Articles Posted in Litigation

62-Email-06-24-19-picture-1024x768Running a small business is a challenging endeavor that can prove even more difficult if someone publishes false information about your company.  This is situation is exactly what happened to husband and wife Robbie and Susan Arnaud, owners of Robbie’s Wrecker Service, a towing business located just outside Eunice, Louisiana.

In fall 2010, Ronald Dies was elected Police Chief for City of Eunice, effective January 1, 2011.  Eunice Police Department’s rotation list for situations needing a wrecker service had previously included Robbie’s Wrecker Service. However, after being elected, Dies took action to remove Robbie’s Wrecker Service from the list. In a letter dated December 31, 2010, Dies told the Arnauds that their business would be removed from the list effective January 1, 2011, and that only wrecker services headquartered inside Eunice City limits could be on the list. On January 3, 2011, Dies spoke with a reporter for a local newspaper, The Eunice News, and stated that there had been numerous complaints about the company’s selective response to calls. This claim of “numerous complaints” formed the basis of Arnauds’ defamation claim. 

The required elements in a defamation claim are (1) a false and defamatory statement involving another, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault (at least at the level of negligence) of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury. See Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129 (La. 2004).  At trial, the court held that the Arnauds had not proven either defamation or damages and dismissed all of the Arnauds’ claims against Dies. The Arnauds appealed.

martha-dominguez-de-gouveia-nMyM7fxpokE-unsplash-1024x697Navigating any lawsuit can be challenging, especially when the initial trial gives rise to complicated appeals. In this instance, the plaintiff was left wondering how jury instruction impacted her medical malpractice lawsuit. 

Mrs. Sherry Wedgeworth filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Tynes Mixon, an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) physician. Mrs. Wedgeworth start seeing Dr. Mixon in 2006 for recurring sinus infections. Dr. Mixon performed sinus surgery in 2009 and then a revision sinus surgery three years later in 2012. After this surgery, a pathologist examined the tissue that was removed and found a fragment of brain tissue. Dr. Mixon immediately advised Mrs. Wedgeworth and advised her to go to the hospital for a C.T. scan because of the risk for infection. Mrs. Wedgeworth declined this advice, but went to see Dr. Mixon the next day, where she again turned down hospital admission and a C.T. scan. Three days later, she was hospitalized, and another three days later she began to show symptoms of a brain infection. Mrs. Wedgeworth and her husband, Mr. Wedgeworth, then filed a malpractice claim.

The initial medical review panel held for Dr. Mixon. The Wedgeworths then petitioned for damages, claiming loss of consortium, services, and society. A civil jury ruled in favor of Dr. Mixon, dismissing all claims. The Wedgeworths filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict or Alternatively New Trial. The trial court denied these motions, and the Wedgeworths appealed. The issues for the appellate court were whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that negligence equals malpractice and by improperly denying a new trial. 

retro-clock-1422611-1024x919If you are injured and think another party might be at fault, it is important to contact an attorney as soon as possible. If you wait too long, your claim, and any chance of recovering damages could expire, leaving you with little recourse against the responsible party. In the law, this is referred to as prescription, and different claims have different time periods before they prescribe, i.e., expire. In Louisiana, the doctrine of prescription protects defendants from having to defend against stale claims by requiring plaintiffs to file suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue within a specified time period and to pursue that suit in a timely manner. There are additional rules determining what actions serve to interrupt the running of prescription, but generally, prescription begins to run from the day damage is sustained, La. C.C. art. 3492, and prescription can be interrupted by commencing an action against the other party in a court that has jurisdiction and where venue is proper. La. C.C. art. 3462. However, as with most everything in the law, there are some nuisances and exceptions to these rules.

