Articles Posted in Miscellaneous

A July CNN report has brought to light a lawsuit filed against Louisiana school officials for repeatedly handcuffing and shackling a 6 year old. The lawsuit has been filed by rights advocates and the child’s parents on behalf of children in the Louisiana Recovery School District, a statewide entity managed by the Louisiana Department of Education. The superintendent of the district, and school officials and security officers at the school, Sarah T. Reed Elementary, were named in the lawsuit as well.

According to the suit, the 6 year old boy was handcuffed and shackled for “minor offenses,” involving a shoving match with another student. The School District stands behind the behavior of their employees and has indicated that the incident was an isolated one. They did not arrest the student or terminate the employee involved. The school principal, Daphyne Burnette also defended the school’s action, going so far as to state that it is school policy to handcuff “out of control” students, and that if children fail to follow rules in the future, they will be handcuffed. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit disagree with this policy and have argued that the punishment methods crossed the line and that the conduct was “unreasonable and excessively intrusive.”

The child’s father, Sebastian Weston, claims that his son’s life has been forever changed because of the incident.

Car accidents oftentimes are not simple, clear-cut events that lend a clear idea of who was right and who was wrong. Instead, many times it is left to a court to decide what the circumstances were that led to the collision and the amount of responsibility each party had for it occurring. As a result, because no court is perfect, individuals who have been harmed due to another party’s acts are left out in the cold because they could not prove their case. However, each year new technology comes out that provides a better opportunity for plaintiffs, and their attorneys, to prove their case and receive the compensation they deserve.

One firm, Advanced Research and Technology (ART) Corporation, works with the very technology required to prove cases. Utilizing Finite Element Analysis (FEA), commonly referred to as computer simulations, the company provides compelling engineering evidence to explain the cause of a crash-related case. FEA’s due this by calculating the kinematics of the investigated accident (speeds, relative motion, different parts of accident) and structural analysis (where the cars collided and relevant stresses, strains, failures, energy displacements, etc.). By analyzing this information, FEA can help plaintiffs win cases related to auto and motorcycle crashes, airbag and seatbelt related problems, structural analysis relating to accidents or blasts, slip and fall cases, fuel tank and pipeline pressure analysis and a variety of others.

FEA simulations are widely recognized by the engineering community as a reliable and advanced tool for solving structural dynamics, crash, blast and impact-related matters. Automotive companies often use FEA for car testing in the same way that highway safety systems are designed using the technology. The reliability of FEA comes down to the simulator being able to develop accurate formulations or equations to explain how the millions of small elements involved in a collision react when variables are at a certain set. Because of its ability to determine how a car will behave in a collision and the effects of a collision, technology experts are able to move backwards and determine what variables were in place to lead to the results suffered.

Louisiana courts, like those in most other states, enforce a prohibition in jury trials known as the “golden rule.” During a closing argument, the plaintiff’s attorney may not ask the members of the jury to imagine themselves in the place of the plaintiff when deciding how much to award the plaintiff in damages. The rationale for prohibiting such a request is that the jury’s sympathy may be unfairly invoked, resulting in an inappropriately large award of damages. So, while the jury should not be asked to imagine themselves going through the same experience that the plaintiff endured, the plaintiff’s attorney may simply direct the jury to consider the pain and suffering the plaintiff has been through.

An alleged violation of the golden rule was one basis of the appeal in Tingle v. American Home Insurance Co., No. 10-71 (La.App. 3d Cir. June 11, 2010). On March 5, 2006, Brian Montgomery was driving his tractor-trailer while intoxicated in Lake Charles. He ran a red light and slammed into the car of Levi and Tasha Tingle. The Tingles’ two-year-old daughter, Madison, who was also in the car, was killed; her parents suffered severe injuries. The Tingles settled with Montgomery’s employer, Boots Smith, for the limits of his primary liability insurance policy. The Tingles then filed suit against Smith’s excess insurance carrier, American Home Insurance Co. At the trial, the jury awarded the Tingles over $10 million in damages, of which approximately half were punitive damages.

On appeal, American argued that the trial court erred in permitting the Tingles’ attorney to “implore the jury to put themselves in the [Tingles’] shoes.” (The court did not include in its opinion exactly what the Tingles’ attorney said in his closing argument.) But the court declared that it “prefer[s] to allow the trial court latitude to conduct a trial,” citing a line of Louisiana cases espousing the view that

A power failure at Chalmette Refining LLC has led to a thin layer of white powder descending upon Southeast Louisiana, raising concerns about the toxicity and potential harm that could emerge from exposure. Citing a power failure for the reason that up to one ton of catalyst were released into the air and falling down atop cars, homes, businesses and other property, the company has attempted to assure the public that safety is not a concern. However, the care that the refinery recommends during clean-up tells a much different story.

