Articles Posted in Civil Matter

After a traffic stop in Shreveport, Louisiana, a man was arrested by two officers. The man had thrown liquid at the car behind him before he was pulled over. During the arrest, the two officers repeatedly grabbed and tasered the man. Eventually, they realized that the man’s elbow had been dislocated and called for medical assistance. Because of the injury, the man had to undergo multiple surgeries and was ultimately left with permanent disabilities in his left arm and hand. In light of this, the man claimed that the officers used excessive force during the arrest.

The injured man brought suit against the police officers as well as other defendants, and ultimately the trial court granted the motion of summary judgment filed by the defendants, ruling against the injured man. When appealing this decision, the injured man brought two main claims: 1) that the district court erred by granting the two police officers qualified immunity with regard to the excessive force claim; and 2) that the district court erred by dismissing the constitutional claim he brought against the head of the police department and the city for not implementing a proper policy for off-duty cops (one of the cops involved in the arrest was off-duty at the time).

With regard to the first claim, public officials (e.g. police officers) are allowed qualified immunity on summary judgment unless two requirements are met: 1) the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct actually violated a constitutional right; and 2) the actions of the officers were objectively unreasonably in light of the relevant law at the time. In this case the Fourth Amendment provides that excessive force during an arrest is impermissible. However, according to the Supreme Court, every arrest requires the right to use some force, especially if the suspect is a threat to the officers or is resisting arrest. So, did the police officers use force that was clearly excessive and clearly unreasonable?

When an accident occurs at someone’s place of work, the injured party can hold the employer responsible in certain circumstances, under the legal concept of vicarious liability. This doctrine provided relief for Kenneth and Pamela Porter in a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case arising out of Avondale, Louisiana.

In Porter v. Fulkerson, the accident occurred at the office of a Navy project that was staffed by personnel from a variety of entities, including subcontractor John J. McMullen Associates (“JJM”). The workspace, with an open air layout with low cubicles, was designed to foster camaraderie and ease of communication, creating a very social environment.

One day, JJM employee Philip Fulkerson was on his way into the office, heading to his desk, when he saw an acquaintance sitting with Navy employee Kenneth Porter in Porter’s cubicle. Fulkerson stopped by to chat, perching on the edge of Porter’s desk. At one point while Porter was speaking, Fulkerson went to pat Porter in what the court described as the style of Tony Soprano. But Fulkerson slipped off the desk, causing him to accidentally slap Porter hard in the face.

On January 25, 2010, while at work at The Oaks Nursing Home in West Monroe, Sheriff Royce Toney of Ouachita Parish wrongfully arrested Ms. Annette Brown for aggravated battery. Despite showing Dep. David Germany of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office (“OPSO”) her drivers license, which listed an address separate from the one on the arrest warrant, she was still taken into custody. Ms. Brown then had to gather $1,255 to pay a bail bondsmen.

Upon release, she brought hospital records showing where she was on the night of the alleged battery and her driver’s license. The charges were quickly dropped. Despite several requests for a return of her $1,255, city officials replied there was nothing they could do about it. Ms. Brown then filed suit demanding general damages for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

OPSO filed for, and was granted, summary judgment asserting that it was MPD that gave the wrong name to the issuing magistrate. OPSO argued that it acted pursuant to a facially valid warrant, while Ms. Brown argued that someone likely in the OPSO mistakenly grabbed her DMV record instead of the real culprit, Annette Bryant. While ruling in favor of OPSO, the court explained that a “suspicion of what might have happened” is not sufficient evidence to connect OPSO to the warrant. Upon appeal, the court used a duty-risk analysis to determine whether to impose liability under La. C.C. art. 2315 A, which holds “every act whatever of a man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

The appellate court differed with the trial court on the validity of a compromise when Louisiana company D.R.D. Towing was sued by a crew member on D.R.D.’s ship.

Mr. Randy Rudolph was a crew member of the M/V RUBY E, which was struck by another ship while he was on board. The collision threw him from his bunk, causing injuries to his back. Additionally, Mr. Rudolph lost his personal computer, cell phone, car keys and other items when the ship sank. He filed suit against D.R.D. Towing, the operator of the M/V RUBY E.

The issue for the court was whether Mr. Rudolph’s signing a release settling all claims for $3,000 a few days after the incident precluded him from collecting further money for his injuries. He argued that he understood the $3,000 was offered to compensate him for what he lost on the boat, but not to cover his future claims, including medical expenses and loss of earning potential associated with his injuries.

Two clocks fell from a wall display in the Lafayette Hobby Lobby and struck a customer in the head. Jo Anna Savant brought a negligence suit seeking compensation for her accident-related damages. The case went to trial and the jury found for the plaintiff. The trial judge, finding errors in the jury’s verdict, set it aside, and issued a judgment even more favorable to the plaintiff.

The case went up on appeal.

The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal addressed four legal issues in this case: the trial court (1) setting aside of the judgment; (2) not charging the jury to determine Ms. Savant’s fault in the accident; (3) approving the award to plaintiff for the cost of her second cervical fusion surgery; and (4) awarding the loss of consortium to plaintiff’s children.

In 2011, a Louisiana woman appealed a decision issued by the state’s highest court in a case she filed after suffered damages from the drug metoclopramine. Julie Demahy filed a lawsuit in 2008, alleging that she had suffered damages from the generic version of metoclopramide, which she took between 2002 and 2007. The state court had dismissed Ms. Demahy’s claims against Actavis, the manufacturer of the generic version of the drug, and against prescription drug makers Wyeth, Inc. and Schwarz Pharma, Inc. Schwarz had acquired the name-brand rights to the drug in 2001.

