Articles Posted in Litigation

Lamar Richardson of Joyce brought an action against his employer, Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway Company, for injuries he claims to have sustained on May 14, 1990 when he was working on a maintenance crew. While clearing debris off train tracks, Richardson was cutting limbs from a large willow tree on the track at mile post 149.8 in Winn Parish and claims he was struck with a large limb and injured.

Richardson sued KCS under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq for medical expenses, mental anguish, and lost wages that resulted from the alleged injury. He contended that his employer failed to provide a safe workplace and was negligent in not adequately supervising the clearing of trees or training personnel in how to cut trees. Richardson claimed his injuries kept him from working and eventually led to a need for cervical disc surgery. The case went to trial in 1994 and 1995. Judgment was entered in June 1998 in Richardson’s favor and he was awarded medical expenses of $3,869.75, general damages of $150,000, and lost wages of $525,435.00. The major contention presented during the trial was Richardson’s report that he visited the emergency room Jackson Parish Hospital on May 15th after the pain in his neck intensified. Hospital records do not confirm the report but rather show he visited the ER three days prior to his alleged injury on May 11, 1990 where he complained of, among other things, neck pain that had lasted about a week. The emergency room had no record of a visit on May 15. Richardson claimed that he drove his son to a basketball event in Hammond on May 11 and therefore could not have gone to the emergency room. Witnesses at trial corroborated his testimony and the jury found his account more convincing than the hospital records which Richardson claimed had been made in error.

KCS appealed, and in their April 1, 1999 decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed. The court found that the Richardson failed to show that the date in the hospital records was inaccurate and that the idea that the records were created in error is implausible and not supported. The court also found that Richardson’s claim that he was treated by a particular doctor and nurse when he visited the hospital on May 15th was impossible given the testimony of those individuals. Finally, Richardson made no claim that the hospital intentionally falsified medical records or provide a motive for them to do so. The court found the hospital records to be accurate and reliable. Medical records are typically considered to be inherently reliable given that health care providers rely on them in making life and death decisions. As such, the plaintiff sought medical treatment for neck pain prior to his alleged injury and was not entitled to damages from his employer.

In November 2000, Debra Anne Addis of Addis, Louisiana filed a request for review with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund alleging that Mary Eschette M.D. of LSU Medical Center acted negligently in changing her prescription medications and violated the appropriate standard care in failing to properly diagnose a problem with her left wrist. The medical review board entered their decision in September 2003 and concluded that Ms. Addis failed to show that the defendant’s did not meet the applicable standard of care in her treatment. Two and a half years later the defendant doctor and medical center filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted the medical review panel opinion, asserting that the plaintiff Ms. Addis failed to name an expert despite almost six years of discovery.

The Louisiana Court of Appeals (first circuit) entered their decision in March of last year in favor of the defendants. The court found that the record of the case showed Ms. Addis failed to submit any evidence to counter the medical review panel’s opinion or show she could meet her burden of proof should the case go to trial. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and ordered the Plaintiff to pay all costs associated with her appeal.

The granting of a summary judgment motion means that a case will not proceed any further because the plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing sufficient issues of material fact that can be decided by a jury. Therefore the decision is decided by the court as a matter of law. Summary judgment motions can be granted for the plaintiff or defendant. Here, the motion was granted for the defendant, effectively dismissing Ms. Addis’ case.

In certain situations, a person that witnessed another get physically injured has a legal claim against the person that caused the physical injury—even when the witness suffered only mental anguish, without any direct physical injury. The rule allowing this recovery is known as the bystander recovery rule.

Louisiana’s bystander recovery is governed by Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.6 and the Louisiana Supreme Court case of Trahan v. McManus. As stated in Trahan, the bystander recovery rule does not “compensate for the anguish and distress that normally accompany an injury to a loved one under all circumstances.” Rather, the bystander recovery rule is more limited and has four requirements in order for a bystander to recover damages for his mental anguish from witnessing another’s injuries.

Those four elements are:

In a tort case based on negligence, a plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that the defendant breached that duty, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. In some circumstances, though, it can be difficult for a plaintiff to obtain clear evidence of the defendant’s breach of duty.

