Strict Liability

August 16, 2011

Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 2: Determining Causation

In our prior post, we observed the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s finding that the jury correctly held that Centerpoint Energy failed to meet its duty of properly securing the natural gas line and valve when it disconnected service at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Establishing the duty owed by Centerpoint was one of several elements of the duty-risk analysis that Jones was required to establish in order to prevail. Another element that we will now consider is that of causation. Centerpoint argued that its failure to properly shut off and secure the gas supply was not the legal cause of the injuries sustained by the Jones family. Instead, in Centerpoint’s view, Jones’s “reconnection of the gas service constituted intervening conduct that was not only grossly negligent, intentional, and criminal, but also not foreseeable.” Under Louisiana law, an intervening act will relieve the original tortfeasor of liability if it

“superseded the original negligence and alone produced the injury.” Adams v. Rhodia, Inc. However, if the intervening act is foreseeable to the original tortfeasor, it is considered to be “within the scope of the original tortfeasor’s negligence.” In short, Centerpoint argued it could not possibly have foreseen Jones’s attempt to reconnect his gas line and, therefore, its failure to properly secure the line was irrelevant once Jones acted to steal the gas.

The court, however, found that Centerpoint’s position was “defeated” by the testimony of its own wtinesses. One employee, the company’s Operations Supervisor, explained that the security mechanisms were necessary because it was “common sense that people will try to steal natural gas after their supply has been cut off.” Another, Centerpoint’s former Operations Manager for Louisiana, stated that the locking mechanisms were required because “people do not always understand the dangers associated with natural gas.” Also, an expert in the field of natural gas operations testified that Centerpoint should have “no illusions” about the potential for people to steal natural gas. The court found that “Jones’s actions in leaving an uncapped gas line open in the house, breaking the plastic locking device and stealing natural gas, and negligently leaving the natural gas running into the house all night, are exactly the unsafe acts that Centerpoint Energy’s duty to properly terminate service is designed to prevent.” Thus, it concluded, the jury’s finding that Jones’s conduct was foreseeable was well supported, and it correctly determined that Centerpoint could not rely on Jones’s intervening criminal act to relieve it of all responsibility for the explosion.

August 14, 2011

Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 1: Exploring the Utility Company’s Duty

by Berniard Law Firm

On May 7, 2003, Centerpoint Energy disconnected the natural gas service at the house of Carl Jones, Sr. and his family because they were past due on an outstanding balance. A short time later, Jones and his son removed the gas stove from the kitchen and replaced it with an electric model. Unfortunately, Jones forgot to cap the gas line before installing the new stove. Late in the evening of June 15, 2004, after having been without a functioning water heater since the disconnection, Jones reconnected the gas line. He did so because he was expecting guests the following day and wished to have a supply of hot water that did not require stove-top heating. To make the reconnection, Jones used a wrench to snap off the red plastic locking device that the Centerpoint technician had installed on the line when he closed the valve. Unable to re-light his water heater, Jones assumed no gas was flowing and went to bed. By morning, the house was filled with gas, and as the family arose several large fireballs erupted. Jones, his wife, and their four children were severely injured in the explosion. Jones sued Centerpoint seeking to recover for his and his family’s injuries. A trial was held in July, 2010. After the judge denied Centerpoint’s motion for a directed verdict, a jury apportioned half of the fault to Centerpoint and half to Jones and awarded substantial sums to Jones’s family members for their injuries. Centerpoint appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting the case to go to the jury at all. In Centerpoint’s view, its duty to reasonably disconnect gas service for non-payment did not extend to protecting Jones against the explosion caused “by [his] subsequent negligent, intentional, criminal and then grossly negligent conduct.”

An appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict requires the appellate court’s de novo review because such a motion can be granted “only if the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that the court finds that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that “[t]o prevail in their personal injury suit, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing that Centerpoint Energy was at fault in causing the accident, using a duty-risk analysis.” Centerpoint argued that Jones failed to meet this burden, in part, because he could not establish that the utility did not conform to the appropriate standard of care when shutting off the gas supply. The court found two sources for the scope of duty imputed to Centerpoint. First, Louisiana case law takes the position that it is

“common knowledge … that natural gas, being highly flammable and explosive in nature, is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Those who handle and distribute it are charged with that degree of care commensurate with its dangerous character for the protection of the public from any foreseeable injury.” Giordano v. Rheem Manufacturing Co..

