73-Email-06-24-19-PHOTO-1024x685Cyclists must follow the rules of the road, not only for their own safety, but also because if an accident occurs the cyclist’s rule breaking could affect recovery. When a car hits a cyclist, the injured party can sue for negligence and recover damages as long as the other party was at fault. Outside of New Orleans, at the intersection of Jefferson Highway and North Causeway Boulevard, one cyclist failed to recover damages because he did not follow cycling rules.

 On September 24, 2012, Felix Palmisano was biking west on Jefferson Highway at 9:45 PM. At that time, Walter J. Ohler was driving a truck south on Causeway Boulevard. At the intersection of these two roads, Jefferson Highway is six lanes wide while Causeway Boulevard merges into one lane. As Mr. Ohler approached the southbound redlight, the signal turned green so Mr. Ohler coasted through the intersection. Mr. Palmisano saw the oncoming truck, but thought he could cross one lane before the truck could cross six. His intuition was wrong, and he was hit, suffering injuries. 

 On September 20, 2013, Mr. Palmisano sued Mr. Ohler in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court Parish of Jefferson, arguing that Mr. Ohler was at fault for causing the accident. The District Court ruled that Mr. Palmisano failed to prove this fault by the required “preponderance of the evidence,” which means there is a greater than 50% chance of it being true. Mr. Palmisano then appealed this decision to The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, which focused on the fault and obligations of both the driver and the cyclist.

36-Email-06-24-19-PHOTO-1024x569Terms of Sale commonly include an “escape clause,” which gives the buyer a way out of a contract if unplanned circumstances arise. It is often a lawyer’s obligation to ensure that this clause is present in a contract, because if the lawyer fails to include one, this could result in malpractice.  However, in order to receive recovery from the malpractice, the aggrieved party must promptly bring a lawsuit. The Longs family of Long’s Preferred Products, Inc. in Alexandria, LA, learned this the hard way when they sued their lawyer in the Ninth Judicial District Court Parish of Rapides for not including an escape clause in a stock purchase.

 Charles Elliot represented the Longs in a stock purchase of $500,000 worth of shares from Linda Minton. On March 28, 2011, both parties agreed to the Terms of Sale and on April 29, 2011, the Longs signed the $500,000 promissory note that promised payment to Linda Minton. The Longs relied on receiving loan approval in order to pay on this note, but on August 11, 2011, the Longs’ loan was denied. Twelve days later, they discovered that they were sued to enforce the promissory note. The Longs hoped that an escape clause in the Terms of Sale would relieve them from the duty to pay; however, their lawyer, Elliot, failed to include one.

 In May 2013, the Longs spoke with a different lawyer, and on April 28th, 2014, the Longs sued Elliot for malpractice in the Ninth Judicial District Court. The District Court ruled that this lawsuit was perempted, which means that the Longs lost their right to bring a lawsuit.

61-1024x683Insurance plans and policies are often riddled with complicated jargon and loopholes to protect insurance companies from financial loss. These confusing insurance provisions can lead an individual to think he/she is covered in case of an accident, but many times leaves individuals unprotected. In one recent Louisiana lawsuit, a consumer’s expectations of coverage are shattered by the complexity of insurance provisions.

 Cynthia Bennett was driving a vehicle that she borrowed from Service Chevrolet Cadillac (Service Chevrolet) in Lafayette, Louisiana when she was in a car accident with Samantha Brown. The vehicle Ms. Bennett was driving was a “covered auto” under a “garage policy” issued by Tower National Insurance Company (Tower) to Service Chevrolet. Samantha Brown had an auto liability policy issued under USAA and Cynthia Bennett had a personal automobile policy with Allstate that provided uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. Ms. Bennett was able to settle with USAA and Allstate but continued to pursue Tower National Insurance Company for the remainder of damages under her UM coverage provisions in Tower’s “garage policy.”

 Tower filed a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when evidence shows that there is “no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). Tower argued that Ms. Bennett was not considered an “insured” under the liability portion of the policy because she had her own policy with Allstate, which showed that there was no genuine issue to material fact. Because Ms. Bennett had her own coverage under Allstate, she was not protected under Tower’s policy as an uninsured motorist. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and Ms. Bennett appealed that decision.

68-1024x683Timing and deadlines are important aspects of the judicial system. However, these specific guidelines are not familiar to most non-lawyers, which underscores the importance of having an excellent attorney represent you. The lack of an attorney can immediately put an individual at a disadvantage, as it did in one New Orleans woman’s case.

 Ms. Scott decided to represent herself in her case against Kindred Hospital New Orleans (Kindred). She alleged that Kindred Hospital violated the standard of care she should have been afforded by allowing a hospital employee to sexually batter her while she was a patient there from May 16 to July 31, 2013. Additionally, she argued that the hospital failed to properly investigate the sexual battery.

 Ms. Scott first brought the lawsuit against Kindred on May 5, 2014. Kindred argued that the claim must be submitted to a medical review panel since it was a medical negligence case.  Kindred also filed an exception of prematurity to the trial court. The trial judge granted the exception of prematurity and dismissed the case.

