Articles Posted in Strict Liability

In a recent medical malpractice case, the jury found that the plaintiffs did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the standard of care applicable to the emergency room doctor they had sued for a medical malpractice allegation. Because the plaintiffs had not proved their case the suit was dismissed. However, on a motion by the plaintiffs, the trial judge issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the jury’s decision and awarding the plainiffs over five million dollars in damages. The doctor and hospital board appealed this decision.

A plaintiff in a medical malpractice case alleging that the doctor was negligent must prove 1) the amount of skill or knowledge possessed by a typical doctor or the amount of care ordinarily exercised by licensed doctors in Louisiana practicing in a similar community or under similar circumstances as the doctor being sued. 2) that the doctor either did not have required level of knowledge or skill or did not use ordinary level of care and 3) that the result of this lack of knowledge, skill or care caused the plaintiffs injuries which would not have otherwise occurred. The jury found that the plaintiffs failed to establish the level of care used by Louisiana emergency room physician in similar circumstances therefore they could not have proved either of the other elements.

A judge may issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the evidence is so strongly in favor of one party that reasonable jurors could not give a verdict for the other party. When a party (the party who lost the jury verdict) moves for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the motion must be denied if there is evidence for the other party (which won the jury verdict) that could lead a reasonable person to side with the other party. The court should resolved all reasonable inferences and factual questions in favor of the party who won the jury verdict. This is a very difficult standart for the moving party to clear. The jury verdict must have been completely illogical and unfounded for a judge to override it. When an appeals court reviews a trial judge’s decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict the same standard is used. In this case the courts must evaluate the evidence given my both sides medical experts to determine whether reasonable people could have found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the applicable standard of care.

In September 2006, Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC’s Westlake facility suffered a fire and explosion. Because of the fire and explosion, hazardous chemicals were released into the air. Several people filed suit because of the medical complications that the exposure caused. Georgia Gulf stipulated that it was the cause of the chemical release, but argued that the release did not cause the Plaintiff’s medical complications and that it should not be charged damages. The trial court disagreed and awarded the Plaintiffs damages. Georgia Gulf appealed.

Georgia Gulf’s major concerns were about two major decisions of the trial court. The first was that the trial court excluded their expert witness. Second, the lower court found a link between the Plaintiff’s symptoms and the chemical exposure, which Georgia Gulf argued did not really exist.

In Louisiana, the Court of Appeals reviews these types of decisions with great deference to the lower court. The lower court gets to see all of the witnesses and hear the testimony whereas the Court of Appeals generally does not. As such, the lower court may be a better judge of character and credibility because they actually see the person making the testimony and can observe their demeanor and evaluate how truthful they seem. The court is set up in this way so that people do not have to come back repeatedly to testify and attorneys do not have to present the same evidence to different people again; it is a matter of convenience and timesaving for everyone involved.

Many people in New Orleans rent property. Whether a house, a duplex, or an apartment, these residents typically rely on property owners to make necessary repairs to the premises. Proper maintenance ensures that residents are safe and their well-being will be protected. Unfortunately, all too often property owners fail to remedy dangerous situations, which can lead to serious injuries. Wynn v. Luck, a recently decided lawsuit by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, illustrates how a negligence claim can help victims of these situations obtain the compensation they deserve.

In that case, two women were injured when a large section of the kitchen ceiling in a rented house collapsed on them. Though the property owner claimed he did not know of the condition and therefore was not negligent for failing to repair it, the court found the record full of evidence to the contrary. First, an inspection of the property days after the incident found that almost all of the ceilings in the house were in dangerous disrepair and would have been noticeable during any visit by the property owner. Second, a maintenance man hired by the property owner provided services to the house on several occasions and, according to the court, he should have noticed the conditions and conveyed that information to the property owner. Finding the property owner constructively knew of the dangerous condition, the court held the property owner liable for negligence and the victims’ injuries.

According to Louisiana law, an owner or lessor of a property is responsible for the condition of his premises when leased to another. Therefore, the owner is liable for any damage or injuries caused by a defect in the property that he knew of or should have known of through the exercise of reasonable care, provided the dangerous condition could have been prevented through the exercise of reasonable care and the owner failed to exercise that care.

A February 27, 2013, decision issued by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana overruled a jury verdict in favor of defendant Dr. Robin Yue, finding that he failed to obtain informed consent before performing surgery on his patient, Plaintiff Clyde Snider, Jr.

At only 26-years old, Mr. Snider already had a personal as well as a family history of heart trouble, diabetes, and high blood pressure. On November 28, 2007, Mr. Snider and his wife Lisa went to the Emergency Room at Beauregard Memorial Hospital (Beauregard) in DeRidder, after Mr. Snider experienced chest pains and an extreme drop in his pulse rate. At Beauregard, Mr. Snider expressed a desire to be transferred to his primary cardiologist, Dr. J. King White, but Dr. Yue asserted that Mr. Snider required immediate attention and scheduled him for a heart catharization. Right before the procedure, Mr. Snider signed a consent form, provided to him by Dr. Yue. The implant procedure left a permanent scar, and Mr. Snider suffered pain and lost normal use of his left arm for several weeks.

