Articles Posted in Negligence

Roxane Montgomery was hired in October of 2001 as an assistant manager for a video store owned by C & C Self Enterprises, Inc. in Lake Charles. She was 41 years old. Five months later, on April 8, 2002, she was terminated.

Ms. Montgomery sued C & C Self Enterprises claiming that she was terminated because of her age. The Louisiana Age Discrimination Employment Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual with respect to his compensation, or his terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual’s age.” Included in her claim that her employer violated LADEA, Ms. Montgomery alleged that she suffered “severe emotional distress resulting in physical complications due to her wrongful termination.” C & C Self Enterprises answered by denying that Ms Montgomery was fired because of her age, but was instead fired because of her “inadequate job performance.” They followed up their answer to the complaint by filing a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment and awarded the plaintiff $50,000.

Roxane Montgomery v. C & C Self Enterprises, Inc., was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals from the Fourteenth Judicial District Court of the Parish of Calcasieu. The purpose of this article is to identify and discuss the necessary elements of a successful age discrimination claim and to identify why the trial court erred when it denied C & C Self Enterprises’ motion for summary judgement. The Third Circuit court looked at Federal case law to assist in making their decision because LADEA is “nearly identical” to the Federal statute prohibiting age discrimination: the court looked at the U.S. Supreme Court decision McDonnell Douglas v. Green 411 U.S. 792 (1973) because this decision “set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in an unemployment discrimination case.”

An explosion at the Multi-Chem Corporation chemical plant, followed by a series of smaller ones, has led to an evacuation of the area’s residents. Preliminary reports indicate that no injuries have taken place but it will take some time before a full understanding of the incident is known. The company, which creates oilfield product chemicals, still does not know the full details of the incident. That another explosion has taken place, with the Dow Hahnville incident still in recent memory, leads to a lot of questions regarding the safety standards and practices being utilized at these facilities.

The Associated Press reports that the incident, which appears to have first begun at 4 pm today, featured a significant explosion that could be heard from more than a mile away. The incident led to a one mile radius surrounding the plant being evacuated as all plant employees are accounted for. While the State Police say no one was injured in the incident, previous chemical releases have proven that only after some time are the full effects of an explosion known.

A Multi-Chem Group in Houston spokesman says that the company is still in its exploratory phase and will provide details when they are available. Information is still scarce at this time but we will update this blog as it is available.

Reports are coming in that an explosion has taken place at the New Iberia chemical plant, leading to an immediate evacuation of residents in the area and plant personnel.

More information will be provided as it becomes available.

After filing a lawsuit, plaintiffs are required to notify defendants of the impending suit so that they may defend and respond to the claim. Without notice that a lawsuit has been filed against them, defendants’ due process rights may be violated if an unfavorable judgment is entered or rendered without their knowledge. The time frame for this requirement – commonly known as “service of process” – varies among state and federal jurisdictions. In Louisiana, plaintiffs have ninety days from filing a lawsuit to request service of process, which is known in Louisiana as “citation and service.” The lawsuit officially begins once a defendant receives citation and service because only then will a court have jurisdiction over all of the parties. If service is not completed within the statutory period, defendants may justifiably make a motion to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs, however, may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss if they can show good cause for being untimely with the requirement. This issue was recently before the Supreme Court of Louisiana in George Igbinoghene and Sebastian Busari v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co.

In the seminal case, Igbinoghene and Busari (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) filed their petition in the parish of Orleans on May 18, 2007, but failed to request service within ninety days of the filing date. St. Paul Travelers Insurance Company (hereinafter “St. Paul”) filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The district court denied the motion and St. Paul appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that denying the motion to dismiss was proper because good cause was shown for being untimely since they agreed to St. Paul’s request to extend the time to file responsive pleadings. The Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive given that such events occurred in 2008 and 2009, which were outside of the relevant period. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that requesting an extension to file pleadings did not act as an express, written waiver of citation and service. In addition, the Supreme Court declared that St. Paul’s knowledge of the suit did not make citation and service unnecessary. To support this assertion, the Supreme Court relied on Naquin v. Titan Indemnity Co., a Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case, which held that “defendant’s actual knowledge of a legal action cannot supply the want of citation because proper citation is the foundation of all actions.”

