Articles Posted in Civil Matter

In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a person, proper service of process must be employed, giving legal notice to the party of the suit and enabling them to timely prepare in anticipation of the suit. If proper service is not performed, a court may not have jurisdiction over such person. In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, the requirements of proper service were explored in order to determine whether the proper steps were employed. proper service of process is one of the most important parts of a law suit, without proper service, the defendant may not be forced to participate in the case. Thus, the importance of proper service cannot be emphasized enough.

The case at issue involves the plaintiff, who fax-filed suit against several defendants, including the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), seeking to recover damages arising from an automobile accident. In the plaintiffs petition, requested service on DOTD though the attorney general was made. The issue became whether the plaintiff’s service of process was insufficient based on the fact that he did not request service on the secretary of DOTD. Citing to Louisiana Revised Statute 13:5107(A) which provides in part:

“In all suits filed against the state of Louisiana or a state agency, citation and service may be obtained by citation and service on the attorney general of Louisiana, or on any employee in his office above the age of sixteen years, or any other proper officer or person, depending upon the identity of the named defendant and in accordance with the laws of this state, and on the department, board, commission, or agency head or person…”

Gambling is one of the many recreational activities that the state of Louisiana has to offer. One of the more popular ways to gamble in Louisiana, is on the river boat casinos. However, in a recent Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision, the court explored whether or not incidents such as personal injury that occur on these river boat casinos qualify under maritime law as a result of being “in navigation.” This issue presents an interesting dilemma in classification, especially after the Louisiana legislature in 2001 amended the gambling laws so as to prohibit gambling boats in Lake Charles from conducting cruises or excursions. Thus, the question becomes: are these river boat casinos in navigation and thus governed by maritime law?

The facts of the case include a young woman who visited a river boat casino on Lake Charles to enjoy gambling in addition to the complimentary food and drinks. However, she became intoxicated and at 4 a.m., she fell from a stairway onto the ground below, suffering serious injuries. According to protocall, her blood alcohol content was measured at 0.33%. Initially, the young woman pursued damages under Louisiana law, however, Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.1 provides:

“The legislature finds and declares that the consumption of intoxicating beverages, rather than the sale or serving or furnishing of such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person.”

When making a legal claim against a person or entity, time is of the essence. Prescription bars certain legal actions after a specified time period. If the specified time period has lapsed, the action is thereafter prohibited. The Fifth Circuit recently explored the issue of prescription, demonstrating how prescription operates to effectively bar actions if they are not timely brought.

The facts of the case are disturbing; the plaintiffs alleged that they were sexually abused by a Roman Catholic priest who was ordained by the Catholic Church. The complaint alleges very serious accusations of abuse. However, abuse turned out not to be the dispositive issue, rather, prescription was the focal point for the Fifth Circuit. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether the suit, based on molestation allegations that occurred over twenty-five years ago, was timely under Louisiana law. It was uncontested that the plaintiff’s claims had indeed expired and that they were as a result, barred, unless prescription was tolled under the Louisiana law doctrine of “contra non valentem.” This is an exception that was judicially created to statutory prescription, it applies only in exceptional circumstances. In particular, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Eastin v. Entergy Corp., held that the “prescriptive period commences on the date the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which his cause of action is based” if contra non valentem applies. The plaintiffs alleged that exceptional circumstances were present, as a result of their memories of the abuse they suffered being repressed, preventing them from knowing about their cause of action. However, depositions that the plaintiff gave showed otherwise. Rather, the plaintiffs unequivocally stated that they actively remembered the abuse after it occurred. Thus, their memories were not repressed and the concept of contra non valentem would not apply. Prescription would instead, govern the issue.

The plaintiffs thereafter contended that they should have the opportunity to obtain additional evidence on the subject of their repressed memories and would obtain an affidavit from a professor of psychology that would support their contentions. This affidavit would be used to rebut the defendant’s Rule 56 summary judgment motion, such motions are generally favored and should be liberally granted, but the plaintiffs must demonstrate two things. First, they must demonstrate why they need additional discovery and second, how the additonal discovery will likely create a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, even if the plaintiffs were granted additional time to obtain the affidavit in their support, it would not suffice to defeat a summary judgment motion. The plaintiffs already admitted in their depositions that they could remember the abuse right after each encounter, thus, the affidavit would not help defeat summary judgment since they already have demonstrated a lack of exceptional circumstances to qualify for prescriptive tolling.

