Pain And Suffering Claims

October 9, 2012

Chlorine Gas Leak Case Offers Lesson on Products Liability Claims

Four workers who were employed by the Prairieville-based Proserve Hydro Co. were working on at a Honeywell International facility when a hose carrying chlorine gas ruptured, causing them injury. The workers sued Triplex, Inc., the company that had sold the hose to Honeywell, under the theory that it was liable for their injuries as the manufacturer of the hose. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, applying the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), granted summary judgment in favor of Triplex, and the workers appealed.

In its review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified four elements that a plaintiff must establish in a products liability suit under the LPLA. It focused particualrly on the requirement that the defendant must be the “manufacturer” of the product according to the state’s definition. The lower court’s summary judgment was based on Triplex’s position that it was not a manufacturer of the hose within the meaning of the LPLA. The hose in question was a “Resistoflex Chlorine Hose Part # HB30HB30HB-1560.” It consisted of a Teflon inner-core surrounded by a braided material jacket. The core and jacket were assembled by the Crane Resistoflex Company and shipped in bulk to Triplex for distribution. Upon receipt of an order from Honeywell, Triplex cut the hose to the requested length, installed Resistoflex-approved fittings to either end, and pressure-tested the hose. Triplex recorded the specifications of this work on an assembly test certificate which listed “Resistoflex” as the manufacturer of the hose.

The court looked to the LPLA to determine whether, based on its cutting the Resistoflex hose and installing the end fittings, Triplex fit the definition of “manufacturer.” It noted that the workers’ expert conceded that the hose rupture occured a significant distance away from any end fitting and did not appear to result from the modifications Triplex performed. It also affirmed the point that “the simple act of testing a product after modifications,” as Triplex did, “does not transform a seller into a statutory ‘manufacturer.’” The court was not persuaded that Triplex exercised any “control over… a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the product,” given that Honeywell specified the exact Resistoflex part number and the end fittings it required. Accordingly, the court concluded that Triplex was not a manufacturer under the state law definition, and therefore could not be found liable for the workers’ injuries under the LPLA.

October 7, 2012

Louisiana’s Third Circuit Upholds Prescription Finding in Kinder Property Contamination Case

by Berniard Law Firm

In 1960, Hunt Petroleum Corporation (“Hunt”) entered into a surfaces lease with the Reynolds family. In 1997, Kinder Gas Processing Corporation (“Kinder Gas”), one of Hunt’s successors in interest, notified the Reynolds of an environmental study “that showed a few things [Kinder Gas] wanted to clean up,” and that it was “in the process of cleaning them up.” Over several years, Kinder Gas discussed with the Reynolds the possibility of buying part of the property and cancelling the entire lease. On January 14, 2008, the Reynolds (through a real estate appraiser) offered to sell the entire property to Kinder Gas. The offer referred to environmental problems on the property caused by Kinder Gas or its predecessors.

In 2010, Kinder Gas brought suit for a declaratory judgment against the Reynolds to avoid liability for damage to the Reynolds’ property. In turn, the Reynolds sought damages against Kinder Gas and other successors (“the Gas Companies”) in connection with toxic wastes that were spilled or disposed on the property. The Reynolds relied on theories of strict liability, nuisance, continuing trespass, and breach of contract. They asserted that the lease was cancelled as a result of the Gas Companies’ breach of contract. The Gas Companies countered that the tort claims had prescribed, and that the breach of contract claim was premature.

The Kinder Gas v. Reynolds trial court agreed with the Gas Companies, finding that the Reynolds’ had constructive knowledge of possible contamination prior to the real estate agent’s January 14, 2008 offer. Citing Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. and Hogg v. Chevron USA, the court held that the Reynolds’ failure to file their tort claims within a year from this date resulted in prescription. The court also found that the lease was still in effect. Relying on Dore Energy Company v. Carter-Langham, Inc., the court held that the Reynolds’ contract claim for restoration of land on which operations were ongoing was premature.

October 5, 2012

Louisiana’s Third Circuit Overturns Decision Limiting Landowners’ Recovery of Damages in Vermillion Parish Pollution Case

by Berniard Law Firm

In Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, the State of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board brought suit against Union Oil Company of California (“Unocal”) and other oil companies for remediation of polluted state property in Vermilion Parish. Unocal admitted that it was responsible for environmental damage on the property and filed a motion to refer the case to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) pursuant to Act 312 of 2006, La.R.S. 30:29. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that such a referral could not take place until all Defendants admitted responsibility and the private claims were tried to the jury. The trial court agreed with Plaintiffs.

Unocal filed a motion for partial summary judgment limiting Plaintiffs’ remediation damage claims to the amount determined by LDNR to be “the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental damage” under La.R.S. 30:29(c)(3). Unocal argued that this language served as a cap on remediation damages resulting from a tort or the implied restoration obligation of a mineral lease. The trial court agreed.Plaintiffs appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued a decision on the case on February 1, 2012.

In considering whether La.R.S. 30:29 limited Plaintiff’s recoverable remediation damages to the cost of a “feasible plan,” the appeals court first looked to the language of the statute. The court quoted the first sentence of La.R.S. 32:29(H): “This section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section.” The court found that this language clearly contemplated the landowner receiving an award in addition to that provided by the feasible plan.