According to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, a merchant may use reasonable force to detain a suspected shoplifter for questioning or arrest for up to an hour. La. Code Crim. P. Art. 215(A)(1). A merchant who acts under this provision is entitled to immunity from any civil actions arising out of the detention, provided he can show that he had reasonable cause to believe that the detained person committed theft; he did not use unreasonable force; the detention occurred on the store premises; and the detention did not last longer than 60 minutes. Freeman v. Kar Way, Inc.

The issue of the merchant’s reasonableness was at the center of the recent case of Rhymes v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. On the morning of December 24, 2007, Thomas Rhymes visited the Winn-Dixie grocery store in Abbeville to purchase some cough syrup. While shopping, Rhymes’s blood sugar began to drop and he felt dizzy and weak. He slipped the cough syrup into his jacket pocket, grabbed several bags of honey buns, and made his way toward the checkout. A store manager intercepted Rhymes and demanded the products from his jacket pockets. The manager then told Rhymes to leave the premises but a moment later told him to stay, though Rhymes ignored this request and continued toward the door. The manager grabbed Rhymes by the neck and twisted his left arm behind his back. The manager attempted to hit Rhymes as they made their way to the back office but was stopped, mid-swing, by another store employee. When the police arrived, a different manager advised the officer to release Rhymes as the store did not wish to press charges. Rhymes filed suit for physical and mental injuries resulting from the incident. Winn-Dixie answered, denying that Rhymes was injured and asserting the merchant’s detention privilege under the Louisiana Code. Winn-Dixie also filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on May 20, 2010. Rhymes appealed.

The Third Circuit began its review with the well-established principle that summary judgment is appropriate only when there is “no genuine issue of material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rhymes’s argument on appeal was that a question of material fact “regarding whether the force used by the manager was reasonable” existed. Indeed, Rhymes argued that the store manager’s actions were “beyond unreasonable.” The court likened the analysis under the merchant statute to determining whether the force used by police officers in arresting criminal offenders is reasonable, for which the Louisiana Supreme Court has held:

Over the past two decades, America’s working class has suffered the impact of exposure to asbestos. Before it was known that asbestos could lead to serious illness and death, people worked around the material without hesitation. Problems with exposure arise due to the fact that the fibers of asbestos, once inhaled, can have a very negative impact on your lungs and body. Those who have been exposed to asbestos can contract mesothelioma, a rare kind of cancer that can develop from the protective lining that covers many of the body’s internal organs. It is an aggressive and deadly kind of cancer that has very little remedy; usually the best type of treatment is the keep the person as comfortable as possible.

Even worse, mesothelioma can have the same symptoms of other diseases, so it can be misdiagnosed very easily and lead to significant delays in treatment. Furthermore, the symptoms of the disease often do not appear right away. Because the impact of exposure may not become obvious for many years after exposure, people have the possibility of being diagnosed with something other than the disease and miss out on sorely needed medical attention. Because the disease manifests itself so late, it can easily go under the radar and get worse before anything can be done to resolve it.

In Louisiana, in the New Orleans Parish Civil District Courthouse, the family members of yet another victim of exposure to asbestos will have their day in court. The deceased, Phillip Graf, was exposed to asbestos for over 30 years and died a long, emotional and painful death. His family members are suing up to 29 different defendants in their lawsuits arising from his untimely and unfortunate death. Among the defendants are organizations that may have directly or indirectly played a critical role in the exposure of asbestos leading to Mr. Graf’s unfortunate passing.

The U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit upheld a District Court ruling in early 2011 allowing a contractor out of a negligence suit following a tragic incident in which a young man was electrocuted while trimming trees. The Court held Defendant Contractor Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. (CDM) did not have a duty to protect a subcontractor from injury and therefore could not be held negligent. Because there was no contract between the contractor and the tree service subcontractor, the Court held there was no principal-independent contractor relationship that would have formed a duty.

Chad Groover, an employee of Groover Tree Service (GTS), was operating an aerial lift and cutting trees on the morning of December 7, 2006, north of Slidell when the basket he was riding in made contact with an energized line. Groover’s brother, Larry Groover, witnessed the electrocution. Chad Groover was severely injured at the scene and sadly died seven months later from complications. The family of the deceased brought a negligence action against several defendants, including the contractor CDM, a CDM worksite monitor, and CDM’s insurers, Zurich American Insurance Company and ACE American Insurance Company. The suit alleged CDM’s negligence caused Larry Groover to suffer mental anguish when he witnessed his brother’s death.

