Pain And Suffering Claims

September 25, 2012

Taser Death Explored in St. Martin Parish Case

In our prior post, we began our review of a wrongful death action that followed the tasering of Othello Pierre by two St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s deputies after he caused a disturbance at a Fourth of July party and attempted to flee the scene. We now examine the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in analyzing whether the deputies’ use of the taser amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force.

According to the court, an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment “must demonstrate (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a clearly excessive force, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” In order for the Plaintiff to be successful in this wrongful death action, it is essential that all of these three requirements articulated by the court are met. If even one of the prongs to an excessive force claim are not met, then the Plaintiff will ultimately fail in his action.

In the case of Mr. Pierre, the court concluded that the Plaintiff’s claim “fail[ed] on the second prong” because they offered no evidence to show that Pierre’s injuries–and, by extension, his death–were the direct result of the tasing. Thus, in the court’s view, Pierre’s death did not result directly from the tasing; therefore, he did not meet all the explicit requirements for an excessive force claim. By not meeting the second requirement, the question of whether the tasering was reasonable in the first place was effectively moot.

September 23, 2012

St. Martin Parish Police Tasing Leads to Wrongful Death Suit

by Berniard Law Firm

On July 4, 2008, Othello Pierre attended a party at his uncle’s house in St. Martin Parish. Pierre’s uncle called 911 when Pierre got into a violent argument with a cousin. Two deputies with the St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Department responded. A third deputy and distant relative of Pierre was also at the party; she informed the two deputies who responded to the 911 call that she suspected there may be warrant out for Pierre’s arrest. The deputies ran Pierre’s name and confirmed that he had an outstanding felony arrest warrant for burglary. When one of the deputies attempted to place Pierre under arrest, he broke away and fled the scene. The two responding deputies pursued Pierre on foot and soon found him hiding behind an old camper shell. Though ordered not to move, Pierre again attempted to run away, at which point one of the deputies fired his taser. The taser barbs hit Pierre in the arm and the head, shocking him with a single five-second cycle. An ambulance took Pierre to the Lafayette General Medical Center where he died approximately three hours later. The autopsy revealed that Pierre’s death was the result of “multidrug intoxication” from substances such as methamphetamine, THC, cocaine, alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine.

Narra Batiste and other members of Pierre’s family filed a civil action against the St. Martin Parish Sheriff and the deputies for the wrongful death of Pierre, alleging, among other things, that the deputies’ use of the taser was an unconstitutional use of deadly or excessive force. The district court heard motions for summary judgment on several issues, including the deputies’ motion to dismiss the claim of excessive force. The court denied the deputies’ motion, and appeal was taken in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Plaintiffs relied on two paths to argue that Pierre’s tasering amounted to an unconstitutional use of deadly force. First, the Plaintiffs cited a Supreme Court case that held it was unlawful to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to a police officer. Because that case concerned the use of a gun and not a taser, however, the court rejected its applicability. The court noted that no Fifth Circuit cases equated the use of a taser to the discharging of a firearm, and it declined to be the first. Second, the Plaintiffs argued that the deputy’s use of the taser while running violated the Sheriff Department’s policy and was contrary to the taser manufacturer’s guidelines for safe use. Yet, in the court’s view, the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the use of the taser in the manner they described created an unreasonable risk of death. The court pointed to a dispute over whether Pierre was actually running when the taser was deployed, and concluded that “Plaintiffs’ assertions that the use of a taser on a fleeing suspect amounted to deadly force [were] unfounded.”

September 19, 2012

How Louisiana Determines Damages for Personal Injury

by Berniard Law Firm

When a court award damages, the judges commonly look to whether or not that pain and suffering can be attributed to the defending party, the amount of time a victim suffered, and how much pain and suffering occurred. The cause is perhaps the most important aspect of whether or not a party will be awarded damages. It makes little sense for a defendant to have to pay for pain and suffering to the plaintiff if the defendant’s actions did not cause that pain and suffering. Then, the length and intensity of the suffering will help determine how much money will be awarded.

In a recent case, the plaintiff appealed from the Parish of Lafayette to the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit based on the issue of damages. In this case, the plaintiff was in a car accident where she suffered significant damage to her back. As a result of this injury, she spent approximately twenty-eight months with the chiropractor attempting to correct the damage sustained to her lower back.

Although the victim visited the chiropractor before the accident occurred, the doctor recorded the services rendered before and after the accident. The doctor stated that the victim’s injuries worsened and the accident definitely caused the worsened condition. The lower court awarded general damages and medical fees, but it only ordered enough general damages that would cover seven months after the accident. It explained that the victim was already seeing the chiropractor; therefore, the services she received after the accident were only relating to a condition that was already present before the accident.

September 17, 2012

Wife’s Interests Not Represented by Attorney in Pre-Divorce Collusion

by Berniard Law Firm

Officers of the Court are expected to follow a specific level of professionalism and truthfulness that trumps any personal feelings they have on a case. One unfortunate case highlighted today involves the dissolution of a 22-year marriage and the unfortunate deceitful behavior of the husband and his attorney. Unbeknownst to the wife, the husband filed a petition for divorce on August 9, 2006. On that same day, the husband convinced his wife to meet at his attorney’s office to discuss a settlement of the community property. The wife was under the impression that the attorney was a neutral party, helping the couple come to a fair division of their property. However, things were not as they appeared.