The concept of “res ipsa loquitur,” which is Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” can be employed in certain situations to establish the defendant’s breach of duty in the absence of direct evidence. Under this doctrine, the mere occurrence of an accident raises the inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. When res ipsa loquitur is applied, the defendant bears the burden to put on other evidence to dispute the presumption of negligence.

There are two essential elements for applying res ipsa loquitur in a particular situation:

On April 17, 1968, Doris Brantley of Oak Grove, Louisiana was involved in an automobile accident when her car struck by a vehicle driven by Albert McKee. Mrs. Brantley was immediately taken to a local hospital and was released the next day. Her painful injuries included numerous abrasions, bruises, and lacerations, as well as trauma to her neck, back, and knees. She received care from a general practitioner for several weeks following the collision and then sought treatment from an orthopedic surgeon in Greenville, Mississippi.

At the time of the crash, Mrs. Brantley was 40 years old and in good health. She worked at the Lamont Glove Factory in Oak Grove as an inspector, where she earned $1.92 per hour. The trial court awarded Mrs. Brantley $5,000 for her personal injuries resulting from the accident, and an additional $1,313.85 for her lost wages and expenses she incurred in repairing her car. Mr. McKee, the other driver, appealed the judgment on the sole basis that the damages awarded by the trial court were excessive.

The principle that “much discretion” must be afforded the trial judge or jury in awarding tort damages has been a part of the Louisiana Civil Code since 1825. (Currently, the provision resides in Section 3 of Article 1934.) According to William A. Sherwood, who wrote about this matter in a note that appeared in the Tulane Law Review in 1974, its inclusion in the Code

In 1984, a natural gas pipeline exploded in the parish of West Feliciana resulting in death and destruction to people and property. The pipeline was owned and operated by Texas Eastern and Clarkco was performing work on the pipeline. The pipeline was on Mrs. Winters’ property and Clarkco sued Mrs. Winters for general allegations of negligence or strict liability with regards to the pipeline.

You may have heard the term strict liability before but you are not certain as to what the term actually means. Strict liability means that a person is responsible for damage or loss caused by his or her actions or omissions even if the person is not at fault.

It is irrelevant if that person attempted to take all the possible precautions to prevent injury concerning strict liability cases. With strict liability, the court simply says the person is guilty. It is important to note that not all injuries stem from strict liability crimes. The most common incidences involve people who own wild animals and people who deal with inherently danger instruments. This means that the object itself is very risky to try to control.

As discussed in the last post on the topic of traffic accident reconstruction, experts can play a pivotal role in the outcome of a case. Many accident victims can benefit from the opinion of reconstruction experts in establishing the at-fault party in a crash. Key to achieving this result is officially qualifying the reconstruction expert in the eyes of the court. Though a person may represent himself as qualified to analyze traffic accidents and offer an opinion on its cause, it may be quite another matter for the court to accept the opinion and permit the jury to consider the expert’s testimony.

The case Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1999) helps to explain the trial court’s role in evaluating the qualifications of a self-proclaimed accident reconstruction expert. The case concerned a car accident in which the defendant, driving a tractor-trailer, collided with the defendant’s car at an intersection in Yazoo City, Miss. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent because at the time of the crash he was operating his truck at a speed in excess of the posted limit of 55 MPH. In support of this theory, the plaintiff sought during her jury trial to qualify that her witness, Mr. Rosenhan, was an expert in accident reconstruction. Rosenhan was to testify, based on his review of the police’s accident report, that he calculated that the defendant’s truck was traveling 63 MPH when the collision occurred. The defendant objected, arguing that Rosenhan’s qualifications were insufficient to form the basis of an expert opinion on the crash. After substantial analysis, the district (trial) court refused to qualify Rosenhan as an expert witness and did not allow the jury to hear his testimony. When the jury delivered a verdict for the defendant after the plaintiff could not otherwise prove her speeding theory and establish the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff appealed on the basis that the trial court’s exclusion of Rosenhan’s testimony was improper.