39-1024x683Car accidents are unpredictable. Typically when you get in your car and drive, you do not think you are going to be involved in a life-changing automobile accident.  For one Louisiana woman, a car accident got even more complicated when she was hit in a rental car by another rental car.

Crystal Stephens was awarded $12,000 in general damages and $5,500 in medical expenses from a 2005 automobile accident at the intersection of North and Trudeau Streets in Natchitoches, Louisiana.  In the accident, Mary J. King backed her vehicle into Ms. Stephens, causing damages to Ms. Stephens’ vehicle as well as her person. Both drivers were in rental cars, and Safeway Insurance Company was the insurance provider for her uninsured/ underinsured motorists coverage. Stephens claimed at the trial court that Ms. King was an uninsured motorist, which meant that her insurance with Safeway should cover the damages to the vehicle as well as the injuries that were incurred. During the accident, Ms. King’s rental car was from Avis, and Ms. Stephens settled a related claim with Avis for $10,000.

At trial, a plaintiff is required to prove in evidence that the defending party did not have insurance. La. C E. art. 801. Evidence presented cannot be that of hearsay, which is evidence either stated by a witness as having been heard from another person besides the witness, or from a document that depicts events that are not witnessed at the trial itself.  In Ms. Stephens’ trial however, she was granted an exception to the hearsay rule, meaning that it was declared to be admissible as evidence, because the affidavit stating Ms. King was uninsured was said to be a “normally kept” business record under La. C. E. art. 803(6)

35-753x1024What does the common phrase “you got served” mean? You may have heard it in movies, or read it in books, and it is usually associated with the situation where someone shows up to a person’s house to hand them papers that give legal notice of a hearing. In fact, the United States Constitution requires proper service in order to guarantee fair due process. In the case of Brian Lewis versus the Baton Rouge General Medical Center (“BRGMC”), the notice procedure was complicated by the fact that Mr. Lewis failed to provide his current physical address. Mr. Lewis decided to bring a lawsuit pro se, which means that he represented himself instead of hiring an attorney. This is generally inadvisable, as Mr. Lewis proved, because it can result in not following the correct protocols, such as including his physical address

Mr. Lewis filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against BRGMC, alleging a number of claims including physician negligence and not proving him with proper medical care after blood was found in his urine. In the lawsuit, Mr. Lewis provided his P.O. box to BRGMC instead of his physical address, causing him to not be properly notified.  In the initial hearing at the 19th Judicial District Court of Louisiana, the trial court dismissed Mr. Lewis’ claims because he had failed to provide a valid address to receive notice. The official language the court used was that the malpractice lawsuit was dismissed due to “a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action,” which is a complicated way of saying that Mr. Lewis failed to provide a valid physical address. From this judgement Mr. Lewis appealed.

On appeal to the State of Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, Mr. Lewis did not state any errors from the District Court ruling, but due to his pro se status, the Court used its discretion from Putman v. Quality Distribution, Inc., 77 So.3d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 2011) to determine if the dismissal was valid. La. C.C.P. article 891(A) requires a petitioner to file a claim with a valid physical address and not a P.O. box. Service is typically made by a sheriff at a person’s physical address, but if a plaintiff fails to provide a physical address, then service could be made either via registered or certified mail under La. C.C.P. art. 1313(C), or to the plaintiffs last known address under La. C.C.P. art. 1571(B). Further, for plaintiffs who bring suit pro se, La. C.C.P. art. 1314(A)(2)(a) allows for service to the clerk of court instead of directly to the plaintiffs address. The Court noted that the purpose of the provisions under 1313 and 1314 is to allow for full constitutional due process notice to take place. Adair Asset Management, LLC/US Bank v. Honey Bear Lodge, Inc., 138 So.3d. 6, 11 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

56Sometimes, a single witness can make the difference between winning and losing at trial. This is especially so when you are fighting for reasonable medical compensation. Since insurance companies generally try to give patients the least amount of money as possible, they look for all sorts of ways to do so. One way is to prevent a patient’s physician from testifying and giving an opinion of what he or she believes is causing the patient’s current pain. In the following case, the defendant attempted to do just this, but fortunately for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal found error in the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff’s physician. 

Jasmine Jones and Keith Morgan were in opposite lanes of travel waiting for the traffic light to turn green. Morgan was driving a pickup truck while Jones was driving a compact car. When the light turned green, Jones headed straight, but Morgan made a turn and collided with Jones. Morgan struck Jones’s front tire, but Jones’s vehicle suffered only minor damage. However, Jones felt pain in her back and went to the Rapides Regional Hospital later that day. Dr. Gerald LaGlue, Jones’s initial physician, was unsuccessful in relieving Jones’s pain, and so he referred Jones to Dr. George Williams. Dr. Williams then referred Jones to Dr. Melanie Firmin who performed an epidural steroid spinal injection, which only increased Jones’s pain. 

