Articles Posted in Litigation

openly-sky-1227535-1-1024x768In  Louisiana, the objection of prescription extinguishes a legal right of recovery when a party fails to exercise it over a given period of time. It is essentially a time limit on a claim, which can be raised in a couple of ways. Typically, it is raised by a peremptory exception, but it can also be raised by way of a prescriptive motion for summary judgment. One defense to the objection of prescription is the doctrine of contra non valentem. This doctrine is used to “soften the occasional harshness of prescriptive statutes.” Carter v. Haygood, 892 So.2d 1261, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 2005). A 2015 case from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal discusses the operation of contra non valentem when pleaded in opposition to a peremptory exception or prescriptive motion for summary judgment.

The dispute in this case arose out of a construction project in which Plaquemines Parish sought to rebuild a parish-oriented drainage pumping station damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Shortly before the project’s completion, M.R. Pittman Group, L.L.C. filed a lawsuit against Plaquemines Parish and several of the parish’s engineering firms. Plaquemines Parish answered, bringing a reconventional demand (or counterclaim as it is known in other states) against Pittman, alleging a tort-based property claim for damages to the pumping station’s wing wall, and a third-party direct action claim against Pittman’s insurer, Gray Insurance Company. Both Pittman and Gray sought to have Plaquemines Parish’s tort claim dismissed on the basis of prescription. Gray filed a peremptory exception of prescription while Pittman filed a motion for summary judgment adopting the reasons put forward by Gray in support of its exception. Plaquemines Parish argued that the doctrine of contra non valentem should apply to toll the one-year prescriptive period.

According to the Fourth Circuit, Louisiana recognizes four situations where contra non valentem applies to prevent prescription: “1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff’s action; 2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; 3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; and 4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though this ignorance is not induced by the defendant.” In determining whether any of these categories apply, Louisiana courts will look at the individual circumstances of each case. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 245 (La. Ct. App. 2010).

build-4-1213636-1-768x1024Insurance companies are coming under increasing pressure due to the recent proliferation of natural disasters in the United States. For an insurance company, navigating the boundary between legitimate and bad faith denial of claims can be a very risky business. However, courts are providing more and more guidance for insurers of companies who find themselves targeted by disaster. Recently, in Citadel Broadcasting Corp. v. Axis U.S. Insurance Co., 2014-CA-0326, the Fourth Circuit  Court of Appeal in Louisiana clarified the requirements a claimant must meet in order to receive payment  through an insurance plan.

Citadel Broadcasting (“Citadel”) was based in New Orleans at the time it sustained crippling damage from Hurricane Katrina. Prior to the incident, Citadel was insured by Axis U.S. Insurance (“Axis”) for physical damage and business interruption (“BI”) losses, including contingent business interruption income. This means that in addition to physical damage, Axis covered the loss of profits suffered by Citadel while it was restoring its locations and broadcasting capabilities. This BI coverage was to extend for 365 days from the date of the incident. Axis denied coverage to Citadel relying on “exclusion k”, a loss of market exclusion. Loss of market means that the coverage would be denied because Citadel had lost the opportunity to market their broadcasting to their listeners. A jury returned a verdict against Axis in the amount of $11,813,976, and this amount was mostly affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Louisiana law imposes a relaxed burden of proof showing  that a particular catastrophic event actually caused the damage. Damages must be proven to a reasonable certainty, and the proof of loss must only be as precise as circumstances allow. See La Louisiane Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co, 09-825, p. 28 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/8/11) The court is given broad discretion over these questions due to the imprecise nature of the calculation of lost profits. The formula examines a company’s actual loss by comparing expected performance prior to the incident with actual performance after the incident, and does not require direct proof of loss of customers. For example, Citadel satisfied this requirement by demonstrating a loss of market share at the expense of an increased market share of its competitors, and by calculating actual loss according to Axis’ insurance coverage provisions.

lawyers-1491730-1024x768The last thing that you want to do after dealing with litigious matters is have to hire more lawyers.  However, if you believe your lawyer committed legal malpractice thats exactly what you will be forced to do.  Lawsuits containing claims of legal malpractice are taken very seriously by the courts presiding over them.  Very strict timelines dictate when you must file a lawsuit alleging legal malpractice and if your not careful your case could be dismissed before it gets started.  A recent case out of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal discusses a lower courts ruling in a legal malpractice lawsuit in favor of Defendants, Romauldo Gonzalez, Sr., and the Law Offices of Romauldo Gonzalez, L.L.C. d/b/a Braden Gonzalez and Associates (collectively, “Mr. Gonzalez”) based on prescription arguments.

In July of 2013, Marco Tulio Miralda filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Mr. Gonzalez. In his petition, Mr. Miralda alleged that he retained Mr. Gonzalez in early 2008 in regards to renegotiating a mortgage note held by Wells Fargo on his New Orleans home. Mr. Miralda was in default on his mortgage note and Wells Fargo had initiated foreclosure proceedings on the property. Mr. Miralda alleged that Wells Fargo was inclined to negotiate reinstatement of the loan.

