55What would it take for an appellate court to overturn an award of damages? According to the Louisiana 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal, the bar is set high and very rarely does an award for damages get overturned as long as it’s reasonable. Lafayette Motors employed Mr. Menard as a service advisor. In August 2003, Dr. Stroy came to Lafayette Motors to obtain a copy of the repair estimate for his wife’s car. While Menard made a copy of the estimate, the shop manager instructed Menard not to give the estimate to Dr. Stroy. Menard crumpled up the estimate to place it in the trash; however his right wrist was grabbed and twisted by Dr. Stroy. Dr. Story proceeded to take the estimate and leave the premises with it. Menard had injuries to his wrist and arm and was later diagnosed with tendinitis by an orthopedic surgeon. Almost ten years later, Menard testified he still had pain in his wrist.

A year after the incident occurred, Menard filed a petition for damages. His petition alleged that Dr. Stroy’s actions were the proximate cause of his injuries, and he wanted damages for the medical bills he incurred at the time of the incident. Dr. Story filed an answer to the petition, as well as petitioning for reconventional demand alleging Menard made public statements that were slanderous and defamatory. He further alleged that these statements caused him to suffer embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish. Menard filed a motion to strike or dismiss the reconventional demand, and the court granted the motion. Menard then added Dr. Stroy’s insurance company as a defendant, and they responded by saying that the police did not provide coverage for that particular incident. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court denied it. A bench trial was held, and the court ruled in favor of Menard and awarded him $3,000 in general damages and $3,048 in special damages for the medical expenses from August 2003 to November 2003.

The standard of review, in this case, is really what this case turns on and, in this case, there is broad discretion owed to the trier of fact when it comes to fixing awards for general damages. See Hollenbeck v. Oceaneering Int., Inc., 685 So.2d 163 (La. 1997). Unless the record shows that a factual and reasonable basis does not exist and the finding is wrong or erroneous, an appellate court should not disturb a finding of fact. See Thibodeaux v. Comeaux, 69 So.3d 674, 679 (La. App. Ct. 2011).

28-Email-06_24_19-picturePublic entities are treated as private entities when it comes to slip and fall situations. They must abide by a liability standard when a customer or employee slip and fall on their premises. The standard gives the public entity responsibility for things that they control. The standard is similar to the standard used in cases of slip and fall. In this case, the court considered whether a slip and fall on a public entity’s premises can lead to liability. 

  The Grotes were at a conference at the River Center Convention Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana when Mrs. Grote tripped and fell on an elevation of one inch between two concrete walkway near the entrance of the River Center. After the incident, the Grotes filed a petition for damages against SMG, Federal Insurance Co., and the City of Baton Rouge. They argued that the defendants were liable for damages from the injury. The Grotes then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the defect in the sidewalk was unreasonably dangerous. After the Grotes’ summary judgment, the City filed a summary judgment stating that the sidewalk was not unreasonably dangerous and was open and obvious. 

In cases of slip and falls with a public entity, a motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions show that there are no genuine issues as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The mover bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to summary judgment. He has the responsibility to demonstrate the absence of factual support for one or more essential elements of his opponent’s claim. La. C.C.P. art. 966. If the mover fails to prove his burden, the burden never shifts to the adverse party, and the mover is not entitled to summary judgment. LeBlanc v. Bouchereau Oil Co., Inc., 15 So. 3d 152 (La. Ct. App. 2009).

up-and-down-the-stairs-1254204-1024x743Although many people are aware that merchants are required to keep their premises reasonably safe, it can be complicated to establish what exactly constitutes unreasonable risk. 

While on a shopping trip at the Mall of Louisiana, Hermina Lavergne, her daughter, and her granddaughter, stopped at BJ’s Restaurant (“BJ’s”) to eat. As the group was being escorted to their table, Lavergne fell down several steps, severely injuring her right foot. The host had advised Lavergne’s daughter and granddaughter to watch their step; however, Lavergne did not hear the warning herself because she was reading the restaurant’s menu as she walked. 

Lavergne filed a lawsuit to recover damages, alleging that Lavergne was injured due to a lack of adequate lighting and a lack of warning about the steps. The trial court found that the steps presented an unreasonable risk of harm, but also found that Lavergne failed to exercise reasonable care as she walked to the table. BJ’s appealed the finding, arguing that the step was not unreasonably dangerous.

48-Email-06-24-19-Part-II-PHOTO-768x1024When writing leases, it is important to pre-determine who is at fault if an accident or injury occurs on the rented land.  Yet, this determination can become complicated when the border of the leased land comes into play. Other issues can involve the exact lease language which states whether one party is indemnified, or is free from having to pay damages. A case out of western New Orleans shows how damages and fee allocations for a horrific accident involving a loose metal gate depends on which lease governs, what clauses are met, and where fault should be allocated.

