Articles Posted in Miscellaneous

by

In a recently published case, a four-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of Louisiana upheld a trial court’s determination that the defendants pay all of the court costs, even though they prevailed on the merits of the case. This kind of decision is highly unusual; typically, the losing party pays court costs, which can include, for example, filing fees, expert witness fees, and costs of depositions. They can be substantial, especially in a decade-long court case such as this one. Here, the defendants were ordered to pay court costs of $326,307.09, which they promptly appealed.

In order to appeal a judgment of costs, the costs must be substantial and a hearing on the subject must be held after the case has resolved on the merits. Here, the trial judge, Judge Hebert, did in fact hold a hearing where both sides were allowed to present briefs and arguments as so why the opposing party should be forced to bear the costs.

The judge acknowledged that the lawyers for both sides were aggressive advocates and did not fault them for that. Though Judge Hebert took one of the plaintiff’s attorneys to task for losing his temper and throwing a pencil, he also pointed out that the defendants’ attorneys engaged in behavior that was calculated to mislead the court, intimidate and harass witnesses, and impede litigation.

Continue reading

by

A common litigation strategy employed by savvy plaintiffs is choosing the most favorable jurisdiction in which to file a complaint. Favorability can turn on a number of factors including geographical convenience, the perception that a “local” jury may be more sympathetic, or that certain judges are more welcoming to the plaintiff’s particular cause of action than others. The choice of forum is governed by a series of procedural rules, but in many instances a plaintiff’s case may be properly filed in more than one parish. Or, in a case involving multiple defendants, there may be a need to decide between filing in state or federal court. Generally, state court is preferred by plaintiffs in tort actions, but federal court may be the only available forum when one or more defendants is not a resident of Louisiana. Accordingly, a critical part of the forum selection strategy is deciding whom to name as a defendant. Federal civil procedure rules seek to limit the parties’ unfair manipulation of defendants to affect forum choice.

The term “complete diversity” refers to the situation where none of the plaintiffs in a case is from the same state as any of the defendants; this results in jurisdiction by the federal court. A plaintiff who prefers to have his case heard in state court may attempt to name a defendant who resides in his own state in order to destroy complete diversity. The concept of “improper joinder,” however, can be employed by a defendant who favors federal court to challenge the plaintiff’s inclusion of the in-state, or “non-diverse,” defendant. To do so, the objecting defendant must demonstrate either

(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or

Continue reading

by

Louisiana law reflects the state legislature’s interest in protecting the health and safety of residents of rental property. For instance, landlords are required to warrant that a house is “suitable for the purpose for which it was leased” and that it is “free of vices or defects that prevent its use for that purpose.” La. C.C. art. 2696. The warranty extends even to problems that are not personally known to the landlord, though there is an obligation on the part of tenants to report any unsafe conditions. La. C.C. art. 2697. Some limited waivers of this warranty are permitted, but only by “clear and unambiguous language that is brought to the

attention of the lessee.” La. C.C. art. 2699. So strong is the state’s intent to protect tenants that the law imposes strict liability on a landlord for damages that arise from defects to the property. To prevail against a landlord, the tenant must only prove that the landlord had control over the thing that caused injury; the thing that caused injury suffered from a condition that created an “unreasonable risk of harm”; and that the condition caused the tenant’s injury. In fact, the landlord’s liability is based entirely on his status as the landlord, not his personal fault. Thus, a landlord’s “lack of knowledge regarding a [particular] defect is inconsequential.”

A case that recently came before the Second Circuit Court of Appeal demonstrates the operation of this statutory warranty. In 2000, Antonio Wells, Sr. signed a lease to rent a house on Julia Avenue in Bossier City from William Norris. Wells’s family, who lived with him in the house, included his wife, Amanda, and three children: Amber, Antinio Jr., and Arquisia. When the family moved in, several electrical outlets were not working. Wells and his wife got into the habit of using extension cords to power lights and other appliances in the home that were not located near working outlets. Discovered later was the fact that many of the 20-amp fuses in the home’s fuse panel had been replaced with 30-amp fuses to prevent overloads; this caused excessive heat to build up in the circuits. Around lunch time on July 1, 2001, the house caught fire when an air conditioner overloaded a circuit with an altered fuse and ignited. The Bossier City Fire Department responded and extinguished the fire, but, tragically, not before Arquisia was killed and both Amber Antonio Jr. were severely injured. Wells filed suit against the landlord, Norris, in June of 2002. Wells alleged that Norris was strictly liable for the damages sustained by him and his family in the fire. A trial was held in March, 2010 in which the trial judge, without oral or written reasoning, ruled in favor of Wells and awarded $207,572.79 in damages. Norris appealed.