Mr. Miralda was allegedly advised by Jose Chacon, a non-attorney employee of Mr. Gonzalez’s law firm, to deposit $30,000 into a trust account to serve as a down payment, for purposes of the renegotiation. Per the instructions, Mr. Miralda deposited $33,864.75 into the trust account.

mailbox-1-1481771-1024x683In  order to file an insurance claim you first must have insurance coverage.  It’s important that you stay aware of the renewal dates for the continuation of coverage so that you do not end up losing out on critical insurance payments in times of crisis.  In certain situations it’s your insurance company or agent’s duty to notify you that your coverage has lapsed.  A recent case involving a homeowners insurance policy for a property located on Lafourche Street in New Orleans discusses the burden of proof necessary to justify a homeowner’s claims of improper notification of nonrenewal by his insurance agent.

In early 2000, after the roof of his property in New Orleans was damaged, Edward Collins filed a claim under his homeowner’s policy with State Farm Insurance Company. State Farm paid Mr. Collins for the damage per his homeowner’s policy for that claim. In 2004, Mr. Collins submitted a subsequent claim under his homeowner’s policy. State Farm performed an investigation and uncovered that Mr. Collins failed to repair his roof after his funds were disbursed for his 2000 claim. Upon this discovery, State Farm did not renew the homeowner’s policy when it expired in May of 2005.

Mr. Collins was sent a letter of nonrenewal on April 27, 2005. However, Mr. Collins asserts that he never received a notice of nonrenewal. In August of 2005, Mr. Collins filed a claim under the homeowner’s policy for damage to his property as a result of Hurricane Katrina. State Farm denied the claim, setting forth that there no longer was an existing policy for Mr. Collin’s property.

more-storm-surge-debris-1560382-1024x683Class actions can be complex cases that lead the parties involved to appeal many of the decisions of the trial court.  Sometimes the appeals court will determine that certain issues need more review at the trial court level prior to any decisions being issued on their part.  A recent case out of Orleans Parish, involving a class action lawsuit for claims of improper insurance claim handling and delay of repair claims discusses the limits of what is proper for appeals court in Louisiana to review.

A condominium complex in New Orleans sustained flood and wind damages following hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The plaintiff’s who were owners of the condominiums filed a class action lawsuit against Harbor Homeowners’ Association, Inc and its insurer as well as the president of the Homeowners’ Association, asserting three claims. The claims included (1) unlawfully increasing the insurance deductible without notice and approval from condo owners, (2) unlawfully entering the condos without authorization as well as discarding, gutting, destroying, and damaging contents, and (3) negligently failing to supervise and administer the rebuilding of the condos, resulting in damages and repair delays.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification twice. After a scheduled hearing, the defendants moved for involuntary dismissal, claiming the plaintiff did not establish the required elements for class certification. Following briefs from post-hearings, the trial court granted the class certification motion for the plaintiff only on the delay of repairs and insurance claims and denied the defendant’s involuntary dismissal motion.  An appeal and oral arguments followed in the Louisiana Fourth Circuit of Appeal.  After those arguments both sides filed motions to file post-arguments briefs in the appeals court.

yellow-bicycle-1494018-1-1024x768When one is injured by the actions of another, it is hard to consider all of the moving parts inside and outside of a lawsuit designed to make the injured person whole again. Past medical bills after an accident may come back to haunt someone who has been injured after they have won their personal injury lawsuit.

On February 22, 2013, Hiram Lawrence Armstrong was injured riding his bicycle on D’Abadie Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was struck by a car and taken to a Louisiana State University Hospital (LSU) and to University Medical Center Management Company (University). At the time of Mr. Armstrong’s treatment, LSU was a public hospital and University was a private hospital- the distinction is important and will become clear later.

Mr. Armstrong had some disputes regarding payment of his medical bills with the insurance companies involved, but worked out those disputes outside of this case. This case involves Mr. Armstrongís dispute with LSU and University of the amount of the medical bill and how those relative amounts are determined.

pills-1158992-1024x683Patricia Jolynn Paulsell-Lathrop (Ms. Paulsell) was injured in a motorcycle accident on June 13, 2005. She, consequently, needed extensive medical care. Her health insurance company covered some of the medical costs. The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals- Medicaid Program (DHH) covered some additional costs. According to DHH, Ms. Paulsell received $69,131.92 in medical assistance payments from June 13, 2005 through December 8, 2008.

On December 11, 2008 Ms. Paulsell settled a lawsuit she had with the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) seeking damages for her motorcycle injury.

Here is where it gets a little tricky- according to La.R.S. 46:446(B) DHH must be given notice within 30 days of any settlement stemming from an event that caused an injury requiring DHH assistance by any person who received DHH benefits; failing to provide notice of the settlement causes the benefits recipient to be responsible for total payments received.

pediatrics-1529152-1-1024x683Many people in Louisiana have been in a situation where they are striving to earn a promotion at work. Employers typically reward loyal, qualified employees in these circumstances, but sometimes there is more than one employee who may be right for the job. The ultimate choice may leave other employees feeling spurned or, in some situations, questioning if the decision was made for the wrong reasons.

