Litigation

August 10, 2016

Louisiana Appeals Court Finds Tangipahoa Parish School Board Partially Liable for Eye Injury Sustained on School Band Trip

independence-day-1436454 If you are fortunate enough not to sustain serious injury as a result of someone else’s negligent actions, you may not realize that the compensation for your injuries can be apportioned and spread to other liable parties. Further still, if you were partially responsible for causing your own injury, you will likely see a reduction in the amount of damages you can recover. This was the case for a Ponchatoula High School band student who was injured while on a school-sponsored band trip in Tennessee.

In May 2006, Kent Kinchen, while on a band trip to the Smokey Mountain Music Festival in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, sustained an eye injury after a game involving Airsoft novelty guns, purchased at a tourist shop earlier that day with his fellow classmates. A year later, Kent and his father Barry Kinchen, filed a lawsuit seeking damages against the Tangipahoa Parish School Board for the incident.

The trial court found the School Board partially liable for the injury because “allowing the students the opportunity to purchase various weapons while on the school sponsored trip created an atmosphere that did not provide all students with reasonable supervision…” The trial court awarded the Kinchens $20,000 in “general damages”, which cover mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, loss of gratification or intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of lifestyle that cannot be definitively measured, $14,329.34 in “special damages”, which are damages that can be more readily measured, like medical costs or loss of wages, and awarded Mr. Kinchen $1,000 for related claim of loss of consortium, which refers to the loss of love and affection, companionship, loss of material services, support, etc. The school board, appealed the finding of liability, and the Kinchens appealed the amount of damages, arguing that the amount was “abusively low.”

August 7, 2016

Oral Loan Agreement Made During Romantic Relationship Survives Summary Judgment In Jefferson Parish

by Berniard Law Firm

for-the-love-of-money-1543612-1024x768 Love gone bad, broken promises and loans not written down come to a head in the following case in Jefferson Parish. In the case at hand, Mr. Palmisano and Ms. Nauman-Anderson had been romantically engaged for several months, during which time Mr. Palmisano allegedly credited Ms. Nauman-Anderson with nearly $26,000 dollars in loans. These loans were allegedly subject to an oral agreement at the time that they were advanced and no effort was made to memorialize the loans (put them in writing) until the romantic relationship between the parties had ended. Upon severing romantic ties, Mr. Palmisano provided Ms. Nauman-Anderson with a promissory note in order to commemorate their alleged agreement but Ms. Nauman-Anderson refused to sign the note, claiming that the loans were in fact gifts. In response, Mr. Palmisano brought suit for a breach of contract.

Following a summary judgment granted by the Twenty-Fourth trial court of Jefferson Parish the case was dismissed. In dismissing Mr. Palmisano’s suit, the trial court affirmed Ms. Nauman-Anderson’s theory that the Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute precluded claims against her. See Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute, La. R.S. 6:1122

Ms. Nauman-Anderson claimed that the Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute provided a complete defense because the promissory note was unsigned and the statute does not allow an action to be maintained based on an oral promise. Mr. Palmisano appealed the trial court’s decision to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit of Appeal.

August 4, 2016

Louisiana Legal Malpractice Case shows how Court’s deal with Attorney’s Failure to Timely File a Lawsuit on Behalf of Client

by Berniard Law Firm

law-offices-1477311-1-1024x743 The Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit of Louisiana recently took on a “case within a case.” This phrase is used in situations of legal malpractice against an attorney’s actions. For years a standard was set for these trials that required the client of the malpracticing attorney to prove the amount of damages by going through the original case they brought to the attorney. Jenkins v St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co set forth a new standard. Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109 – La: Supreme Court 1982.

In Jenkins the court decided that in situations where a plaintiff proves his prima facie case upon a showing that his former attorney is negligent (such as a showing that your attorney did not file your lawsuit in time) it makes more sense for the negligent attorney to carry the burden of overcoming the client’s accusations by proving they never could have won their original claim. Then the jury would be left with deciding causation and damages. Therefore, if the client can prove the attorney accepted the job and failed to timely assert the claim there is a prima facie case of negligence against the attorney. From here, the burden is on the negligent attorney to overcome the claim of legal malpractice. To do this the negligent attorney will typically try to show that the client would have never won the lawsuit he was hired to pursue on their behalf. Such a situation is shown in the facts below:

In May 2009 the Plaintiffs, suriving daughters of Brenda Noid, hired attorney Mason Oswalt for a medical malpractice/wrongful death claim arising from the death of their mother. On February 8, 2010 Oswalt filed the complaint naming a doctor, and St. Francis Medical Center as the Defendants. Oswalt received a letter dated February 18, 2010 from Patient’s Compensation Fund (“PCF”) saying Oswalt had until April 5, 2010 to pay a $300 filing fee. The payment was not done in time and the PCF notified Oswalt that the claim was not going to be considered. Oswalt sent a $300 check to PCF on May 6, 2010 asking that the Plaintiff’s claim be reinstated because the failure to pay was because of a clerical error. The PCF denied this request on May 12, 2010.

