Articles Posted in Negligence

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Mar’Kirney Holland, only four years old, died tragically in Orleans Parish after allegedly receiving negligent medical care in Lincoln Parish six years ago. This story provides a lesson on how important procedural motions are to a case. Plaintiffs often choose a certain jurisdiction because of different factors. Sometimes certain jurisdictions are chosen because of ease and convenience to parties and witnesses. Other times, plaintiffs have heard that certain courts or judges are more amenable and therefore, more likely, to rule in their favor. No matter the reasoning, deciding which court to proceed in is an essential decision that plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys must make. In this case, Holland v. Lincoln General Hospital, No. 2010-CC-0038 (La. Oct. 19, 2010), Defendants were successful in having the case moved from Plaintiffs preferred location of Orleans Parish to Lincoln Parish.

Mar’Kirney was born prematurely on November 12, 1999, and from an early age suffered from hydrocephalus, a condition where cerebrospinal fluid pools in the brain. At Tulane Hospital in New Orleans, doctors inserted a shunt to drain this fluid. Most, if not all, of the treatment related to the shunt took place at Tulane Hospital. The most recent “shunt revision” took place at Tulane Hospital two weeks before her death.

However, when Mar’Kirney began to suffer headaches, nausea, and vomiting, her mother, Latisha Holland, took Mar’Kirney to the closer hospital, Lincoln General Hospital. There, after fruitlessly waiting an hour, leaving, and coming back, Latisha claims that the doctor diagnosed Mar’Kirney with an upper respiratory infection. This was not the case. Mar’Kirney worsened and had to be transferred to Tulane Hospital after CT scans revealed that the shunt was blocked. Mar’Kirney died less than 24 hours after arriving at Tulane’s Pediatric Unit. Latisha brought a wrongful death and survival action against Lincoln General Hospital.

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Many of Louisiana’s woes are from recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Gulf oil spill. However, for Plaintiffs in David v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation, their woes began long before then. Plaintiffs were residents and property owners in the Cow Island area of Vermilion Parish when they discovered that their lands had high levels of arsenic in the ground water, in some instances eighty times the Environmental Protection Agency’s acceptable levels. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ product, Cooper’s Cattle Dip, contaminated their land and drinking water with arsenic and other hazardous chemicals causing the high rate of cancer in the area.

Plaintiffs’ story begins before 1970 when Cooper’s Cattle Dip was used in dripping vats located on, or adjacent to, all of the Plaintiffs’ properties. The dip solution contained high concentrations of arsenic and other poisonous chemicals. After being dipped in the solution, the cattle would stand as the dip slowly dripped its poison into the Plaintiffs’ lands. Although this dip eradicated the ticks that were killing cattle across the United States, it was deadly to humans and animals. This poisonous dip was simply allowed to run off into the ground and, as Plaintiffs alleged, contaminate the ground and eventually the water.

Despite this, the trial court ruled that twenty-one of these Plaintiffs had no cause of action and no standing to proceed in the case. Just recently, the Third Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling allowing the twenty-one Plaintiffs a chance to prove their case under pre-Louisiana Product Liability Act (LPLA) strict liability law. As a side note, this case is governed by pre-LPLA strict liability law because the contamination occurred before enactment of the LPLA. For further discussion on the LPLA, please see an earlier entry on the blog.

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According to Houma Today, a 17-year-old boy from Cut Off was killed on October 22nd when the car he was riding in struck a utility pole. The boy, Edward Domingue, and his 15-year-old girlfriend were going to pick up pizza and movies when she lost control of the vehicle. Questions remain regarding why the girl was driving since she did not have a driver’s license. Further, the girl’s mother and owner of the vehicle, Gillian Reynolds, adamantly stated that she would not allow her daughter to drive. While the facts are still not clear, civil liability for the accident and Domingue’s death are also still up in the air.

Louisiana Revised Statute 32:52 states that no person shall operate a vehicle or allow another person to operate a vehicle owned or controlled by him if the driver is unlicensed. However, the simple fact that doing so is a statutory violation does not necessarily imply that the owner, or the unlicensed driver, was negligent. In Enlow v. Blaney, the Louisiana Third Circuit held that even though a 14-year-old was not licensed to drive, the fact that the vehicle’s owner allowed her to drive without a license was “immaterial and irrelevant” to the issue of negligence where her “conduct in driving without a license was not a cause-in-fact of the accident.” Following its rationale in Enlow, the Third Circuit ruled that even when the owner allows an unlicensed minor to drive her vehicle, she will not be liable for a resulting accident where evidence suggests that the minor was competent to drive and the fact the driver was unlicensed is not the cause-in-fact of the accident.