October 1, 2012

Maritime Injury Leads to Lawsuit Against Employers Leads to Jurisdiction Issue

by Berniard Law Firm

An employee working on the deck of a marine vessel suffered injuries to his back and hips after a crane moving equipment from the dock swung a cargo basket at him and pinned him to the ship. The employee sued the company operating the crane as well as his own employer who operated the ship he was loading.

The plaintiff-employee, Hamm, and the defendant-companies, Island Operating Company (IOC) and Rodan, disagree about what jurisdiction controls this case. The plaintiff argues that his claims fall under admiralty jurisdiction and as such elected to undertake a non-jury trial as allowed under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the defendant companies desire a jury trial and believe that the case falls under the Outer Continental Shelf lands Act (OCSLA).

What law is applicable in this case—admiralty or OCSLA—is determinative in this case due to the different statute of limitations. If the case falls under federal maritime law then the employee has three years to file his claim, but if the case falls under OCSLA then the case will fall under the law of the adjacent state (in this case, Louisiana) and the employee had to file his claim within a year. If OCSLA is found to be the applicable law then the employee’s claim will not be valid since he filed suit fifteen months after the accident. If federal maritime law applies, then not only will Hamm be entitled to the non-jury trial he wants, but Rodan and IOC will not be able to throw the case out.

September 29, 2012

Calcasieu Parish Taser Death Raises Questions on Duty of Care

by Berniard Law Firm

A man died in Calcasieu Parish following an altercation with the Lake Charles Police Department. The victim, Deshotels, was chased out of a neighbor’s garage by her husband. The husband grabbed him in a chokehold, which ultimately rendered him unconscious. On their way to a burglary call in the same area, the police en route received a call from dispatch that the neighbor had apprehended Deshotels. Believing it to be the same call, they arrived at the apartment complex, expecting to deal with a burglary suspect, not a trespasser. When Deshotels attempted to run from the police officers, one of them tased him twice to stop his resistance so the others could handcuff him. The officers noted that Deshotels had turned blue and stopped breathing so they uncuffed him and called an ambulance.

His family sued the officers involved, the Lake Charles Police Department, and the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office. They brought charges for excessive force and failing to provide appropriate medical assistance against the officers involved in cowing Deshotels. Against the other officers present, they brought bystander liability claims for not preventing the tasing. The trial court granted summary judgment to the police department, dismissing the bystander liability and excessive force claims against the majority of the officers. However, the family’s claims of failure to render appropriate medical assistance and excessive force by the tasing officer are currently pending before the district court. The family appeals the dismissal of these claims.

An excessive force claim will succeed if the plaintiff can show that he suffered an injury that resulted directly and only from the use of force and that the force used was objectively unreasonable. In police situations, courts consider factors like whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of others, whether he was actively resisting arrest or trying to flee, the existence of alternative methods of arrest, the nature of the offense involved, and the risks and dangers faced by the officers. But because police officers are usually required to make split second judgments in tense situations, the court evaluates the officer’s use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer being thrust into that scene. Since the excessive force claim against the tasing officer was denied summary judgment, the appellate court looked the other officer’s actions in subduing and handcuffing Deshotels. Were the actions reasonable under the circumstances?

September 27, 2012

Choice of Law: Wrongful Death Case in Amelia, LA Uses Louisiana Law

by Berniard Law Firm

As you may know, different states have sometimes very different laws. Laws are overall somewhat similar, but small discrepancies between state laws will matter a great deal in a lawsuit. The most common example of this type of conflict occurs when an individual has been injured in one state, usually while traveling, and actually lives in another state. Whose law applies in that situation? Naturally, the states have come up with a generalized test for the court to consider.

The test is usually referred to as the “significant relationship” test. The court will determine which state has the strongest connection to the lawsuit. It will consider factors such as where the injured party lives, where the injury occurred, who caused the injury, and where the causing party lives. Where the injury actually occurred is important because witnesses and evidence will be gathered from the scene. If those witnesses and evidence have to be transferred to another state, then the trial may become a lot more time consuming and expensive for both parties. In order to maintain efficiency, the court will weigh the location of the incident heavily.

In February of this year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case where choice of law was a major issue. In this case, an individual was killed as he was being transported in a helicopter to an oilrig in international waters off the coast of Louisiana for employment purposes. The helicopter hit a bird and went down, killing eight of the nine people that were in it. The crash was attributed to a product defect.

September 25, 2012

Taser Death Explored in St. Martin Parish Case

by Berniard Law Firm

In our prior post, we began our review of a wrongful death action that followed the tasering of Othello Pierre by two St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s deputies after he caused a disturbance at a Fourth of July party and attempted to flee the scene. We now examine the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in analyzing whether the deputies’ use of the taser amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force.

According to the court, an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment “must demonstrate (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a clearly excessive force, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” In order for the Plaintiff to be successful in this wrongful death action, it is essential that all of these three requirements articulated by the court are met. If even one of the prongs to an excessive force claim are not met, then the Plaintiff will ultimately fail in his action.

