Strict Liability

September 5, 2011

Three Part Series Regarding Workplace Injuries

3rd Circuit Uses Helicopter Injury Case to Clarify “Injury Within the Scope of Employment”

Injuries in the workplace occur frequently and thus many states have forced employers to purchase workers’ compensation insurance. Under workers’ compensation, the employer’s insurance agrees to pay for any lost wages and medical bills as a result of the employee’s injury. In exchange for this security the employer may use workers’ compensation as an affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the employer to insulate the employer from tort liability. This essentially minimizes an injured’s claim. However, as Herbert v. Richard illustrates, it is vital that one consider whether or not the injury occurred while within the scope of employment. Depending on the answer to this question, an employer may be barred from using workers’ compensation as an affirmative defense to protect itself from tort liability, resulting in a potentially greater claim by the injured.

In Herbert v. Richard, an employee fell from a helicopter while netting deer in Mexico on behalf of a game management company, Game Management Inc (GMI). Though the deer netting enterprise was GMI’s, the employee worked for Industrial Helicopters, Inc., a company owned by the same family that owned GMI. Mr. Herbert, the employee, had been a fuel truck driver for twenty nine years and had only been on GMI’s netting excursions once before the injury. Industrial sought to invoke a workers’ compensation affirmative defense arguing that Mr. Herbert was either within the scope of his employment, was a borrowed employee from Industrial, or, alternatively, that Industrial and GMI were joint employers.

September 3, 2011

Ouachita Parish Medical Malpractice Case Reminds Litigants of the Importance of Meeting Litigation Deadlines

by Berniard Law Firm

Previously on this blog, we have explored a number of cases where a party has faced defeat in court because of the failure to follow a procedural rule in litigation. Louisiana’s rules of civil procedure are designed to require a timely commencement to a suit and to ensure that the suit is then adjudicated in an expedient manner. Similar rules apply to the procedure for summary judgments. Motions either for or in opposition to summary judgments may be accompanied by affidavits (in fact, in some cases, affidavits are required). An affidavit must be filed no later than eight days prior to the hearing on the motion. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). A party’s failure to observe this time requirement will result in the court’s excluding the affidavit from consideration. As the plaintiff in Sims v. Hawkins-Sheppard learned, such a failure can result in a dismissal of the case when the affidavit is critical to opposing summary judgment.

On May 22, 2009, Rebecca Sims sued Dr. Tonya Hawkins-Sheppard alleging medical malpractice after Sims’s son was severely injured and disfigured during delivery at the Glenwood Regional Medical Center in Ouachita Parish. During the discovery phase, Hawkins-Sheppard requested the identity of any medical expert who could support Sims’s claim of malpractice. Sims responded that she had not consulted a medical expert, and Hawkins-Sheppard filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was set for May 4, 2010. Sims requested, and was granted, a continuance of the hearing until July 7, 2010. Sims then filed an opposition to summary judgment that included an unsigned physician’s affidavit. Sims’s lawyer stated that the unsigned affidavit would be replaced with a valid affidavit before the scheduled hearing on the motion. No such substitution was made. On the day of the hearing, Sims explained to the trial judge that she had fired her lawyer and was seeking new counsel. Sims suggested that she had been misled by her attorney. Refusing to permit further delay, the judge went ahead with the hearing and then granted Hawkins-Sheppard’s motion for summary judgment. Sims appealed. The Second Circuit found that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to permit Sims a reasonable amount of time to find new counsel and to substitute the unsigned affidavit with a valid, signed version. Hawkins-Sheppard then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which reached a different result. “[W]e find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in this case,” the supreme court stated. “[Sims] failed to show ‘good cause’ under La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) why she should have been given additional time to file an opposing affidavit.” Consequently, the court concluded, there was no genuine

issue to the material fact that Sims was unable to prove that Hawkins-Sheppard breached the standard of care. A medical malpractice action is one that, on summary judgment, requires a valid affidavit containing a medical expert’s opinion on the issue of the doctor’s breach of duty. Had Sims’s motion been accompanied by a valid affidavit, she could have avoided the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Thus, the court reversed the Court of Appeal and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Hawkins-Sheppard.

September 1, 2011

Court Explores Scope of Employment in Baton Rouge Car Accident

by Berniard Law Firm

After working at his job as a recruiter for the U.S. Army, Sergeant Sean Fowler went out drinking with friends on the evening of February 4, 2008. He returned to the recruiting station in Covington briefly to pick up some personal belongings before heading home, as he had the following day off from work. At about 12:30 am early Mardi Gras morning, Fowler fell asleep at the wheel of his government-owned vehicle (“GOV”).