However, under general common law principles, if the owner knowingly allows a person who is incompetent to drive, such as by repeated instances of negligent or reckless conduct, the owner may be liable for negligence. This usually requires that the incompetent driver be “on a mission” for the owner, acting as the owner’s agent or employee, or the owner is negligent for entrusting his vehicle to the incompetent driver. In order to establish negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must show that the vehicle’s owner knew or should have known that the borrower is incompetent to drive. One case of particular interest is the 1993 case of Jones v. Western Preferred Casualty Co. In that case, the Louisiana First Circuit found that a 19-year-old vehicle owner did not negligently entrust his car to a 13-year-old where the 13-year-old had only driven a few times before, had been drinking, and the 19-year-old had never met the 13-year-old before that day.

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On the day after Thanksgiving in 2003, plaintiff Nicol Hannie’s vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by defendant Ray Guidry in LaFayette, Louisiana. Due to the holiday shopping sales offered that day, traffic was very heavy. Hannie, who had just finished eating at a restaurant, attempted to make a left hand turn onto a five lane roadway. The middle lane of the roadway was a turning lane. Because traffic was completely backed up in the two travel lanes immediately closest to Hannie, several cars in those lanes graciously created a space for Hannie to traverse and waved him through. As Hannie cautiously passed through the space created in the immediate two lanes, he inched onto the turning lane to complete his left hand turn. However, as soon as he began to pass through the turning lane in order to merge onto the distant travel lanes, he was struck by Guidry, who was allegedly using the turning lane as a passing lane and also traveling at a high rate of speed.

At trial, the district court agreed that Guidry was impermissibly using the turning lane as a passing lane. They reached this conclusion by noting that Guidry’s intended turn-off was nearly 700 feet away from the scene of the collision, and he could have stayed in the inside travel lane several hundred feet further before entering the turning lane. Furthermore, the high rate of speed Guidry was driving, as witnessed by others, tended to show that Guidry may have been impatient and did not want to remain in the travel lanes before commencing his left handed turn in the turn lane. Accordingly, the district court held Guidry to be 100% at fault for Hannie’s resulting injuries.

Dissatisfied with the verdict, Guidry appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana. Guidry denied all fault and contended the Court of Appeals should review the district court’s finding under a de novo standard of review.

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This post constitutes part two of an introduction to mesothelioma:

Tissue changes resulting from asbestos exposure cause fluid to become trapped between the lung and the chest wall. This trapped fluid induces three symptoms which are often the initial symptoms a patient notices comprising coughing, chest pain, and shortness of breath. The trapped fluid creates uncomfortable pressure between the chest wall and lungs which the patient describes as chest pain under the rib cage. Coughing may accompany these symptoms which are typically the initial symptoms a patient experiences.

Additional symptoms may begin developing over several decades. For instance, weight loss may occur which is a symptom often seen in conjunction with cancerous tumors. Also, anemia may result when mesothelial cells comprising the pleura (lungs) and pericardium (heart) are involved. Blood clotting abnormalities typically present only in severe mesothelioma cases.

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On the evening of August 2, 2005, Latiffany Dunn slowed her car as she approached the intersection of Pearl and Washington Streets in Homer, Louisiana. As she came to a stop, a vehicle driven by Latonya Harris pulled up beside Dunn’s vehicle. Shatara Harris, Latonya’s sister, was a passenger in Latonya’s vehicle. Shatara got out of the car and approached Latiffany’s vehicle. The two women argued, and Shatara took a swing at Latiffany. As Shatara walked back to Latonya’s vehicle, Latiffany drove off and then circled back. As it passed by, Latiffany’s car clipped the open passenger door of Latonya’s vehicle. Shatara, who was attempting to get into the car at the same time, was injured when the door slammed closed against her. Latiffany did not stop her car, but instead drove to the Claiborne Parish Sheriff’s Department where she filed a report about the incident. A sheriff’s deputy interviewed Latiffany, transported her to the Homer Police Station, and then arrested her on a charge of aggravated second degree battery. Latiffany later pled guilty to simple battery. Shatara filed suit against Latiffany and her auto insurance carrier, U.S. Agencies Casualty Insurance Company, Inc. for damages arising from her injuries. U.S. Agencies filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Latiffany intentionally struck Latonya’s vehicle, which would have excluded coverage by the terms of the policy. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed U.S. Agencies from the suit; Shatara appealed.