On July 1, 2010, Lisa Plaia dropped off her daughter at a daycare run by the First Baptist Church of New Orleans (“FBCNO”). As she drove away, a metal gate suddenly swung into the road, crashed through the windshield, and hit her in the face, causing permanent facial and brain damage. Ms. Plaia then sued the following three parties: Fireman’s Charitable & Benevolent Association (“FCBA”) which owned the land the gate was located on; Stewart Enterprises and its subdivision SEFH, a funeral home company which mowed the grass around the gate and leased property from FCBA; and FBCNO which subleased land from SEFH and leased land from FCBA. Each of these parties subsequently filed indemnity claims against one another in order to avoid paying Ms. Plaia for any damages related to her injury.

In the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, the jury allocated fault between these parties as follows: 15% for SEFH and 42.5% for both FCBA and FBCNO. Due to indemnity claims, the District Court ruled that FBCNO owed indemnity (reimbursement) of defense fees to FCBA as well as reimbursement of defense fees to SEFH. FBCNO subsequently appealed to The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing in part that the District Court used the wrong lease and incorrectly ruled that it was required to defend FCBA.

48-Email-06-24-19-Part-I-PHOTO-1024x676Freak accidents can happen in the most unexpected ways. When these life-altering events occur, it often affects more than the injured person. Depending on the circumstances, family members can receive compensation for non-physical injuries, such as loss of consortium (companionship).

On July 1, 2010, Lisa Plaia dropped off her young daughter, Carolina, at a Baptist Church daycare and drove away with her other daughter, Petra, who was sitting in the backseat. As she left the facility, a hinged metal gate swung into the road, crashed through the windshield, and hit Ms. Plaia in the face. While Petra received no physical injuries, Ms. Plaia alleged that she suffered, among other injuries, partial facial paralysis, permanent facial disfigurement, traumatic brain injury, memory damage, and hearing loss. To recover for these injuries, Ms. Plaia sued three defendants potentially responsible for the loose gate.

The case required a trial by jury which the Civil District Court, Orleans Parish, scheduled for April 15, 2013, but then rescheduled for April 22th. The District Court also reserved a trial period of two weeks with the possibility of a third if necessary. Due to a lack of jurors available, the District Court rescheduled again, this time for the trial to begin August 5, 2013. Additionally, the District Court only set aside ten days for this trial, as opposed to the originally granted two to three weeks.

73-Email-06-24-19-PHOTO-1024x685Cyclists must follow the rules of the road, not only for their own safety, but also because if an accident occurs the cyclist’s rule breaking could affect recovery. When a car hits a cyclist, the injured party can sue for negligence and recover damages as long as the other party was at fault. Outside of New Orleans, at the intersection of Jefferson Highway and North Causeway Boulevard, one cyclist failed to recover damages because he did not follow cycling rules.

 On September 24, 2012, Felix Palmisano was biking west on Jefferson Highway at 9:45 PM. At that time, Walter J. Ohler was driving a truck south on Causeway Boulevard. At the intersection of these two roads, Jefferson Highway is six lanes wide while Causeway Boulevard merges into one lane. As Mr. Ohler approached the southbound redlight, the signal turned green so Mr. Ohler coasted through the intersection. Mr. Palmisano saw the oncoming truck, but thought he could cross one lane before the truck could cross six. His intuition was wrong, and he was hit, suffering injuries. 

 On September 20, 2013, Mr. Palmisano sued Mr. Ohler in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court Parish of Jefferson, arguing that Mr. Ohler was at fault for causing the accident. The District Court ruled that Mr. Palmisano failed to prove this fault by the required “preponderance of the evidence,” which means there is a greater than 50% chance of it being true. Mr. Palmisano then appealed this decision to The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, which focused on the fault and obligations of both the driver and the cyclist.

36-Email-06-24-19-PHOTO-1024x569Terms of Sale commonly include an “escape clause,” which gives the buyer a way out of a contract if unplanned circumstances arise. It is often a lawyer’s obligation to ensure that this clause is present in a contract, because if the lawyer fails to include one, this could result in malpractice.  However, in order to receive recovery from the malpractice, the aggrieved party must promptly bring a lawsuit. The Longs family of Long’s Preferred Products, Inc. in Alexandria, LA, learned this the hard way when they sued their lawyer in the Ninth Judicial District Court Parish of Rapides for not including an escape clause in a stock purchase.