The importance of proper and timely filing of a lawsuit is illustrated in Lee v. RTA, where a streetcar passenger was injured when the streetcar had to aggressively brake to avoid a car turning in front of it on Canal St. Although the plaintiff filed his claim before the prescriptive period ended, he filed the claim in First City Court, which lacks jurisdiction over the RTA as a political subdivision. Instead, the claim should have instead been filed in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court. The law states that when a claim is filed in an improper court, prescription is interrupted only by actual service of process within the prescriptive period. La. C.C. art. 3462. Service of process is procedure by which a party is informed of the lawsuit against them. In this case, the plaintiff’s claims had a prescriptive period of one year. By failing to properly serve the defendant within one year, and since his claim was not brought in a proper court, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice after being transferred to the proper court. This means that the plaintiff will have no opportunity to fix his mistakes and attempt to bring the claim again. The trial court’s dismissal was upheld on appeal. If he had originally filled his claim in the correct court, or made timely service on the defendant, his claims would have been able to proceed. This highlights the importance of not only prompt action in choosing an attorney when you have been injured, but also choosing an experienced and reputable firm. 

Additional Sources: Lee v. Regional Transit Authority of New Orleans

41-Email-05-22-19-1024x772In deciding whether to dismiss a specific case, the Appellate Court should consider many factors. Among them are subject matter jurisdiction and statutory of limitation. The claims might be dismissed if they are filed to a wrong court which does not have the legal power to adjudicate on this case, or if they are filed too late (peremption) because laws encourage people to file a lawsuit timely. 

In 1996, Leonard Bracken (“Bracken”) exposed himself to sulfur mustard, widely known as mustard gas, at a facility which was owned by Georgia Gulf Corporation in Plaquemine, Louisiana. Bracken agreed to a global settlement. On October 27, 1999, a workers’ compensation judge (“WCJ”) approved the settlement. Bracken alleged that when he signed on the settlement, he had no idea that the settlement would deprive his right to file any workers’ compensation claims in the future and this is because his former attorney deliberately misled him. On February 2, 2015, Bracken filed a petition in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”),  seeking to vacate the WCJ’s approval of the settlement and grant his right to file any workers’ compensation claims arising from the bad accident in 1996, because this is a judgment obtained by fraud or ill practice. Bracken listed various parties as defendants, e.g. Georgia Gulf Corporation and Worker Compensation Tribunal. In response, defendants timely filed exceptions raising the objections of, among other things, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, prescription/peremption and sanctions. On June 1, 2015, after a hearing was held, the 19th JDC held that all the exceptions were sustained and Bracken’s petition was dismissed. Then the 19th JDC dismissed Bracken’s motion for a new trial but granted Bracken a devolutive appeal (in which the appellate courts can determine on some issues while the trial court continue on other issues, rather than suspend).

The jurisdiction of the subject matter is a court’s legal authority and power to hear, analyze and make judgment regarding a particular class of cases. La. C.C.P. art. 2. Even if both parties reach an agreement to give a court the legal power to hear their case, this agreement is not valid at all. A judgment by a court which has no power to hear a case is not valid. La. C.C.P. art. 3. To invalidate a judgment which is reached by ill practice or fraud, the case should be filed to the court which made that judgment. Bracken’s settlement was approved by the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration (“OWCA”), not 19th JDC, so Bracken should file this lawsuit to OWCA. In addition, all claims which arises from the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law may be filed to OWCA, since WCJ have the exclusive and original jurisdiction. La. R.S. 23:1310.3(F)

7-Email-05-22-19-picture-1024x668Timing is everything, especially when it comes to lawsuits. If you delay too long in filing a medical malpractice lawsuit, then you – like Mr. Verbois – may be unable to recover for the alleged negligent acts.

In May 2011, Dr. Jonathan Taylor operated on Mr. David Verbois to repair a hernia resulting from an earlier coronary bypass surgery. After the surgery, Verbois experienced adverse symptoms including fever, vomiting, and abdominal pain. Verbois was readmitted to the hospital. In October 2011, Dr. Taylor removed Verbois’ gallbladder, and in December 2011, Dr. Taylor performed a third surgery on Verbois after a CT scan showed that there was a perforation in his stomach by the gastric sleeve he received during a gastric bypass surgery performed by a different doctor in 2009. Verbois was hospitalized again in January 2012. In March 2012, Verbois visited Dr. Taylor for the last time and terminated his services. Thereafter, Verbois returned to the doctor who had previously performed the gastric bypass. The old doctor removed Verbois’ entire stomach in September 2012.