Under Louisiana law, an insurer may limit the coverage it provides by the terms of its policy, but the insurer has the burden of proving that the facts and circumstances support the exclusion. Furthermore, “a summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy is not appropriate unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts, under which coverage could be provided.” The policy provision that U.S. Agencies pointed to excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage “caused by an intentional act” or “caused … while engaged in the commission of a crime.” U.S. Agencies argued that Latiffany committed a crime (as established by her guilty plea to the battery charge) and also that she intentionally struck Latonya’s vehicle to injure Shatara.

With respect to the crime exclusion, the Second Circuit noted that the policy defined “crime” as “any felony or any action to flee from, evade or avoid arrest or detection by the police or other law enforcement agency” (emphasis added). The court concluded that the crime exception was inapplicable because Latiffany’s guilty plea to simple battery–a misdemeanor offense–did not fit the policy’s definition. Furthermore, the court explained that Latiffany’s guilty plea was not determinative as to her intent to strike Shatara. While a guilty plea from a criminal matter is admissible in a civil case, it is not conclusive evidence. The court acknowledged that “summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no factual dispute as to intent,” which, after reviewing the trial record, was “not the case here.” The court reasoned, “we cannot say as a matter of fact that the record shows [Latiffany] intended to hit either Latonya’s vehicle or Shatara with her vehicle… Even though Latiffany pled guilty to simple battery, we find that the record shows that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Latiffany’s actions constituted an intentional act.” Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

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In 1988, Louisiana enacted the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) which provides for strict liability causes of actions against manufacturers of alledgedly defective products. This case is important because the ruling provides a guideline in which lawyers can litigate their client’s cases and attempt to provide them the financial recovery they deserve.

Under the LPLA, set forth in La.R.S. 9:2800:53(A):

The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristict of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticapated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.

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As we have discussed previously on this blog, summary judgment is a procedural device for expediently resolving a case without a full trial where there is “no genuine issue of material fact.” Johnson v. Evan Hall Sugar Co-op, Inc., 836 So.2d 484, 486. (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002). It is well settled in Louisiana that summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact” and that party requesting judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law. See La. Code Civ. P. Art. 966(B). A trial court’s analysis of whether summary judgment is proper can involve the review of a considerable volume of documents which may contain conflicting information. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled on a summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice case that turned on the trial court’s treatment of the defendant doctor’s deposition and subsequent affidavit.

On June 9, 2007, Percy Bethley, 80, was admitted to Baton Rouge General Medical Center Mid-City (“BRGMC”) with breathing difficulties. He had a five-year history of serious heart and lung disease. Bethley underwent various treatments in the hospital and received a pulmonary consultation by Dr. Reza Sheybani. After examining Bethley, Dr. Sheybani decided to replace the Bethley’s tracheostomy tube. A respiratory therapist, Cecilia Eason, was brought in to perform the replacement. Eason had great difficulty with the procedure and, sadly, as a result of a series of further complications, Bethley expired.

Following Bethley’s death, his widow and children (the plaintiffs) filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund. The panel found that the evidence supported the possibility that Dr. Sheybani failed to meet the applicable standard of care and that his conduct had been a factor in Bethley’s death. The plaintiffs then filed suit against BRGMC and Dr. Sheybani, alleging that Dr. Sheybani and the hospital employees who treated Bethley negligently contributed to his death. BRGMC answered and filed a motion for summary judgment. Dr. Sheybani responded with a pleading that opposed summary judgment and which included a personal affidavit that contained his own expert medical testimony. This testimony was offered to prove that genuine issues of material fact existed in the case: Dr. Sheybani alleged that Eason, a BRGMC employee, had been negligent in her treatment of Bethley. BRGMC then filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Dr. Sheybani, which the trial court granted after a hearing. The trial court also granted BRGMC’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs’ claims against BRGMC. Dr. Sheybani filed a motion for devolutive appeal.

