Pain And Suffering Claims

December 29, 2013

Rayville Doctor Found to Have Acted Within Standard of Care

Going to the hospital can be an unsettling experience. There are many ways treatment can go wrong and result in serious injury or death. Medical conditions can be misdiagnosed or wrongly diagnosed, wrong prescriptions or doses can be prescribed, and surgical errors can occur. When these mistakes happen and a medical malpractice lawsuit is filed against a doctor and hospital, the trier of fact must determine three elements in order to decide whether or not medical malpractice occurred, which often requires a careful examination of a doctor’s standard of care.

In a recent case heard by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, Crockham v. Thompson, a woman filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against her mother’s doctor and hospital after her mother died from a brain hemorrhage induced by high blood pressure. According to the lawsuit, the mother had been paraplegic for 20 years and often suffered from bowel blockages. In this instance, the woman went to the hospital to have a blockage removed, but failed to get better after the operation was completed. The plaintiff took her mother back to the hospital where she was given oral medication for her high blood pressure, but she later suffered the stroke and her family chose to take her off life support.

In her wrongful death claim against the doctor, the plaintiff in this case claimed the doctor breached his duty of care to the deceased. The plaintiff claimed the blood pressure medication should have been given intravenously rather than by pill because the pill would have bypassed her mother’s non-functioning bowel. Also, the plaintiff suggested the standard of care had been breached because the doctor failed to make his daily round in the morning, failed to admit the patient to the ICU, and failed to develop a cardiovascular profile for the patient. The plaintiff supported her argument with the fact that the hospital’s medical board had found the doctor breached the standard of care. However, at trial, a jury found for the doctor and denied the plaintiff compensation. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

December 28, 2013

Car Accident Leads to Examination of Mutual Responsibility

by Berniard Law Firm

We’ve all been there: you’re running late for work, so you rush out the door and into your car. You drive ever so slightly above the speed limit, and all the traffic lights you come across are green. Fortune seems to be on your side. Suddenly, a car seemingly comes out of nowhere and hits you. Are you partially to blame because you were in a rush and drove over the speed limit? If you are liable, how does it affect your ability to collect damages from the other driver and his or her insurance company?

Laura McKinney of Shreveport, Louisiana, faced those very questions after she collided with another driver on the morning of July 23, 2009. She was running late for her 6:00 a.m. shift at Holy Angels Residential Facilities, and the accident occurred just as she turned into its parking lot. A co-worker was leaving the parking lot and cut across several empty parking spaces to enter the main travel lane when she collided with McKinney. Neither party reported any injuries at the time, but McKinney developed left knee pain three weeks later and was diagnosed with a left knee contusion. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the other driver and her insurance company.

At trial, several witnesses to the accident provided vital eyewitness accounts to help the court determine who was at fault. One witness testified that it appeared that McKinney was driving faster than the parking lot’s signed speed limit of 15 miles per hour. Another witness, however, testified that she did not think McKinney was driving above the speed limit. After weighing the evidence, the trial court ruled that McKinney was 40 percent at fault and the other driver was 60 percent at fault. McKinney’s damages award was therefore reduced by 40 percent, and the trial court entered a judgment in her favor in the amount of $7,632.60. McKinney appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she was 40 percent at fault and that the trial court also erred in awarding her an excessively low amount of damages.

December 24, 2013

Medical Malpractice Ruling Awards Wrongful Death Damages

by Berniard Law Firm

Imagine taking your mother to the emergency room for abdominal pain and vomiting. A CT scan and x-ray do not reveal any serious medical issues, and blood work merely shows that her potassium level is low. But within a few hours, she is dead. Now imagine witnessing her death – seeing her break out in convulsions, foam at the mouth, gasp for breath, and lose consciousness.