After examining Jones further, Dr. Williams opined that the cause of her pain was radiculopathy, which likely originated from her car accident. However, Dr. Williams never actually performed a diagnostic test to determine if Jones’s pain was caused by radiculopathy. However, he was prevented from testifying about his opinion of Jones’s pain because the defendants succeeded in their Daubert motion, which essentially asks the court to exclude expert witness testimony because it is not reliable. As a result, Jones did not succeed in obtaining as much compensation as she desired because Dr. Williams was not able to testify. 

55For some people, getting fired from work is like receiving the death sentence.  In the following case, an employee was fired without any reason by his employer. The employer also tried to shortchange him by not giving him his earned wages. However, the employer fought back and, more or less, was vindicated under Louisiana law.

Ralph J. Hanks worked at Louisiana Companies as an insurance producer for more than two decades. However, on November 10, 2009, his employer terminated him without any explanation. As part of his termination, he was given a Separation Agreement (“Agreement”) to sign, which stated that Louisiana Companies would pay the wages he had thus far earned. The Agreement also stated that Hanks would sell his Louisiana Companies stocks to Louisiana Companies. Furthermore, Hanks would agree not to sue Louisiana Companies or solicit current Louisiana Companies employees. If Hanks were to sue or solicit customers, then Louisiana Companies stated that it would not pay the wages he had earned.

Hanks signed the Agreement on December 1, 2009. In February 2010, Hanks began working for another employer, First Federal. First Federal shared that it had hired Hanks through a local billboard and newspapers. As a result, some of Louisiana Companies’ customers moved to First Federal for their business. Soon after, Louisiana Companies notified Hanks that he had violated the Agreement and stated that it would not pay his earned wages. Hanks sued Louisiana Companies. The district court found that Louisiana Companies’ Separation Agreement was null and void because Louisiana Companies, by making Hanks sign the Agreement, violated Louisiana’s wage payment statute. Louisiana Companies appealed. 

54Slip and falls are one of the most common accidents in the United States.  Though some slip and falls may only lead to a sense of embarrassment, others can lead to permanent and serious damage to the body. Thus, it makes sense that an establishment owner should ensure that his or her establishment is safe. However, it is also important that people who visit an establishment should be responsible and not behave recklessly. In order to achieve this through law, Louisiana has an “open and obvious” doctrine, which states that an establishment is not responsible for people who were injured due to an open and obvious defect at the establishment. 

While out for some exercise at the Acadiana Mall in Lafayette, Wilson Trahan slipped and fell on a sidewalk, fracturing his right fibula. Trahan apparently slipped on a buildup of algae while trying to avoid a surface of water on the sidewalk. Trahan sued Acadiana Mall, but the district court dismissed his lawsuit. Trahan appealed, and the Court of Appeal ordered the district court to retake Trahan’s case for further proceedings. However, the district court ruled in favor of Acadiana Mall, holding that the algae buildup was open and obvious and that Trahan did not have a legitimate claim. Trahan appealed once more to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing that the district court erred in using the open and obvious doctrine to rule in favor of Acadiana Mall. 

Under Louisiana law, an owner or custodian is responsible for a thing under his or her control and that an owner or custodian is responsible for any damage that the thing causes due to the negligence of the owner or custodian. La. C.C. art. 2317.1. For a plaintiff to successfully prove their claim, he or she must show: (1) that the defendant owned the thing that caused the damage; (2) that the thing had a defect and presented an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the defendant should have known about the defect; (4) that the defect could have been prevented if the defendant had taken reasonable care; and (5) that the defendant did not take reasonable care. Riggs v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Trust Auth., 997 So.2d 814 (La. App. Ct. 2008). However, if the defect is open and obvious, there is not an unreasonable risk of harm. Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So.3d 175 (La. 2013)

58-Email-6-24-19--1024x681Lawsuits are typically thought of as only between two parties.  Frequently however, a lawsuit will involve multiple parties, such as with automobile accidents.  In these cases, it is common to assume that a large number of those involved are insurance companies.  The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal recently grappled with these multiparty lawsuits in a recent auto accident lawsuit out of Sulphur.   

In September of 2013, Amanda Douga was driving her car in Sulphur, Louisiana when she was rear-ended by Teenishia Powell.  Ms. Powell was driving a loaner vehicle while her personal vehicle was repaired by All Star Dealership (“All Star”). Ms. Douga sustained physical injuries from the accident and filed a lawsuit against Ms. Powell, her insurance company Progressive, as well as All Star and its insurance company Tower National.  Progressive admitted to providing Ms. Powell with the statutorily required minimums for liability coverage. Tower National and All Star denied that Ms. Powell was covered by Tower National’s policy and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu agreed with All Star and Tower National and granted the motion thus dismissing them from the case.  All remaining parties appealed.   

Tower National’s coverage denial centered on their definition and interpretation of who could be an insured party under the contract.   Tower National argued that the policy expressly excepted customers from the definition of an “insured” unless the customer did not have insurance or if their insurance did not meet the minimum legal requirements. The policy also provided however that exclusions did not apply when a vehicle was rented to a customer while their personal vehicle at the dealer for repair.   The appealing parties all agreed the policy was ambiguous on who exactly could be counted among the insureds.  

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