At the intersection of Harding and Howell Boulevards in Baton Rouge, he collided with a car driven by Fartima Hawkins. Fowler, who submitted to a breathalyzer test at the scene, had a blood alcohol content of 0.112%, which was over the legal limit in Louisiana of 0.08%. Hawkins, who sustained serious injuries in the crash, sued Fowler and the U.S. government in federal district court. Her complaint asserted that Fowler was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the crash and, therefore, the government was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court granted the U.S. government’s motion for summary judgment. Hawkins appealed, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact existed over whether Fowler was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conducted a de novo review of the district court’s decision. Hawkins’s case against the federal government was premised on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which limits responsibility for injury to that which is “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Under the FTCA, the question of whether a negligent act occurred within the course and scope of a federal employee’s duty is settled according to the law of the state in which the alleged act occurred. See Garcia v. United States. Thus, the Fifth Circuit applied Louisiana jurisprudence in its analysis. Generally, an employee’s conduct is within the course and scope of his employment if it is (1) of the kind of conduct that he is employed to perform; (2)it occurs within the authorized time and space of employment; and (3) it is initiated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. See Orgeron v. McDonald. The default approach in Louisiana is the “going and coming” rule: that is, when an employee is involved in a car accident on his way to or from his place of employment, it is considered to be outside of the course and scope. An exception to the rule is when the employee uses an employer-owned vehicle in the “performance of an employment responsibility.” Factors that influence the analysis include: (1) whether the employee’s use of the vehicle benefitted the employer; (2) whether the employee was subject to the authority of the employer at the time of the accident; (3) whether the employee was authorized to use the vehicle; and (4) whether the worker was motivated to use the vehicle, at least in part, by the employer’s concerns. Brooks v. Guerrero. The court found “no evidence … that Fowler’s use of the GOV was related to any employment responsibility or was of any value to the Army.” Instead, the court found that “Fowler was going home for the Mardi Gras holiday at the time of the accident” and, accordingly, was not acting within the course and scope of his duties as an Army recruiter. Although the court recognized that Fowler’s “permission to use a GOV on the evening of the accident [was] genuinely disputed,” it held that the settlement of that issue was not essential to determining the course and scope of employment. Thus, the court concluded that “no genuine issue of material fact exists that might preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of the United States.”

August 30, 2011

Service Crucial in Successful Court Cases

by Berniard Law Firm

In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a person, proper service of process must be employed, giving legal notice to the party of the suit and enabling them to timely prepare in anticipation of the suit. If proper service is not performed, a court may not have jurisdiction over such person. In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, the requirements of proper service were explored in order to determine whether the proper steps were employed. proper service of process is one of the most important parts of a law suit, without proper service, the defendant may not be forced to participate in the case. Thus, the importance of proper service cannot be emphasized enough.

The case at issue involves the plaintiff, who fax-filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), seeking to recover damages arising from an automobile accident. In the plaintiffs petition, requested service on DOTD though the attorney general was made. The issue became whether the plaintiff’s service of process was insufficient based on the fact that he did not request service on the secretary of DOTD. Citing to Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5107(A) which provides in part:

“In all suits filed against the state of Louisiana or a state agency, citation and service may be obtained by citation and service on the attorney general of Louisiana, or on any employee in his office above the age of sixteen years, or any other proper officer or person, depending upon the identity of the named defendant and in accordance with the laws of this state, and on the department, board, commission, or agency head or person…”

August 28, 2011

River Boat Casino Injury: Is it a Maritime Issue?

by Berniard Law Firm

Gambling is one of the many recreational activities that the state of Louisiana has to offer. One of the more popular ways to gamble in Louisiana, is on the river boat casinos. However, in a recent Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision, the court explored whether or not incidents such as personal injury that occur on these river boat casinos qualify under maritime law as a result of being “in navigation.” This issue presents an interesting dilemma in classification, especially after the Louisiana legislature in 2001 amended the gambling laws so as to prohibit gambling boats in Lake Charles from conducting cruises or excursions. Thus, the question becomes: are these river boat casinos in navigation and thus governed by maritime law?

The facts of the case include a young woman who visited a river boat casino on Lake Charles to enjoy gambling in addition to the complimentary food and drinks. However, she became intoxicated and at 4 a.m., she fell from a stairway onto the ground below, suffering serious injuries. According to protocall, her blood alcohol content was measured at 0.33%. Initially, the young woman pursued damages under Louisiana law, however, Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.1 provides:

“The legislature finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person.”

