Articles Posted in Medical Malpractice

Imagine that your doctor gives you a prescription drug to alleviate a persistent headache or cold, or recommends for you a new pacemaker or prosthetic joint. If your doctor’s prescription drug or medical device ends up injuring you—what do you?

The general rule is that a consumer who is injured by a prescription drug or medical device may be able to seek compensatory damages from the physician that prescribed that drug or device and from the manufacturer who manufactured that drug or device. For example, a doctor may be liable for a patient’s damages if he should not have prescribed the drug or medical device or if he failed to warn of a non-obvious risk. Likewise, the manufacturer could be liable if the product is unreasonably dangerous or if the manufacturer failed to warn of non-obvious dangers.

However, there’s an important exception regarding a drug or device manufacturer’s liability—the learned intermediary doctrine. A majority of states, including Louisiana, have adopted some form of the learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine works as a shield to protect manufacturers from being liable for not informing the patient of the product’s risks if the manufacturer has adequately warned the patient’s physician of the risk. Essentially this means that a manufacturer has no duty to warn you- the patient; instead, the manufacturer must warn your physician of the drug or device’s dangers. The physician then becomes responsible for warning the patient of the risks. The physician is quite literally the intermediary between the patient and the manufacturer.

Medical malpractice occurs when a doctor or medical professional fails to competently perform a medical treatment and the patient is harmed as a result. One type of medical malpractice is lack of informed consent by the patient – doctors are required by law to inform their patients about the known risks involved for a proposed medical procedure or a course of treatment. When fulfilling this requirement is in question, litigation can become essential to analyze what happened.

While informed consent is not required in some situations, such as in an emergency, under most circumstances, doctors must give their patients detailed information about the particular procedure to be performed and explain the risks. Typically doctors ask the patients to sign an informed consent form to satisfy this requirement. After a patient gives his or her informed consent, the doctor cannot do what the patient has not consented to by doing a different surgery or performing additional medical treatment.

To better illustrate these points, a recent medical malpractice case examines the doctrine of informed consent: Ms. Boudreaux underwent a shoulder replacement surgery performed by Dr. Parnell to cure rheumatoid arthritis that severely affected her right shoulder joint. Following the surgery, however, Ms. Boudreaux developed radical nerve palsy that ultimately became permanent and disabling.

A person may file a medical malpractice claim when a health care provider unintentionally breaches a contract for service rendered. Medical malpractice claims may be filed when there is a failure to render timely services in the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient. In Matherne v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Distr. No. 1 (2012), the Plaintiff, Mrs. Matherne, sought damages for an injury she received when she fell while a hospital employee was transporting her to a hospital bed; and in response to her complaint, the hospital argued the petition was premature because she did not first present the claim to the medical review panel.

Under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”), if a claim is not first presented to a medical review board, a medical malpractice claim against a private health care provider is subject to dismissal on an exception of prematurity. According to La. Civ. L. Treatise, Tort Law § 15:5, the purpose of statutes requiring board review is to: separate frivolous claims from those with merit, alert claimants to the weaknesses of their position, reduce litigation costs, expedite the disposition of cases, and encourage settlement with meritorious cases.

The medical board review panel is composed of four members: three licensed health care providers and an attorney, whose role is purely advisory and cannot vote. The claimant and defendant each choose one health care provider panelist, and the third provider is chosen by the first two. Additionally, if only the defendant is a specialist, then all health care providers on the panel must be from that specialty. The panelists sign an oath of impartiality, review only written evidence, must request additional information from each party if necessary, and deliberate in private. Within thirty days of reviewing the claim or within 180 days of selection of the final panelist, a decision must be reached on whether the health care provider acted negligently by determining whether the standard of care was met and whether failure to follow the standard of care caused the injuries. The panel must give a written opinion delineating the reasons for its decision; this opinion is admissible at trial, but is not conclusive. At trial, the parties may also call the panelists as witnesses.

Many people wonder what can be done from a legal standpoint to get a better verdict. In situations involving accidents where the damages awarded don’t fully cover the perceived damage, it would be prudent to appeal your verdict. However, before any action be taken, it is crucial to note the role of the Appellate court and its scope of power in reviewing a damage award. This is important for two reasons: (1) to keep expectations realistic and (2) to highlight the pertinent actions to be taken after an injury.

Trying to get a damage award amended on appeal can be an uphill battle, but it is possible. To better understand this amendment process, a recent attempt to amend a general damage award provides a solid example.

In December of 2007, Shirley Langley was the victim of a bee sting, resulting in a severe allergic reaction. She was admitted to American Legion Hospital in Crowley, LA, where the hospital medical staff improperly administered epinephrine to Mrs. Langley, resulting in, amongst other ailments, permanent damage to her heart.

The law has a wide variety of rules in place to force a clean route to evidence, especially from authorities on the topic, like people present or involved with the case’s topic. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the person themself while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Article 802 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence states “Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by this Code or other legislation.”

Understanding Legal Terms

Assertive Conduct:

Joseph Trascher of Slidell, LA, was born in April 15, 1940 and died April 11, 2007. Shortly before his death in March of 2007, he filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony. He alleged that in August 2006, he was diagnosed with asbestosis, and that it was unlikely that he would survive longer than six more months. In the petition, Trascher also alleged that he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages. The district court granted the order.