August 3, 2016

New Orleans Breach of Contract Between Subcontractors Centers on Contract Payment Provision “Pay if Paid” or “Pay when Paid”

by Berniard Law Firm

construction-workers-1215154-1024x738 Construction contracts can be confusing because contractors often use many subcontractors to carry out the terms of the contract. This is why when a dispute arises those involved in construction contracts need the best lawyer possible to untangle contractual provisions especially in the context of payment to subcontractors.

The Dryades Young Men’s Christian Association and Ellis Construction, Inc. entered into a contract for a project known as the Dryades YMCA Natatorium and Wellness Center in New Orleans, Louisiana. Ellis then entered into a subcontract with Rotolo Consultants, Inc. (RCI). RCI formed a contract with Tymeless; Tymeless was a subcontractor of the first subcontractor, RCI. After performing the terms of its subcontract, Tymeless invoiced RCI. Although RCI made a partial payment, RCI did not pay Tymeless completely. In its lawsuit, Tymeless claimed that RCI was liable to it for the full amount of the contract, plus interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. In response to Tymeless’ lawsuit, RCI filed a dilatory exception of prematurity, based on the payment provision in its subcontract with Tymeless: “Payments are to be made as follows: 90% of Sub-Contractorís approved invoices or pay request will be paid subject to the conditions following, after payment by the Owner for Sub-Contractor’s work. Retention of 10% will be released upon satisfactory completion of this contract and release of final payment by the Owner.” RCI argued that because of this provision, “unless and until” Ellis paid RCI, RCI could not pay Tymeless the amount Tymeless wanted. The district court in New Orleans found that the contract had a “pay-if-paid clause” and dismissed the lawsuit filed by Tymeless.

On appeal, the issue was whether the provision in the subcontract was a “pay-if-paid” clause or a “pay-when-paid” clause. Most courts now treat pay-when-paid clauses differently than pay-if-paid provisions. A “pay-when-paid” clause creates a window of time in which the general contract has to pay the subcontractor. The general contractor has to pay the subcontractor within a reasonable time, even if the general contractor does not receive payment from the owner. A “pay-when-paid” clause can be interpreted in two ways: setting a condition before payment, or fixing a specific point in time at which payment is due. Most states hold the view that “pay-when-paid” clauses function as time mechanisms, and not as a condition precedent. The more restrictive “pay-if-paid” clause indicates that the general contractor is only required to pay the subcontractor if and to the extent that the general contractor has received payment from the owner for the subcontractor’s work. In other words, the risk of nonpayment is transferred from the general contractor to the subcontractor. Louisiana law aligns with the national viewpoint of a “pay-when-paid” clause; under Louisiana law, such a payment clause sets a reasonable time for payment. Southern States Masonry, Inc v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 507 So. 2d 198 (La. 1987). On the other hand, “pay-if-paid” clauses create a condition precedent to the subcontractor’s payment. Imagine Constr., Inc. v. Centex Landis Constr. Co., Inc., 707 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 1998).

August 2, 2016

Jefferson, Louisiana- Fifth Circuit Reverses Special Motion to Strike Overruling Trial Court Statutory Interpretation

by Berniard Law Firm

freedom-of-speech-1058617-1024x900 When the law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, then the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. If however there are multiple interpretations to a statute, the court will examine it in order to figure out what the legislative intent was behind it in hopes of clearing up any and all ambiguities. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal was recently faced with the task of interpreting a statute in order to determine whether or not it was properly applied at the trial level. The particular piece of legislation at issue is Louisiana’s Code of Civl Procedure Article 971. The issue rose within the context of a lawsuit brought by Chris E. Yount against Douglas Handshoe for defamation and several other related claims in which Mr. Handshoe was granted a special motion to strike pursuant to Article 971 asserting that his speech was protected under the First Amendment.

