Articles Posted in Litigation

blond-hair-desk-employee-1181534-1024x684Employment discrimination can take many forms. One common form is gender discrimination. However, an employer may be able to avoid liability if they can provide legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons why they decided to hire someone else that are not based on the candidate’s gender.

Tensas Parish School Board (“TPSB”) needed a head football coach and athletic director for Tensas High School, so they posted a job advertisement in March 2011. Due to budgetary constraints, TPSB requires that all coaches also teach. Sue Ann Easterling, who had prior experience coaching high school basketball, softball, gymnastics, volleyball, and track and field, applied for the job. Including Easterling, a total of seven people applied for the job. Easterling called the superintendent, Carol Johnson, after submitting her application in order to express her interest in the job. During the call, Easterling and Johnson discussed how Easterling had no experience as a football coach or as an athletic director, although she was a certified teacher. Easterling was not one of the three applicants contacted for follow-up interviews. 

The first man to whom Johnson offered the position turned down the job at the last minute. The next man, Rex McCarthy, who was offered and accepted the job was already the interim head football coach at the high school. When Easterling learned she had not received the job, she requested that she be considered for any job openings the following year. McCarthy resigned from the position the following year. Easterling still was not hired for the position.

auditorium-benches-chairs-207691-1024x731Generally, terminating an employee on the basis of race is a violation of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, which is similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. La. R.S.23:301; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000. Generally, to establish a case of racial discrimination under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she had appropriate qualification for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by someone not in her protected group. Mbarika v. Board of Sup’rs of Louisiana State University, 992 So.2d 551, 562 (La. Ct. App. 2008).

In this case, three employees of Education Management, Inc. d/b/a Blue Cliff College (“Blue Cliff”) filed a lawsuit alleging that they were fired due to being Caucasian. On November 7, 2008, a customer at Blue Cliff’s cosmetology school’s beauty salon made a comment regarding recently elected President Barack Obama, which caused a disruption in the salon. Two Blue Cliff employees, Nedina Chaisson (“Chaisson”) and Melissa Shapcotte (“Shapcotte”), were working with the students in the salon when the incident occurred. Joe Rogalski (“Rogalski”) subsequently expelled four African American students who were involved in the November 7th incident. Shortly after the four students were expelled, they were reinstated by Blue Cliff, and Chaisson, Shapcotte and Rogalski were discharged for “inappropriate professional behavior” and mishandling the November 7th incident.

In the lawsuit, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Cliff, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Reginald L. Moore, the president and CEO of Blue Cliff. The plaintiffs claimed that this affidavit was improper, as it contained 12 unverified, unsworn witness statements. Generally, an affidavit may be challenged via a motion to strike.

24A 2016 case demonstrated the importance of making sure our universities remain safe and secure. While one would like to think our schools would be free from the dangers of larger society, Tulane learned the necessity of vigilance.

While a student at Tulane University, the Plaintiff, Stephanie Boyd, shared a dorm suite with shared bathroom. One of her suitemates guests, Defendant Andrew Cebalo, took advantage of the shared bathroom to sneak into Stephanie’s bedroom at night and molest her.


In the initial trial, Ms. Boyd alleged Tulane University was negligent for failing to properly secure the premises, provide safe housing, and comply with industry standards regarding door locks and security. In response, Tulane filed an exception of no cause of action. Boyd filed an opposition to the exception of no cause of action, and an amended and supplemental petition alleging a failure to implement measures protecting students from foreseeable criminal harm. The trial court sided with Tulane, and dismissed the case with prejudice (meaning the lawsuit could not be filed again in the future).

14-1024x682Often times during a lawsuit, cases involve a classic “battle of experts,” where each side presents an expert with an opinion which differs from their respective opponent’s side. The recent Jefferson Davis Parish case involved this exact situation.

Hayes Fund for the First United Methodist Church of Welsh, L.L.C. and other groups brought a lawsuit against a group of defendants including Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, alleging monetary losses which resulted from defendants’ mismanagement of two oil and gas wells in which the plaintiffs’ had royalty interests. Nevertheless, when it reached the Louisiana Supreme Court, it was mainly about the standards of appellate review.

The wells in question were both located in Jefferson Davis Parish. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, when drilling the wells, did not follow the customary and industry-wide accepted protocols. For example, one of the well’s drill pipe was stuck, and later abandoned. Because of the remaining drill pipe, the hole could not properly be cemented, resulting in extraneous water to enter the reservoir and damage it, and causing loss of production and royalties for the plaintiffs. In another of the wells, the use of triple permanent packer caused the well to be “sanded up,” and resulted in the loss of lower zones. Overall, the alleged royalty loss of plaintiffs from both wells was $13.4 million.

