash-1024x768Going to the grocery store is a frequent occurrence for most of us. However, most people are probably not aware of when a grocery store can be held liable for selling unsuitable products. 

On February 15, 2013, Elton Simmons purchased a package of fruit cups from Brookshire Grocery, a Shreveport grocery store. That night Simmons ate a fruit cup, and woke up the next morning with stomach pain. At this point he ate another one to “settle his stomach.” At around 7:00 a.m. Simmons opened the rest of the fruit cups and noticed they had mold growing inside of them.

In the initial trial, Simmons alleged negligence for “(a) selling products that were unfit to eat, (b) not ensuring that all products were fit for their purpose, (c) not preventing the sale of dangerous products, and (d) other acts of negligence.”

martha-dominguez-de-gouveia-nMyM7fxpokE-unsplash-1024x697Navigating any lawsuit can be challenging, especially when the initial trial gives rise to complicated appeals. In this instance, the plaintiff was left wondering how jury instruction impacted her medical malpractice lawsuit. 

Mrs. Sherry Wedgeworth filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Tynes Mixon, an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) physician. Mrs. Wedgeworth start seeing Dr. Mixon in 2006 for recurring sinus infections. Dr. Mixon performed sinus surgery in 2009 and then a revision sinus surgery three years later in 2012. After this surgery, a pathologist examined the tissue that was removed and found a fragment of brain tissue. Dr. Mixon immediately advised Mrs. Wedgeworth and advised her to go to the hospital for a C.T. scan because of the risk for infection. Mrs. Wedgeworth declined this advice, but went to see Dr. Mixon the next day, where she again turned down hospital admission and a C.T. scan. Three days later, she was hospitalized, and another three days later she began to show symptoms of a brain infection. Mrs. Wedgeworth and her husband, Mr. Wedgeworth, then filed a malpractice claim.

The initial medical review panel held for Dr. Mixon. The Wedgeworths then petitioned for damages, claiming loss of consortium, services, and society. A civil jury ruled in favor of Dr. Mixon, dismissing all claims. The Wedgeworths filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or Alternatively New Trial. The trial court denied these motions, and the Wedgeworths appealed. The issues for the appellate court were whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that negligence equals malpractice and by improperly denying a new trial. 

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