Articles Posted in Strict Liability

You have probably heard the phrase “accidents happen.” But if you are in an accident, the first thing that you want to ask is who is at fault. With all of the chaos that can be part of an accident, sometimes the answer to this question isn’t always clear. This is when comparative fault, also known as comparative negligence, comes into play. In general, negligence refers to conduct that falls below the standards of behavior established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Comparative negligence is different from ordinary negligence in that ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonable person would exercise in similar circumstances whereas comparative negligence describes conduct that creates an unreasonable risk to one’s self.

In 1979, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323 was amended to provide for a pure comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s own contributing negligence did not bar the recovery of damages, but merely reduced it by his or her own portion of fault. The Louisiana Legislature, in 1996, further amended the Code, making Louisiana a “true” comparative fault jurisdiction and the language of that amendment provided:

In an action for damages where a person suffers injury … the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury … shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action, and regardless of such person’s insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute …

When cases are appealed, the appeals court must grant a great deal of deference to the lower court as the fact-finder. The lower court sees both parties at trial and deals extensively with all of the circumstances of the case. The appeals court, however, may see the parties, but does not listen to testimony or review the facts nearly as extensively as the lower court. Often, the only facts that are presented are those in the record of the lower court. Where the lower court has leeway to find additional facts, the appeals court has no such ability. However, the appeals court does have the discretion to adjust findings of the lower court should they find that the lower court’s determination is not supported by the evidence in the record. Damages are generally vulnerable to changes at the appeals level.

Deference to the trial court may occasionally produce some results that one might question. For example, in a case appealed from the Abbeville City Court in the parish of Vermillion, the plaintiff, who was also the sole witness, and evidence seemed questionable, but because the lower court found in her favor, the appeals court had to defer to the lower court’s version of the facts. In that case, the plaintiff sought damages related to a car accident. The question of fault in the car accident was clearly on the other driver, but the issue in the case revolved around the plaintiff’s request for damages related to her injuries.

The plaintiff was involved in at least six car accidents in the past twenty years. The two most recent occurrences, however, were the issue in this case. The first accident involved the other driver in question. The second accident occurred one month later; she was at fault and it was much more serious because the air bag deployed in the second crash, but not in the first. Nonetheless, the plaintiff attributed back pain, neck pains and severe headaches to the first accident, which was not her fault.

A medical malpractice claim in Natchitoches, Louisiana was dismissed by the District Court, but on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, keeping the claim alive. What led to the different outcomes was a difference in interpretation of the applicable Louisiana statute.

The claim was brought by the husband and children of 62 year old Margaret Benjamin, who was treated for abdominal pain by Dr. William Zeichner at Natchitoches Parish Hospital. Dr. Zeichner performed a surgery, and seven days later Mrs. Benjamin returned to her home in Lynwood, California. Enduring frequent vomiting, she was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of St. Francis Medical Center a few days later. The source of the problem was a small bowel construction. Tragically, she passed away a few weeks later.

Mrs. Benjamin’s family brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Zeichner, alleging the small bowel construction that caused her death was due to Dr. Zeichner’s manipulation of her bowel. They also argued that Dr. Zeichner’s surgery was below the standard of care. They offered an expert witness, Dr. James Shamblin, to testify that Dr. Zeichner breached the standard of care in this case, causing Mrs. Benjamin’s death.

Automobile accidents create questions of coverage and liability – the only problem is how to answer those questions. Who is liable? Are you covered? If you are covered, to what extent are you covered? If you are covered, are your passengers covered? The final point is a more complex question to which recent case law has provided guidance for us.

In February of 2009, an uninsured motorist crashed into a vehicle owned by Ann Bernard. Ann was the driver and she had two passengers with her, Andrea and Norell Bernard, both members of her family not living in her household. Ann filed suit against her insurance provider, Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company in order to obtain uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage under Ann’s Imperial policy. This type of coverage was named “UM” coverage. Ann believed that herself, Andrea, and Norell were all “using” the vehicle and were, accordingly, all insured persons as defined under her policy; thus statutorily entitling them all to coverage under Louisiana law.

In her filing, Ann referenced La. R.S. 22:1295 which states, in relevant part:

A Saint Martinville, Louisiana, construction company, Cole’s Construction Crews, Inc., recently had a judgment against it reversed and remanded back to the trial court. Back in 2007, Cole’s had filed a lawsuit against J-O-B Operating Company. A few months after filing suit, Cole’s requested production of documents and sent interrogatories (or a list of probing questions) to JOB. Almost two years later, in July of 2009, JOB finally answered the requests. Then, in June of 2011, JOB filed a motion to dismiss the suit, claiming that Cole’s had abandoned the lawsuit. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss was signed, and Cole’s then attempted to get the motion set aside. The trial court denied this attempt, and Cole’s appealed the case to the appellate court to get it reviewed.

Cole’s claims that granting the motion to dismiss was an error that should be reversed. First, JOB had just answered the interrogatories less than two years earlier, and second, JOB did not file the requisite affidavit with its motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling and decided that granting the motion to dismiss had been done in error. They came to this conclusion by considering the various aspects of the complex Louisiana abandonment law, which is discussed below.

In Louisiana, Article 561 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure imposes three requirements on plaintiffs in order for their lawsuit to not be considered abandoned. The first requirement is that the plaintiff has to take some sort of formal action before the court with regard to the lawsuit. Next, this action needs to take place during a court proceeding and must be in the suit’s record, unless it is part of formal discovery. Finally, this action has to take place in the requisite amount of time. If three years have passed without an appropriate action as described above taken by either party, then the suit is automatically abandoned. Even though abandonment is self-executing, defendants are encouraged to get an ex part order of dismissal, just like JOB did in this case, to make sure that their right to assert abandonment is not waived.