Continue reading

by

Is the Failure to Observe a “Do-Not-Resuscitate” Order Medical Malpractice?

A common element in medical malpractice cases we have previously examined on this blog is the role of Louisiana’s medical review panel. As a brief review, claims brought against healthcare providers under Louisiana’s Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”) must be reviewed by a medical review panel before proceeding to court. The panel’s purpose is limited to determining whether the evidence supports the plaintiff’s allegation that the healthcare provider failed to observe the appropriate standard of care. If the board determines the standard was not met, it must then decide whether that failure contributed to the plaintiff’s injury. The panel’s report, though not conclusive, is admissible in any subsequent litigation.

A plaintiff who believes he has been a victim of medical malpractice must first determine whether a particular claim is even subject to the MMA, and therefore whether it must be submitted to a medical review panel prior to litigation. This is an important matter, because a medical malpractice claim against a health care provider is “subject to dismissal on an exception of prematurity if such claim has not first been presented to a medical review panel.” The Louisiana Supreme Court, in the case of Coleman v. Deno, identified six factors which are to be considered when determining whether a claim falls under the medical malpractice umbrella. But even with these factors as a guide, the decision may not necessarily be straightforward. A recent case that demonstrates the “grey area” of medical malpractice claims involved a hospital’s ignoring a patient’s Do-Not-Resuscitate Order (“DNR”). Agnes Liles was admitted to the Northern Louisiana Medical Center (“NLMC”) in Ruston on July 10, 2009. A few days later, he went into cardiac arrest. Despite NLMC’s knowledge of Liles’s DNR, hospital employees resuscitated Liles. The process left him with physical disabilities until his death two months later. Liles’s two daughters filed suit against NLMC for recovery of the medical expenses attributable to Liles’s post-resuscitation care as well as physical and mental pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and cognitive decline. They also asserted a claim for bystander recovery. NLMC filed an exception of prematurity in the trial court arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims must be reviewed by a medical review panel prior to litigation. The trial judge overruled the exception after a hearing and NMLC filed for supervisory review of the judgment with the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. The court relied primarily on two cases to ultimately conclude that “the actions by the nursing personnel in failing to honor the DNR order were not covered under the MMA as medical malpractice, but instead should be governed by Louisiana negligence principles of law.” The first case contained the Louisiana Supreme Court’s pronouncement that

Continue reading

by

Our previous post discussed the various principles of contract law at work in the Mendoza case, which can be viewed here. This case involved a dispute between an injured worker’s employer and another company with which that employer had a contract. A provision of this contract provided for indemnification, the assuming by one entity of the liability of another.

Companies often assume the liabilities of other entities with which they hold contracts. This is seen as a cost of doing business. Indemnification makes up part of or the entirety of the consideration for some corporate contracts. Contracting away your liability can be extremely valuable. The dispute in this case was when the contract actually became effective. The court used various principles discussed in its opinion and the previous post on this topic to determine that the trial court was correct in denying summary judgment to one party and granting it to the other. Mid South, Mr. Mendoza’s employer, was to be indemnified and held blameless by EXCO as per their 2008 agreement.

In general, this dispute really came down to an issue of timing. The two companies in question signed an agreement in December 2008. The incident that created Mr. Mendoza’s cause of action occurred in October 2007. He filed suit in August of 2008. Mid South did not file an answer to the complaint until July of 2009. After this filing Mid South demanded defense from EXCO; this defense was promptly denied. Mid South again attempted to illicit indemnification and defense from EXCO in September 2009 based on a 2004 contract that Mid South held with Anadarko, a company whose interests were subsequently absorbed by EXCO. EXCO did not respond until after Mid South filed a cross-claim against EXCO. EXCO filed an exception and answer in April 2010 along with a motion for summary judgment. In July 2010, Mid South filed its cross-motion for summary judgment. The former motion for summary judgment was denied and the latter granted in August of 2010. When the trial court denied EXCO’s motion to designate the judgment as appealable, EXCO sought aid from a higher court. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit of Louisiana granted EXCO’s writ application but ultimately sided with the trial court.