August 10, 2011

Exploring a No Cause of Action Ruling Shows Power of Appeal

by Berniard Law Firm

Plaintiffs have the right judicially, to assert a legal action against a defendant that consists of operative facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The issue for the court may become whether the plaintiff does in fact, have a cause of action. If the law does not support the facts alleged, the defendant may have the opportunity to file a peremptory exception of no cause of action. This exception questions the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint, does the plaintiff allege an injury, harm, or sustained damage that is able to be remedied under the law? Or, does the plaintiff’s complaint lack the vital element of legal support in order to become “whole again” under the law? These questions were explored recently by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana. The Court reviewed the trial court’s judgment finding that the plaintiff’s had no cause of action against the defendants as a result of an apparent absence of legal support. However, the appellate court found differently, explaining in detail the reasons for which they reversed the trial court’s decision and allowed the plaintiff’s case to move forward against the defendants.

The plaintiffs in this case experienced every parent’s worst nightmare, the death of their daughter. The question for the court was who should be ultimately responsible for the death considering the tragic circumstances. The facts include the victim and two class mates who allegedly bullied her severely, to the point the young girl transferred to a different high school in order to avoid the emotional distress. One day, while exiting the bus after school, the young girl was approached by the two former class mates she had tried so hard to avoid. A heated altercation ensued, in which the young girl was pushed in front of an oncoming school bus where she was quickly run over and died as a result of her injuries. The young girl’s mother brought the suit against the school board, State Farm Mutual Insurance, the superintendent of the school board, the principal of her daughter’s former high school, the bus driver that struck her daughter, the mothers of both of the involved former classmates, and three “on duty” teachers. The plaintiff argued that the defendants were negligent in numerous ways, including the failure to supervise, failure to timely respond to the fight and failure to adequately staff the bus are with teachers or school personnel. Further, the complaint alleged that the bus driver saw or should have seen the fight and failed to stop his vehicle, disregarding the safety of the children aboard the bus and the children in the school bus zone. However, the defendants asserted the plaintiff had no cause of action against the school board employees in their individual capacities under Louisiana Revised Statute 17:439 which reads,

“Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no person shall have a cause of action against any school employee based on any statement made or action taken by the school employee provided that the action or statement was within the course and scope of the school employees’ duties as defined by the school board in which the school employee is employed and was within the specific guidelines for school employee behavior as established by that school board.”

August 8, 2011

Court Reviews Driver’s Duty of Care in Bossier City Car Accident

by Berniard Law Firm

Louisiana law requires that the driver of a motor vehicle maintain a safe distance from other cars and that the driver “not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” A driver who rear-ends another car is “presumed to have breached this duty” and, therefore, is assumed to be negligent. To challenge this presumption, the driver must prove he was not at fault for the collision by establishing two facts: 1) that he had his vehicle under control, and 2) closely observed the lead vehicle and followed at a safe distance under the circumstances. See Broussard v. Zurich American Ins. Co. The driver can also avoid fault by showing that the driver of the leading car “negligently created a hazard which could not reasonably be avoided. In the case of a multi-car accident, “the fact that the second driver is able to see and avoid an emergency situation ahead sets the standard of care applicable to the other following drivers.” Anderson v. May.