 Charles Elliot represented the Longs in a stock purchase of $500,000 worth of shares from Linda Minton. On March 28, 2011, both parties agreed to the Terms of Sale and on April 29, 2011, the Longs signed the $500,000 promissory note that promised payment to Linda Minton. The Longs relied on receiving loan approval in order to pay on this note, but on August 11, 2011, the Longs’ loan was denied. Twelve days later, they discovered that they were sued to enforce the promissory note. The Longs hoped that an escape clause in the Terms of Sale would relieve them from the duty to pay; however, their lawyer, Elliot, failed to include one.

 In May 2013, the Longs spoke with a different lawyer, and on April 28th, 2014, the Longs sued Elliot for malpractice in the Ninth Judicial District Court. The District Court ruled that this lawsuit was perempted, which means that the Longs lost their right to bring a lawsuit.

61-1024x683Insurance plans and policies are often riddled with complicated jargon and loopholes to protect insurance companies from financial loss. These confusing insurance provisions can lead an individual to think he/she is covered in case of an accident, but many times leaves individuals unprotected. In one recent Louisiana lawsuit, a consumer’s expectations of coverage are shattered by the complexity of insurance provisions.

 Cynthia Bennett was driving a vehicle that she borrowed from Service Chevrolet Cadillac (Service Chevrolet) in Lafayette, Louisiana when she was in a car accident with Samantha Brown. The vehicle Ms. Bennett was driving was a “covered auto” under a “garage policy” issued by Tower National Insurance Company (Tower) to Service Chevrolet. Samantha Brown had an auto liability policy issued under USAA and Cynthia Bennett had a personal automobile policy with Allstate that provided uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. Ms. Bennett was able to settle with USAA and Allstate but continued to pursue Tower National Insurance Company for the remainder of damages under her UM coverage provisions in Tower’s “garage policy.”

 Tower filed a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when evidence shows that there is “no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). Tower argued that Ms. Bennett was not considered an “insured” under the liability portion of the policy because she had her own policy with Allstate, which showed that there was no genuine issue to material fact. Because Ms. Bennett had her own coverage under Allstate, she was not protected under Tower’s policy as an uninsured motorist. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and Ms. Bennett appealed that decision.

68-1024x683Timing and deadlines are important aspects of the judicial system. However, these specific guidelines are not familiar to most non-lawyers, which underscores the importance of having an excellent attorney represent you. The lack of an attorney can immediately put an individual at a disadvantage, as it did in one New Orleans woman’s case.

 Ms. Scott decided to represent herself in her case against Kindred Hospital New Orleans (Kindred). She alleged that Kindred Hospital violated the standard of care she should have been afforded by allowing a hospital employee to sexually batter her while she was a patient there from May 16 to July 31, 2013. Additionally, she argued that the hospital failed to properly investigate the sexual battery.

 Ms. Scott first brought the lawsuit against Kindred on May 5, 2014. Kindred argued that the claim must be submitted to a medical review panel since it was a medical negligence case.  Kindred also filed an exception of prematurity to the trial court. The trial judge granted the exception of prematurity and dismissed the case.

39-1024x683Car accidents are unpredictable. Typically when you get in your car and drive, you do not think you are going to be involved in a life-changing automobile accident.  For one Louisiana woman, a car accident got even more complicated when she was hit in a rental car by another rental car.

Crystal Stephens was awarded $12,000 in general damages and $5,500 in medical expenses from a 2005 automobile accident at the intersection of North and Trudeau Streets in Natchitoches, Louisiana.  In the accident, Mary J. King backed her vehicle into Ms. Stephens, causing damages to Ms. Stephens’ vehicle as well as her person. Both drivers were in rental cars, and Safeway Insurance Company was the insurance provider for her uninsured/ underinsured motorists coverage. Stephens claimed at the trial court that Ms. King was an uninsured motorist, which meant that her insurance with Safeway should cover the damages to the vehicle as well as the injuries that were incurred. During the accident, Ms. King’s rental car was from Avis, and Ms. Stephens settled a related claim with Avis for $10,000.

At trial, a plaintiff is required to prove in evidence that the defending party did not have insurance. La. C E. art. 801. Evidence presented cannot be that of hearsay, which is evidence either stated by a witness as having been heard from another person besides the witness, or from a document that depicts events that are not witnessed at the trial itself.  In Ms. Stephens’ trial however, she was granted an exception to the hearsay rule, meaning that it was declared to be admissible as evidence, because the affidavit stating Ms. King was uninsured was said to be a “normally kept” business record under La. C. E. art. 803(6)

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