The defamation itself arises from a series of posts and comments authored by Mr. Handshoe and codefendant Jacke E. Truitt on www.slabbed.org, which is owned and operated by Mr. Handshoe and his company New Slabbed Media, LLC. On February 13th 2014 Mr. Handshoe published a drawing authored by Mr. Yount’s 13 yr old son on www.slabbed.org which had been used in Mr. Yount’s prior divorce proceedings in the 24th Judicial District Court. The captions authored by Mr. Handshoe clearly identified the author as a minor child and the divorce proceedings the child was involved in. The trial court found Mr. Handshoe’s blog posts were protected by his right of free speech under the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Thus granting Mr. Handshoe’s special motion to strike dismissing all of Mr. Younts claims. Mr. Yount then filed for an appeal of the trial court’s ruling to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Mr. Yount on appeal argued that the trial court erred in application of Article 971 because he is a private figure and the claims arise out of comments made in connection to a private rather than public issue.

The appellate courts decision hinges on the interpretation of Article 971. That code article can be interpreted so that the special motion to strike will apply to any and all statements made in connection with any issue under consideration by a government body or alternatively that it will apply only to statements made in connection with public issues under consideration by a government body. Because the statute can be interpreted in multiple ways with adverse effects and absurd consequences the appellate court examined the purpose of the law to determine which of the above meanings conforms to the true purpose of the legislature. The court identified Article 971 as Louisiana’s Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, lawsuits under this statute involve a civil complaint or counterclaim filed against non-governmental individuals because of their communications to a government body or electorate on an issue of some public interest. The special motion to strike was created to limit discovery, dismiss meritless claims quickly and award attorneys fees to the winning party regarding SLAPP claims.

July 31, 2016

Playground Injury at Jefferson Parish Baptist Church Aftercare Program Leads to Lawsuit

by Berniard Law Firm

fireman-s-playground-1496789-1024x768 Playgrounds bring great joy to young children. Countless hours are spent sliding down slides, swinging on swings and traversing monkey bars throughout the state of Louisiana. While it might come as news to some, playground equipment has certain set standards for what age range is appropriate to play on the equipment. In a recent case involving a Baptist Church Aftercare program in Jefferson Parish these standards were discussed when unfortunately a young girl broke her arm while playing on their playground.

In September 2010, a 19-month old girl fell and broke her arm playing on a playset while in an aftercare program at Riverside Baptist Church. The playset was only meant for children 5 years old or older. The parents of that child felt that Riverside failed in providing age appropriate equipment and therefore sued Riverside for damages in a negligence claim.

Personal injury can arise in many different scenarios, ranging from automobile accidents to medical malpractice cases. A common occurrence in these claims include the theory of negligence. The legal foundation for a negligence (failure to use reasonable care) theory in Louisiana involves five elements: (1) the defendant (the party being sued) had a duty to exercise reasonable standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to exercise this duty; (3) because the defendant’s lack of exercising this duty properly caused the injury; (4) the defendant’s ‘substandard’ care was within the scope of liability (i.e. even if the cause, were they legally liable for the cause); (5) did actual damages (injury or economic loss) occur. La. C.C. art. 2315.

July 30, 2016

Louisiana Court of Appeal finds buyer breached contract by not precisely adhering to contractual terms when he agreed to buy real estate before inspecting its flood elevation

by Berniard Law Firm

sale-1419590-1024x768

Disputes between parties over a contract happen in the real world. Even large sophisticated companies with legal departments and retained law firms have difficulty making air tight contracts that flow smoothly and are dispute free.

A company named 1100 South Jefferson Davis Parkway, LLC (South) was selling a property in New Orleans, Louisiana. On November 28, 2008 South entered into an Agreement to Purchase the property (the Agreement) with Richard H. Williams (Williams) for $875,000.

The Agreement stipulated Williams had 30 days from the November 28, 2008 acceptance of South’s offer to inspect the property. Williams was free to hire his own inspectors during this period, but was required to furnish the inspection reports on the property to South. On December 18, 2008, Williams asked for an extension of an additional 30 days to inspect the property. South agreed to the extension and a new deadline for the completed inspections was set for January 19, 2009.

July 29, 2016

Court of Appeal upholds eviction in Chalmette, Louisiana in an unclear rent-to-own contract

by Berniard Law Firm

keys-1190660-1024x683

To many the ownership of a home is a major part of the American dream. Many who have bought a home in the past have been enticed by the possibility of turning basic rent payments into eventual ownership of a home. If you do enter into this type of agreement with a landlord make sure the contract is clear and you uphold your obligations.

