Articles Posted in Criminal Matter

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Location can be crucial in determining what law applies to a given situation. When an ambulance driver struck Mr. Dwight Johnson’s truck in the Marksville Taco Bell drive-through lane, Mr. Johnson and his friend were injured. His truck was damaged as well. Since this accident occurred in a parking lot, the general tort law of Louisiana applies to the case; the Highway Regulatory Act, while potentially persuasive, is not controlling in a situation like this. Relying solely on this source of law could prove detrimental to a party in a personal injury action. The defendants in this case, Smith v. Johnson, were unsuccessful for many reasons, not the least of which was that they failed to convine the court to place the blame for the accident anywhere but on themselves.

One plaintiff in this case, Mr. Johnson, testified that he saw the ambulance, noticed that it was stopped and noted that its brake lights were illuminated. Only then, according to his testimony, did he proceed. There was no testimony concerning Mr. Johnson’s view being obstructed, nor was there evidence that he was speeding presented at trial. Mr. Smith, the ambulance driver, testified that he felt the impact with the other vehicle rather than saw it and evinced that he was not paying attention to the situation in front of him while proceeding forward in his vehicle. The Highway Regulatory Act is not binding on activities in parking lots. It is, however, persuasive. In this case, it was persuasive against the defendants.

This case was not the first time that the Louisiana appellate courts have allocated fault in accidents that occurred in parking lots. The court mentioned two notable cases in its analysis in this case. In Gatheright v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., a standard of due caution was set that applied to all motorists proceeding in a parking lot. In that case, the plaintiff was traveling too fast and not applying her brakes. As a result, she was found to be 100 percent at fault for the accident giving rise to the case. The standard set forth in this case appears to have been refined and clarified in a line of cases that have come after it.

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Creating laminated veneer lumber and I-Joists, which are used in residential and commercial construction, require toxic chemicals such as formaldehyde, phenol, and methanol. The chemicals also end up in the waste products of plants that produce these goods. In the Parish of Natchitoches, hundreds of individuals discovered the damage that these chemicals could cause. These individuals stated “that sawdust from the plant fell like snowflakes upon them, their children, their homes and their cars.” The plant admitted that accidental release of admissions were fairly common, and they were all observed and recorded.

As a result of this exposure, hundreds of plaintiffs joined to form a class action lawsuit. A class action lawsuit involves numerous individuals who have suffered in a similar manner, usually resulting from the same incident or series of incidents. Class action lawsuits allow individual people to get compensation for damages where they may not have been able to if they just sued by themselves.

The damages in this case not only included the obvious mess that sawdust would create in a home, but also included an array of medical issues. Some examples include conjunctivitis, difficulty breathing, wheezing, coughing, bronchial pneumonia, and asthma. The side effects of exposure to the chemicals in the plant were relatively the same as those claimed by hundreds of nearby residents.

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Louisiana law, in providing for uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, reflects the state’s strong public policy of providing full recovery to victims who suffer damages in car accidents. If an at-fault driver lacks sufficient insurance coverage, the UM provision of the victim’s own policy will operate to make up the shortfall. UM coverage will be read into an insurance policy by default unless the coverage is rejected, and rejection “shall be made only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance,” where the “form shall be provided by the insurer and signed by the named insured or his legal representative.” The following requirements must be met in order to create a valid rejection: 1.initialing the rejection the UM coverage; 2. printing the name of the insured or legal representative; 3. signing the name of the insured or legal representative; 4. filling in the policy number; and 5. dating the form. In cases of dispute, the insurance company bears the burden of proving that the insured rejected UM coverage, but a properly completed form “creates a rebuttable presumption that the insured knowingly rejected UM coverage.” A dispute over the waiver of UM coverage formed the basis of a case that came before Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal earlier this year.

