Articles Posted in Offshore Accidents

Susan Michelle Canon brought suit in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, when her boat caught fire while en route from North Carolina back to Louisiana. The trial court ruled in favor of the sellers, who were from North Carolina, and dismissed them from the suit because of lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court upheld this decision. This case is an excellent example of why every lawsuit must be examined for proper jurisdiction to make sure that it is filed properly and that the expected outcome isn’t cut short from the very beginning.

To determine whether personal jurisdiction existed, the court considered a number of factors indicating whether it would be proper to draw the sellers into court in the state of Louisiana. These factors included where the sellers reside, where they do business, where they have registered offices, and whether their business targets a particular region. Their contact with Louisiana must also have been continuous and systematic, to support an assertion of general jurisdiction.

Sellers Raeford and Jennifer Millis here did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana. They did not live there, do business there, or have a registered office in that state. The boat they sold Ms. Canon was simply listed on the internet, accessible and available to people all over the world. Ms. Canon made the initial contact, and mailed the sale proceeds to a bank in North Carolina, where the Millises live. Ms. Canon also went to North Carolina to execute the bill of sale, using a North Carolina notary, and took possession of the boat in that state. Based on these facts, she could not establish meaningful contacts, ties, or relations between the Millises and Louisiana.

The law has a wide variety of rules in place to force a clean route to evidence, especially from authorities on the topic, like people present or involved with the case’s topic. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the person themself while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Article 802 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence states “Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by this Code or other legislation.”

Understanding Legal Terms

Assertive Conduct:

The case of Williams v. C&E Boat Rental shows how important it is to hire attorneys who navigate court proceedings in line with judicial expectations. This post’s case arose out of a maritime injury claim and centered around comments made by the defense attorney during closing arguments.

In 2007, Williams was a deckhand on a boat owned by C&E. He alleged that he was injured by fumes while cleaning out the vessel’s lube oil tanks. Later that year, he hired an attorney and filed suit against C&E. The suit was voluntarily dismissed the day after it was filed. In 2009, Williams re-filed his suit against C&E alleging negligence and unseaworthiness. After the defense made its closing statement, Williams moved for a new trial claiming that statements the defense made during its closing argument were inappropriate and prejudicial. The defense made six different statements that Williams argued were prejudicial, specifically regarding the fact the statements alleged various types of misbehavior on the part of Williams’ attorney.

When discussing closing statements, an important evidentiary requirement is that statements made during closing argument must have some basis in evidence that was presented to the court. This is an issue of fundamental fairness as the opposing side would not be able to challenge the validity of such statements.

You have probably heard the phrase “accidents happen.” But if you are in an accident, the first thing that you want to ask is who is at fault. With all of the chaos that can be part of an accident, sometimes the answer to this question isn’t always clear. This is when comparative fault, also known as comparative negligence, comes into play. In general, negligence refers to conduct that falls below the standards of behavior established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Comparative negligence is different from ordinary negligence in that ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonable person would exercise in similar circumstances whereas comparative negligence describes conduct that creates an unreasonable risk to one’s self.

In 1979, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323 was amended to provide for a pure comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s own contributing negligence did not bar the recovery of damages, but merely reduced it by his or her own portion of fault. The Louisiana Legislature, in 1996, further amended the Code, making Louisiana a “true” comparative fault jurisdiction and the language of that amendment provided:

In an action for damages where a person suffers injury … the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury … shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action, and regardless of such person’s insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute …

A Saint Martinville, Louisiana, construction company, Cole’s Construction Crews, Inc., recently had a judgment against it reversed and remanded back to the trial court. Back in 2007, Cole’s had filed a lawsuit against J-O-B Operating Company. A few months after filing suit, Cole’s requested production of documents and sent interrogatories (or a list of probing questions) to JOB. Almost two years later, in July of 2009, JOB finally answered the requests. Then, in June of 2011, JOB filed a motion to dismiss the suit, claiming that Cole’s had abandoned the lawsuit. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss was signed, and Cole’s then attempted to get the motion set aside. The trial court denied this attempt, and Cole’s appealed the case to the appellate court to get it reviewed.