Mr. Snider was later examined by Dr. White, after an injury and infection around the location of the pacemaker (which were unrelated to the implant procedure). Dr. White removed the pacemaker, and he told Mr. Snider that the implantation of the pacemaker was unnecessary and unwarranted given his condition when he went to Beauregard. A three-member Medical Review Panel unanimously agreed that Dr. Yue violated the proper standard of care in performing the surgery on Mr. Snider under the non-emergent circumstances.

Findings of fact refer to the findings of a jury on issues of fact submitted to it and are distinct from conclusions of law. Generally, a jury resolves questions of fact, whereas a judge, or an equivalent resolves questions of law. However, in Rayne, Louisiana, Mary Betty Williams, the plaintiff in a personal injury case, appealed the trial court judge’s determination that she did not carry her burden of proving that the defendant caused the accident at issue.

On December 8, 2009, Ms. Williams and Paula Trahan were involved in an automobile accident in Rayne, Louisiana. Accordingly, Ms. Williams filed suit against Ms. Trahan, asserting that Ms. Trahan caused the accident and was responsible to pay damages to Ms. Williams for pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost income. At trial, both Ms. Williams and Ms. Trahan offered conflicting testimony that the other was to blame for the accident. Moreover, Ms. Trahan testified that the accident report filed included only portions of the statement she made to Patrolman Joshua Board at the scene of the accident. According to Patrolman Board, he found “a little plastic shard” of debris in the area where the accident occurred, which he believed fell from one of the vehicles involved in the accident. However, Patrolman Board further testified that he never checked either Ms. Williams’ or Ms. Trahan’s vehicle to determine whether the plastic shard had fallen from one of their vehicles or had resulted in damage to either vehicle.

After the accident, Ms. Trahan submitted an amended statement to reflect what she says accurately describes the incident and includes the portions of her statement not included in the initial accident report filed by Patrolman Board. However, at trial, Patrolman Board denied that Ms. Trahan’s amended statement reflected what the she told him at the scene of the accident. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded judgment in favor of Ms. Trahan and dismissed Ms. Williams’s claims, concluding that Ms. Williams had not carried her burden of proof. According to the trial court judge, “the scales are evenly balanced. I don’t feel that the plaintiff has carried her burden, because both versions are plausible, but neither one has more credibility than the other. So this is a case where plaintiff cannot recover, because she could not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accident was the fault of the defendant in this case.” As a result, Ms. Williams appealed the trial court’s determination and submits that the trial court erred in its conclusion that she did not prove Ms. Trahan caused the accident.

The essential elements necessary to form a binding contract are usually described as: (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance, (3) a legal purpose or objective, (4) a “meeting of the minds,” (5) consideration, and (6) competent parties. Ambiguities typically arise with offers and acceptances that often lead to litigation. An offer is generally defined as the manifestation of the willingness to enter into a deal so as to justify to another party the offeror’s assent to the deal. Although an acceptance of an offer can occur in several ways, it is most typically described as the assent to the terms made by the offeror. In a recent case in Lake Charles, Louisiana, a finding made by a trial court that an offer and acceptance were ambiguous is under appeal.

On December 13, 2006, a woman robbed Jalil Abushanab as he was about to enter the Isle of Capri Casino in Lake Charles. While attempting to chase the woman, Mr. Abushanab was struck by an SUV and suffered bruises, abrasions, and a broken hip. After Mr. Abushanab’s death in early 2008, his surviving spouse and ten children were substituted as party plaintiffs and asserted claims against the Isle of Capri Casino for wrongful death and survivor damages. In May of 2011, the Isle of Capri Casino filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for lack of liability. But on August 6, 2011, before the hearing, the casino made a written offer to the plaintiffs seeking to settlement the matter for $250,000.00. Prior to the hearing, the plaintiffs accepted the casino’s offer with a signed acceptance letter.

On October 6, 2011, a trial court ruled in the plaintiffs favor and agreed with their motion that the offer made by the casino was exclusive of medical and statutory liens and court costs. At that time, Mr. Abushanab’s family was awarded a lump sum payment of $250,000.00, plus any Medicare/Medicaid liens, a lien on behalf of a drug company, and court costs. Accordingly, Isle of Capri Casino appealed, contending that the trial court was legally incorrect in its finding and that based on the law and on the totality of the circumstances, the offer and acceptance were ambiguous. The casino contends that not only did the trial court err in refusing to consider the casino’s intent when it made the offer, but that the court erred in concluding that there was a “meeting of the minds” and that the parties had reached a compromise agreement.