On July 21, 2008, Richard Gunter, a Bossier Parish police jury employee, was injured when the parish-owned vehicle he was riding in as a passenger was struck by another vehicle. Gunter filed suit against the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer, Gunter’s own insurer, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Gunter alleged that St. Paul provided UM coverage for the police jury. St. Paul filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the police jury had rejected UM coverage under its policy. The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of St. Paul; Gunter appealed on the grounds that material facts about whether the police jury knowingly and properly rejected UM coverage were in dispute.

St. Paul’s position that the police jury rejected UM coverage was based on the fact that the parish administrator had completed a UM waiver form on September 27, 2007. Yet, the parish president’s testimony via affidavit revealed uncertainty as to whether the administrator had the authority to reject UM coverage, or whether such an action required approval by the parish finance committee. The court noted that “the record does not show that [the parish administrator] acted with the agreement, knowledge, or approval of the police jury in rejecting UM coverage for the policy period at issue.” Thus, “considering the strong public policy favoring UM coverage,” the court concluded that there were “genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the parish administrator] was authorized … to reject UM coverage on behalf of the police jury as its legal representative and whether the police jury knowingly rejected UM coverage for the relevant policy period.” Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment.

 

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In trial, experts are individuals who have specific knowledge about their field beyond what the average person would have. That knowledge could be about a broad, technical field such as neuroscience or it could be something as simple as a neighbor who constantly watches the happenings in the neighborhood. As a result of their experiences, those individuals have special knowledge that they are able to share with the judge and jury at a trial.

However, in order to allow an expert to testify at trial, there are certain criteria that must be met. Recently, thanks to a State of Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, those requirements have been spelled out explicitly. The case involved the death of a teen as he was driving down a slippery highway in the evening on Highway 102 in Jefferson Davis Parish. He lost control of his vehicle as he was driving around a curve and the vehicle struck a headwall of a cement culvert that ran under the roadway. The vehicle rolled over into the ditch and partially ejected the teen; his head and neck were trapped between vehicle and the ditch. He died as a result of his injuries.

The family brought a wrongful death action against the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), arguing that the road was maintained in a hazardous condition. They contended that headwall of the concrete culvert was slightly above grade by about three inches and that the slope of the ditch was steeper than it should be. Obviously, both of these claims involve a lot of technical information about highways and regulations that the average person would not know. Therefore, when this case got to trial, both sides called in experts to determine whether these conditions were violating any rules and whether the above grade culvert and the slope of the ditch could have contributed to the accident regardless of whether they were maintained improperly.

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A court granted a Louisiana woman’s motion to quash the criminal information against her granted in 2007. She was charged with theft after she removed some kitchen equipment from a premises on which she once operated a business. After this outcome she initiated a claim against various parties involved in the prosecution of this case for unlawful searches and seizures, unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. Though her criminal case ended with a positive outcome for the woman, her civil action did not fare well.

When the criminal justice system does wrong by a criminal defendant, the civil justice system provides a few potential remedies. Unfortunately for this woman, she did not meet the standard for receiving such a remedy. Her case did not rise to a level where relief could be granted and had a summary judgment rendered against her. This judgment was upheld by the appellate court.

Proving that a criminal case was investigated, filed or prosecuted improperly is a difficult task. The woman in this case failed to even raise genuine issues of fact in her case. The appellate court held that she did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether she abandoned the property from which she removed the items she was eventually accused of stealing. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that Fourth Amendment rights do not reside in places but in people. In order to be protected under that Amendment, a person must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a given space. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later held that an individual cannot claim any legitimate expectation of privacy in property once it has been abandoned. The woman’s first unlawful search and seizure claim was defeated by this finding by the appellate court.

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A Louisiana Court of Appeals remanded a class action case back to the trial court for further determination on the size of a class of plaintiffs affected by a Livingston Parish hazardous waste dump. The case, while unfortunate in subject matter, is an excellent overview of the appeals process.