A three-car accident was at the center of Ebarb v. Matlock, a case recently decided by Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal. On December 3, 2008, Yolanda Ebarb was driving her Kia Sorento in the left east-bound lane of I-20 in Bossier City. As she approached the overpass at Old Minden Road, she observed that the traffic ahead in both lanes had stoped. She applied her brakes and came to a complete stop safely behind the vehicle in front of her. A moment later, David Terry, driving his Jeep Cherokee also in the left east-bound lane of I-20, approached the same location. Terry noticed the stopped traffic and safely stopped his vehicle directly behind Ebarb’s.Then, Terry’s Jeep was hit from behind at high speed by a Ford F-250 pickup truck driven by Phillip Matlock. The Jeep pushed forward, rolled over, and collided with Ebarb’s Kia. Ebarb suffered a serious spinal injury as a result. Matlock was cited for following to closely at the scene. Ebarb sued both Terry and Matlock. The trial court granted summary judgment against Ebarb in Terry’s favor and against Matlock in Ebarb’s favor. Matlock appealed. The Second Circuit reviewed the law on rear-end collisions in Louisiana and the presumption of negligence against the driver. The court applied a duty-risk analysis to the circumstances and to Matlock’s conduct, which was bolstered only by his “self-serving statements” that he had his vehicle under control, closely observed the lead vehicle, and followed at a safe distance under the circumstances.” The court concluded that Matlock failed to meet the standard of care “established” by Terry and Ebarb when they were both able to safely stop their cars after coming upon the stalled traffic. The court noted that “to rebut the objective evidence that two other drivers were able to safely stop and avoid a collision, Mr. Matlock has failed to offer any competent evidence.” Because Matlock “failed to establish that he will be able to rebut the presumption of his own negligence at trial,” the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for Ebarb.

The facts of this case left Matlock with little opportunity to rebut the presumption of his negligence in rear-ending Terry’s Jeep. That Ebarb and Terry both managed to stop safely when they realized the traffic was stopped ahead suggests that any reasonable driver in control of his vehicle should have been able to do the same. Without evidence of any mitigating circumstances, Matlock’s defense was overcome by the presumption of his negligence.

August 4, 2011

After Two Car Accidents, Man Denied Damages Due to Testimony of Previous Settlement

by Berniard Law Firm

Car accidents are a common occurrence and when a car accident is caused by another party, you want to receive the appropriate relief for doctor’s bils, aches, pains and other accruing expenses. Just because an individual has received damages owed to him from one car accident should by no means preclude him from getting the deserved amount from a subsequent accident.

John Clyde Deville was involved in a car accident as a result of being hit by a mail truck that ran a red light. From the scene of the accident, Deville was taken to the emergency room complaining of neck, shoulder and back pain. At the hospital he was diagnosed with both cervical and lumbar disc herniations. Upon seeing a family physician, Deville was prescribed pain medication and sent to physical therapy. With little success, he was then referred to an orthopedic surgeon who suggested that epidural steroid injections may be the only viable option to alleviate the pain. While the first round of injections produced a small round of relief, Deville began to feel a noticeable reduction in pain with the second round.

Just as things were getting better and Deville began to feel relief, he was involved in another accident where he was sideswiped by another vehicle. While the impact from this vehicle was not extreme, his car was still thrown from his lane of travel and onto the sidewalk. As a result of this accident, Mr. Deville began to feel an increased tightness and pain in his back, pain that had originally subsided from the previous accident. He chose not to seek medical treatment immediately because he had food in his vehicle which had to be delivered. When he finally saw his physician, the severe pain had returned and this time, the injections did not help. Finally, based on advice from his doctor lumbar surgery was performed. However, the results were mixed and Deville still complained of a gnawing pain in his lumbar spine.

August 2, 2011

Fifth Circuit Finds Rifle Manufacturer “Not Liable” for Injuries Sustained After Rifle Firing Resulted in Uncontained Explosion

by Berniard Law Firm

If a company manufactures a defective product, and an individual is injured by that product, the manufacturer may be liable for the damages suffered by the product-user. The product, be it a cleaning supply or an automobile part, or any number of different items found in everyday life, bears an element of responsibility of reliability and worthiness when it is delivered by a manufacturer. When that responsibility is breeched, legal remedy is available.

As the Fifth Circuit described in the seminal case of Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., in order for an injured party to win an action against a product manufacturer, that party must prove: (1) that the party, or another “person or entity” was using the product in a manner reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer; (2) that an aspect of the product directly caused the damage(s) claimed; “(3) the product was ‘unreasonably dangerous’ either in construction, design, or warning; and (4) the characteristic rendering the product unreasonably dangerous either ‘exist[ed] at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer or result[ed] from a reasonably anticipated alteration or modification of the product.’”