Spreading across the communities of Arabi and New Orleans’ lower ninth ward, the powder used for refinery processes resembled simple dust or powdered sugar and alarmed many during a time in which little to no information can cause significant panic. Taking place on September 6th, many in these communities are left wondering just why chemical releases keep happening and what is being done to prevent them from happening.

Louisiana’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), already investigating the unapproved release of catalyst, has notified the public that, after photographic any and all damage the powder has caused to their property, they can move forward with clean-up. Yet, in their required notice to the DEQ, the Chalmette refinery warned that gloves and safety glasses should be used when cleaning up the material. St. Bernard Parish Fire Chief Thomas Stone warned that the powder could be an irritant to individuals with respiratory problems and that the powder should be cleaned in order to prevent extended exposure.

In June 2007, Chadwick Dukes and his daughter, Skylah, were driving on La. Hwy. 983 in West Baton Rouge Parish. Their car was struck by a vehicle driven by Paul Declouette and owned by Sheryl Rogers. The following May, Dukes filed a lawsuit on behalf of Skylah seeking to recover damages for the injuries she sustained in the crash. Dukes named as defendants Declouette, and the Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, which was Declouette’s as-then unknown insurance carrier.

Shortly thereafter, Imperial Fire was identifed and admitted that it had issued an auto liability policy to Declouette that was in effect at the time of the accident. Dukes added Imperial Fire as a named defendant and then signed an agreement to release Declouette and Rogers from the suit. As a result, on November 20, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment to dismiss Dukes’s claims against Declouette. Imperial Fire immediately filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it could not be found liable because Dukes released its insured customer (Declouette) by agreement without a reservation of rights. Imperial Fire relied on the language of the insurance policy, which obligated the company to pay damages for any injuries for which

An insured person becomes legally responsible because of an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered vehicle.

John C. Elliott, 26, of Zavalla, Texas was driving a 1999 GMC pickup east on LA.8 and he lost control while passing another vehicle in a curve. He collided with several trees before the truck stopped on La. 8 facing the other direction. Elliot was injured seriously and taken to Lake Charles Memorial Hospital. There were two passengers in the car.

As reported in the Leesville Daily Leader

His two passengers,19-year-old Susie Dixon and an infant, both of Zavalla, Texas, suffered minor injuries and were transported to Byrd Regional Hospital.

Lamar Richardson of Joyce brought an action against his employer, Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway Company, for injuries he claims to have sustained on May 14, 1990 when he was working on a maintenance crew. While clearing debris off train tracks, Richardson was cutting limbs from a large willow tree on the track at mile post 149.8 in Winn Parish and claims he was struck with a large limb and injured.

Richardson sued KCS under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq for medical expenses, mental anguish, and lost wages that resulted from the alleged injury. He contended that his employer failed to provide a safe workplace and was negligent in not adequately supervising the clearing of trees or training personnel in how to cut trees. Richardson claimed his injuries kept him from working and eventually led to a need for cervical disc surgery. The case went to trial in 1994 and 1995. Judgment was entered in June 1998 in Richardson’s favor and he was awarded medical expenses of $3,869.75, general damages of $150,000, and lost wages of $525,435.00. The major contention presented during the trial was Richardson’s report that he visited the emergency room Jackson Parish Hospital on May 15th after the pain in his neck intensified. Hospital records do not confirm the report but rather show he visited the ER three days prior to his alleged injury on May 11, 1990 where he complained of, among other things, neck pain that had lasted about a week. The emergency room had no record of a visit on May 15. Richardson claimed that he drove his son to a basketball event in Hammond on May 11 and therefore could not have gone to the emergency room. Witnesses at trial corroborated his testimony and the jury found his account more convincing than the hospital records which Richardson claimed had been made in error.

KCS appealed, and in their April 1, 1999 decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed. The court found that the Richardson failed to show that the date in the hospital records was inaccurate and that the idea that the records were created in error is implausible and not supported. The court also found that Richardson’s claim that he was treated by a particular doctor and nurse when he visited the hospital on May 15th was impossible given the testimony of those individuals. Finally, Richardson made no claim that the hospital intentionally falsified medical records or provide a motive for them to do so. The court found the hospital records to be accurate and reliable. Medical records are typically considered to be inherently reliable given that health care providers rely on them in making life and death decisions. As such, the plaintiff sought medical treatment for neck pain prior to his alleged injury and was not entitled to damages from his employer.