Cole’s claims that granting the motion to dismiss was an error that should be reversed. First, JOB had just answered the interrogatories less than two years earlier, and second, JOB did not file the requisite affidavit with its motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling and decided that granting the motion to dismiss had been done in error. They came to this conclusion by considering the various aspects of the complex Louisiana abandonment law, which is discussed below.

In Louisiana, Article 561 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure imposes three requirements on plaintiffs in order for their lawsuit to not be considered abandoned. The first requirement is that the plaintiff has to take some sort of formal action before the court with regard to the lawsuit. Next, this action needs to take place during a court proceeding and must be in the suit’s record, unless it is part of formal discovery. Finally, this action has to take place in the requisite amount of time. If three years have passed without an appropriate action as described above taken by either party, then the suit is automatically abandoned. Even though abandonment is self-executing, defendants are encouraged to get an ex part order of dismissal, just like JOB did in this case, to make sure that their right to assert abandonment is not waived.

In a fairly publicized case, three people were killed in 2008 by a diving boat explosion off the coast of Louisiana. This case is still working its way through the courts and got a little further from resolution in Jillian Morrison, LLC v. Sonia because of an obscure legal concept: ripeness.

Lawsuits need several parts to get off the ground. There has to be a plaintiff with claim with a valid legal basis, you need to have defendant that is liable for the claim. There can’t be any successful defenses, there has to be a court with jurisdiction and finally, the claim must be “ripe.”

Ripeness is a technical concept. For a case to be ripe it means that the cause of action being alleged has to have moved beyond the “abstract or hypothetical.” If the only question remaining is whether the law applies, you have a case. If there are still facts that need to develop to decide the case, then it will be determined to lack “ripeness.”

The Berniard Law Firm’s principal attorney, Jeffrey Berniard, recently taught an Introduction to Personal Injury course. Having been an active part of Continuing Legal Education (CLE), Mr. Berniard was selected to teach the topic due to the firm’s specialization in medical malpractice, first party insurance disputes, and premises liability claims. Some of the topics covered included: Personal Injury Protection and First Party Benefits in auto policies; medical records disclosure including mental health and substance abuse treatment records; recoverable personal injury damages.

Under many state’s no-fault insurance laws, a claimant’s insurance company will only pay for Personal Injury Protection, or the first $10,000 out-of-pocket expenses. The remainder of expenses must be recovered from the Defendant. Many auto insurance companies do offer First Party Benefits packages, an optional supplement that will cover all medical expenses in the event of an accident for the policyholder or anyone else listed on the plan. However, many auto insurance companies also use a computer program that performs a calculation to value the severity of a victim’s injury. The program does not take into consideration the stress, pain, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life that a victim may have suffered.

Medical records unrelated to a victim’s injury, but pertaining to his/her health, are discoverable if “good cause” can be shown. Both state law and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) apply to a consent for release of medical records. The consent must contain ten items, including a statement that the health care provider cannot condition treatment upon the signing of the consent for release. However, because of the broadness of the item language requirements, HIPAA, and state law, a health care provider may refuse to honor the consent. If a consent cannot be obtained from the patient, HIPAA continues to allow health care providers to release information with a court order or a subpoena. If an attorney issues a subpoena without a court order, the health care provider will not release information unless certain assurances are made.

It is no secret that evidence and witness testimony are arguably the two most important aspects of injury litigation and the impact that each has on the outcome of an adjudication can either make or break your case. In order to understand these effects more fully, it is important to note that there is a difference between an ordinary and an expert witness. Ordinary, factual witnesses provide knowledgeable accounts of the facts of the case through either their direct participation or observation of the intricacies of the case, whereas expert witnesses hold specialized knowledge in a particular educational field and use this advanced knowledge to clarify or explain a piece of information. Ordinary and expert witnesses are viewed differently in the eyes of the court system and are governed under separate sections in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to this distinction.