The appellate court recalled its prior decision in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc. in which the wide discretion district courts are granted when deciding whether expert testimony is admissible was determined. This discretion is only overturned when its’ exercise was “manifestly erroneous”. 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir.1997). The court also referenced the Supreme Court decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in which the Court stated that a district court’s function was to act as gatekeepers, only permitted expert testimony that is both reliable and relevent to be presented to the jury. When the appellate court considered the matter of Rosenhan’s expertise as analyzed by the district court, it found he had earned a bachelor of science degree and a masters degree in mechanical engineering. Rosenhan had experience teaching mechanical and industrial engineering at vocational schools and colleges. During his 25-year consulting career, Rosenhan had worked in fire investigation and reconstruction; Rosenhan testified that his specialty had only recently changed to car accident reconstruction.

In 2010 the St. Landry Sheriff’s Department welcomed a traffic accident reconstruction expert among its team as Captain Brian Hundley successfully completed a course on accident investigation and reconstruction. Especially in fatal accidents or in cases where there are no eye-witnesses, car crash experts can play a pivotal role in determining the most probable explanation for how the accident occurred.

In an investigation, a crash reconstruction expert must rely heavily on evidence gathered by the police at the accident scene. Although the expert can consider a variety of physical evidence, including the road layout and traffic markings, tire skid marks, and the damaged vehicles themselves that remain after the occurrence of the crash, much of the expert’s analysis must be based on observations made after the event. For this reason, it is critical that police officers who respond to an accident scene are extremely diligent in preserving and recording evidence once the medical needs of the victims are addressed.

The reconstruction expert will review photographs of the roadway and vehicles and obtain detailed measurements of the site in order to create a diagram of the situation. This diagram is important for establishing the vehicles’ positions both before and after the impact.

Louisiana workers’ compensation law creates a system that provides medical treatment and monetary income to employees who suffer injuries while on the job. The law is designed to benefit both employees and employers. Workers are protected against the difficulties that result from job-related injuries such as the expenses of medical care and lost wages from being unable to work. An injured employee can receive bi-weekly income payments and free medical treatment, but must forfeit any right he may otherwise have under the law to sue his employer over the injury. The employer benefits by avoiding a potentially costly and unpredictable lawsuit in exchange for accepting limited liability under the structured system that seeks to protect the interests of both parties. Under this system, the issue of fault or negligence is not at issue—it is enough for the employee to show that he suffered an injury while performing work for his employer.

One important procedural obligation on the part of an injured worker is that he must report the injury to his employer in a timely manner. According to Louisiana statute,

No [claim] for compensation shall be maintained unless notice of injury has been given to the employer within thirty days after the date of the injury or death. This notice may be given or made by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or by anyone on his behalf. La. R.S. 23:1301.

Fleeing the scene of an escalating argument, a driver injured two persons when he ran over them with his car. The incident happened in Minden on February 7, as reported by Jana Ryan. Local authorities believed the victims were merely bystanders and were not part of the argument. After brandishing a gun, the driver attempted to leave in his car, and he ran over the bystanders while trying to back away. The driver was later arrested on criminal charges of aggravated assault and aggravated battery stemming from the incident.

Events like this one often bring criminal charges against the person who injures another. However, the driver in this case may also be civilly liable to the injured victims; that is, in addition any criminal conviction, a court can hold him financially responsible for the injuries that resulted from his actions. To be held civilly, or financially, liable to a victim, generally a person’s actions must be the legal cause of the victim’s injury. The law does not even require that the person have intentionally injured a victim; a careless, or negligent, act may be sufficient to establish liability.

It is important to keep in mind, though, that criminal law and civil liability are administered very differently and that criminal convictions and civil remedies are distinct under Louisiana law. A conviction by a criminal court does not automatically ensure that a civil court will hold a convicted defendant financially liable for the injuries he caused. Nor will a person found innocent be guaranteed immunity from civil liability. Each type of court requires attorneys to establish different elements, and criminal courts require them to prove those elements with more certainty. This is true even if key words, such as “assault” and “battery,” seem to mean essentially the same thing in each court.

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