Numerous prior posts on this blog have examined Louisiana’s system for helping plaintiffs who have been the victim of medical malpractice. Although the state’s medical review panel is in place to screen potential claims before they get to court, a plaintiff must still rely on competent legal counsel to see the case to resolution. So important is the lawyer’s role that the courts have consistently held that when a litigant loses his day in court solely due to his attorney’s negligence, strictly enforcing a technical rule should not result in the miscarriage of justice. This principle was recently relied upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of Sims v. Hawkins-Sheppard to avoid an unjust outcome for the plaintiff.

Rebecca Sims was admitted to the maternity ward of the Glenwood Regional Medical Center in Ouachita Parish on April 2, 2007 for the delivery of her baby. She requested a delivery by Caesarean section due to complications she experienced with her first child. Sims’s doctor, Tonya Hawkins-Sheppard, nevertheless decided to perform a surgical vaginal delivery

with the use of forceps. Sims’s baby suffered permanent eye injuries from the use of the forceps, and Sims herself suffered injuries that required a hysterectomy. Sims submitted her claim to the state’s medical review panel. She alleged that she was heavily medicated and in great pain, and therefore did not give consent for the delivery as performed by Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard; further, Sims asserted that Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard breached the applicable standard of care in the delivery of her baby. After receiving the review panel’s opinion that Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard did meet the standard of care, Sims filed a lawsuit. Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard filed a motion for summary judgment when Sims’s counsel responded to discovery requests with a statement that Sims did not have a medical expert who could offer an opinion. Sims’s counsel then filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment which contained an unsigned physician’s affidavit. Sims’s lawyer assured both Sims and the court that the unsigned affidavit would be replaced with a valid affidavit before the scheduled hearing on the motion. But Sims’s lawyer failed to obtain the signed affidavit because he did not present it to the physician, Dr. Kimberly Hess, before she left for vacation out of state. Sims learned of this only the day before the hearing, at which time she fired her attorney. At the hearing, Sims explained the situation to the court but the judge refused to grant a continuance so she could obtain new counsel. Instead, the court granted the motion for summary judgment. Sims found new counsel about a month later, who immediately filed an appeal of the court’s granting of summary judgment for Dr. Hawkins-Sheppard.

In the event that a landowner plans to do any form of significant work on an area of land, whether cosmetic, such as landscaping, or extensive, the work should be preceded by the contracting of one qualified and certified to inspect the property and physically mark the location of utility cables upon it. This is to prevent damage to the utility cables, and to prevent the costs of repair to the companies which own the cables. Such action invokes the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act – Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities Damage Prevention Law.

An incident central to the MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan case was noted at causing a $20,000 per minute loss to the utility company for every minute the cable was out of commission. It seems rational that the possible negligence and/or trespass in damaging the cable, property owned by a utility company, can cause significant troubles, even if it occurs within the land of the property owner.

The most substantial part involved in this case is the determination of what the definition of trespass and negligence is when a landowner affects the transposed property of the utility company. Without a doubt, a landowner has the right to be on and use the land, but the utility company also has been given the right by law to continue to leave its utility cable in/on the land and continue using it, and retains this right even if the contract for use of the land was made with a previous landowner. If a servitude is involved with having the utility cable in/on the land, then there is a possible claim for Trespass to Land in conjunction with a negligence claim. However, if there is not a servitude, and only a right to continue to use the utility cable on the land exists, then the recourse if damage occurs would be Trespass to Chattels, for destruction to private property, not Trespass to Land, as attempted in this case.

The ABA (American Bar Association) has called upon lawyers and non-lawyers alike to submit blogs from across the internet as exceptional examples of legal advice and content. With content about the law ranging widely across the internet, the ABA recognizes the value of those blogs that wish to educate the public about a wide range of issues as examples of how attorneys can help bring an understanding of public policy to the masses.

Through a form, located here, ABA members and/or the public can nominate the efforts of attorneys whose work helps explain the complexities that the law has to offer. While the competition prevents bloggers from nominating themselves, the ABA has requested that the work of their peers be showcased. Due by September 9th, blog suggestions can cover any topic of the law, whether maritime, personal injury, civil or criminal in nature. This possibility of diversity makes the Top 100 list all the more interesting because of the wide variety of content the selected are sure to cover.