21-card-game-black-jack-blackjack-1871508-1024x644In order to successfully handle a lawsuit addressing the duty a business has to its patrons, an injured party should know that under Louisiana’s duty-risk analysis the main questions are: (1) whether a duty was owed; (2) whether that duty was breached; and (3) whether the breach caused the patron’s harm. Additionally, for a lawsuit in which the premises of the building are alleged to be dangerous, the plaintiff must prove that the building defect in question was “unreasonably dangerous.” Broussard v. State ex. Rel Office of State Buildings, 113 So.3d 175 (La. 2013).

A skilled attorney, and a successful injured party, will also be aware of how to win a motion for summary judgment (or survive the other party’s request for summary judgment). A motion for summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue as to material fact and a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. La. C.C.P. art. 966. This essentially means that the dispute does not hinge on determining whether facts are true or false, but instead hinges on whether elements of the law have been met using the facts that both parties agree to be true.

On February 12, 2015, Lee Edmison fell down an escalator at Harrah’s New Orleans Casino and sustained severe injuries. Mr. Edmison’s blood alcohol content was 0.244 at the time of injury, three times Louisiana’s legal limit for driving. Mr. Edmison brought a lawsuit against Caesars Entertainment, the owner of Harrah’s, and Schindler, the manufacturer and servicer of the escalator.

asphalt-automobile-automotive-125514-1024x576The “burden of proof” may be a familiar concept to everyone, even those inexperienced with the courts.  The idea is that the party in a lawsuit holding the “burden of proof” is tasked with providing evidence that reaches the level of proof required to meet the burden.  In car accidents, where amount of fault decides how damages may be determined, this burden is especially important. The evidence in some car accidents makes the division extremely obvious, both as to fault and to extent of damage.  Other cases, however, especially when the accident is relatively minor, may not be so clear cut. In an unpublished opinion, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal considered such a case where the burden of proof was the main issue.  

In 2014, Meagan Lemoine was driving a truck owned by the father of her children near Marksville, LA.  With her were her young children and her sister. She had stopped at a traffic light when she was rear-ended by a white Jeep.  No one in the car was able to identify the driver of the Jeep. After stopping to assess the damage to her vehicle, Ms. Lemoine followed the Jeep to a nearby AutoZone where the driver, a woman, exited the vehicle and entered the store.  Ms. Lemoine took pictures of the Jeep. Later that afternoon, she reported the accident to the local police. A few months later, the owner of the Jeep, Lionel Augustine, and his wife received a letter from tMs. Lemoine’s attorney regarding the accident.  Both Mr. and Mrs. Augustine denied they had been involved in an accident on that date. Mrs. Augustine claimed she had driven that day and visited AutoZone, but denied being in an accident. They both pointed out that there had been no damage visible on the Jeep.  The insurance agent for the Augustines spoke about damage in the form of a “black smudge” on the front of the vehicle, but it did not match the position of the trailer hitch on the truck Ms. Lemoine was driving. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of Ms. Lemoine and her sister.  Both parties appealed.

In Louisiana, the burden of proof is upon the person seeking damages in a lawsuit. Big D Dirt Servs., Inc. v. Westwood, Inc, 653 So.2d 604, 609 (La. Ct. App. 1995)  This means the party must show enough evidence to convince the finder of fact in a case, whether it be jury or the judge, that the allegations of damage are factual.  While both sides seemed to be telling what they believed to be the truth, their stories were completely contradictory. The Third Circuit considered the facts and how the trial court had handled them.  The fact that there was white paint on the truck’s trailer hitch after the accident seemed to indicate that an accident had occurred. Also, the court considered that the heavy traffic in the area at the time made it very likely that such an accident could easily occur, and that a driver might not actually be aware they have hit another vehicle.  The Third Circuit considered that the plaintiffs had observed the accident and were able to track the same Jeep. There was also uncontroverted evidence that Mrs. Augustine was in the area that day. With this evidence, Ms. Lemoine and her sister met the burden of proof that both the accident occurred and Mrs. Augustine was the responsible party. Although Mrs. Augustine disputed the evidence, the Third Circuit held that the trial court’s ruling was reasonable.  The Third Circuit does not have to determine that the trial court was right or wrong, just whether or not the decision was a reasonable one given the evidence. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So. 2d 840 (La.  1989).

38-1024x678In Louisiana, if someone does work to your home and you find the work to have been completed unsatisfactorily, you have a one-year prescription period to bring the issue to court. However, what does one do if problems from this work do not appear right away? Considering the statute that allows a one-year prescription period at the first notice of damage, what exactly is noticing damage? Is it formally reporting the issue or simply remarking on an observation?  The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided a case on appeal from Jefferson Parish that answered such questions. 

In early 2010, Carlos Caballero Castro contacted Omar Oceguera from Triple OH Shoring, Inc. about fixing the elevation of the Caballero home. Mr. Oceguera recommended Keystone Custom Homes, LLC to Mr. Caballero, and as a result Mr. Caballero made a deal with Keystone to fix the elevation of the Caballero home. However, Mr. Oceguera would remain the general contractor of the project – he would design the foundation plan and Keystone would implement the plan. The work was completed on the home on November 20, 2010 and at the time the work was completed Mr. Caballero said the job was well done.