August 26, 2011

Time is of the Essence When Understanding Prescription and Timing of a Case

by Berniard Law Firm

When making a legal claim against a person or entity, time is of the essence. Prescription bars certain legal actions after a specified time period. If the specified time period has lapsed, the action is thereafter prohibited. The Fifth Circuit recently explored the issue of prescription, demonstrating how prescription operates to effectively bar actions if they are not timely brought.

The facts of the case are disturbing; the plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually abused by a Roman Catholic priest who was ordained by the Catholic Church. The complaint alleges very serious accusations of abuse. However, abuse turned out not to be the dispositive issue, rather, prescription was the focal point for the Fifth Circuit. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether the suit, based on molestation allegations that occurred over twenty-five years ago, was timely under Louisiana law. It was uncontested that the plaintiff’s claims had indeed expired and that they were as a result, barred, unless prescription was tolled under the Louisiana law doctrine of “contra non valentem.” This is an exception that was judicially created to statutory prescription, it applies only in exceptional circumstances. In particular, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Eastin v. Entergy Corp., held that the “prescriptive period commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based” if contra non valentem applies. The plaintiffs alleged that exceptional circumstances were present, as a result of their memories of the abuse they suffered being repressed, preventing them from knowing about their cause of action. However, depositions that the plaintiff gave showed otherwise. Rather, the plaintiffs unequivocally stated that they actively remembered the abuse after it occurred. Thus, their memories were not repressed and the concept of contra non valentem would not apply. Prescription would instead, govern the issue.

The plaintiffs thereafter contended that they should have the opportunity to obtain additional evidence on the subject of their repressed memories and would obtain an affidavit from a professor of psychology that would support their contentions. This affidavit would be used to rebut the defendant’s Rule 56 summary judgment motion, such motions are generally favored and should be liberally granted, but the plaintiffs must demonstrate two things. First, they must demonstrate why they need additional discovery and second, how the additonal discovery will likely create a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, even if the plaintiffs were granted additional time to obtain the affidavit in their support, it would not suffice to defeat a summary judgment motion. The plaintiffs already admitted in their depositions that they could remember the abuse right after each encounter, thus, the affidavit would not help defeat summary judgment since they already have demonstrated a lack of exceptional circumstances to qualify for prescriptive tolling.

August 24, 2011

Ouachita Parish Medical Malpractice Case Reveals Second Circuit’s Interest in Allowing Plaintiffs Their Day in Court

by Berniard Law Firm

Numerous prior posts on this blog have examined Louisiana’s system for helping plaintiffs who have been the victim of medical malpractice. Although the state’s medical review panel is in place to screen potential claims before they get to court, a plaintiff must still rely on competent legal counsel to see the case to resolution. So important is the lawyer’s role that the courts have consistently held that when a litigant loses his day in court solely due to his attorney’s negligence, strictly enforcing a technical rule should not result in the miscarriage of justice. This principle was recently relied upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of Sims v. Hawkins-Sheppard to avoid an unjust outcome for the plaintiff.

Rebecca Sims was admitted to the maternity ward of the Glenwood Regional Medical Center in Ouachita Parish on April 2, 2007 for the delivery of her baby. She requested a delivery by Caesarean section due to complications she experienced with her first child. Sims’s doctor, Tonya Hawkins-Sheppard, nevertheless decided to perform a surgical vaginal delivery

with the use of forceps. Sims’s baby suffered permanent eye injuries from the use of the forceps, and Sims herself suffered injuries that required a hysterectomy. Sims submitted her claim to the state’s medical review panel. She alleged that she was heavily medicated and in great pain, and therefore did not give consent for the delivery as performed by Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard; further, Sims asserted that Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard breached the applicable standard of care in the delivery of her baby. After receiving the review panel’s opinion that Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard did meet the standard of care, Sims filed a lawsuit. Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard filed a motion for summary judgment when Sims’s counsel responded to discovery requests with a statement that Sims did not have a medical expert who could offer an opinion. Sims’s counsel then filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment which contained an unsigned physician’s affidavit. Sims’s lawyer assured both Sims and the court that the unsigned affidavit would be replaced with a valid affidavit before the scheduled hearing on the motion. But Sims’s lawyer failed to obtain the signed affidavit because he did not present it to the physician, Dr. Kimberly Hess, before she left for vacation out of state. Sims learned of this only the day before the hearing, at which time she fired her attorney. At the hearing, Sims explained the situation to the court but the judge refused to grant a continuance so she could obtain new counsel. Instead, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Sims found new counsel about a month later, who immediately filed an appeal of the court’s granting of summary judgment for Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard.