If a party can show that a product, used in a way reasonably anticipated, could harm a product-user, the manufacturer may have a legal duty to design its product in a manner which would avoid such harm. As explained by the Fifth Circuit, a reasonably anticipated use is a “use or handling of a product that the product’s manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.” If it can be shown that a product was misused and that misuse resulted in the damages claimed by the product-user, then that user cannot collect against the manufacturer for his or her damages.

July 31, 2011

Louisiana Supreme Court Changes Apportionment of Fault in Medical Malpractice Case

by Berniard Law Firm

Hospitals, their staff, and doctors must treat patients in accordance with an established “standard of care.” A standard of care is generally the amount of care a reasonable person would exercise in a particular situation. For doctors and nurses this means that they must act in a manner similar to a reasonable person with similar training and skills in that profession. They must conform their conduct to the customs of their profession.

In the seminal case, Belinda and Jonathon Johnson (“the plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit against Morehouse General Hospital and Ms. Johnson’s treating doctor. The plaintiffs alleged that the negligent care provided by the treating doctor and the hospital staff to Ms. Johnson resulted in injuries to plaintiffs’ son.

Belinda Johnson is an insulin-dependent diabetic and, because of this condition, her pregnancy was considered high-risk. In such high-risk pregnancies, delivery is usually accomplished through a C-section once the baby’s lungs have sufficiently developed. When Ms. Johnson was approximately 36 1/2 weeks pregnant, she made an appointment with her treating doctor because she had become concerned about the baby’s health. Over the course of the next four days, Ms. Johnson received care from Morehouse Hospital staff and her treating doctor because of continuing concerns regarding the Ms. Johnson’s baby. According to the trial court jury findings, both the Morehouse Hospital staff and the treating doctor were negligent in their care of Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson’s son was born with brain damage and cerebral palsy which were caused by lack of oxygen to the brain during the delivery process.

July 29, 2011

2nd Circuit Affirms City of Shreveport’s Liability for Failure to Maintain Sidewalks

by Berniard Law Firm

The plaintiff, Linda Garcie, filed a claim against the city of Shreverport after she sustained multiple injuries from tripping over an elevated portion of a sidewalk within the city. Ms. Garcie was walking her dog when she tripped over a crack in the sidewalk. The sidewalk was located outside the residence of Ms. Emily Pasquier, and was maintained by the city of Shreveport. After the pain in her right shoulder continued to bother her days after the accident, Ms. Garcie decided to seek medical treatment for her injuries. The court found the city to be 75% liable for Ms. Garcie’s injuries, while the court determined that the remaining 25% of liability was from Ms. Garcie’s own fault. In filing its appeal, the city contended that the trial court erred in finding that the city was at fault for its failure to maintain the sidewalk on which Ms. Garcie tripped because the city had no knowledge of the apparent defect in the sidewalk.

The determination for a city’s liability over public objects, like a sidewalk, rests on three key factors: knowledge, opportunity, and neglect. LSA-R.S. 9:2800 states that in order to find a public entity liable for damages based on the condition of objects within their control, the public entity must have had actual or constructive notice over the condition of the object, have had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect, and have failed to do so. In Lee v. State, the court determined that in order for an individual to recover against a public entity, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the thing that caused damage was in the defendant’s custody; (2) the thing was defective due to a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the defendant possessed actual or constructive notice of the defect, yet did not take corrective action within a reasonable period of time; and (4) the defect was a cause in fact of plaintiff’s harm. The court in Graves v. Page established that in order for the appellate court to overturn the decision, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusion is reasonable based upon the record as a whole.

Unfortunately for the city of Sherveport, the evidence presented at the trial court was heavily stacked against them. During the trial, it was discovered that Mr. Pasquier contacted the city on multiple occasions to notify them of the sidewalk’s condition. Originally, the Pasquires reported a three inch crack in the sidewalk, which was later repaired by the city. However, Mr. Pasquire testified that sometime between 2006 and 2007 a one inch crack in the same sidewalk reappeared. Again, he called the city to request a repair of the sidewalk. However, Mr. Pasquire also testified that the newly formed crack in the sidewalk was obvious to him and he had walked multiple times across the sidewalk without tripping. The city’s superintendent of street and drainage was responsible for the intake of street issues, like Mr. Pasquire’s report of the reoccurring sidewalk crack. The superintendent, relying on the city’s C-CAR complaint system, stated that at no time did Mr. Pasquire’s new sidewalk complaint ever appeared in their system. The system relied on an operator to input all public complaints requiring city maintenance. Due to Mr. Pasquire’s vague recollection of reporting the second sidewalk issue, and the failure of the city’s complaint system to not recognize any complaint by Mr. Pasquire, the city questioned whether the complaint was made at all. The city argued that Ms. Garcie failed to establish all elements of liability necessary to hold the city responsible because there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Pasquire’s sidewalk issue was never reported to the city, therefore preventing actual or constructive notice by the city of the defect.

