Articles Posted in Wrongful Death

Put simply, summary judgment is a decision rendered by a court for one party and against another without the litigation of a full trial. According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, summary judgment is appropriate when all relevant facts are brought before the court, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the sole remaining issue relates to the legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts. As you can probably understand, arguing for or against a party’s motion for summary judgment is not only a complex process, but also one that carries much risk.

On September 2, 2008, Daniel Milbert fell off of a roof and broke his ankle. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Milbert received surgery to repair his ankle at the Lafayette General Medical Center and was placed on a pain pump. After speaking to one of his doctors about an increase in pain following his discharge from the hospital, Mr. Milbert was instructed to call if the pain worsened. After attempting to contact doctors at the medical center, Mr. Milbert and his wife were required to leave messages with Dexcomm, an answering service in Lafayette. After Mr. Milbert was diagnosed with compartment syndrome and had to undergo surgery, he and his wife filed suit against Dexcomm on December 23, 2009. Accordingly, Dexcomm filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the right of recovery had expired. At trial, the court agreed with Dexcomm and granted the motion for summary judgment.

Mr. Milbert and his wife appealed.

After you have been in a terrible accident or lost a loved one, especially when the accident or death was caused by the negligence of someone else, you probably want justice. The outrage, the pain, and the sense of loss are too much to bear, and you want someone to pay for what was done. You want to be made as whole as possible. But what if the evidence that would allow that justice to come to pass has been ruined? And what if it was the allegedly guilty party who destroyed it? This intentional destruction of evidence primarily for the purpose of depriving the opposing party of its use is known as spoliation of evidence.

While a party might assume that spoliation of evidence has occurred, mere allegations will not get you far, and actually proving that spoliation of evidence has occurred can be much harder than you might think. In the state of Louisiana, there are several rules and standards with regard to how a party must prove that such spoliation of evidence actually occurred. First of all, merely accusing someone of negligently destroying evidence is not enough to prove spoliation of evidence. The standard is much higher than that. The plaintiff actually has to prove that the evidence was intentionally destroyed, and it can be quite difficult to prove the intentions of one’s actions.

If a party fails to produce evidence within his or her reach, there is a presumption that the evidence would have been detrimental to the case; however, it is still essential to prove that the evidence was intentionally destroyed. Furthermore, the defendant has a duty to preserve evidence. This duty arises because of the foreseeability of needing that evidence in the future. If there is no ability to foresee the need for that evidence in the future, though, the duty does not exist.

Under Louisiana law, there are very specific rules about how to properly serve someone, and one of the important aspects of service that an attorney has to get right is the timing of it. Furthermore, not only does the service have to be carried out in a timely manner, but it also has to be perfected properly.

This particular Supreme Court of Louisiana case dealt with service on a state entity, and it is important for your attorney to be aware of any differences that exist with regard to service requirements depending on who the other party is. According to the applicable state law, La. R.S. 13:850, “perfecting” a service request requires that the appropriate filing fees and transmission fees have been received by the clerk of the court and that the original signed document has been received by the clerk. All of this must be received within the proper timeframe. As stated in La. R.S. 13:850, the proper timeframe for perfection in this case is seven days.

In this case, the service request was received within the required ninety-day timeframe (ninety days since the filing of the petition), and the service request was perfected five days later once the requisite documents and fee payments were received by the clerk of the court. The question then is whether or not this counts as proper request for service: Was the request for service properly received within ninety days even though perfection of the request was outside of that ninety-day timeframe?

In a recent case, Johnson v. University Medical Center in Lafayette, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reversed a trial court decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s case for abandonment due to her failure to timely pay the costs of appeal. The plaintiff in the case, Lela Johnson, originally filed a medical malpractice action against both the University Medical Center in Lafayette and the Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans. The case has proceeded through courts since the original petition for damages was filed on March 15, 2006.

Both defendants, whose principal places of business correspond with the last word of their names, are operated by the State of Louisiana. After a dismissal of her original suit by the Supreme Court of Louisiana due to her failure to properly notify the defendants of the action because she had requested service of process on individuals who had not been individuals who were authorized to accept such information on behalf of the defendants, Ms. Johnson’s decided to re-file the original suit in trial court. Once again, Ms. Johnson’s service of process was held insufficient by the trial court and she moved to appeal that judgment.