Such was the experience of one of Virginia Martin’s thirteen adult children. Ms. Martin’s daughter, Betty Farmer, brought her to the emergency room after Ms. Martin complained of abdominal pain, vomiting, and diarrhea. Ms. Martin was 69 years old, and she was otherwise in very good health at the time of her hospital visit. She did not have any heart problems or other serious health-related issues.

The ER physician determined that she suffered from simple gastroenteritis. A chest x-ray came back normal. Ms. Martin began to receive pain medication via an IV, and her blood work revealed that her potassium was low. A CT was performed and showed that there were no abdominal abnormalities that could have caused her gastric distress. Ms. Martin returned from the CT scan to the ER at 9:35 p.m. By 9:44, Ms. Martin started convulsing, her face turned red, she began to foam at the mouth, and her eyes rolled into the back of her head. She lost consciousness, and efforts to resuscitate her failed. Her cause of death was listed as acute cardiac arrhythmia and arteriosclerotic heart disease.

December 21, 2013

Medical Malpractice Claims Rely Heavily Upon Prescriptive Period

by Berniard Law Firm

In Louisiana, a civil law doctrine known as “prescription” limits the amount of time that may pass before someone files a lawsuit. Prescription is the extinction of a right of recovery and occurs due to a failure to exercise that right over a period of time. In other states, this doctrine may be referred to as a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. Louisiana’s prescription period for filing a lawsuit based upon personal injury is one year. Often this doctrine is not an issue in litigation, but in a recent case in St. Tammany Parish, one doctor’s objection of prescription has fundamentally altered the life of a woman, alleging to have suffered from medical malpractice.

On November 21, 2008, Glenda DeBram was hospitalized by her attending physician, Dr. Keshelava, after complaining of painful urination, fever, and cough. On October 15, 2009, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), Ms. DeBram filed a request for a medical review panel with the Patient’s Compensation Fund. According to her request, Ms. DeBram alleged that St. Tammany Parish Hospital and Dr. Keshelava fell below the standard of care owed to her between November 21, 2008 and October 20, 2009. Subsequently, Dr. Keshelava filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, arguing that Ms. DeBram’s complaint was prescribed on its face as it was filed on January 29, 2010, which was more than one year following her discharge from the hospital stay during which she claims Dr. Keshelava and the hospital breached the standard of care. As such, on September 16, 2010, the trial court sustained the exception and dismissed Ms. DeBram’s medical malpractice claims.

The prescriptive period for a medical malpractice claim is contained in LSA-R.S. 9:5628A. Any action seeking damages, regardless of whether for a fatality or the severity of injuries, and whether against a doctor, nurse, or the hospital within which they work, may be brought unless the action is brought within 365 days (1 year) from when the incident or injury occurred or was found to have occurred, regardless of whether the act was that of unintentional or intentional neglect, omission or some other form of injury. Even with claims filed within the time limit, the law suit must be filed within three years of the incident’s occurrence, regardless of discovery

December 20, 2013

Employer-Employee Relationship Must Be Defined In Car Accident Lawsuits

by Berniard Law Firm

Under the respondeat superior legal theory, an employer can be held liable for his employees’ acts that occur within his scope of employment. This means that a truck company, for example, may be held responsible for an accident caused by one its drivers who was speeding or intoxicated while driving his route. This doctrine can be complicated when questions arise as to whether or not the employee was within the scope of his employment, or whether the person who caused the injurious accident was in fact an employee.

To determine scope of employment, one must look to what the employer pays the employee to do and what, exactly, the employee was doing when the accident occured. If a truck driver deviated from his route to go to a bar, for example, then it will likely be determined the driver was engaged in frolic for his own benefit and therefore was not within the scope of his employment. This means if an accident occurs while that truck driver is on his way to the bar, then the truck company will not be held liable. If, on the other hand, the truck driver had to deviate from his standard route because of a flooded road, then the detour is still considered to be to the employer’s benefit and within his scope of employment. An accident that occurs while on detour will still be imputed to the truck company.

