Articles Posted in Strict Liability

On January 25, 2010, while at work at The Oaks Nursing Home in West Monroe, Sheriff Royce Toney of Ouachita Parish wrongfully arrested Ms. Annette Brown for aggravated battery. Despite showing Dep. David Germany of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”) her drivers license, which listed an address separate from the one on the arrest warrant, she was still taken into custody. Ms. Brown then had to gather $1,255 to pay a bail bondsmen.

Upon release, she brought hospital records showing where she was on the night of the alleged battery and her driver’s license. The charges were quickly dropped. Despite several requests for a return of her $1,255, city officials replied there was nothing they could do about it. Ms. Brown then filed suit demanding general damages for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

OPSO filed for, and was granted, summary judgment asserting that it was MPD that gave the wrong name to the issuing magistrate. OPSO argued that it acted pursuant to a facially valid warrant, while Ms. Brown argued that someone likely in the OPSO mistakenly grabbed her DMV record instead of the real culprit, Annette Bryant. While ruling in favor of OPSO, the court explained that a “suspicion of what might have happened” is not sufficient evidence to connect OPSO to the warrant. Upon appeal, the court used a duty-risk analysis to determine whether to impose liability under La. C.C. art. 2315 A, which holds “every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

The appellate court differed with the trial court on the validity of a compromise when Louisiana company D.R.D. Towing was sued by a crew member on D.R.D.’s ship.

Mr. Randy Rudolph was a crew member of the M/V RUBY E, which was struck by another ship while he was on board. The collision threw him from his bunk, causing injuries to his back. Additionally, Mr. Rudolph lost his personal computer, cell phone, car keys and other items when the ship sank. He filed suit against D.R.D. Towing, the operator of the M/V RUBY E.

The issue for the court was whether Mr. Rudolph’s signing a release settling all claims for $3,000 a few days after the incident precluded him from collecting further money for his injuries. He argued that he understood the $3,000 was offered to compensate him for what he lost on the boat, but not to cover his future claims, including medical expenses and loss of earning potential associated with his injuries.

Two clocks fell from a wall display in the Lafayette Hobby Lobby and struck a customer in the head. Jo Anna Savant brought a negligence suit seeking compensation for her accident-related damages. The case went to trial and the jury found for the plaintiff. The trial judge, finding errors in the jury’s verdict, set it aside, and issued a judgment even more favorable to the plaintiff.

The case went up on appeal.

The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal addressed four legal issues in this case: the trial court (1) setting aside of the judgment; (2) not charging the jury to determine Ms. Savant’s fault in the accident; (3) approving the award to plaintiff for the cost of her second cervical fusion surgery; and (4) awarding the loss of consortium to plaintiff’s children.

In 2011, a Louisiana woman appealed a decision issued by the state’s highest court in a case she filed after suffered damages from the drug metoclopramine. Julie Demahy filed a lawsuit in 2008, alleging that she had suffered damages from the generic version of metoclopramide, which she took between 2002 and 2007. The state court had dismissed Ms. Demahy’s claims against Actavis, the manufacturer of the generic version of the drug, and against prescription drug makers Wyeth, Inc. and Schwarz Pharma, Inc. Schwarz had acquired the name-brand rights to the drug in 2001.

As of 1985, the FDA required that generic manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide include a warning with the medication about the risk of tardive dyskinesia, an often irreversible neurological disorder. In 2004, Schwarz voluntarily requested a change to the name-brand label, adding a warning that the drug should not be used for more than 12 weeks. It was not until 2009 that the FDA issued a black-box warning that informed consumers about the risk of tardive dyskinesia and that warned customers that the drug should not be used for longer than 12 weeks except in rare cases.

Under federal law, generic drug labels are required to be the same as name-brand labels. This means that state law cannot require generic manufacturers to include more information than that which would be available on the name-brand product of a prescription drug, as this would be contrary to the federal law. On these grounds, the state court had found that Actavis was not responsible under a failure-to-warn claim brought by Ms. Demahy. On appeal, Ms. Demahy claims that the state court’s mandate to change the district court ruling in favor of the defendant was improperly interpreted as calling for the dismissal of all claims against Actavis; Ms. Demahy argued that Actavis could still be found liable outside of the failure-to-warn claim.

Plaintiff Judith Henry seeks to recover damages resulting from an accidental fall in the defendants’ restaurant in Houma, Louisiana, on March 13, 2008. The accident occurred when Ms. Henry placed her order and got her soft drink at the counter and began to walk back across the carpeted floor to the table. At that time, she was using a cane and one of her friends was walking ahead of her carrying her soft drink. According to Ms. Henry’s deposition, she was stepping with her right foot when her toe got caught in the carpet. Her foot went backwards and she fell, landing on the foot and breaking her right ankle. Although the carpet was not frayed or worn, she stated it was uneven because it had little squares that formed its weave.

On February 17, 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Henry filed suit for the damages they had incurred as a result of her fall naming NOHSC and its insurer Colony as defendants. On April 1, NOHSC and Colony filed a motion for summary judgment supported by excerpts from Ms. Henry’s deposition, an affidavit from Paul McGoey, NsOHSC managing partner, and an affidavit from Donald Maginnis, a registered architect. Included in this evidence were attachments consisting of photographs of the restaurant interior, a hand-drawn diagram of the restaurant interior and excerpts from the 2006 Life Safety Code Handbook.

After hearing arguments and considering the evidence presented by the parties, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Henrys claims with prejudice The judgment was signed on June 30, 2010. The Henrys then appealed this judgment.

