Articles Posted in Negligence

In late 2007, the Tangipahoa Parish government began making repairs to Berry Bowl Road in Independence, Louisiana. One of the contracting firms the parish hired to complete street overlay work was Barriere Construction Company, LLC. On the evening of January 8, 2007, Joseph Alessi, Jr. struck a “bump” in the road with his car, resulting in substantial damage to the vehicle and injuries to him and his two passengers, Linda Alessi and Tommie Sinagra. Following the accident, Alessi filed suit against Barriere, alleging that the company’s employees were negligent and liable for his damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Barriere was negligent in creating a defect in the roadway where vehicles were allowed to drive and failing to take reasonable measures to protect the public from the hazardous condition.

Barriere filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had nothing to do with the condition of the road where Alessi’s accident occurred. Barriere submitted affidavits and detailed invoices it had remitted to Tangipahoa Parish in order to be paid showing that its crews had not worked on Berry Bowl Road for at least six days prior to the accident. Additionally, Barriere asserted that the time it had last worked on Berry Bowl Road, the repairs had ended approximately 700 feet from the location where Alessi hit the bump. Barriere offered that any problemw with the road must have been caused by a Tangipahoa Parish bridge construction crew that was working in the area at the time. The district court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on September 28, 2009 and the next day granted Barriere’s motion. Alessi appealed.

The First Circuit reviewed the district court’s granting of summary judgment de novo, meaning that it examined all of the evidence in the case as if for the first time. The court explained that “summary judgment is warranted only if there is no genuine issue as to material fact.” A fact is considered “material” if

On October 18, 2007, Kalencia Young and her passenger, Ashley Newsome, both pregnant, were driving on DeSiard Street toward Renwick Street in Monroe. At the same time, Gerald Adams was driving toward the intersection, which was controlled by a traffic light, on Renwick Street. The two vehicles collided when Adams’s pickup truck struck the passenger side of Young’s car.

Officer Tobyn Berry of the Monroe Police Department responded to the scene. He questioned both drivers and inspected the traffic light to determine that it was working normally. Berry also questioned two witnesses to the accident. One of the witnesses claimed that he saw Adams talking on his cell phone at the time of the crash and alleged that the traffic light was red for Adams as he approached the interestion. Officer Berry issued Adams a citation for failing to observe the traffic signal. Both Young and Newsome were taken to the St. Francis Hospital by ambulance and were released a short time later.

Young and Newsome sued Adams for the injuries they sustained in the crash. At the trial, Officer Berry’s deposition and accident report were entered into evidence. Both Young and Newsome testified, agreeing on few details except that they had a green light at the intersection. In response, Adams testified that he had the green light as he approached the intersection, and denied talking on his cell phone at the time of the accident. The trial court rendered judgment for Adams, finding his testimony to be “more credible than the entirety of the plaintiffs’ case.” Young and Newsome filed a motion for a new trial so they could subpoena the two witnesses from the scene. The witnesses failed to appear during the second trial, and the court once again rendered judgment in Adams’s favor.

The Berniard Law Firm is look to tackle a negligent refinery by representing a Chalmette resident assaulted by chemicals released from a St. Bernard Parish oil refinery. While taking a walk through her neighborhood on the morning of September 6, 2009, the woman observed white dust covering homes and vehicles. She experienced exposure symptoms including difficulty breathing, coughing, sore throat, headache, and burning sensations in her nose and eyes. As the symptoms persisted, she went to a hospital the following day. The white powder comprised a spent catalyst including components of kaolin and titanium dioxide which are eye, skin and lung irritants. Portions of Chalmette, Arabi, and New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward were blanketed with the fine white powder.

In addition to releasing a ton of spent catalyst, the refinery released two thousand pounds of sulfur dioxide, one thousand pounds of nitrogen oxide, and an unspecified amount of hydrogen sulfide. Not only was the refinery negligent in releasing the toxic chemicals but also for failing to notify area residents of the accident in a timely manner so that they could take precautionary measures. Moreover, children and pets are more susceptible to exposure symptoms due to their smaller size while residents with certain pre-existing medical conditions would also suffer greater harm than a healthy adult. For example, children have a greater lung surface area to body weight ratio along with other parameters that differ from adults leading to greater susceptibility to chemical inhalation effects at lower concentrations. Likewise, pre-existing medical conditions including chronic pulmonary disease and asthma increase susceptibility to exposure symptoms at lower concentrations.