A recently decided case by Court of Appeal for the First Circuit helps illustrate issues of determining the employee/employer relationship. The importance of this aspect is if the party responsible for the accident is found to be an independent contractor rather than an employee, liability cannot be placed on the employer. So, in the case heard on appeal by the First Circuit, a woman who was injured by the negligent driving of a delivery van driver sought to join the subcontracting broker and the delivery service that hired the individuals responsible for the accident. To determine whether an independent contractor relationship existed, the court looked to case law and the facts before it.

December 19, 2013

Injured Employee Limited to Workers’ Compensation Following Accident at Lena Power Plant

by Berniard Law Firm

Work-related injuries, especially in construction, are not uncommon. However, the outcomes in workers’ compensation cases vary because the contractual relationship between the parties is often not clear. Under Louisiana law, workers’ compensation is provided to an employee if they’re injured by an accident “arising out of” and “in the course of” his employment with a statutory employer. However, the issue centers on whether the defendant is a statutory employer thereby limiting the plaintiff to workers’ compensation as their sole remedy. If a valid, written contract recognizes the existence of a statutory employer relationship, it creates a rebuttable presumption; this requires careful interpretation of the terms of the contract.

On August 12, 2008, Louis Fox (hereinafter “plaintiff”), employee of Foster Wheeler North America Corp. (hereinafter “Foster”), was assisting with the installation of boiler units at the Rodemacher Power Station near Lena. While working inside a cyclone tower, the plaintiff alleged that he sustained an injury when an object fell from above striking his head and neck. The plaintiff sought damages beyond workers’ compensation against several defendants including CLECO Power (hereinafter “CLECO”), owner of the power station, and general contractor Shaw Constructors, Inc. (hereinafter “Shaw”).

The installation of the boiler units was the result of a written contract between CLECO Power, owner of the station, and Shaw Constructors, Inc. As general contractor, Shaw selected Stone and Webster, Inc. (hereinafter “Stone”) to take charge of engineering and procurement services. Stone then entered into a purchase order agreement with Foster for the sale and installation of the boiler units.

December 17, 2013

Summary Judgment Tripping Case from Baton Rouge Illustrates Court Complexities

by Berniard Law Firm

A recent case appealed from the Parish of East Baton Rouge provides a great example not only of the potential difficulties of recovering damages for negligence from a merchant, but also of summary judgment and how it works. In November 2006, the plaintiff entered the defendant’s store, tripped on what she claims was a ‘flipped-up’ doormat, and struck her head on some shelving. She was injured as a result and tried to recover damages from the merchant, claiming that she was injured as a result of the merchant’s negligence in maintaining the premises. The trial court granted summary judgment in the merchant’s favor, and the appellate court affirmed.

If someone is injured while lawfully on a merchant’s property and wishes to recover damages for negligence from that merchant, they must meet four requirements provided by Louisiana law. The claimant must show that their injury was the result of an unreasonably dangerous condition on the merchant’s property, that the danger presented by that condition was reasonably foreseeable, that the merchant knew or should have known of the danger prior to the claimant’s accident, and that the merchant did not take reasonable steps to correct the situation.

Summary judgment is rare and requires clearing some pretty high hurdles. A court must first find that there is no genuine contention as to any facts that might influence the outcome of the case. If the court so finds, then it will simply apply the law to the relevant facts and rule in a party’s favor as a matter of law, perhaps before there is even a chance for a trial. Where the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of proof at trial, for instance if that party is a merchant defending against a negligence claim, then s/he need only show the opposition’s inability to prove or disprove one or more key elements of his/her action or defense. The opposing party must then answer somehow to prove that s/he will be able to prove the element(s) in question at trial, or lose on summary judgment.

December 4, 2013

Burden of Proof in Claims Against Merchants

by Berniard Law Firm

Louisiana merchants must keep their premises safe not only for their guests or customers but also for any person invited onto the property for business purposes. This also includes persons delivering goods to restaurants like in the case of Jones v. Jula Trust, LLC.