In January 2011, Mr. Caballero decided to build a deck on the back of his house. When he began to build the deck, he noticed there was two-inch dip in the slab – at the time Mr. Caballero rationalized the dip to simply be either the house settling or evidence of poor craftsmanship. However, Mr. Caballero stated that there was no apparent damage to his home at that time. A few days later, Mr. Caballero decided to call Keystone and inform them of the dip. He also told Keystone that since the work had been completed he and his family has heard popping noises, but that he thought these noises were a normal byproduct of the house setting. 

28-1024x683Arbitration is a matter of contract. Parties to an arbitration agreement contract on matters they agree to submit to arbitration. That agreement defines the extent to which the parties are subject to the authority of arbitrator, and such authority corresponds to the boundaries set in the agreement. This case is an example of an attempt to enlarge those boundaries and of the consequences of such attempt.

Jacob Chandler sued his business partner in East Baton Rouge and decided to hire attorney Preis Gordon to represent him. They entered into a written agreement that had a “Fee Contract,” which contained an arbitration clause. Soon after the completion of the lawsuit for which Chandler hired Gordon, it was Gordon who filed a petition in the East Baton Rouge Parish District Court against Chandler seeking a payment of legal fees. Soon the matter was directed to an arbitrator, in accordance with the arbitration clause in the agreement. The arbitrator denied Gordon his claims for legal fees and awarded attorney and expert witness fees totaling altogether almost $43,000 to Chandler.

Chandler contended that Section 10 of the Fee Contract provided the basis for arbitrator’s award. In particular, it that “Client further agrees that any award by arbitrator shall include the costs and expenses of the arbitration, including attorneys’ fees actually incurred.” Based on this, the arbitrator awarded Chandler attorney fees, finding that the Fee Contract provided for prevailing party to recover attorney fees.

55What would it take for an appellate court to overturn an award of damages? According to the Louisiana 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal, the bar is set high and very rarely does an award for damages get overturned as long as it’s reasonable. Lafayette Motors employed Mr. Menard as a service advisor. In August 2003, Dr. Stroy came to Lafayette Motors to obtain a copy of the repair estimate for his wife’s car. While Menard made a copy of the estimate, the shop manager instructed Menard not to give the estimate to Dr. Stroy. Menard crumpled up the estimate to place it in the trash; however his right wrist was grabbed and twisted by Dr. Stroy. Dr. Story proceeded to take the estimate and leave the premises with it. Menard had injuries to his wrist and arm and was later diagnosed with tendinitis by an orthopedic surgeon. Almost ten years later, Menard testified he still had pain in his wrist.

A year after the incident occurred, Menard filed a petition for damages. His petition alleged that Dr. Stroy’s actions were the proximate cause of his injuries, and he wanted damages for the medical bills he incurred at the time of the incident. Dr. Story filed an answer to the petition, as well as petitioning for reconventional demand alleging Menard made public statements that were slanderous and defamatory. He further alleged that these statements caused him to suffer embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish. Menard filed a motion to strike or dismiss the reconventional demand, and the court granted the motion. Menard then added Dr. Stroy’s insurance company as a defendant, and they responded by saying that the police did not provide coverage for that particular incident. The insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court denied it. A bench trial was held, and the court ruled in favor of Menard and awarded him $3,000 in general damages and $3,048 in special damages for the medical expenses from August 2003 to November 2003.

The standard of review, in this case, is really what this case turns on and, in this case, there is broad discretion owed to the trier of fact when it comes to fixing awards for general damages. See Hollenbeck v. Oceaneering Int., Inc., 685 So.2d 163 (La. 1997). Unless the record shows that a factual and reasonable basis does not exist and the finding is wrong or erroneous, an appellate court should not disturb a finding of fact. See Thibodeaux v. Comeaux, 69 So.3d 674, 679 (La. App. Ct. 2011).

68-1024x683Timing and deadlines are important aspects of the judicial system. However, these specific guidelines are not familiar to most non-lawyers, which underscores the importance of having an excellent attorney represent you. The lack of an attorney can immediately put an individual at a disadvantage, as it did in one New Orleans woman’s case.

 Ms. Scott decided to represent herself in her case against Kindred Hospital New Orleans (Kindred). She alleged that Kindred Hospital violated the standard of care she should have been afforded by allowing a hospital employee to sexually batter her while she was a patient there from May 16 to July 31, 2013. Additionally, she argued that the hospital failed to properly investigate the sexual battery.

 Ms. Scott first brought the lawsuit against Kindred on May 5, 2014. Kindred argued that the claim must be submitted to a medical review panel since it was a medical negligence case.  Kindred also filed an exception of prematurity to the trial court. The trial judge granted the exception of prematurity and dismissed the case.

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