This is where Brian Toval, a former employee of the Children’s Hospital in New Orleans, apparently found himself in 2011. Toval, who is black, had initially been hired as a medical technologist, but within three years he had risen to senior systems analyst in the hospital’s IT department. However, apparently all was not right, because in 2008 he expressed some complaints to his supervisors – both of whom were white – about some circumstances of his employment. It seems nothing ever came of those complaints, and then in 2010 Toval expressed interest in a soon-to-be-created project team lead position. He did not get promoted to that position. Instead, the position was filled by a white employee – without the position ever being announced or any interviews being conducted. Two days later, Toval filed a complaint with human resources, but the HR department ultimately determined that his complaint was unfounded. In the months that followed, Toval claimed that he experienced retaliation through humiliation, a heavy work load, and excessive scrutiny of his job performance. In June of 2011, Toval took medical leave to address mental health conditions, but before doing so he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. His complaint to the EEOC claimed that he had been discriminated against in the promotion process due to his earlier complaints from 2008. While Toval was on medical leave he accepted employment elsewhere and resigned from the Children’s Hospital, but that did not stop him from taking legal action.

In September of 2013, Toval filed a lawsuit in federal court based on discrimination claims. However, the trial court granted the Children’s Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of Toval’s claims. The trial court reasoned that dismissal was appropriate for two reasons. First, the EEOC had not conducted a full investigation of Toval’s claims. Second, Toval was unable to rebut the hospital’s non-discriminatory reasons for why he had not been chosen for the promotion. Toval appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

tennis-1466072-1-1024x768Everyone likes to be paid what they think they are worth at their jobs. But, sometimes employers take actions that make employees question their value and question whether or not the employer has ulterior motives. That seems to have been the thought process for the former coach of LSU’s women’s tennis team, and he filed a lawsuit as a result.

The plaintiff, Anthony Minnis, was the first black head coach of any sports team in LSU’s history. He was hired in 1991, and by the end of his contract Minnis was earning a salary of $85,000. Throughout his tenure he had received multiple awards, despite the fact that the team he coached had only achieved a winning record in three seasons out of 20. And, in the final three years of his contract, the team had experienced three straight losing seasons. This did not stop Minnis from questioning his pay, to which LSU responded that his salary was based on the team’s performance and comparable salaries for other women’s tennis coaches in the Southeastern Conference. His performance reviews throughout his term of employment were mixed, and in 2008 Minnis had in fact received a written reprimand due to his job performance. His response to that reprimand was to accuse his immediate supervisor of being a racist, although he could not support that claim with any facts. Minnis’ employment situation with LSU seemingly came to a head in February of 2012, when he was said to have been involved in a serious incident that jeopardized the health and safety of a team member. In June of 2012, LSU announced that the school would not renew Minnis’ contract. His replacement was a white, female coach who was offered a salary of $115,000.

It did not take long for Minnis to take action. In November of 2012, he filed a lawsuit based on various state and federal claims, including claims of disparate pay, discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation.  These claims included, Title VII, Title IX discrimination under state law.  About two years later, in October of 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted LSU’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Minnis’ claims. He appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

school-1231939-1024x691Litigating an issue once is a difficult and time consuming process in itself, and having to do so twice would be an unbearable and unfair burden which is the reason for the existence of the doctrine of res judicata. It serves the courts purposes of fairness and efficiency by preventing the relitigation of matters previously litigated and decided on as well as those that should have been raised and litigated in a previous lawsuit. The application of this doctrine is a complicated and lengthy one but the Second Circuit when reviewing a trial courts application of the doctrine in a lawsuit involving teacher Kamithia D. Penton as plaintiff and the Caddo Parish School Board (CPSB) as defendant (with others) was able to do so whilst also addressing a few of the doctrines exceptions.

The lawsuit itself arises out of an injury suffered by Ms. Penton when escorting a bipolar, disruptive and violent student to the school’s office. The injury took place after Ms. Penton had already urged principal Pamela Bloomer to remove the child from the school due to the danger he posed to the staff and other students. Ms. Penton, on October 12, 2011 filed a lawsuit against the child’s divorced parents; Ms. Bloomer and; the CPSB in its capacity as Ms. Bloomer’s employer seeking damages for her personal injuries. State Farm was later added as as a defendant, as the insurer of each parent. In response to the lawsuit CPSB and Ms. Bloomer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting Ms. Penton could not establish an intentional tort and that all of her recovery was in workers compensation and that she had in fact already made the workers compensation claim and received full benefits.

The motion was granted as to all parties except the father and his insurer, who asserted the affirmative defense of the payment of workers compensation benefits. CPSB then sought intervention to recover the sums already paid and any future sums they may have to pay on Ms. Penton’s behalf. In response Ms. Penton filed the exception of Res Judicata as set forth in La. R.S. 13:4231 stating that the intervention sought to present a claim which CPSB was obligated to bring prior to the dismissal as a compulsory pleading. Before the exception was heard in court on June 16, 2014, a settlement was reached regarding the liability of the father and his insurer for Ms. Penton’s injuries. The claims were dismissed “with prejudice, reserving any and all rights” as they relate to claims by Ms. Penton between her and the CPSB.

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