If you know of a blog that wishes to discuss legal issues of interest to lawyers (and perhaps those outside of the field), click here to fill out the ABA’s form. Limited to 500 words, nominations should explain why the blog, obviously, deserves to be included in the list as well as its value as a whole. Nominated sites should avoid the regurgitation of content from other sites (copy and pasted quotes of news items, etc.), showing that the main focus of the content is original discussion of those issues of law that affect professionals as well as the public.

Recently we explored the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s discussion of the legal cause of a tragic natural gas explosion at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Another of Centerpoint’s assignments of error on appeal, the last that we’ll review from the case, was that the jury incorrectly apportioned fault; the jury assigned 50 percent of the fault to Centerpoint and 50 percent to Carl Jones, Sr. Centerpoint argued that Jones should have been assessed “at least ninety percent of the fault in causing the explosion and fire.” The review of fault allocation by an appellate court is based on the “manifestly erroneous” standard. That is, the court must allow the jury’s apportionment to stand unless it is clearly wrong.

The court began its review of Centerpoint’s argument by focusing on the trial testimony of several of its witnesses. All expressed that the company “clearly recognizes the inherently dangerous nature of its product and has developed numerous measures designed to prevent explosions and fires, such as occurred in this litigation.” One witness, the company’s former Operations Manager for the state of Louisiana, testified that the procedures for

disconnecting gas service are “based on the inherently dangerous nature of” natural gas and are designed to “protect people from their own ignorance.” He further expressed the view that Centerpoint has “an obligation to take every reasonable step to prevent its customers from tampering with its natural gas supply system.” The court equated the risk of “catastrophic consequences” created by Centerpoint’s conduct to Jones’s action in reconnecting the gas supply. Had either party “not breached the applicable duties imposed upon them,” reasoned the court, the accident would not have happened. Nevertheless, when comparing their relative conduct, the court concluded that “Centerpoint Energy’s fault far exceeds that of Mr. Jones.” It considered Centerpoint to be the “superior actor” in the incident who failed–even in light of the gas industry’s general awareness that “customers will attempt to steal gas”–to engage in a “rather simple task” that was designed to “prevent exactly the result which occurred.” Thus, the court could “not find that the jury was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in apportioning fault equally” between Centerpoint and Jones.

In our prior post, we observed the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s finding that the jury correctly held that Centerpoint Energy failed to meet its duty of properly securing the natural gas line and valve when it disconnected service at the Jones residence in Opelousas Parish. Establishing the duty owed by Centerpoint was one of several elements of the duty-risk analysis that Jones was required to establish in order to prevail. Another element that we will now consider is that of causation. Centerpoint argued that its failure to properly shut off and secure the gas supply was not the legal cause of the injuries sustained by the Jones family. Instead, in Centerpoint’s view, Jones’s “reconnection of the gas service constituted intervening conduct that was not only grossly negligent, intentional, and criminal, but also not foreseeable.” Under Louisiana law, an intervening act will relieve the original tortfeasor of liability if it

“superseded the original negligence and alone produced the injury.” Adams v. Rhodia, Inc. However, if the intervening act is foreseeable to the original tortfeasor, it is considered to be “within the scope of the original tortfeasor’s negligence.” In short, Centerpoint argued it could not possibly have foreseen Jones’s attempt to reconnect his gas line and, therefore, its failure to properly secure the line was irrelevant once Jones acted to steal the gas.

The court, however, found that Centerpoint’s position was “defeated” by the testimony of its own wtinesses. One employee, the company’s Operations Supervisor, explained that the security mechanisms were necessary because it was “common sense that people will try to steal natural gas after their supply has been cut off.” Another, Centerpoint’s former Operations Manager for Louisiana, stated that the locking mechanisms were required because “people do not always understand the dangers associated with natural gas.” Also, an expert in the field of natural gas operations testified that Centerpoint should have “no illusions” about the potential for people to steal natural gas. The court found that “Jones’s actions in leaving an uncapped gas line open in the house, breaking the plastic locking device and stealing natural gas, and negligently leaving the natural gas running into the house all night, are exactly the unsafe acts that Centerpoint Energy’s duty to properly terminate service is designed to prevent.” Thus, it concluded, the jury’s finding that Jones’s conduct was foreseeable was well supported, and it correctly determined that Centerpoint could not rely on Jones’s intervening criminal act to relieve it of all responsibility for the explosion.