The husband and wife signed an agreement partitioning their community property at the meeting along with a quitclaim deed for their real estate. A few days later, the couple returned to the attorney’s office and re-executed the documents in the presence of two witnesses for formality purposes.

When the wife became aware of the scheming on the part of her husband and the attorney, she immediately filed a suit in the trial court to rescind the agreement based on error, fraud, duress and lesion. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the husband and the wife appealed, bringing us to the case-at-hand.

September 12, 2012

Maritime Injury: The Jones Act and How it Applies to Recovering Damages (Part 2)

by Berniard Law Firm

This post is a follow up regarding the worker’s compensation claims in a maritime case previously discussed in “Maritime Injury: The Jones Act.” The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed the complicated worker’s compensation aspects of this case in addition to the rejection of the use of The Jones Act in the injured party’s attempt to avoid an employer’s contributory negligence claim. In order to fully understand the worker’s compensation aspects of this case, it is important to consider some additional facts of the District Court’s decision.

As a reminder, a crane mechanic employed by a third party was injured on an oil rig due to the partial negligence of himself and the owners of the rig. He fell through an uncovered ladder from the top portion of the crane cab and was seriously injured when he landed on the deck below. After his injury, the employee was no longer able to work as a crane mechanic but remained an employee for his previous company.

While the injured man was unable to work as a crane mechanic, his employer gave him a clerical position and paid him significantly more than someone in a clerical position would earn. His employer continued to pay him the wage he earned as a crane mechanic and although he only worked approximately twenty hours a week, his employer paid him for fifty-five hours per week. The lower court determined that this dramatic increase in wages for the work done could be considered an advance of worker’s compensation benefits. They based this determination on the original intention of the employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision by stating that the lower court had ample evidence to make this conclusion.

September 10, 2012

Maritime Injury: The Jones Act and How it Applies to Recovering Damages

by Berniard Law Firm

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an injury case that involved a crane mechanic who was injured on an offshore drilling rig. The man was injured when he fell through an uncovered ladder hole on the top portion of the crane cab which was about fourteen feet above the deck of the rig. As a result of his injuries, he is now unable to work as a crane mechanic, but he has returned to work in a clerical capacity for the company in which he was working for previously. The two parties in this case are the employee and the owner of the rig on which he was injured; however, this case is complicated because the employer is also involved in the worker’s compensation claims.

This case involved a cross appeal where both parties appealed some part of the lower court’s decision. There were a few issues that arose in this case that that Court of Appeals addressed. This case touches on the Jones Act and considers the concept of contributory negligence. This case is also based on the Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act so it affects the employer and their insurance company as well. This post will present the basic facts of this case and discuss the Jones Act. A follow up post will address the worker’s compensation aspects of the court’s decision.1

The employee appealed based on the claim that that he did not contribute to his own injury by being careless. This concept is generally known as contributory negligence. He also argued that even if he was partially responsible, the Jones Act protected him from being punished for his contribution to the injury. The owner of the rig appealed based on the claim that they were also not partially negligent. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered all of these issues in turn and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court states that both parties were partially negligent in this case; the owner of the rig left open the cover through which the employee fell and the employee was not watching where he was going, thus contributing to his injury.

September 3, 2012

Malicious Prosecution Another Form of Injury Suffered by Public

by Berniard Law Firm

A sheriff candidate for Concordia Parish, James Whittington, sued his opponent, Sheriff Randy Maxwell, for malicious prosecution and violating both his Fourth Amendment and First Amendment rights.

During the sheriff election campaign, Whittington ran several ads in the local newspaper including several that described misconduct that had allegedly taken place in the Sheriff’s Office during Maxwell’s term. Specifically, Whittington claimed that the deputy sheriff had been arrested on charges of marijuana possession. He even published an arrest ticket for the deputy sheriff’s arrest for marijuana. These ads caused Maxwell much embarrassment over his management of the Sheriff’s Office.

Maxwell arrested Whittington on the report of his ex-girlfriend who claimed that Whittington had harassed her by making multiple phone calls to her and taking two rings off her hand, refusing to return them. The judge, Boothe, set Whittington’s bail at $175,000, a high amount considering Whittington’s prior record of a single misdemeanor. Since Whittington could not post bond, he spent fifty days in jail.

August 31, 2012

Damages a Complicated Concern in Louisiana Asbestos Case

by Berniard Law Firm

Damages are awarded in successful civil instances in order to put the injured party back into a position that they would have been in had the events in the case unfolded as planned or if the transaction had not taken place at all. For example, in a contracts case, if one party ordered and paid for widgets, and does not receive those widgets, then he should be able to get his money back or the court could force the other party to provide the widgets as promised. Sometimes, however, the position that you were in before the deal is not easy to quantify into a dollar amount. In cases where the injury is either physical or emotional, damages are very difficult to estimate.