In this case, the trial court had decided to certify a class of all people living within 2.5 miles of a dump site of Combustion, Inc., that had released toxic chemicals into the air and water. Initially, over 14 lawsuits had been filed by 1200 people, but the trial judge had consolidated the cases to a single class action case. The defendants in the case appealed the trial judge’s decision on two grounds: first, that a class action lawsuit was not the appropriate means of deciding the matter because separate lawsuits would be better; and second, that the judge incorrectly set the eligible class of plaintiffs at all those people living within 2.5 miles of the site.

The Court of Appeals sided with the plaintiffs on the first issue. The Court noted that, under Louisiana civil procedure, a case is appropriately decided by class action if the plaintiffs are numerous enough, the named plaintiffs will adequately represent all plaintiffs in the class, and if there is a common character between the claims of all plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that, there being over 1200 plaintiffs in the initial class, there were clearly enough plaintiffs for the trial court to decide that a class action was fair. Also, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs would likely all have similar damage from the toxic chemicals—namely, bodily injury and property damage—that would make the named plaintiffs adequate representatives of everyone in the class. Finally, the Court reasoned that the legal issues encountered by the plaintiffs were similar enough that there was a common character between them. For these reasons, the Court held that class action was appropriate to resolve the issues in the case.

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Late in the afternoon of April 15, 2001, Geraldine Fruge and her eight-year-old granddaughter, Hannah Lejeune, were involved in an auto accident on US Highway 171 in Beauregard Parish. Fruge, who was driving southbound, lost control of her Pontiac and veered into oncoming traffic. Tragically, both she and Lejeune were killed when their car struck a Ford pickup truck heading northbound. It had been raining on and off throughout the day and Highway 171 was wet at the time of the crash. The victims’ family brought a wrongful death action against Louisiana’s Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). The plaintiffs alleged that due to the highway’s construction, water was allowed to collect and pond on the roadway. They alleged that this condition amounted to a defect that caused Fruge’s car to hydroplane. After jury returned a verdict in favor of DOTD, the plaintiffs appealed.

The primary duty of Louisiana’s DOTD is to maintain the public roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe and which does not present an unreasonable risk of harm to motorists who exercise ordinary care. As discussed in this prior blog post, a plaintiff must prove the following elements in a tort action against DOTD arising from accident on the roadway: (1) that the condition that caused the damage was in DOTD’s control; (2) that the condition amounted to a defect that presented an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the DOTD was aware or should have been aware that the defect existed; and (4) that the defect was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Upon review, the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit began “with the second element: whether Highway 171 contained a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm.”

The court reviewed the record and examined the testimony presented by eyewitnesses, experts, and accident investigators, much of which centered around the ridges or ruts in the travel lane that on the day of the accident held water on the road. The court noted that “it is clear that the jury could not have come to any conclusion other than the fact that the travel ruts on both lanes of Highway 171 were holding some water at the time of the accident. Thus, the pivotal question is whether this retention of water was a defect in the highway that created an unreasonable risk of harm.” After an exhaustive review of matters such as rut depth, roadway gradient, tire tread depth, and the physics of hydroplaning, the jury found that the condition of the road did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. “The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Accordingly, the court held that “the evidence in the record provides a reasonable factual basis for the jury to have concluded that Highway 171 was not defective,” and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

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Four workers who were employed by the Prairieville-based Proserve Hydro Co. were working on at a Honeywell International facility when a hose carrying chlorine gas ruptured, causing them injury. The workers sued Triplex, Inc., the company that had sold the hose to Honeywell, under the theory that it was liable for their injuries as the manufacturer of the hose. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, applying the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), granted summary judgment in favor of Triplex, and the workers appealed.

In its review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified four elements that a plaintiff must establish in a products liability suit under the LPLA. It focused particualrly on the requirement that the defendant must be the “manufacturer” of the product according to the state’s definition. The lower court’s summary judgment was based on Triplex’s position that it was not a manufacturer of the hose within the meaning of the LPLA. The hose in question was a “Resistoflex Chlorine Hose Part # HB30HB30HB-1560.” It consisted of a Teflon inner-core surrounded by a braided material jacket. The core and jacket were assembled by the Crane Resistoflex Company and shipped in bulk to Triplex for distribution. Upon receipt of an order from Honeywell, Triplex cut the hose to the requested length, installed Resistoflex-approved fittings to either end, and pressure-tested the hose. Triplex recorded the specifications of this work on an assembly test certificate which listed “Resistoflex” as the manufacturer of the hose.