In September 2013, Adrienne Brown and Roger Brown, Jr. responded to an advertisement stating a property in Chalmette, Louisiana was available for rent or rent-own. On September 26, 2013 the Browns entered into a contract with the owner, Ellis Keys for a rent-to-own agreement. The property was to be sold in the amount of $100,000 at $750 per month until “paid in full.” The Browns were also required to maintain the property and forward mail to Mr. Ellis.

The relationship soured quickly. In early April 2014 Mr. Keys began the process of evicting the Brown for nonpayment of rent, nonpayment of contractually required late fees and not forwarding mail addressed to him which caused him to lose money. After Mr. Keys notified them, the Browns had five days to vacate the property for failing to pay rent under La. C.C.P. art. 4701.

July 25, 2016

Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal Tackles Questions of Amended Pleadings and Federal Jurisdiction

by Berniard Law Firm

house-fire-3-1519596-1024x771 In bringing or defending against a lawsuit, an important question is which court should hear the merits of the dispute, a state court or a federal court. Any court hearing the lawsuit must have “jurisdiction”; the power to hear a particular dispute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, titled “diversity jurisdiction”, federal courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy (damages sought) exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 allows the defendants to remove civil actions from state courts to federal courts when a case becomes “removable,” i.e. when federal courts would have proper jurisdiction over the case. Skilled lawyers know that jurisdictional issues can have significant effect on the outcome of the case and understand the nuances of procedural posturing. A 2015 case from the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal discusses how amendments or supplements to pleadings such as a Petition can raise important jurisdictional questions.

On April 3, 2011, Jerry and Elnora Harris’s home in Springfield, Louisiana burned to ashes. A year later, the Harrises filed a lawsuit against Union National Fire Insurance Company for the payment of their policy limits, penalties, and attorney fees. In their petition against Union National, the Harrises asserted that the total amount of damages did not exceed $75,000.00 including attorney fees, penalties, and interest. On April 9, 2012, the Harrises amended their petition, adding as defendants Bank of New York Melon, successor-in-interest to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. The Harrises’ Amended Petition alleged that the Defendants engaged in predatory lending and fraudulent practices and sought additional damages for mental anguish, damage to their credit, and attorney fees. The Amended Petition stated that the total amount of damages sought by the plaintiffs against all named defendants would not exceed $75,000.00 including attorney fees, penalties, and interest.

On November 15, 2013, after the Defendants filed exceptions and answered the Petition and Amended Petition, the Harrises filed a Second Amended Petition, asserting that the total amount of damages against all defendants would exceed $75,000.00. The Defendants countered by filing a motion to strike the Second Amended Petition from the record, or alternatively, set for a hearing. The Trial Court granted the Defendants’ motion and ordered that the Second Amended Petition be struck from the record. The Harrises then filed a motion to vacate that order and requested that the Trail Court reinstate their Second Amended petition. After a hearing, the Trial Court vacated the order dismissing the Harrises’ Second Amended Petition and imposed sanctions of the Defendants for filing a frivolous motion to strike.

July 24, 2016

Louisiana Fourth Circuit Denies an Exception of Prescription Based on Procedural Nuances.

by Berniard Law Firm

hour-glass-1307106-1-1024x768 In legal matters, there is generally always a time frame in which certain actions must be taken. Failing to bring an action in the allotted time may bar a person from filing a lawsuit. Once the specified time period has passed, the plaintiff is no longer able to file a lawsuit or claim. In other states this time limitation is called the statute of limitations; however, in Louisiana, it is called Prescription. Usually, the prescriptive period for filing a lawsuit is one year. La. C.C. art. 3492. Additionally, if a lawsuit is filed but is not filed according to certain procedural guidelines, the plaintiff may also be barred from going forward with their lawsuit, irrespective of whether it was filed within the one year prescriptive period. In either instance, opposing council may file an Exception of Prescription.

An Exception of Prescription is a motion which asks the court to dismiss the lawsuit due to not bringing the lawsuit timely or failing to abide by procedural rules. The failure to follow procedural guidelines, became the center of the controversy in the Fourth Circuit case of Richard Lewis v. Robert Constigan Flowers and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. Lewis v. Costigan, et al. 2015.

In this Orleans Parish case, the initial controversy arose from a vehicle collision between Robert Lewis and Robert Costigan Flowers. Mr. Lewis filed a Petition for Damages on April 21, 2014 via facsimile. According to Mr. Lewis’ counsel, the documents were sent to the Clerk of Court on April 25, 2014. However, on May 1, 2014, ten days after the facsimile transmission, the Clerk of Court stamped the original documents when they processed the filing fees.