Service of process is a legal term of art which essentially describes the process in which plaintiffs notify defendants of a pending suit. When the plaintiff files a complaint with a court, any defendant in the case must be given notice of the pending case and an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the complaint. This requirement is a basic constitutional right conferred upon everyone who has been accused of some wrongdoing and it is the accuser’s responsibility to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused is protected. The importance of service of process to our legal system and the rights of defendants makes it necessary for trial courts to dismiss actions, without regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, if service of process is deficient in some way or another.

In a recent medical malpractice case, the jury found that the plaintiffs did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard of care applicable to the emergency room doctor they had sued for a medical malpractice allegation. Because the plaintiffs had not proved their case the suit was dismissed. However, on a motion by the plaintiffs, the trial judge issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the jury’s decision and awarding the plainiffs over five million dollars in damages. The doctor and hospital board appealed this decision.

A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case alleging that the doctor was negligent must prove 1) the amount of skill or knowledge possessed by a typical doctor or the amount of care ordinarily exercised by licensed doctors in Louisiana practicing in a similar community or under similar circumstances as the doctor being sued. 2) that the doctor either did not have required level of knowledge or skill or did not use ordinary level of care and 3) that the result of this lack of knowledge, skill or care caused the plaintiffs injuries which would not have otherwise occurred. The jury found that the plaintiffs failed to establish the level of care used by Louisiana emergency room physician in similar circumstances therefore they could not have proved either of the other elements.

A judge may issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the evidence is so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable jurors could not give a verdict for the other party. When a party (the party who lost the jury verdict) moves for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the motion must be denied if there is evidence for the other party (which won the jury verdict) that could lead a reasonable person to side with the other party. The court should resolved all reasonable inferences and factual questions in favor of the party who won the jury verdict. This is a very difficult standart for the moving party to clear. The jury verdict must have been completely illogical and unfounded for a judge to override it. When an appeals court reviews a trial judge’s decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the same standard is used. In this case the courts must evaluate the evidence given my both sides medical experts to determine whether reasonable people could have found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the applicable standard of care.

In 2011, a Louisiana woman appealed a decision issued by the state’s highest court in a case she filed after suffered damages from the drug metoclopramine. Julie Demahy filed a lawsuit in 2008, alleging that she had suffered damages from the generic version of metoclopramide, which she took between 2002 and 2007. The state court had dismissed Ms. Demahy’s claims against Actavis, the manufacturer of the generic version of the drug, and against prescription drug makers Wyeth, Inc. and Schwarz Pharma, Inc. Schwarz had acquired the name-brand rights to the drug in 2001.

As of 1985, the FDA required that generic manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide include a warning with the medication about the risk of tardive dyskinesia, an often irreversible neurological disorder. In 2004, Schwarz voluntarily requested a change to the name-brand label, adding a warning that the drug should not be used for more than 12 weeks. It was not until 2009 that the FDA issued a black-box warning that informed consumers about the risk of tardive dyskinesia and that warned customers that the drug should not be used for longer than 12 weeks except in rare cases.

Under federal law, generic drug labels are required to be the same as name-brand labels. This means that state law cannot require generic manufacturers to include more information than that which would be available on the name-brand product of a prescription drug, as this would be contrary to the federal law. On these grounds, the state court had found that Actavis was not responsible under a failure-to-warn claim brought by Ms. Demahy. On appeal, Ms. Demahy claims that the state court’s mandate to change the district court ruling in favor of the defendant was improperly interpreted as calling for the dismissal of all claims against Actavis; Ms. Demahy argued that Actavis could still be found liable outside of the failure-to-warn claim.

Imagine that your doctor gives you a prescription drug to alleviate a persistent headache or cold, or recommends for you a new pacemaker or prosthetic joint. If your doctor’s prescription drug or medical device ends up injuring you—what do you?

The general rule is that a consumer who is injured by a prescription drug or medical device may be able to seek compensatory damages from the physician that prescribed that drug or device and from the manufacturer who manufactured that drug or device. For example, a doctor may be liable for a patient’s damages if he should not have prescribed the drug or medical device or if he failed to warn of a non-obvious risk. Likewise, the manufacturer could be liable if the product is unreasonably dangerous or if the manufacturer failed to warn of non-obvious dangers.