Specifically, sulfur dioxide may induce acute exposure symptoms comprising irritation in the upper respiratory tract, nosebleeds and rhinorrhea (runny nose), coughing and choking, expectoration (coughing up phlegm), dysphagia (difficulty swallowing), and oropharyngeal erythema (redness). Although predominately affecting the upper respiratory tract via inhalation, sulfur dioxide also acts as an intense eye and skin irritant by combining with water producing sulfuric acid and sulfurous acid. Dermal exposure symptoms range from irritation to urticarea (itchiness) and burns. Given this high solubility, sulfur dioxide is also rapidly distributed throughout the body producing metabolic acidosis possibly inducing vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, fever, headache, vertigo (dizziness), and agitation. Decontamination should include removal of contaminated clothing and rinsing of the skin and eyes. Reproductive and teratogenic effects (malformation of embryo, fetus) of exposure are unknown, which has raised concerns among women at varying stages of pregnancy at the time this accident occurred.

On Saturday, July 24, 2010, tragedy struck in East Feliciana Parish as a 9-year-old girl died in a car accident. Reports state that the young girl, Tobiya Kato, was killed when the car driven by her mother, Jamet Kato, veered off the road and flipped before coming to a rest on its roof in a wooded area. This tragic event serves as a reminder of the importance of all passengers wearing seatbelts, especially young children seated in the back of a vehicle.

According to reports, the young girl, whom was seated in the back seat, was thrown from the vehicle during the accident due to not wearing her seatbelt. Police noted that in addition to the 9-year old girl, three other children, ages 6, 5, and 2, were also in the back of the vehicle, not wearing seatbelts, when the accident occurred. However, Jamet Kato, along with a 12-year-old sitting in the front seat, were both wearing their seatbelts at the time and only suffered minor to moderate injuries in the crash.

The sheer number of deaths that could be prevented by properly buckling up in a vehicle are staggering. According to NHTSA’s study, in 2008 there were 25,351 accidents involving the death of passengers in the United States. Of those, 12,865, or 50.7%, passengers were not utilizing safety restraint devices, such as a seat belt or car seat for younger children. The statistics for Louisiana residents are similarly shocking. Of the 669 passenger deaths in 2008, 59.2%, or roughly 400 passengers, died in accidents in which they were not buckled.

In Pearl River on July 9, an 18-wheel truck blew out a tire and crossed over into oncoming traffic killing four people. The accident at the Louisiana/Mississippi state line occurred when the driver of the semi was driving northbound on I-59 and lost control of the vehicle after the tire blew out. The semi crossed the center median, and in what state police describe as an almost head on collision, the semi collided into a Dodge Ram pickup and led to both vehicles sliding off the road. While all four individuals in the truck were killed, the driver of the semi suffered minor to moderate injuries. The driver of the semi was from Montgomery, Texas and the four passengers in the Dodge Ram pickup were from Carriere, Mississippi. For his part in the accident, the driver of the semi was charged with careless operation and four counts of negligent homicide.

It is important to know that while negligent homicide is a criminal charge, suit may also be filed under a wrongful death cause of action for the four victims that were killed in the accident. Historically under common law, wrongful death was not available and only criminal law was an option. Under statutory law however, a person can be held responsible in civil court in addition to criminal court for wrongful death. Wrongful death statutes provide a legal remedy for wrongfully causing the death of another human being. The applicable Louisiana Civil Code wrongful death statute is under Book 3, Title 5, Chapter 3, Article 2315.2 and states, “If a person dies due to the fault of another, suit may be brought […] to recover damages which they sustained as a result of the death.”

In civil court, the basis for wrongful death is negligence. In a case of negligence, the plaintiff must prove a duty to conform to a standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the injury, and damages. If a claim is brought in negligence, the driver is held to a “reasonable person” standard of care. The question to ask is, “Would a reasonable person behave this way under the same or similar circumstances?”

Under Louisiana law, a motion for summary judgment is a procedural device that allows a court to resolve a case without a full trial when there is no “genuine issue of material fact” to be decided. See Duncan v. USAA Insurance Co., 950 So.2d 544 (La. 2006). A “genuine issue of material fact” is a matter about which reasonable people could disagree. This kind of decision is left to the jury to decide (or, in the case of a bench trial, the trial judge). If, based on the evidence, reasonable people could reach only one conclusion about an issue, there is no need for a jury to resolve it. A fact is “material” when it relates to an essential element of a plaintiff’s theory of recovery. A motion for summary judgment can be filed by either the plaintiff or defendant (the “movant”). The initial burden of proof rests with the mover to show that based on the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits, no genuine issue of material fact exists in the case. If the movant makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the other party to present evidence that shows that a material fact issue actually does exist; in the absence of this evidence, the court can grant the motion. See Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, 866 So.2d 228 (La. 2004).