On July 26, 2013, Verbois filed a complaint with the Division of Administration alleging malpractice against Dr. Taylor from May 2011 until March 2012. Verbois requested a medical review panel (“MRP” to review his claims against Dr. Taylor.

3-Email-05-14-1024x683In the legal world, establishing fault and determining liability is not always easy. In some situations, it may seem clear who is responsible for recovery, but in other cases the situation can become much more difficult than it initially seemed. This issue was explored after an automobile accident in Acadia Parish.

In the morning of December 16, 2011, Ronnie Myers was driving through heavy fog and headed north on Charlene Road. He came to a “T” intersection where Charlene Road met Prudhomme Road (Louisiana Highway 95) but the intersection’s stop sign was twisted and down so that Myers could not see it. Myers was also unfamiliar with the road, and resultantly drove his car across Prudhomme Road and into a ditch, causing injuries to himself and damage to his vehicle. On December 11, 2012, Myers filed a lawsuit in Fifteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Acadia against the Acadia Parish Police Jury (APPJ) and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), wanting personal injury and property damages. He claimed that APPJ and DOTD were responsible for the improper state of the stop sign at the intersection.

Nearly three years after Myers’s accident, APPJ and DOTD filed motions for summary judgment, asking for judgment as a matter of law rather than on the merits. A hearing was held on January 12, 2015, and the District Court granted the motions, finding that APPJ did not have custody and control of the stop sign and was not notified of the sign’s defective state. While DOTD was responsible for the stop sign, the District Court held that it also did not have notice of the sign’s problem. Both DOTD and APPJ were dismissed from the lawsuit. Myers appealed.

image-for-post-70-from-email-5-14-19-1024x679The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that awarding damages for medical expenses without awarding pain and suffering damages, though seemingly inconsistent, is not invalid on its face. See Wainwright v. Fontenot, 774 So.2d 70 (La. 2000). Appellate courts afford juries great deference and disturb verdicts only when they are clearly and objectively unsupported by the evidence in the trial record. One such example of this can be seen in an auto accident case involving a “serial plaintiff.”

Joseph Wiltz was rear-ended in stop-and-go traffic by Maya Welch. Wiltz filed a petition in state court against Welch and her insurance company, State Farm, claiming he was injured in the accident. He sought damages for past and future medical expenses, lost wages, loss of enjoyment of life, and pain and suffering. The trial moved to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana by the defendants and the case proceeded to trial.

The defendants admitted Welch’s fault in the accident, leaving the main issue whether Welch’s negligence was the cause of Wiltz’s injuries. Discovery revealed that Wiltz was a “serial plaintiff” with pre-existing injuries that he failed to disclose to the doctors that treated him following the collision. Between 1991 and 2011, Wiltz had four different accidents and incidents that resulted in injuries to his neck, back, and shoulders. Furthermore, Wiltz told doctors that he’d never experienced back or neck pain previously and answered discovery in a similarly untruthful and incomplete manner. Even with the information concerning the pre-existing injuries, the jury still returned a verdict in favor of Wiltz; however, the jury awarded him compensation for past medical expenses only. Wiltz filed a motion for a new trial or an amendment to the judgment, contending the verdict amounted to an abuse of discretion by the jury. The district court denied the motion because Wiltz failed to prove he endured any compensable pain and suffering.

image-for-post-69-from-email-5-14-19-1024x384Offshore drilling platforms enable petroleum companies to access oil deposits beneath the ocean floor. Although these platforms are anchored to the sea floor, they are technically movable and can be relocated. Whether a platform is considered “immovable property” under Louisiana law became a central issue in a case involving an injured worker because different prescription periods apply to personal injury claims depending on the nature of the property at which the injury occurred.