In cases where the injury is either physical, emotional, or both, the court uses a variety of methods to attempt to determine the appropriate amount of damages. For example, if someone has been harmed physically and needs to go to the hospital, then part of the compensation will often include money to cover the hospital bills. If an individual has been troubled emotionally and needs to see a therapist, then the bills for that service will often be considered to figure damages. In addition, the court will often look at past cases to determine what type of monetary award that juries have given to the victim under similar circumstances. If the award that the jury gives is significantly smaller or larger than past awards then the court may intervene to adjust the damages granted.

A 2011 Delaware Supreme Court case illustrates this concept very well. In this case, a son and mother were exposed to asbestos while operating a car repair business for over forty years in Louisiana. They died after contracting mesothelioma; the mother died two years prior to her son’s death. Several issues came up in this case regarding the payment of damages. The lower court declared that two businesses were partially liable for the death of these individuals. Therefore, those businesses were ordered to pay $500,000 to the four remaining family members for the loss of their mother, $0 to the son for the loss of his mother, $80,000 to the mother’s estate for pain and suffering, and $1.6 million to the son’s estate for his pain and suffering. All of these funds were given to the four remaining family members.

August 27, 2012

Court Determines Louisiana Man’s $1.3 Million Award for Injury is Not Excessive

by Berniard Law Firm

In October of 2009 a man was injured on a tugboat near Amelia, Louisiana, while attempting to do his duty as a deckhand. Two major issues came up in this case when it went to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. First, the deckhand had to prove that he did not cause or partially cause his own injury. Second, he also had to demonstrate that the damages he was awarded at the District Court level were not excessive. Both of these factors were proven and the injured man was awarded approximately $1.3 million in damages.

The deckhand in this case was on a small tugboat and attempted to transfer a big barge that they were hauling to another larger tugboat. The small tugboat crew made the transfer in the very early morning hours and while the sea was quite rough. The deckhand was injured when his tugboat dipped in a wave; a wire came untied, and struck him. He was thrown against a wall, which knocked him unconscious. As a result, he had fractures in two of his vertebrae and wore a back brace for a month before a serious surgery that fused his vertebrae together. He also has serious pain issues that will have to be controlled with a pain pump, which gives pain medication directly to the spinal cord, or the continued use of oral pain medication. His pain issues will likely continue for the rest of his life.

In order to collect damages, the deckhand needed to prove that his injury was not also partially his own fault because he was being careless. In legal terms, this is known as contributory negligence. This was a major issue because at the time that the deckhand was injured, he was in what was called a “pressure zone.” The pressure zone basically assumes that the portion of the deck in which he was standing was more dangerous at the time of the transfer than the other portions of the deck. This is because a wire that the boats used to transfer was tight at that portion of the deck, so if it came loose then the deckhands would lose control of it. The court determined that he did not contribute to his injury in this case because he was following the orders of his captain when he was injured. Previous case law has stated that individuals following orders cannot have contributory negligence because their superiors put them in that situation.

August 20, 2012

Medical Malpractice Claim Arises from Failure to Follow DNR

by Berniard Law Firm

A do-not-resuscitate order (“DNR”) is a formalized direction to medical personnel that they are forbidden from performing life-saving efforts on an individual who is in need of care. In Jones v. Ruston Louisiana Hospital Company, the decedent filed a DNR, which was kept on record, with the Northern Louisiana Medical Center (“NLMC”) in Ruston, Louisiana. In July of 2009, the decedent was admitted to the NLMC for medical treatment; and six days later, despite the very clear instructions of the DNR, NLMC employees resuscitated him when he went into cardiac arrest. Thereafter, the decedent suffered unnecessary and extensive physical disabilities, requiring rehabilitative treatment for two months until his death.

The decedent’s family members (the “Plaintiffs”) posthumously brought suit against NLMC for the following four claims: (1) reimbursement for medical expenses in connection with his rehabilitation care; (2) physical and mental pain and suffering; (3) loss of enjoyment of life and cognitive decline; and (4) bystander recovery. However, the NLMC fired back with a procedural defect argument that the Plaintiffs skipped a crucial step in bringing the lawsuit. An “exception of prematurity” was filed based on the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”), which requires that a case be brought before a medical review panel prior to claims being filed in court when the defendant is a qualified healthcare provider. This exception applies when the underlying alleged conduct of the defendant exists under the LMMA umbrella. Specifically, and most importantly in this case, the claim must be for medical malpractice claim and not general tort liability.

The issue at hand was whether the Plaintiffs’ claims were based on medical malpractice or general tort law. In order to resolve this issue, the court relied on Coleman v. Deno (2002), which established the following six factors: (1) whether the wrong is “treatment related” or caused by failure to exercise professional judgement; (2) whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether a standard of care was breached; (3) whether the patient’s condition was assessed; (4) whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities that a hospital is licensed to perform; (5) whether the treatment caused the injury or would have happened without medical care; and (6) whether it was an intentional tort.