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A Union Carbide Corporation plant facility in Taft, Louisiana, leaked a toxic chemical compound for at least seventeen hours on September 10th and 11th in 1998. Rainwater accumulation from Tropical Storm Frances caused partial collapse of the floating roof on a large tank storing liquid naphtha. Consequently, a tank seal broke allowing escape of liquid naphtha which volatilized and exposed workers and surrounding residential areas to naphtha fumes including the towns of Montz and Killona. An estimated 4.6 million pounds of naphtha vaporized before application of a chemical foam to the tank roof effectively stopped the volatilization hazard.

In the case of Howard v. Union Carbide Corporation, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reduced to negligible amounts the already decided damages awarded to plaintiffs exposed to the naphtha fumes. Specifically, original damages awarded were $3,500, $2,500, and $1,500. However, the Supreme Court reduced these damages to amounts of $500, $250, 150, and $100 based on proximity to the leak with higher awards to those within the plant and lower awards to those in the surrounding residential areas.

Exhibiting a controversial impression of the dangerous chemical involved, as well as defining exposure injuries, the Court concluded “simply no reasonable relationship” exists between the injuries and the original damages awarded. Assuming all fumes are equal regardless of the vastly different compounds which any given chemical leak may constitute, the Court cited other negligible awards in other cases despite the fact that the other cases involved unrelated chemicals.

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As we have examined in several prior blog posts, expert testimony plays a very important part in the resolution of many tort suits, especially those involving medical malpractice claims. Because the details of medical procedures can add considerable complexity to a case, expert witnesses are commonly relied on by both plaintiffs and defendants to help the jury better understand the facts. The input of experts is essential to the jury’s analysis of whether a doctor’s conduct which caused the plaintiff’s harm met the applicable standard of care; the recent case of Verdin v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of Terrebonne, No. 2010 CA 0456 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010), offers a look at the considerations a court may give when qualifying a witness as an expert.

On February 27, 2002, Don Verdin underwent back surgery at the Terrebonne General Medical Center to repair a herniated disc. Dr. Henry Haydel, an orthopedic surgeon, performed the procedure. During the surgery, Dr. Haydel’s tool punctured an artery, which required emergency surgery to repair. It was also discovered that Verdin’s bowel had been punctured, which necessitated yet another surgery to correct. Following these procedures, Verdin developed a severe infection that required an extended hospital stay, during which he experienced a number of other complications prior to his release from the hospital nearly a month later. Verdin filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund against Dr. Haydel, alleging that Dr. Haydel breached the standard of care in performing the back surgery and failed to properly treat the injuries that occurred during the surgery. Verdin also included similar claims against the surgeons who repaired the artery and bowel perforations. The Medical Review Panel found that none of the doctors who treated Verdin failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged in the complaint. Nevertheless, Verdin filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Haydel in June of 2005, alleging the same claims as were denied by the Review Panel. Following a four-day trial, during which numerous expert witnesses testified, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Haydel, finding that he did not breach the standard of care in his treatment of Verdin. Verdin then filed an appeal in which he attacked the jury verdict as manifestly erroneous.

Verdin’s primary enumeration of error centered on the expert testimony of Dr. Chad Millet, who was called as a witness by Dr. Haydel during the trial. Verdin objected to Dr. Millet’s qualifications, arguing that he did not have the necessary knowledge to qualify as an expert witness because he had not performed spine surgery in the six years prior to Verdin’s procedure in 2002. Verdin further asserted that because Dr. Millet had not taken any continuing medical education courses in the area of spine surgery during that time, he was not qualified to testify regarding the surgical procedure employed by Dr. Haydel. In reviewing the trial court’s decision to nevertheless accept Dr. Millet as an expert in the field of orthopedic surgery, the court reviewed La. R.S. 9:2794(D)(l)(b) and (c). These provisions require that in order to qualify as an expert witness, a physician must have knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the treatment involved in the claim, and that the physician must be qualified on the basis of training to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of medical care. The court also reaffirmed the long-standing view “trial courts have great discretion in determining the qualifications of experts and the effect and weight to be given to expert testimony. In the absence of a clear abuse of this discretion, [appellate courts] will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the qualification of a witness.” See Bradbury v. Thomas, 757 So.2d 666, 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999). “It is well settled,” noted the court, “that the law does not require an expert to be actively practicing in the particular specialty about which he or she will testify.” Instead, “the court need only be satisfied that the witness is qualified to give testimony regarding the applicable standard of care. Bradbury, 757 So.2d at 674.

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