Continue reading

by

A well-written contract can not only solve most problems, it can prevent most problems from becoming problems in the first place. For a contract to have its maximum problem eliminating effect, however, all parties to the contract must agree as to what it mean. Contract law is filled with cases that could have been avoided if the entities involved had simply expressed their terms more clearly or asked the right questions before, during and after the drafting of the contract. While this ambiguity may be intentional by one side or both in the event they think a benefit can be attained, the truth is the best contract is often the one where both parties are simply looking to achieve the main goal fairly. Those instances where ambiguity dominates, however, cause problems. The case of Mendoza v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., discussed in an earlier post, is one such case.

The Mendoza case was two-fold. It involved questions as to whether and when one company assumed liability for another company. Several contract law principles were implicated in this dispute from which this opinion resulted. Contracts get drafted under the assumption that the parties have reached an agreement. This alleged agreement is nowhere to be found when there is a dispute over the meaning of a contract. When adverse parties give contradictory interpretations of the same contract language a suit often ensues. It is because of the relative frequency of this occurrence that the courts have come up with various rules for interpreting contracts when the parties themselves cannot.

The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit of Louisiana applied Texas contract law in this case. This was due to an agreement between the parties which was most likely part of the contract itself; there was no dispute over this portion of the contract. For guidance, Texas law contains several well-established principles for evaluating disputed contracts:

Continue reading

by

A defendant who wishes to challenge a jury’s damages award can petition the court for a new trial. As this is often an undesirable path for both the defendant and the plaintiff, Louisiana law offers an alternative approach: when the trial court believes that the verdict is “so excessive … that a new trial should be granted for that reason only,” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 1814, it can order remittitur. This option is available only if the plaintiff agrees to it, under the assumption that accepting a lower amount of damages may prove preferable to another trial. The trial court is permitted to order remittitur “only if the issue of quantum is clearly and fairly separable from other issues in the case.” The recent case of Great West Casualty Co. v. AAA Cooper Transport offers an instructive example of Louisiana’s remittitur statute as applied by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On November 27, 2006, a tractor-trailer which operated by Juan Rodriguez-Salas was struck by another tractor-trailer; the second truck was being driven by Ray Johnson and was owned by AAA Cooper Transportation. Rodriguez-Salas’s truck rolled over, and he suffered injuries to his right shoulder as a result. Rodriguez-Salas sued Johnson and AAA Cooper in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. He sought to recover for his medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering and lost wages. After a trial, the jury awarded Rodriguez-Salas $38,000 for lost wages; $120,000 for pain, suffering, and mental anguish; and $10,000 for loss of enjoyment of life. AAA Cooper, objecting to the damages award, filed a motion for a new trial. The district court entered judgment on the verdict and denied AAA Cooper’s motion. AAA Cooper appealed, seeking a reduction in Rodriguez-Salas’s $130,000 general damages award on the theory that Rodriguez-Salas’s injuries were to only one shoulder and only required treatment for eight months; in AAA Cooper’s view, $40,000 was an appropriate amount.

The Fifth Circuit, in applying Louisiana law, first reviewed the district court’s finding that a new trial was unnecessary. The district court determined that sufficient evidence of Rodriguez-Salas’s “injuries, medical treatment and recovery, and the effect of both on his work and daily activities” had been presented at trial “to reach a fair determination of his general damages and lost wages.” The Fifth Circuit agreed, noting that the record included such evidence as Rodriguez-Salas’s testimony about his injuries, testimony from doctors about Rodriguez-Salas’s condition, and Rodriguez-Salas’s medical records. Accordingly, in affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “the district court did not abuse its discretion” and that “the award [was] not against the great weight of the evidence.”

Although remittitur offers the parties in litigation a more efficient means by which to resolve a dispute over a damages award, it is still subject to many of the same limitations that apply to appeals in general — that is, that great deference must be afforded a jury’s award of damages. Only through a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court can a defendant prevail on a remittitur action.