General damages are defined as those that involve mental or physical pain, inconvenience, loss of intellectual gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses that can not be measured in monetary terms. In determining an award of general damages, the Louisiana Supreme Court advocates deference to the lower court, and intervention by an appellate court only in the case of clear abuse of discretion. In a recent case, a plaintiff filed a personal injury claim when she was struck in her car by another driver (the issue of sole liability was not appealed by that driver or her insurance company).

The trial court awarded $25,000 in general damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff to her knees as a result of the accident. Although she also suffered a back and shoulder injury, she only sought damages for her knee injury, and the court considered evidence accordingly. The plaintiff argued the court erred in awarding too small a sum for general damages for her knee injuries, and for not awarding general damages for her back injury. The trial court’s decision was subsequently affirmed.

The primary medical information in this case was found in the testimony of the plaintiff’s long-time physician. He noted that although she was referred to therapy and diagnosed with a back sprain, she had other problems that did not relate to the accident. She was discharged from therapy because she did not attend sessions with any regularity, and had inconsistently reported that her knee pain was “bearable.” He further testified that the accident had aggravated arthritis in her knee and back, but that this was a pre-existing condition. Additionally, she had been on prescription medication for back pain long before the accident, had filed for Social Security Disability 13 years prior, and had even been involved in other automobile accidents both before and after the accident in question.

After a traffic stop in Shreveport, Louisiana, a man was arrested by two officers. The man had thrown liquid at the car behind him before he was pulled over. During the arrest, the two officers repeatedly grabbed and tasered the man. Eventually, they realized that the man’s elbow had been dislocated and called for medical assistance. Because of the injury, the man had to undergo multiple surgeries and was ultimately left with permanent disabilities in his left arm and hand. In light of this, the man claimed that the officers used excessive force during the arrest.

The injured man brought suit against the police officers as well as other defendants, and ultimately the trial court granted the motion of summary judgment filed by the defendants, ruling against the injured man. When appealing this decision, the injured man brought two main claims: 1) that the district court erred by granting the two police officers qualified immunity with regard to the excessive force claim; and 2) that the district court erred by dismissing the constitutional claim he brought against the head of the police department and the city for not implementing a proper policy for off-duty cops (one of the cops involved in the arrest was off-duty at the time).

With regard to the first claim, public officials (e.g. police officers) are allowed qualified immunity on summary judgment unless two requirements are met: 1) the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct actually violated a constitutional right; and 2) the actions of the officers were objectively unreasonably in light of the relevant law at the time. In this case the Fourth Amendment provides that excessive force during an arrest is impermissible. However, according to the Supreme Court, every arrest requires the right to use some force, especially if the suspect is a threat to the officers or is resisting arrest. So, did the police officers use force that was clearly excessive and clearly unreasonable?

When an accident occurs at someone’s place of work, the injured party can hold the employer responsible in certain circumstances, under the legal concept of vicarious liability. This doctrine provided relief for Kenneth and Pamela Porter in a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case arising out of Avondale, Louisiana.

In Porter v. Fulkerson, the accident occurred at the office of a Navy project that was staffed by personnel from a variety of entities, including subcontractor John J. McMullen Associates (“JJM”). The workspace, with an open air layout with low cubicles, was designed to foster camaraderie and ease of communication, creating a very social environment.

One day, JJM employee Philip Fulkerson was on his way into the office, heading to his desk, when he saw an acquaintance sitting with Navy employee Kenneth Porter in Porter’s cubicle. Fulkerson stopped by to chat, perching on the edge of Porter’s desk. At one point while Porter was speaking, Fulkerson went to pat Porter in what the court described as the style of Tony Soprano. But Fulkerson slipped off the desk, causing him to accidentally slap Porter hard in the face.

On January 25, 2010, while at work at The Oaks Nursing Home in West Monroe, Sheriff Royce Toney of Ouachita Parish wrongfully arrested Ms. Annette Brown for aggravated battery. Despite showing Dep. David Germany of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”) her drivers license, which listed an address separate from the one on the arrest warrant, she was still taken into custody. Ms. Brown then had to gather $1,255 to pay a bail bondsmen.

Upon release, she brought hospital records showing where she was on the night of the alleged battery and her driver’s license. The charges were quickly dropped. Despite several requests for a return of her $1,255, city officials replied there was nothing they could do about it. Ms. Brown then filed suit demanding general damages for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

OPSO filed for, and was granted, summary judgment asserting that it was MPD that gave the wrong name to the issuing magistrate. OPSO argued that it acted pursuant to a facially valid warrant, while Ms. Brown argued that someone likely in the OPSO mistakenly grabbed her DMV record instead of the real culprit, Annette Bryant. While ruling in favor of OPSO, the court explained that a “suspicion of what might have happened” is not sufficient evidence to connect OPSO to the warrant. Upon appeal, the court used a duty-risk analysis to determine whether to impose liability under La. C.C. art. 2315 A, which holds “every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

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