The video deposition began on April 3, 2007, but was halted due to Trascher’s failing health and fatigue. He tragically died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. The district court admitted the deposition as trial evidence, and the admissibility of the deposition reached the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The LA Supreme found that “while most of the video deposition is inadmissible, parts of the deposition are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.”

Typically, witnesses are to testify in court during a trial in order for the testimony to be admissible. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, and one such exception is to allow a party to perpetuate testimony. Perpetuating testimony is when testimony is prepared so that it can be used as evidence during a trial, even though the person who made the testimony will not be present at the trial. Article 1430 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure grants perpetuation orders when

You have probably heard the phrase “accidents happen.” But if you are in an accident, the first thing that you want to ask is who is at fault. With all of the chaos that can be part of an accident, sometimes the answer to this question isn’t always clear. This is when comparative fault, also known as comparative negligence, comes into play. In general, negligence refers to conduct that falls below the standards of behavior established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Comparative negligence is different from ordinary negligence in that ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonable person would exercise in similar circumstances whereas comparative negligence describes conduct that creates an unreasonable risk to one’s self.

In 1979, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323 was amended to provide for a pure comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s own contributing negligence did not bar the recovery of damages, but merely reduced it by his or her own portion of fault. The Louisiana Legislature, in 1996, further amended the Code, making Louisiana a “true” comparative fault jurisdiction and the language of that amendment provided:

In an action for damages where a person suffers injury … the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury … shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action, and regardless of such person’s insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute …

A medical malpractice claim in Natchitoches, Louisiana was dismissed by the District Court, but on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, keeping the claim alive. What led to the different outcomes was a difference in interpretation of the applicable Louisiana statute.

The claim was brought by the husband and children of 62 year old Margaret Benjamin, who was treated for abdominal pain by Dr. William Zeichner at Natchitoches Parish Hospital. Dr. Zeichner performed a surgery, and seven days later Mrs. Benjamin returned to her home in Lynwood, California. Enduring frequent vomiting, she was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of St. Francis Medical Center a few days later. The source of the problem was a small bowel construction. Tragically, she passed away a few weeks later.

Mrs. Benjamin’s family brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Zeichner, alleging the small bowel construction that caused her death was due to Dr. Zeichner’s manipulation of her bowel. They also argued that Dr. Zeichner’s surgery was below the standard of care. They offered an expert witness, Dr. James Shamblin, to testify that Dr. Zeichner breached the standard of care in this case, causing Mrs. Benjamin’s death.

A Saint Martinville, Louisiana, construction company, Cole’s Construction Crews, Inc., recently had a judgment against it reversed and remanded back to the trial court. Back in 2007, Cole’s had filed a lawsuit against J-O-B Operating Company. A few months after filing suit, Cole’s requested production of documents and sent interrogatories (or a list of probing questions) to JOB. Almost two years later, in July of 2009, JOB finally answered the requests. Then, in June of 2011, JOB filed a motion to dismiss the suit, claiming that Cole’s had abandoned the lawsuit. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss was signed, and Cole’s then attempted to get the motion set aside. The trial court denied this attempt, and Cole’s appealed the case to the appellate court to get it reviewed.

Cole’s claims that granting the motion to dismiss was an error that should be reversed. First, JOB had just answered the interrogatories less than two years earlier, and second, JOB did not file the requisite affidavit with its motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling and decided that granting the motion to dismiss had been done in error. They came to this conclusion by considering the various aspects of the complex Louisiana abandonment law, which is discussed below.

In Louisiana, Article 561 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure imposes three requirements on plaintiffs in order for their lawsuit to not be considered abandoned. The first requirement is that the plaintiff has to take some sort of formal action before the court with regard to the lawsuit. Next, this action needs to take place during a court proceeding and must be in the suit’s record, unless it is part of formal discovery. Finally, this action has to take place in the requisite amount of time. If three years have passed without an appropriate action as described above taken by either party, then the suit is automatically abandoned. Even though abandonment is self-executing, defendants are encouraged to get an ex part order of dismissal, just like JOB did in this case, to make sure that their right to assert abandonment is not waived.

Medical treatment is always a sensitive legal issue. In one instance, a patient, Ms. Finley, received an improper diagnosing from her local ER. The trial court granted Ms. Finley’s motion for summary judgment against an Emergency Room (ER) doctor for breaching the standard of care by misdiagnosing her during examination. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case because summary judgment cannot be based on a factual finding. The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s failure to grant a motion to strike the defendant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment, but was unsuccessful because the trial court has discretion concerning service of process.

Ms. Finley was accepted as a patient at the Christus St. Frances Cabrini Hospital ER of Rapides Parish on August 30, 2002. Although a medical review panel opinioned that Dr. Ugokwe did not breach the standard of care and took all reasonable steps in an attempted diagnosis of a difficult to determine health circumstance, Ms. Finley filed suit on May 11, 2005.

The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was based on depositions from the defendant’s expert witness that allegedly agreed with the plaintiff’s expert, proving the applicable standard of care and its breach. Dr. Ugokwe filed his objection and the opposition was left in the mail slot of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s building. The Plaintiff received the opposition and filed a motion to strike.

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