On April 17, 1968, Doris Brantley of Oak Grove, Louisiana was involved in an automobile accident when her car struck by a vehicle driven by Albert McKee. Mrs. Brantley was immediately taken to a local hospital and was released the next day. Her painful injuries included numerous abrasions, bruises, and lacerations, as well as trauma to her neck, back, and knees. She received care from a general practitioner for several weeks following the collision and then sought treatment from an orthopedic surgeon in Greenville, Mississippi.

At the time of the crash, Mrs. Brantley was 40 years old and in good health. She worked at the Lamont Glove Factory in Oak Grove as an inspector, where she earned $1.92 per hour. The trial court awarded Mrs. Brantley $5,000 for her personal injuries resulting from the accident, and an additional $1,313.85 for her lost wages and expenses she incurred in repairing her car. Mr. McKee, the other driver, appealed the judgment on the sole basis that the damages awarded by the trial court were excessive.

The principle that “much discretion” must be afforded the trial judge or jury in awarding tort damages has been a part of the Louisiana Civil Code since 1825. (Currently, the provision resides in Section 3 of Article 1934.) According to William A. Sherwood, who wrote about this matter in a note that appeared in the Tulane Law Review in 1974, its inclusion in the Code

As discussed in the last post on the topic of traffic accident reconstruction, experts can play a pivotal role in the outcome of a case. Many accident victims can benefit from the opinion of reconstruction experts in establishing the at-fault party in a crash. Key to achieving this result is officially qualifying the reconstruction expert in the eyes of the court. Though a person may represent himself as qualified to analyze traffic accidents and offer an opinion on its cause, it may be quite another matter for the court to accept the opinion and permit the jury to consider the expert’s testimony.

The case Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1999) helps to explain the trial court’s role in evaluating the qualifications of a self-proclaimed accident reconstruction expert. The case concerned a car accident in which the defendant, driving a tractor-trailer, collided with the defendant’s car at an intersection in Yazoo City, Miss. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent because at the time of the crash he was operating his truck at a speed in excess of the posted limit of 55 MPH. In support of this theory, the plaintiff sought during her jury trial to qualify that her witness, Mr. Rosenhan, was an expert in accident reconstruction. Rosenhan was to testify, based on his review of the police’s accident report, that he calculated that the defendant’s truck was traveling 63 MPH when the collision occurred. The defendant objected, arguing that Rosenhan’s qualifications were insufficient to form the basis of an expert opinion on the crash. After substantial analysis, the district (trial) court refused to qualify Rosenhan as an expert witness and did not allow the jury to hear his testimony. When the jury delivered a verdict for the defendant after the plaintiff could not otherwise prove her speeding theory and establish the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff appealed on the basis that the trial court’s exclusion of Rosenhan’s testimony was improper.

The appellate court recalled its prior decision in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc. in which the wide discretion district courts are granted when deciding whether expert testimony is admissible was determined. This discretion is only overturned when its’ exercise was “manifestly erroneous”. 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir.1997). The court also referenced the Supreme Court decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in which the Court stated that a district court’s function was to act as gatekeepers, only permitted expert testimony that is both reliable and relevent to be presented to the jury. When the appellate court considered the matter of Rosenhan’s expertise as analyzed by the district court, it found he had earned a bachelor of science degree and a masters degree in mechanical engineering. Rosenhan had experience teaching mechanical and industrial engineering at vocational schools and colleges. During his 25-year consulting career, Rosenhan had worked in fire investigation and reconstruction; Rosenhan testified that his specialty had only recently changed to car accident reconstruction.

Louisiana workers’ compensation law creates a system that provides medical treatment and monetary income to employees who suffer injuries while on the job. The law is designed to benefit both employees and employers. Workers are protected against the difficulties that result from job-related injuries such as the expenses of medical care and lost wages from being unable to work. An injured employee can receive bi-weekly income payments and free medical treatment, but must forfeit any right he may otherwise have under the law to sue his employer over the injury. The employer benefits by avoiding a potentially costly and unpredictable lawsuit in exchange for accepting limited liability under the structured system that seeks to protect the interests of both parties. Under this system, the issue of fault or negligence is not at issue—it is enough for the employee to show that he suffered an injury while performing work for his employer.

One important procedural obligation on the part of an injured worker is that he must report the injury to his employer in a timely manner. According to Louisiana statute,

No [claim] for compensation shall be maintained unless notice of injury has been given to the employer within thirty days after the date of the injury or death. This notice may be given or made by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or by anyone on his behalf. La. R.S. 23:1301.

Contact Information