A Louisiana volunteer firefighter, Rodney Champagne, who works for the Duson Volunteer Fire Department was injured around June 28, 2010, while testing fire hoses at the fire department. After the hose wall blew out, the hose struck Mr. Champagne in the head, ultimately causing permanent mental injuries. The contact also fractured his skull. In response, Champagne and his wife filed a tort suit, both individually and on behalf of their minor child.

A tort is basically just a wrongful act that someone does that causes them to be legally liable. These acts are not necessarily illegal, but rather, are acts that cause someone else to suffer loss or be harmed unfairly. In this case, the plaintiffs are claiming that the hose wall blowout that led to Champagne’s head injuries is the tortious act for which someone should be legally liable.

The plaintiffs filed suit against several defendants, but two in particular, Lavergne (another fire fighter at the same department) and AAIC (Lavergne’s insurer), tried to get a motion for summary judgment passed to excuse them from the suit. The motion for summary judgment argued that Lavergne was immune from tort liability because he is a co-employee of Champagne.

Medical treatment is always a sensitive legal issue. In one instance, a patient, Ms. Finley, received an improper diagnosing from her local ER. The trial court granted Ms. Finley’s motion for summary judgment against an Emergency Room (ER) doctor for breaching the standard of care by misdiagnosing her during examination. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because summary judgment cannot be based on a factual finding. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s failure to grant a motion to strike the defendant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment, but was unsuccessful because the trial court has discretion concerning service of process.

Ms. Finley was accepted as a patient at the Christus St. Frances Cabrini Hospital ER of Rapides Parish on August 30, 2002. Although a medical review panel opinioned that Dr. Ugokwe did not breach the standard of care and took all reasonable steps in an attempted diagnosis of a difficult to determine health circumstance, Ms. Finley filed suit on May 11, 2005.

The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was based on depositions from the defendant’s expert witness that allegedly agreed with the plaintiff’s expert, proving the applicable standard of care and its breach. Dr. Ugokwe filed his objection and the opposition was left in the mail slot of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s building. The Plaintiff received the opposition and filed a motion to strike.

Louisiana, like many other jurisdictions, has adopted the doctrine of comparative fault. Prior to comparative fault, many plaintiffs were denied recovery from a negligent wrongdoer if they also were negligently at fault (according to the doctrine of contributory negligence). Comparative fault alleviated this harsh rule of contributory negligence and, for some time now, Louisiana Law has provided relief for an injured plaintiff, even if said plaintiff was negligent as well. For instance, if an injured plaintiff filed suit and the jury decided that the defendant was responsible for 15% of your injuries, that defendant would be liable for 15% of the damages. Such a rule promotes a fairness, but how does this rule comport with legal fees?

Trial itself isn’t free, and in many cases expert testimony is crucial. The general rule is that the percentage of fault assigned applies to court costs as well.

In a recent case, Davis v. State of Louisiana, there was an automobile accident where the jury found DOTD 25% at fault but the judge, rather than assigning DOTD 25% of the costs, assigned them 100% of expert fees and clerk’s costs.

In the summer of 2007, a woman was dining at a hotel restaurant in Alexandria, LA, when she was injured, allegedly by the restaurant’s negligence. Exactly one year later the aggrieved, Ms. Holmes, filed suit, naming Choice Hotels, Inc. as the defendant. Within weeks Choice Hotels responded, asserting it had no connection whatsoever with the hotel where the accident occurred. It seems that, through unfortunate circumstances, Ms. Holmes mistakenly named and served the wrong party.

Within a month of receiving notice of her mistake, Ms. Holmes amended her petition, correctly renaming the defendant. However, by the time they were served with notice, fourteen months had passed since the date of the injury. Granting the hotel owner’s motion for “exception of prescription,” the trial court dismissed the case.

Exception of prescription occurs when the prescribed amount of time to file a complaint expires. It is a procedural rule developed to protect a defendant from the burden of defending stale claims, but since it is developed purely for protecting the defendant against prejudice, where prejudice is absent, Louisiana law provides a doctrine that will allow the amended complaint to “relate back.” An amendment “relates back” to the date the original complaint was filed so long as the action asserted by the amended complaint “arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence” of the action asserted in the original complaint. La.Code. Civ.P. art. 1153. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has set forth specific requirements prerequisite of an amended complaint that mistakenly named the wrong defendant in 1983.

In continuing the last post, an automobile accident took place where a variety of damages awarded to the plaintiff were mitigated by the allocation of fault. After the court of appeals reversed the allocation of fault and rendered that Mr. Artigue was 100% at fault, the court addressed four remaining assertions of error. Ms. Richard asserted that the jury committed manifest error in determining each of the four monetary values defined, arguing that the values were lower than the lowest reasonable value that could be determined by the facts at trial.

The jury’s determination of damages is a finding of fact, and much discretion is left to the jury (or judge in a bench trial where he or she is the trier of fact). Therefore, a trial court’s finding of fact cannot be reversed unless it is clearly wrong. i.e. that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding. The court of Appeals affirmed the loss of future wages, past wages, and general damages. However, the court held that the award for future medical expenses demonstrated manifest error and amended the judgment for future medical expenses

Ms. Richard also argued that the amount reached by the jury for future earnings was erroneous because it was below what either economist testified to as her future lost wages. However, both estimations assumed that she could not ever work again, and the facts show that Ms. Richard didn’t cease working until slightly over 2 years after the accident (when she was fired). Therefore, the jury could have reasonably found that Richard may return to work in the future.

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