Jones was a deliveryman for Pepsi. En route, he stopped at a Jennings Popeye’s restaurant to deliver some Pepsi products that morning. While pulling his loaded dolly through the restaurant’s back door, he slipped and fell. His slip caused the boxes of Pepsi to topple on top of him. About a year after his accident, Jones initiated suit against Popeye’s by filing against the landlord of the property, JULA Trust, LLC. Jones claimed that either water or grease on the floor caused his fall, but he could not explain where the substance had come from. The Popeye’s manager said that he had conducted a walk-through inspection of the premises that morning and had not seen anything slippery on the floors. Nor had any employees notified him about any slippery substance on the floor the morning of the accident.

La. R.S. 9:2800.6 requires a merchant to maintain the through ways of the premises in a safe manner, and in a condition so as to not cause harm to patrons. The burden of proof remains with the plaintiff to show the following elements: (1) The conditions at hand posed a reasonably foreseeable danger to the injured person in the case, and that the harm was not a reasonable harm one would expect in the situation; (2) The merchant, prior to the incident, caused the conditions responsible for, or could have prevented the accident, after becoming aware of the problem; (3) The merchant violated the standard of care necessary for the situation. Not having a written or verbal safety and cleanup code is not enough on its own to prove that a standard of care was violated when evaluating reasonable care in a situation or incident.

December 2, 2013

Court Throws Out Lafayette Parish Case As Plaintiff Fails To Deliver Service of Process Before Deadline

by Berniard Law Firm

It is vital to know proper court procedures at the outset of litigation or else an otherwise valid claim might be thrown out of court without ever being heard. One prime example is the need to send initial court documents to a defendant within a set deadline (sending such documents, such as a citation or summons, is known as service of process). Case in point, the Lafayette Parish Court of Appeal, in Boka v. Oller, recently upheld the dismissal of a claim without even considering the merits because service of process was delivered too late. Therefore, it is important to know the rules before bringing a lawsuit or a good claim might be lost due to a mere technicality, such as delivering papers too late. For a non-lawyer, an attorney can be instrumental in making sure proper procedures are followed so that the party has a chance to present their case in court.

In Lafayette Parish, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1201 requires that service of the citation must be requested within a deadline of ninety days from commencement of the action. Article 1201 also notes that service of process on defendants is “essential” and “without them all proceedings are absolutely null.” The deadline for service is to ensure that defendants are aware of an action and have enough to prepare. Therefore, as a delay in service is deemed unfair to the defendant, a court may dismiss a claim if service of process is sent too late.

There are some limited exceptions to the rule, but, due to the risks involved in these exceptions, generally a party should attempt to serve process on time. For example, one exception permits late service if there is good cause for the delay. However, as the court is unlikely to accept run-of-the-mill excuses for delays, proving a good cause for failure to serve process on time can be difficult. As noted below, the court in Lafayette Parish found that there was no good cause for late service as the plaintiff knew the defendant’s address.

November 30, 2013

Appeals Court Upholds Summary Judgment Against Manufacturer in Evangeline Parish Products Liability Case

by Berniard Law Firm

Companies manufacturing items that are inherently dangerous in the course of its normal use have certain legal obligations under products liability law. This case illustrates the necessary components of a successful products liability claim in Louisiana.

The plaintiff was working on a backhoe to clean out a drainage culvert when the clamps holding the vehicle’s hydraulic lines broke free and caused the lines to spew out hydraulic fluid. While attempting to reconnect the clamps, the plaintiff fell off the vehicle and was injured. He brought suit against the backhoe’s manufacturer and claimed that the company knew of the existence of an alternative design of the clamps that would better protect the hydraulic lines from leaking.

The trial court denied two separate motions for summary judgment by the defendant finding there were issues of material fact that precluded the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed his own motion for summary judgment against the manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) which the court granted. The manufacturer appealed the trial court’s decision, and this appeal followed.