On May 7, 2003, Centerpoint Energy disconnected the natural gas service at the house of Carl Jones, Sr. and his family because they were past due on an outstanding balance. A short time later, Jones and his son removed the gas stove from the kitchen and replaced it with an electric model. Unfortunately, Jones forgot to cap the gas line before installing the new stove. Late in the evening of June 15, 2004, after having been without a functioning water heater since the disconnection, Jones reconnected the gas line. He did so because he was expecting guests the following day and wished to have a supply of hot water that did not require stove-top heating. To make the reconnection, Jones used a wrench to snap off the red plastic locking device that the Centerpoint technician had installed on the line when he closed the valve. Unable to re-light his water heater, Jones assumed no gas was flowing and went to bed. By morning, the house was filled with gas, and as the family arose several large fireballs erupted. Jones, his wife, and their four children were severely injured in the explosion. Jones sued Centerpoint seeking to recover for his and his family’s injuries. A trial was held in July, 2010. After the judge denied Centerpoint’s motion for a directed verdict, a jury apportioned half of the fault to Centerpoint and half to Jones and awarded substantial sums to Jones’s family members for their injuries. Centerpoint appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting the case to go to the jury at all. In Centerpoint’s view, its duty to reasonably disconnect gas service for non-payment did not extend to protecting Jones against the explosion caused “by [his] subsequent negligent, intentional, criminal and then grossly negligent conduct.”

An appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict requires the appellate court’s de novo review because such a motion can be granted “only if the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that the court finds that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that “[t]o prevail in their personal injury suit, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing that Centerpoint Energy was at fault in causing the accident, using a duty-risk analysis.” Centerpoint argued that Jones failed to meet this burden, in part, because he could not establish that the utility did not conform to the appropriate standard of care when shutting off the gas supply. The court found two sources for the scope of duty imputed to Centerpoint. First, Louisiana case law takes the position that it is

“common knowledge … that natural gas, being highly flammable and explosive in nature, is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Those who handle and distribute it are charged with that degree of care commensurate with its dangerous character for the protection of the public from any foreseeable injury.” Giordano v. Rheem Manufacturing Co..

Plaintiffs have the right judicially, to assert a legal action against a defendant that consists of operative facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The issue for the court may become whether the plaintiff does in fact, have a cause of action. If the law does not support the facts alleged, the defendant may have the opportunity to file a peremptory exception of no cause of action. This exception questions the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint, does the plaintiff allege an injury, harm, or sustained damage that is able to be remedied under the law? Or, does the plaintiff’s complaint lack the vital element of legal support in order to become “whole again” under the law? These questions were explored recently by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana. The Court reviewed the trial court’s judgment finding that the plaintiff’s had no cause of action against the defendants as a result of an apparent absence of legal support. However, the appellate court found differently, explaining in detail the reasons for which they reversed the trial court’s decision and allowed the plaintiff’s case to move forward against the defendants.

The plaintiffs in this case experienced every parent’s worst nightmare, the death of their daughter. The question for the court was who should be ultimately responsible for the death considering the tragic circumstances. The facts include the victim and two class mates who allegedly bullied her severely, to the point the young girl transferred to a different high school in order to avoid the emotional distress. One day, while exiting the bus after school, the young girl was approached by the two former class mates she had tried so hard to avoid. A heated altercation ensued, in which the young girl was pushed in front of an oncoming school bus where she was quickly run over and died as a result of her injuries. The young girl’s mother brought the suit against the school board, State Farm Mutual Insurance, the superintendent of the school board, the principal of her daughter’s former high school, the bus driver that struck her daughter, the mothers of both of the involved former classmates, and three “on duty” teachers. The plaintiff argued that the defendants were negligent in numerous ways, including the failure to supervise, failure to timely respond to the fight and failure to adequately staff the bus are with teachers or school personnel. Further, the complaint alleged that the bus driver saw or should have seen the fight and failed to stop his vehicle, disregarding the safety of the children aboard the bus and the children in the school bus zone. However, the defendants asserted the plaintiff had no cause of action against the school board employees in their individual capacities under Louisiana Revised Statute 17:439 which reads,

“Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no person shall have a cause of action against any school employee based on any statement made or action taken by the school employee provided that the action or statement was within the course and scope of the school employees’ duties as defined by the school board in which the school employee is employed and was within the specific guidelines for school employee behavior as established by that school board.”

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