July 27, 2011

Freak Garbage Truck Accident Still Has Real Consequences, Monetary Damages to Victim

by Berniard Law Firm

This post continues from yesterday:

The trial court relied on the testimony of Mr. Williams’ account of events leading up to his injury in making its conclusion of what occurred. While the trial court did hear testimony from an IESI employee who stated that the garbage trucks did not have flaps on the top of the garage truck capable of causing the damage to the cable box, the trial court felt that the demeanor and testimony of Mr. Williams made him a credible witness. Though there were a few inconsistencies with Mr. Williams’ story, the trial court was confident in his consistency with the major details of the incident to rely on Mr. Williams’s testimony about the garage trucks flap. The appellate court concluded that there was no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling that there was a flap rising form the top of the truck.

The appellate court dismissed IESI’s second argument because the court failed to again find any clear error made by the trial court in its conclusion that Mr. Williams had in fact met his burden to show that IESI had breached their duty. Benjamin v. Housing Authority of New Orleans notes that, through the question of whether a defendant had a duty to the plaintiff is a question of law, the question of whether the defendant breached that duty is a question of fact. IESI did not dispute that they owed a duty to Mr. Williams, only that the evidence was insufficient to show that IESI had breached that duty. Again, the appellate court is required to apply the manifest error doctrine to determine whether a trial court clearly erred in its factual determination of breach.

July 25, 2011

Mansura Man Granted Compensation For Injuries Caused by Garbage Truck

by Berniard Law Firm

Freak incidences occur every day that do have very real consequences for the responsible party. While some things may seem unavoidable for the victim, the party which caused the injury must go before a court and try to prove their innocence. One recent case, involving a garbage truck and down cable wire, helps illustrate how even unusual chains of events can have real consequences.

The plaintiff, Randy Williams, filed suit against the Louisiana Corporation IESI after the company’s garbage truck caused neck and shoulder injury to Mr. Williams. On December 17 2003, Mr. Williams stopped the IESI owned garbage truck during its daily garbage pick-up to request the help of the garbage men. Mr. Williams was requesting the help of the men to get his garbage can to the curb. After the men provided him assistance, Mr. Williams went to the trunk of his car. Mr. Williams testified that he heard a snapping noise and was suddenly struck by the end of a cable wire. It was concluded that the top of the garbage truck had snagged on the end of the cable wire as the garbage men continued on their route after assisting Mr. Williams. After the IESI employee’s realized what had happened, they pulled the wire loose from the truck and informed Mr. Williams that they would send help to fix the cable wire. The trial court found the IESI to be 100% liable to Mr. Williams’ injuries, awarding him just over $50,000.00. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, while bringing to light the standard needed by a plaintiff to succeed in the different factual and legal questions required to hold a person liable for negligence.

A prima facie case (or a case in which the evidence presented is sufficient for a judgment) of negligence rests on a plaintiff’s ability to show that a duty was owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, the defendant breached that duty, and actual damage resulted as a direct cause of that breach. IESI believed that the trial court incorrectly determined that Mr. Williams had successfully met this burden. IESI made three arguments to the 3rd Circuit, requesting a reversal of the trial court’s decision: (1) IESI claims the trial court erred in concluding that a flap on the top of the garbage truck was what snagged the cable box and caused the accident; (2) IESI claims the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Williams met his burden of proving that IESI breached its duty of care to Mr. Williams; and (3) IESI claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider the possibility that the injury was in part the fault of the cable company in failing to maintain the cable wire as required by Louisiana regulation.