Typically, the questions of a defendant’s negligence or a plaintiff’s contributory negligence are issues of fact and are therefore not appropriate for summary judgment. Freeman v. Teague, 862 So.2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003). However, in the event that reasonable minds cannot differ, these matters can be resolved by summary judgment. For instance, in the case of Pruitt v. Nale, No. 45,483-CA (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010), the plaintiff employed a motion for summary judgment both to recover damages from the defendant and to dispute the defendant’s allegation of contributory negligence.

On March 9, 2007, Tiffany Pruitt, then 19, was driving her father’s pickup truck eastbound on East Jefferson Avenue in Bastrop, Louisiana. Glenn Nale was also driving in the same direction of travel on Jefferson Avenue. He was behind the wheel of a log-hauling tractor-trailer. At the intersection with South Franklin Street, both Pruitt and Nale stopped at the red light, with Pruitt in the center lane of travel and Nale in the designated left-turn lane. When Nale began making a left turn onto South Franklin Street, the logs protruding from the rear of his trailer swung into the center lane and slammed into Pruitt’s truck. At least one of the logs shattered the driver’s side window and entered the cab of the truck, severely injuring Pruitt.

A very recent Louisiana Court of Appeals decision arises from a lawsuit filed by Lloyd and Dotris Bordelon to recover damages stemming from a pedestrian-vehicle accident that followed a vehicle-vehicle collision.

The first accident occurred in September 2003, when John Vercher and his wife were going north on Highway One in Avoyelles Parish to Mr. Bordelon’s house. Mr. Desselle was also going north on the highway and was attempting to pass the Verchers, unaware that Mr. Vercher was going to turn left into Mr. Bordelon’s driveway.The vehicles collided. Mr. Bordelon came out of his house to see what happened. After determining no one was hurt, Mr. Bordelon walked out to the highway to direct traffic. Mr. Bordelon reported that he heard someone asking him to move the vehicles, at which point he turned around and said they should not be moved. When Mr. Bordelon approached Mr. Vercher’s car, it lurched forward and hit Mr. Bordelon, throwing him into the post of his carport and an aluminum building. Mr Bordelon sustained injuries to his brain, face, and stomach. The Bordelons filed suit against both Mr. Vercher and his insurer and Mr. Desselle and his insurer for injuries he sustained as a result of the initial crash and resulting collison. The lawsuit against Mr. Vercher was dismissed prior to trial. After trial the court found that Mr. Desselle was one hundred percent at fault for the collision between him and Mr. Vercher and that both Mr. Desselle and Mr. Vercher were fifty percent at fault for Mr. Bordelon’s injuries, ordering Mr. Desselle and his insurer to pay the entire $50,000 with no reference to the assignment of fault. On the first appeal, the trial court executed a judgment allocating fault and damages equally between Mr. Desselle and Mr. Vercher. Mr. Desselle argued in this appeal that the trial court should not have found Mr. Desselle even fifty percent at fault for Mr. Bordelon’s injuries.

The defendants reasoning for reversing the judgments include the separate nature of the two accidents, the time and distance between them, and the fact that Mr. Desselle owed no duty to Mr. Bordelon.

While many people receive much of their legal understanding from popular tv shows and movies, the fact remains that very real legal concepts are often explored. Regardless of your television preferences, the terms remain the same in real life litigation that often involves great tragedy and turmoil for all parties involved. Medical malpractice. Negligence. These two legal terms have unique meanings and can determine many aspects of a case.

Medical malpractice concerns professional negligence committed by a health-care provider such as a hospital, dentist, doctor or similar professional. A medical malpractice action centers around the behavior of the professional and his use of medical practices that depart from the normal care or skill that other similar professionals with similar experience utilize, that ultimately results in harm to the patient. General negligence, on the other hand, concerns conduct of a person that fails to meet the standard of care a reasonable person in their position would have exhibited in whatever the situation may be. Clearly, general negligence is a broader cause of action than medical malpractice.

This comparison recently became crucial in a wrongful death lawsuit against Pendleton Methodist Memorial Hospital. The facts concern Ms. Althea LaCoste, who passed away after Hurricane Katrina knocked out Pendleton’s power supply. The Times-Picayune reported that although the hospital was prepared with emergency generators to fight through the storm, the generators lacked the improvements necessary to withstand the storm’s raging water levels. Consequently, Ms. LaCoste’s life support machine failed.