 In 2002, McDermott, Inc. designed and delivered the Front Runner Spar, an offshore facility used for removing and processing petroleum from the seabed of the Gulf of Mexico, to Murphy Exploration & Production Company. Murphy affixed the platform to the sea floor at the edge of the continental shelf offshore from Louisiana. James Hefren was hired by Murphy as the lead operator. In June, 2011, Hefren was injured when he was struck in the face by the flange of a valve. He filed a lawsuit suit against Murphy for negligence under the Jones Act, as well as specifically alleging that McDermott failed to properly design and construct the facility. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana entered summary judgment for Murphy, dismissing Hefren’s tort claims as barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

McDermott filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Hefren’s claims were barred by Louisiana’s rule that actions arising out of deficiencies in construction or design must be brought within five years after the date the property was accepted by the owner. See La. R.S. 9:2772. Holding that the Front Runner Spar was an “immovable object” under Louisiana law, and considering that nine years had passed between Murphy’s acceptance of the facility and the date Hefren’s lawsuit was filed, the district court dismissed the claim against McDermott.

adult-ambulance-care-263210-1024x802Often, in litigation – as in life generally – timing is everything. Courts and legislatures set certain time periods for each step in a legal proceeding to establish fairness and to impose reasonable order on the disposition of the case. Occasionally, these deadlines can be ambiguous or open to various interpretations. Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal considered such a situation in a medical malpractice case.

In 2011, Francis Grayson was admitted as a patient at Northeast Louisiana Kidney Specialists in Monroe, Louisiana. After contracting an infection from a catheter used for his treatment, he underwent surgery that left him a quadriplegic. A medical review panel requested by Grayson found that his doctors and the medical facility adequately met the standard of care in his kidney treatments and surgery. In February 2015, Grayson initiated a lawsuit for medical malpractice against his physicians and the facility. The following month, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of the medical board’s decision. A hearing was set for August 17. On August 7, ten days prior to the scheduled hearing, Grayson served the defendants with a memorandum opposing summary judgment. The memorandum was accompanied by an affidavit from a medical expert who would testify on Grayson’s behalf about the medical errors that led to his initial infection. Grayson filed the motion with the court on August 10, seven days prior to the scheduled hearing. The defendants then argued that Grayson’s opposition memorandum and affidavit were invalid because they were filed with the court less than eight days before the hearing, as required by the district court rules. The trial court eventually granted the summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed Grayson’s claims.

In 2015, when Grayson’s original petition was filed, Louisiana district court rules required that memoranda opposing summary judgment must be served on the opposing parties at least eight days prior to the hearing. La. Dist. Ct. R 9.9. The defendants, citing a number of cases, argued that the courts had routinely interpreted that the memoranda must also be filed with the court within that same eight-day period. However the Second Circuit noted that in each of the cases relied on by the defendants, the documents in opposition to summary judgment was either filed within an extremely short time—one even being minutes before the hearing—or had some other defect. The Second Circuit focused on the fact that Grayson had properly served the defendants with the memorandum and affidavit within the required time; that the motion was not filed with the court until some days later was not controlling. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings.  

action-business-cargo-2449454-1024x683Christmas is usually a busy time for families, especially those traveling to visit loved ones. For many businesses it is also a time for increased sales and higher profits. For this reason, it is common for companies to set strict targets and deadlines for employees to meet in order to capitalize on the opportunity. Such deadlines, however, can be dangerous if they push employees beyond their capacities for safety.

On the night of December 25, 2008, Tammy Westbrook, an employee of Western Star Transportation, was driving a truck carrying plants belonging to Nurserymen, Inc. on Interstate 10 near Laplace, Louisiana. Westbrook collided with a GMC Yukon, the impact of which caused the GMC to strike the rear of a Lincoln sedan. The occupants of the vehicles suffered major injuries and a fatality. At the time of the accident, Westbrook had been driving for 33 the prior 36 hours. 

The victims of the accident filed a lawsuit for personal injuries and wrongful death against Westbrook, Westerm Star, and Nurserymen. After the jury concluded that Westbrook was not within the scope of a master-servant relationship with Nurserymen at the time of the accident, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages against Westbrook and Western Star. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

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