In the case of Mr. Pierre, the court concluded that the Plaintiff’s claim “fail[ed] on the second prong” because they offered no evidence to show that Pierre’s injuries–and, by extension, his death–were the direct result of the tasing. Thus, in the court’s view, Pierre’s death did not result directly from the tasing; therefore, he did not meet all the explicit requirements for an excessive force claim. By not meeting the second requirement, the question of whether the tasering was reasonable in the first place was effectively moot.

September 23, 2012

St. Martin Parish Police Tasing Leads to Wrongful Death Suit

by Berniard Law Firm

On July 4, 2008, Othello Pierre attended a party at his uncle’s house in St. Martin Parish. Pierre’s uncle called 911 when Pierre got into a violent argument with a cousin. Two deputies with the St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Department responded. A third deputy and distant relative of Pierre was also at the party; she informed the two deputies who responded to the 911 call that she suspected there may be warrant out for Pierre’s arrest. The deputies ran Pierre’s name and confirmed that he had an outstanding felony arrest warrant for burglary. When one of the deputies attempted to place Pierre under arrest, he broke away and fled the scene. The two responding deputies pursued Pierre on foot and soon found him hiding behind an old camper shell. Though ordered not to move, Pierre again attempted to run away, at which point one of the deputies fired his taser. The taser barbs hit Pierre in the arm and the head, shocking him with a single five-second cycle. An ambulance took Pierre to the Lafayette General Medical Center where he died approximately three hours later. The autopsy revealed that Pierre’s death was the result of “multidrug intoxication” from substances such as methamphetamine, THC, cocaine, alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine.

Narra Batiste and other members of Pierre’s family filed a civil action against the St. Martin Parish Sheriff and the deputies for the wrongful death of Pierre, alleging, among other things, that the deputies’ use of the taser was an unconstitutional use of deadly or excessive force. The district court heard motions for summary judgment on several issues, including the deputies’ motion to dismiss the claim of excessive force. The court denied the deputies’ motion, and appeal was taken in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Plaintiffs relied on two paths to argue that Pierre’s tasering amounted to an unconstitutional use of deadly force. First, the Plaintiffs cited a Supreme Court case that held it was unlawful to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to a police officer. Because that case concerned the use of a gun and not a taser, however, the court rejected its applicability. The court noted that no Fifth Circuit cases equated the use of a taser to the discharging of a firearm, and it declined to be the first. Second, the Plaintiffs argued that the deputy’s use of the taser while running violated the Sheriff Department’s policy and was contrary to the taser manufacturer’s guidelines for safe use. Yet, in the court’s view, the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the use of the taser in the manner they described created an unreasonable risk of death. The court pointed to a dispute over whether Pierre was actually running when the taser was deployed, and concluded that “Plaintiffs’ assertions that the use of a taser on a fleeing suspect amounted to deadly force [were] unfounded.”

September 19, 2012

How Louisiana Determines Damages for Personal Injury

by Berniard Law Firm

When a court award damages, the judges commonly look to whether or not that pain and suffering can be attributed to the defending party, the amount of time a victim suffered, and how much pain and suffering occurred. The cause is perhaps the most important aspect of whether or not a party will be awarded damages. It makes little sense for a defendant to have to pay for pain and suffering to the plaintiff if the defendant’s actions did not cause that pain and suffering. Then, the length and intensity of the suffering will help determine how much money will be awarded.

In a recent case, the plaintiff appealed from the Parish of Lafayette to the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit based on the issue of damages. In this case, the plaintiff was in a car accident where she suffered significant damage to her back. As a result of this injury, she spent approximately twenty-eight months with the chiropractor attempting to correct the damage sustained to her lower back.

Although the victim visited the chiropractor before the accident occurred, the doctor recorded the services rendered before and after the accident. The doctor stated that the victim’s injuries worsened and the accident definitely caused the worsened condition. The lower court awarded general damages and medical fees, but it only ordered enough general damages that would cover seven months after the accident. It explained that the victim was already seeing the chiropractor; therefore, the services she received after the accident were only relating to a condition that was already present before the accident.

September 17, 2012

Wife’s Interests Not Represented by Attorney in Pre-Divorce Collusion

by Berniard Law Firm

Officers of the Court are expected to follow a specific level of professionalism and truthfulness that trumps any personal feelings they have on a case. One unfortunate case highlighted today involves the dissolution of a 22-year marriage and the unfortunate deceitful behavior of the husband and his attorney. Unbeknownst to the wife, the husband filed a petition for divorce on August 9, 2006. On that same day, the husband convinced his wife to meet at his attorney’s office to discuss a settlement of the community property. The wife was under the impression that the attorney was a neutral party, helping the couple come to a fair division of their property. However, things were not as they appeared.

The husband and wife signed an agreement partitioning their community property at the meeting along with a quitclaim deed for their real estate. A few days later, the couple returned to the attorney’s office and re-executed the documents in the presence of two witnesses for formality purposes.

When the wife became aware of the scheming on the part of her husband and the attorney, she immediately filed a suit in the trial court to rescind the agreement based on error, fraud, duress and lesion. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the husband and the wife appealed, bringing us to the case-at-hand.