The court looked to the LPLA to determine whether, based on its cutting the Resistoflex hose and installing the end fittings, Triplex fit the definition of “manufacturer.” It noted that the workers’ expert conceded that the hose rupture occured a significant distance away from any end fitting and did not appear to result from the modifications Triplex performed. It also affirmed the point that “the simple act of testing a product after modifications,” as Triplex did, “does not transform a seller into a statutory ‘manufacturer.’” The court was not persuaded that Triplex exercised any “control over… a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the product,” given that Honeywell specified the exact Resistoflex part number and the end fittings it required. Accordingly, the court concluded that Triplex was not a manufacturer under the state law definition, and therefore could not be found liable for the workers’ injuries under the LPLA.

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An employee working on the deck of a marine vessel suffered injuries to his back and hips after a crane moving equipment from the dock swung a cargo basket at him and pinned him to the ship. The employee sued the company operating the crane as well as his own employer who operated the ship he was loading.

The plaintiff-employee, Hamm, and the defendant-companies, Island Operating Company (IOC) and Rodan, disagree about what jurisdiction controls this case. The plaintiff argues that his claims fall under admiralty jurisdiction and as such elected to undertake a non-jury trial as allowed under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the defendant companies desire a jury trial and believe that the case falls under the Outer Continental Shelf lands Act (OCSLA).

What law is applicable in this case—admiralty or OCSLA—is determinative in this case due to the different statute of limitations. If the case falls under federal maritime law then the employee has three years to file his claim, but if the case falls under OCSLA then the case will fall under the law of the adjacent state (in this case, Louisiana) and the employee had to file his claim within a year. If OCSLA is found to be the applicable law then the employee’s claim will not be valid since he filed suit fifteen months after the accident. If federal maritime law applies, then not only will Hamm be entitled to the non-jury trial he wants, but Rodan and IOC will not be able to throw the case out.

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A man died in Calcasieu Parish following an altercation with the Lake Charles Police Department. The victim, Deshotels, was chased out of a neighbor’s garage by her husband. The husband grabbed him in a chokehold, which ultimately rendered him unconscious. On their way to a burglary call in the same area, the police en route received a call from dispatch that the neighbor had apprehended Deshotels. Believing it to be the same call, they arrived at the apartment complex, expecting to deal with a burglary suspect, not a trespasser. When Deshotels attempted to run from the police officers, one of them tased him twice to stop his resistance so the others could handcuff him. The officers noted that Deshotels had turned blue and stopped breathing so they uncuffed him and called an ambulance.

His family sued the officers involved, the Lake Charles Police Department, and the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office. They brought charges for excessive force and failing to provide appropriate medical assistance against the officers involved in cowing Deshotels. Against the other officers present, they brought bystander liability claims for not preventing the tasing. The trial court granted summary judgment to the police department, dismissing the bystander liability and excessive force claims against the majority of the officers. However, the family’s claims of failure to render appropriate medical assistance and excessive force by the tasing officer are currently pending before the district court. The family appeals the dismissal of these claims.

An excessive force claim will succeed if the plaintiff can show that he suffered an injury that resulted directly and only from the use of force and that the force used was objectively unreasonable. In police situations, courts consider factors like whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of others, whether he was actively resisting arrest or trying to flee, the existence of alternative methods of arrest, the nature of the offense involved, and the risks and dangers faced by the officers. But because police officers are usually required to make split second judgments in tense situations, the court evaluates the officer’s use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer being thrust into that scene. Since the excessive force claim against the tasing officer was denied summary judgment, the appellate court looked the other officer’s actions in subduing and handcuffing Deshotels. Were the actions reasonable under the circumstances?

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