Unlike an ordinary witness, an expert witness is only permitted to testify at trial once an expert report has been filed with the opposing party. This is necessary to alleviate any future misunderstandings concerning the nature and purpose of the expert’s review and this extra measure fosters preparation, awareness and allows the parties to put their best foot forward during trial. Harmon v. Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, a recent opinion handed down from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, illustrates the importance of complying with the mandatory standards regarding expert witnesses and the permissibility of their testimony and how not doing so can cause a party to conclude that it has insufficient evidence upon which to proceed to trial. This case involved injuries caused by an industrial accident in Westlake, Louisiana.

In this case, the Court held that Harmon did not properly comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and therefore, it decided to uphold the exclusion of imperative expert testimony. In 2006 and 2007, Ms. Harmon and four others claimed to have been injured when toxic chemicals were released into the air due to a fire and an explosion at the Georgia Gulf’s chemical facility in Westlake, Louisiana. Before trial was set to begin, the magistrate entered an order requiring Ms. Harmon and the other four plaintiffs, respectively, to provide an expert report within a timely manner for each expert witness to both Georgia Gulf Lake Charles L.L.C. and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company.

In Louisiana, an employee can only be compensated for a work related injury through workers’ compensation. This means that if an employee is negligently harmed during the course of work, the only remedy available is what is provided through the workers’ compensation act. This is true unless the injury was as a result of intentional conduct. In the business world, many general contractors contract out work to subcontractors. Legally the issue in such a case becomes how to define who the employee is employed by in case of an injury. In Louisiana, there is a doctrine called the two contract theory. The basic outline of this theory is that in a situation where there are three parties in a contract which includes a general contractor, subcontractor, and subcontractor’s employee, the subcontractor’s employee is considered an employee of the general contractor. This mean that if the subcontractor’s employee is injured while performing work for the general contractor, the employee will only be able to receive workers’ compensation, not any damages based on negligence or any other branch of tort law. This may, at first glance, seem like a harsh result. However, in the modern business world, there are so many employment contractual relationships that liability must be limited to what is reasonable under the circumstances. The two contract theory should not be viewed as a way to protect business, but rather as a means for the judicial system to not be able to overreach.

In a recent case, Mason v. Waste Management Inc. Et Al., the law concerning employee rights is discussed in such a circumstance. Lamare Kindle and Wallace Bradley, were employed by Waste Management Inc. Mr. Bradley was employed directly by Waste Management. Mr. Kindle was employed by CPST Inc. CPST was a subcontractor which had contractually agreed to supply Waste Management with employees in an effort to help Waste Management collect trash it was required to contractually pick up. Waste Management had agreed to pick up trash in a contract with the Morehouse Parish Police Jury. So the contractual relationships are broken down as follows: Morehouse Parish Police Jury needed a company to come pick up trash in its area. Waste Management agreed to pick up the trash and signed a contract with Morehouse Parish to do so. Mr. Bradley was employed by Waste Management. In an effort to fulfill its obligation to Morehouse Parish, Waste Management needed to hire temp workers. CPST contractually agreed to supply Waste Management with employees. Mr. Kindle was employed by CPST.

Mr. Bradley was driving a truck registered to Waste Management. Mr. Kindle was a passenger in the truck driven by Mr. Bradley. Upon coming to a train track Mr. Bradley made the tragic mistake of crossing over the tracks as a train passed the intersection. Both Mr. Bradley and Mr. Kindle was sadly killed as a result of the collision with the train. Mr. Kindle’s parents sued Waste Management alleging that it was liable for any negligence that was attributed to Mr. Bradley while he was driving the garbage truck. The police report stated that the accident was likely the result of Mr. Bradley’s inattentivness. Waste Management argued that under the two contract theory, Mr. Kindle was its employee and because there was negligence and not intentional conduct, the only remedy available was workers’ compensation. Because Waste Management held a position as a general contractor in relation to Morehouse Parish, and CPST held a relationship with Waste Management as a subcontractor, the circumstance of the contractual relationships fell under the definition of the two contract theory. Therefore, Mr. Kindle was considered an employee of Waste Management and the only remedy available was workers’ compensation.

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