Continue reading

by

Gambling is a tricky form of entertainment that has very serious legal implications surrounding it despite all of the fun, lights and glamour surrounding these games of chance. One legal issue that is intrinsically tied to gambling is the idea of borrowing and/or the financial backing of a player in a game. Often, casinos extend lines of credit to individuals who are regular patrons at their establishment. This line of credit, however, must be used for gambling purposes at the issuing casino’s establishment. The purpose in doing this is to increase the amount of money in play and in return, so the casino hopes, result in higher winnings for the house. Because casino markers are often made for large amounts and are typically interest free, strict laws are in place to protect lending casino’s rights to collect on such markers.

These laws came to light when Ms. Strong, a Texas resident, was issued markers at a Shreveport riverboat casino totaling $60,000. After losing the entire amount, the casino tried to collect on the markers owed. However, the markers were returned to the casino by Ms. Strong’s bank marked “Not Sufficient Funds.” Louisiana law treats casino markers like checks, requiring the collector to make a written demand, sent through the mail, for payment to be made within fifteen working days after receipt of the demand before a suit can be filed. In this case, Ms. Strong failed to make payment within the fifteen days and suit was brought. Ms. Strong’s defense relied on her claim that the markers were not enforceable upon several grounds.

The first issue to consider in determining whether or not a casino marker is enforceable is to ask which state’s law applies, as some states do not recognize markers as a valid form of payment. This is especially relevant in the riverboat casino context, where several patrons come from out of state. Louisiana law provides that the issue is to be governed by the state whose policies are most seriously affected if its state laws are not applied. Here, if Texas law were used, the casino would not be able to collect its debt because Texas has strong policies against the enforcement of gaming debts. This would be more severe to Louisiana’s pro-gaming policies as it would allow those from states with policies similar to Texas to incur gaming debts in Louisiana and avoid them by returning to their home state. This would cause negative implications for both casino profits and state economic development. For this reason, in Ms. Strong’s case, Louisiana law applies.

Continue reading

by

When apportioning fault between two or more parties in a negligence action, the finder of fact is given great deference on review. An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s finding unless there is “manifest error” or it is “clearly wrong.” Cole v. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections. In order

to reverse the trial court’s apportionment of fault, the appellate court must “find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has provided extensive guidance on the trial court’s responsibility for allocating fault. The court is “bound to consider the nature of each party’s wrongful conduct and the extent of the causal relationship between that conduct and the damages claimed.” Watson v. State Farm. Furthermore, in assessing fault, the trial court can consider several factors related to a party’s conduct, including:

“(1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger, (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct, (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought.”Watson

Continue reading

by

Transferring from the deck of your boat to an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico to begin your day’s work should not be a terrifying experience. While the transfer involves getting into the personnel basket that transfers you onto the platform and little else, the process itself is not as simple as one plain act. Tragically, this simple transfer does not always occur as planned. A recent case highlights importnat legal principles associated with this scenario.

In Channette v. Neches Gulf Marine, Inc. and Seneca Resources Corporation, injured seaman Michael Channette was being transferred from the M/V GOLIAD, operated by Neches Gulf Marine, to an offshore platform operated and owned by Seneca Resources. When the transfer went wrong and Channette was injured, Neches Gulf Marine sought indemnity from Seneca Resources. Indemnification is “The act of making another “whole” by paying any loss another might suffer. This usually arises from a clause in a contract where a party agrees to pay for any losses which arise or have arisen.”

In this case, this is exactly what Neches Gulf Marine asserted – that Seneca Resources was contractually obligated to indemnify them. Unfortunately for Neches Gulf Marine, the district court granted a summary judgment motion for Seneca Resources, thus ruling they had no duty to indemnify Neches Gulf Marine.

Continue reading
Contact Information
1140 St Charles Ave
New Orleans, LA 70130
Phone: (504) 521-6000
Fax: (504) 617-6300

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Please do not include any confidential or sensitive information in a contact form, text message, or voicemail. The contact form sends information by non-encrypted email, which is not secure. Submitting a contact form, sending a text message, making a phone call, or leaving a voicemail does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Copyright © 2016 – 2024, Berniard Law Firm
JUSTIA Law Firm Blog Design