However, there’s an important exception regarding a drug or device manufacturer’s liability—the learned intermediary doctrine. A majority of states, including Louisiana, have adopted some form of the learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine works as a shield to protect manufacturers from being liable for not informing the patient of the product’s risks if the manufacturer has adequately warned the patient’s physician of the risk. Essentially this means that a manufacturer has no duty to warn you- the patient; instead, the manufacturer must warn your physician of the drug or device’s dangers. The physician then becomes responsible for warning the patient of the risks. The physician is quite literally the intermediary between the patient and the manufacturer.

Motorist Jennifer Lopez was injured in a hit-and-run accident with a truck near Vinton. At the time of the accident, the truck was being driven by someone other than its owner, Teri Ardoin. The driver fled the scene but the truck was tracked down and Ardoin identified as the owner. Lopez filed suit against both Ardoin and her insurer, Safeway Insurance Company. At trial, the issue was Safeway’s liability as insurer of the truck. The trial judge awarded damages to Lopez, but because of Safeway’s policy limits, Lopez’s own insurer, State Farm, had to cover the balance.

On appeal, Safeway contended that its coverage of the vehicle could not be proven without first establishing that the insured gave permission to drive the truck to the unknown driver. The appeal raises questions of the omnibus insurance clause provided by Louisiana statute, La.R.S. 32:900(B)(2). Under this law, an automobile insurance policy shall cover any person who uses the insured’s vehicle with express or implied permission of the insured. It’s up to the plaintiff to establish use of the vehicle with express or implied permission of the insured.

Demonstrating this permissive use requires fact-finding at the trial level. Without some proof of “manifest error,” such fact-finding will not be overturned on appeal. The trial judge in this case found that Ardoin’s truck was the truck involved in the accident. Further, he found Safeway liable for the accident. Several pieces of evidence were put forth to show this, including eyewitness reports identifying the truck and careful observation and recording of the license plate number.

Any injury suffered by a child under medical care is especially tragic. However, litigation after such an injury is essential for families who often have to do so in order to afford future medical costs down the road. Recently, the parents of an infant sued a group of doctors and a medical equipment provider alleging that the defendants caused their daughter’s brain damage. The jury found another doctor, one who was not sued, to be one hundred percent responsible for the girl’s injuries. The parents appealed this decision but the decision was upheld by the appeals court.

After a stay in the neonatal ICU, the infant in question was sent home with her parents with a device which recorded her breathing and heart rate. This device alerted the parents when problems arose and every so often sent the recorded data to her doctors. After a while, the device began to reach capacity quickly and would delete some of the information as it was programmed to do. The infant’s doctors said they did not receive some of the information they should have received, which proved to be the cause of the tragedy. The infant was again hospitalized and found to have permanent brain damage due to lack of oxygen. The parents alleged that this brain damage caused when the infant was being monitored by the breathing device.

The parents argued that the failure of the device to properly send information to the doctors caused the doctors not to perform surgery which would have prevented the brain injuries their daughter sustained. The equipment provider argued that the infant’s original injuries occurred before she was born and progressed to her current injury.

Many experience the unfortunate circumstance of work related accidents, the most extreme of which may result in death. People often wrongly assume that sustaining an on-the-job injury guarantees a right to sue the employer, in addition to asserting workers’ compensation claims. However, the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act provides strict guidelines for remedying a work relating injury, even those that result in death.

A recent East Carroll Parish decision aims to clarify some of those common misconceptions. McNeil Harvey, an employee of MAPP, Inc. died when a piece of heavy farm equipment he was working under fell and crushed him. His daughter, Valerie Harvey, filed suit against both MAPP, Inc. and Joseph Brown, an officer of MAPP, Inc. Harvey alleged that MAPP, Inc.’s negligence in exposing McNeil to “ultra-hazardous” perils and assigning McNeil to work outside the course and scope of his employment was the cause of the accident and McNeil’s subsequent death. Ms. Harvey sought survivor’s damages and wrongful death damages.

The Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for all work-related injuries and illnesses. If an employee suffers a personal injury as a result of fulfilling a job’s duties, the act provides the employee with compensation. The act also prevents an employee from filing a lawsuit for damages against his employer or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, etc. When such issues arise, the defendant employer bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to immunity under the statute. The employer must prove that (1) the victim was an employee within its company at the time of the accident and (2) the other named defendants are officers, directors, stockholders, etc. of the company. The only exception to the exclusive remedy rule is if a death or injury is the result of an intentional tort. Additionally, an employer must prove that the injury or death occurring during the course and scope of the victim’s employment.

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