August 22, 2011

Louisiana Residents’ Backhoe Damages Utility Cable on Owned Land a Trespass?

by Berniard Law Firm

In the event that a landowner plans to do any form of significant work on an area of land, whether cosmetic, such as landscaping, or extensive, the work should be preceded by the contracting of one qualified and certified to inspect the property and physically mark the location of utility cables upon it. This is to prevent damage to the utility cables, and to prevent the costs of repair to the companies which own the cables. Such action invokes the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act – Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities Damage Prevention Law.

An incident central to the MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan case was noted at causing a $20,000 per minute loss to the utility company for every minute the cable was out of commission. It seems rational that the possible negligence and/or trespass in damaging the cable, property owned by a utility company, can cause significant troubles, even if it occurs within the land of the property owner.

The most substantial part involved in this case is the determination of what the definition of trespass and negligence is when a landowner affects the transposed property of the utility company. Without a doubt, a landowner has the right to be on and use the land, but the utility company also has been given the right by law to continue to leave its utility cable in/on the land and continue using it, and retains this right even if the contract for use of the land was made with a previous landowner. If a servitude is involved with having the utility cable in/on the land, then there is a possible claim for Trespass to Land in conjunction with a negligence claim. However, if there is not a servitude, and only a right to continue to use the utility cable on the land exists, then the recourse if damage occurs would be Trespass to Chattels, for destruction to private property, not Trespass to Land, as attempted in this case.

August 20, 2011

American Bar Association Calling for Nominations of Top 100 Lawyer Blogs

by Berniard Law Firm

The ABA (American Bar Association) has called upon lawyers and non-lawyers alike to submit blogs from across the internet as exceptional examples of legal advice and content. With content about the law ranging widely across the internet, the ABA recognizes the value of those blogs that wish to educate the public about a wide range of issues as examples of how attorneys can help bring an understanding of public policy to the masses.

Through a form, located here, ABA members and/or the public can nominate the efforts of attorneys whose work helps explain the complexities that the law has to offer. While the competition prevents bloggers from nominating themselves, the ABA has requested that the work of their peers be showcased. Due by September 9th, blog suggestions can cover any topic of the law, whether maritime, personal injury, civil or criminal in nature. This possibility of diversity makes the Top 100 list all the more interesting because of the wide variety of content the selected are sure to cover.

If you know of a blog that wishes to discuss legal issues of interest to lawyers (and perhaps those outside of the field), click here to fill out the ABA’s form. Limited to 500 words, nominations should explain why the blog, obviously, deserves to be included in the list as well as its value as a whole. Nominated sites should avoid the regurgitation of content from other sites (copy and pasted quotes of news items, etc.), showing that the main focus of the content is original discussion of those issues of law that affect professionals as well as the public.

August 18, 2011

Opelousas Parish Natural Gas Explosion, Part 3: Assigning Fault

by Berniard Law Firm

Recently we explored the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s discussion of the legal cause of a tragic natural gas explosion at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Another of Centerpoint’s assignments of error on appeal, the last that we’ll review from the case, was that the jury incorrectly apportioned fault; the jury assigned 50 percent of the fault to Centerpoint and 50 percent to Carl Jones, Sr. Centerpoint argued that Jones should have been assessed “at least ninety percent of the fault in causing the explosion and fire.” The review of fault allocation by an appellate court is based on the “manifestly erroneous” standard. That is, the court must allow the jury’s apportionment to stand unless it is clearly wrong.

The court began its review of Centerpoint’s argument by focusing on the trial testimony of several of its witnesses. All expressed that the company “clearly recognizes the inherently dangerous nature of its product and has developed numerous measures designed to prevent explosions and fires, such as occurred in this litigation.” One witness, the company’s former Operations Manager for the state of Louisiana, testified that the procedures for

disconnecting gas service are “based on the inherently dangerous nature of” natural gas and are designed to “protect people from their own ignorance.” He further expressed the view that Centerpoint has “an obligation to take every reasonable step to prevent its customers from tampering with its natural gas supply system.” The court equated the risk of “catastrophic consequences” created by Centerpoint’s conduct to Jones’s action in reconnecting the gas supply. Had either party “not breached the applicable duties imposed upon them,” reasoned the court, the accident would not have happened. Nevertheless, when comparing their relative conduct, the court concluded that “Centerpoint Energy’s fault far exceeds that of Mr. Jones.” It considered Centerpoint to be the “superior actor” in the incident who failed–even in light of the gas industry’s general awareness that “customers will attempt to steal gas”–to engage in a “rather simple task” that was designed to “prevent exactly the result which occurred.” Thus, the court could “not find that the jury was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in apportioning fault equally” between Centerpoint and Jones.