The district court dismissed the claims of Entergy, an electrical utility company, for indemnity from contractors involved with repairs to a building to which the utility company provided electrical service on the ground that the Louisiana Overhead

Power Line Safety Act (“OPLSA”) does not allow indemnification remedy. On appeal, having decided favorably for the plaintiff in the legal issue of whether OPLSA might require indemnity, the appellate court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the contractors.

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, a general contractor, Carl E. Woodward, LLC, (“Woodward”), entered into a contract with Eagle Enterprises of Jefferson, Inc., the owner of the Walgreens Shopping Center. Woodward subcontracted with Stewart Interior Contractors, LLC (“Stewart”) to install framing and exterior wall material at the shopping center. In turn, Stewart subcontracted with Landaverde Construction, LLC (“Landaverde”) to assist with providing labor. On January 5, 2006, Landaverde laborers, including plaintiff, Daniel Moreno, arrived at the shopping center work site. As Mr. Moreno was standing near the scaffold and evaluating how to best disassemble it, another worker at the top of the scaffold moved a piece of metal that came in contact with both the overhead power line and the scaffolding frame. A resulting arc of electricity flashed from the scaffolding to Mr. Moreno’s body, inflicting serious burns.

In general, owners are responsible for any damage caused by the things that they own. Animals are no exception. For example, if you own a cow and it wanders into the road and a car hits it, then you are likely responsible for the damages related to that accident. Damages caused by household animals, such as dogs, are similar. Louisiana Code art. 2317.1 provides that “the owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage.” While owner is a relatively simple concept, custodian may not be.

The classic example of a custodian is someone who is watching a household pet while you are away. It is likely that if your dog bites someone while a caretaker is walking him, both you and the caretaker may be liable for the damage caused by the bite. In a recent case arising from the Parish of Jefferson involving a dog bite, the court explained the caretaker concept in a little more depth.

In that case, a family was visiting their father in a hospice and their dog accompanied them. The dog bit another visitor when the visitor attempted to pet him. The bitten individual has a permanent scar and lost feeling in his finger. All of the parties admitted that it did seem odd that the dog bit because he had never bitten anyone before and was not acting aggressive. In fact, the dog was sitting in the owner’s lap at the time of the incident. The dog had no history of aggressiveness, and all of its shots were up to date.

It is well established that an appeal court gives deference to a trial court’s finding of fact (ruling) unless the court was clearly wrong or acted in extreme error. In other words, even if the appellate court is convinced that they would have decided upon the evidence differently, the trial court’s findings cannot be reversed if it was reasonable that it could rule in the manner it did. Moreover, if there are two permissible rulings that could be determined, the trial court’s choice between the two cannot be found manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

On March 29, 2009, plaintiff Franklin Scott (“Mr. Scott”) was driving his tractor/trailer rig carrying saltwater west on Keatchie-Marshall Road in Caddo Parish (“Caddo”) where he failed to observe and avoid a fallen tree blocking the road. Mr. Scott’s truck slid 350 feet after the collision and hit several other trees before stopping. Among other injuries resulting in the crash, Mr. Scott suffered a “serious injury” to his neck.

Mr. Scott filed a personal injury suit in District Court against Caddo, property owners Roger and Marilyn Connell (“property owners”) and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) for failure to maintain the road from potentially hazardous conditions. After weighing the oral testimony of several witnesses, the District Court found in favor of Caddo. Mr. Scott appealed.

In a recent Louisiana workers’ compensation case, a man filed suit after deciding that the settlement agreement he signed was reached based on misrepresentations. The man was rendered quadriplegic after falling from a roof he was working on during his employment as a roofer. After his injury, he hired an attorney and attended several mediations, which resulted in the signing of a settlement agreement. However, about half a year after the settlement agreement was approved, the man filed a disputed claim for compensation, asking for the settlement to be set aside because it was based on misrepresentations.

What is interesting in this case, though, is that It was not the other party that the man believed misrepresented the facts, but rather, his own attorneys. The plaintiff claims that his own attorneys told him that he would continue receiving 24-hour nursing care and other medical services after the settlement, but this was not the case.

The plaintiff’s motion to set aside the settlement agreement was denied, and the plaintiff then brought suit against his own attorneys, claiming legal malpractice in their representation of him. After a three-day trial, the jury decide to rule in favor of the attorneys and against the injured man. Furthermore, when the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, the trial court also denied that request. The plaintiff appealed the case at that point.

Medical testimony after an automobile accident is complicated enough. When two accidents close in time are involved, it can get downright confusing. All the more so when a court is trying to determine which accident is to blame for not one but several different injuries. But despite questions of accuracy and the sufficiency of evidence, the role of a court of appeals is not to second-guess or set aside the trial court’s facts – provided they are reasonably arrived at and not obviously wrong.

This principle was on display in a case out of Vermilion Parish. Wanda Turner was involved in two accidents in 2010 – one in September and one in October. After the second accident, Turner filed suit against the insurer of the vehicle from the first accident, alleging neck pain, back pain, and migraines. She attributed all of her injuries to the first accident, rather than the second one, despite the fact that the second was more serious. The trial court ruled in Turner’s favor and awarded $8,500 in general damages ($3,500 for the migraines; $3,000 for aggravating her back condition; and $2,000 for her neck pain) and $1,800 in special damages to cover her medical expenses related to the first accident.

The defendant insurance company appealed the ruling, claiming a lack of medical evidence and unsupported testimony. The appellate court even noted numerous inconsistencies in Turner’s testimony. Despite this, and citing past legal precedent, the court explained that it was obligated to give great deference to the factual findings of the trial court. Unless those findings are obviously unreasonable or rife with manifest error, the appellate court will not set them aside. This was the standard applied to Turner’s claims.

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