Proving negligence requires proof that the negligent party owed a duty to the injured party. Duty implies a special relationship or can be established by law. The Defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing they did not have a legal duty to protect Chad Groover from injury. Plaintiffs averred in a cross motion for partial summary judgment Defendants had a statutorily provided duty to have the power company de-energize the lines.

The plaintiff in this case, Eileen Laday, was a passenger on a bus owned by the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government. The bus had been donated to the City-Parish in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. When the bus was donated, it was missing a plexiglass shield that was designed to keep the bus door from coming into contact with passengers. As Ms. Laday sat in the front seat, the door opened and trapped her arm. She was not consistent about how long her arm was trapped.

Ms. Laday went to a doctor the next day, complaining of neck and shoulder pain radiating into her right arm. The doctor ordered an MRI, which showed degenerative cervical disc conditions as well as a disc herniation. She later saw an orthopedic surgeon, who recommended that she undergo surgery. As of the date of trial, she had not yet had the surgery, which was estimated to cost between $60,492.60 and $61,492.60.

The judge conducted a bench trial (where there is no jury) and ruled in favor of Ms. Laday because of the high standard of care imposed on common carries like operators of public buses. He awarded her $60,000 in general damages, $24,084.56 in past medical expenses, and $60,492.60 for future surgery costs to be placed into a reversionary trust under La.R.S. 13:5106, with interest to go to Ms. Laday.

In a prior post, we saw that the trial court is afforded considerable deference in the setting the amount of general damages in tort cases. More than 30 years ago, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

“[T]he role of an appellate court in reviewing general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Each case is different, and the adequacy or inadequacy of the award should be determined by the facts or circumstances particular to the case under consideration.” Reck v. Stevens.

The Court went on to advise that an appellate court’s primary role is to determine whether a trial court’s general damages award amounted to an abuse of discretion. Only if such abuse is found is it appropriate for the appellate court to review prior judicial opinions to determine a range of amounts reasonably applicable in the case.

On the evening of October 29, 2004, Jeanine Pryor, then 69, attended a football game between Barbe High School and New Iberia High School at Lloyd G. Porter Stadium in Iberia Parish. Pryor, who was there to see her grandson play, was recovering from hip surgery and required a cane to get around. She sat in the bleachers on the visitors’ side of the stadium to be with the other fans of the Barbe High Bucs. The seat boards on the visitors’ side bleachers were uniform and approximately eight inches apart in height, except that the space between the first and second seat boards had 18 inches between them. When Pryor first arrived, she realized she could not step up the distance between the first row and the second, so she “grabbed the second board and lay on her side so she could swing one leg up at a time.” Then she stood up and was assisted by her daughter the rest of the way up the rows to her seat. At halftime, when Pryor descended the bleachers in order to visit the restroom, she attempted to simply step down the distance between the first and second seats, rather than use the same maneuver she had executed on the way up. In the process, she fell and was severely injured. Pryor filed suit against the New Iberia school board alleging that the bleachers were defective. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment for the school board, having determined under a risk/utility analysis that the condition of the bleachers was not unreasonably dangerous. Pryor appealed and the court of appeal reversed. It rejected the district court’s analysis, finding there was “no utility or social value in exposing visiting patrons to an eighteen-inch vertical differential between the seat boards in question.” The court apportioning 70 percent fault to the school board and 30 percent fault to Pryor, awarding her damages of over half a million dollars. The school board appealed.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recited the general rule that “the owner or custodian of property has a duty to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition,” though the owner generally has “no duty to protect against an open and obvious hazard.” It is the trial court’s role to decide which risks are unreasonable based upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and review of its determination on appeal is subject to the manifest error standard. Louisiana courts have adopted a risk-utility balancing test for this analysis, which requires weighing four factors:

(1) the utility of the thing. Here, the court concluded, “it is undisputed that the bleachers serve a social utility purpose by providing seating for patrons of the stadium,” and further, that “the eighteen-inch gap between the first and second seat is not a defect in the bleachers per se, but simply part of their design.”

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