In Louisiana, actions in tort must be brought within a certain period of time after the incident occurs. This is called the “prescriptive period,” and reflects the state’s position that “a plaintiff is responsible to seek out those whom he believes may be responsible for a specific injury,” Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corporation, 509 So.2d 420, 423 (La. 1987), and to file suit within a reasonable period of time. The specific prescriptive period for a given tort is set by statute. For example, the prescriptive period for damage to immovable, or real, property is one year. LSA C.C. Art. 3493. The one-year period “commences to run from the day the owner of the [land] acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the damage.” LSA C.C. Art. 3493. A plaintiff’s knowledge of damage is often closely connected with the concept of “constructive notice,” which has been defined by Louisiana courts as “whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the injured party on guard or call for inquiry.” Campo v. Correa, 828 So.2d 502, 510-511 (La. 2002).

The expiration of the prescriptive period for property damage was central to the case of Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 2009-CC-2632 (La. 2010). The Hogg family owned property in Ruston that was located next to Burt’s Chevron Station. In 1997, it was discovered that the gas station’s underground storage tanks were leaking. The tanks were replaced, after which the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) investigated for soil and groundwater contamination. In December 2001 and April 2002, the LDEQ sent the owners of property around Burt’s Chevron, including the Hoggs, letters informing them of the environmental contamination. The first letter, dated December 20, 2001, reported that environmental contamination had been detected in the vicinity of Burt’s Chevron as a result of a leaking underground storage tank system. The letter explained that the contamination had been detected in the subsurface soil and groundwater, and appeared to be migrating in a “west-northwesterly direction,” toward an unnamed stream on the Hoggs’ property. The letter further reported that water samples collected from the stream indicated “the presence of chemicals commonly found in gasoline (i.e., benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene).” The letter specifically warned the Hoggs: “Due to the direction of groundwater flow, there is a possibility that gasoline may have migrated underground from the Burt’s Chevron site to your property or that such migration may occur in the future.” The second letter, dated April 26, 2002, contained the results of ambient air sampling which revealed the presence of petrochemicals in the area of the stream. A map enclosed with the letter showed that the tests were actually conducted on the Hoggs’ property. The LDEQ also recommended that the Hoggs “limit the time spent in the area immediately adjacent to the stream.”

The Hogg family did not file suit against E. Lee Young, the owner of Burt’s Chevron, until September 6, 2007–shortly after they were contacted by the LDEQ to request permission to enter their property to conduct clean-up. In the district court, Young filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the one-year prescriptive period for filing the tort action had expired. Young’s theory was that the period began to run when the Hoggs received the letters from the LDEQ in 2001 and 2002, as the letters provided them with notice of the presence of gasoline on their property. The Hoggs countered that the LDEQ’s letters were subject to more than one interpretation, thereby rendering the reasonableness of the Hoggs’ lack of response a question of fact that should go to a jury. The district court denied Young’s motion, finding issues of fact about whether the LDEQ’s letters provided knowledge of damage sufficient to start the running of the prescriptive period.

On July 24th in Lincoln Parish, two trucks collided on I-20 leaving one dead and several injured. While traveling east on I-20, a Chevy Suburban attempted to pass a GMC truck hauling a livestock trailer. The Chevy Suburban swerved right hitting the GMC truck and both vehicles ran off the road. The vehicles struck the tree line, the Chevy Suburban striking several trees before stopping. The front-seat passenger of the Chevy Suburban was pronounced dead at the scene. Two backseat passengers suffered minor injuries, and the 16-year-old driver of the Chevy Suburban was in critical condition. The driver and passenger of the GMC truck sustained moderate injuries. Three cows in the livestock trailer died in the crash.

It is unclear whether the accident was due to a mechanical defect, driver error, or another cause. Louisiana State Police say that impaired driving is not a likely cause of the accident, but they are awaiting routine toxicology tests to make the final determination. All passengers were wearing seatbelts, and so far no citations have been issued.

The determination of whether the accident is due to a mechanical defect or driver error is critical to determine the claims to file and the parties to bring a lawsuit against. An attorney hired by an injured party may investigate whether the owner of the vehicle negligently maintained the vehicle. To establish negligence, the attorney must prove a duty to conform to a standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the injury, and damages. Investigation of negligently maintaining the vehicle requires that the cars are examined and that the evidence is preserved.

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