As of 1985, the FDA required that generic manufacturers of the drug metoclopramide include a warning with the medication about the risk of tardive dyskinesia, an often irreversible neurological disorder. In 2004, Schwarz voluntarily requested a change to the name-brand label, adding a warning that the drug should not be used for more than 12 weeks. It was not until 2009 that the FDA issued a black-box warning that informed consumers about the risk of tardive dyskinesia and that warned customers that the drug should not be used for longer than 12 weeks except in rare cases.

Under federal law, generic drug labels are required to be the same as name-brand labels. This means that state law cannot require generic manufacturers to include more information than that which would be available on the name-brand product of a prescription drug, as this would be contrary to the federal law. On these grounds, the state court had found that Actavis was not responsible under a failure-to-warn claim brought by Ms. Demahy. On appeal, Ms. Demahy claims that the state court’s mandate to change the district court ruling in favor of the defendant was improperly interpreted as calling for the dismissal of all claims against Actavis; Ms. Demahy argued that Actavis could still be found liable outside of the failure-to-warn claim.

Plaintiff Judith Henry seeks to recover damages resulting from an accidental fall in the defendants’ restaurant in Houma, Louisiana, on March 13, 2008. The accident occurred when Ms. Henry placed her order and got her soft drink at the counter and began to walk back across the carpeted floor to the table. At that time, she was using a cane and one of her friends was walking ahead of her carrying her soft drink. According to Ms. Henry’s deposition, she was stepping with her right foot when her toe got caught in the carpet. Her foot went backwards and she fell, landing on the foot and breaking her right ankle. Although the carpet was not frayed or worn, she stated it was uneven because it had little squares that formed its weave.

On February 17, 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Henry filed suit for the damages they had incurred as a result of her fall naming NOHSC and its insurer Colony as defendants. On April 1, NOHSC and Colony filed a motion for summary judgment supported by excerpts from Ms. Henry’s deposition, an affidavit from Paul McGoey, NsOHSC managing partner, and an affidavit from Donald Maginnis, a registered architect. Included in this evidence were attachments consisting of photographs of the restaurant interior, a hand-drawn diagram of the restaurant interior and excerpts from the 2006 Life Safety Code Handbook.

After hearing arguments and considering the evidence presented by the parties, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Henrys claims with prejudice The judgment was signed on June 30, 2010. The Henrys then appealed this judgment.

The district court dismissed the claims of Entergy, an electrical utility company, for indemnity from contractors involved with repairs to a building to which the utility company provided electrical service on the ground that the Louisiana Overhead

Power Line Safety Act (“OPLSA”) does not allow indemnification remedy. On appeal, having decided favorably for the plaintiff in the legal issue of whether OPLSA might require indemnity, the appellate court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the contractors.

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, a general contractor, Carl E. Woodward, LLC, (“Woodward”), entered into a contract with Eagle Enterprises of Jefferson, Inc., the owner of the Walgreens Shopping Center. Woodward subcontracted with Stewart Interior Contractors, LLC (“Stewart”) to install framing and exterior wall material at the shopping center. In turn, Stewart subcontracted with Landaverde Construction, LLC (“Landaverde”) to assist with providing labor. On January 5, 2006, Landaverde laborers, including plaintiff, Daniel Moreno, arrived at the shopping center work site. As Mr. Moreno was standing near the scaffold and evaluating how to best disassemble it, another worker at the top of the scaffold moved a piece of metal that came in contact with both the overhead power line and the scaffolding frame. A resulting arc of electricity flashed from the scaffolding to Mr. Moreno’s body, inflicting serious burns.

In general, owners are responsible for any damage caused by the things that they own. Animals are no exception. For example, if you own a cow and it wanders into the road and a car hits it, then you are likely responsible for the damages related to that accident. Damages caused by household animals, such as dogs, are similar. Louisiana Code art. 2317.1 provides that “the owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage.” While owner is a relatively simple concept, custodian may not be.

The classic example of a custodian is someone who is watching a household pet while you are away. It is likely that if your dog bites someone while a caretaker is walking him, both you and the caretaker may be liable for the damage caused by the bite. In a recent case arising from the Parish of Jefferson involving a dog bite, the court explained the caretaker concept in a little more depth.

In that case, a family was visiting their father in a hospice and their dog accompanied them. The dog bit another visitor when the visitor attempted to pet him. The bitten individual has a permanent scar and lost feeling in his finger. All of the parties admitted that it did seem odd that the dog bit because he had never bitten anyone before and was not acting aggressive. In fact, the dog was sitting in the owner’s lap at the time of the incident. The dog had no history of aggressiveness, and all of its shots were up to date.

It is well established that an appeal court gives deference to a trial court’s finding of fact (ruling) unless the court was clearly wrong or acted in extreme error. In other words, even if the appellate court is convinced that they would have decided upon the evidence differently, the trial court’s findings cannot be reversed if it was reasonable that it could rule in the manner it did. Moreover, if there are two permissible rulings that could be determined, the trial court’s choice between the two cannot be found manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

On March 29, 2009, plaintiff Franklin Scott (“Mr. Scott”) was driving his tractor/trailer rig carrying saltwater west on Keatchie-Marshall Road in Caddo Parish (“Caddo”) where he failed to observe and avoid a fallen tree blocking the road. Mr. Scott’s truck slid 350 feet after the collision and hit several other trees before stopping. Among other injuries resulting in the crash, Mr. Scott suffered a “serious injury” to his neck.

Mr. Scott filed a personal injury suit in District Court against Caddo, property owners Roger and Marilyn Connell (“property owners”) and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) for failure to maintain the road from potentially hazardous conditions. After weighing the oral testimony of several witnesses, the District Court found in favor of Caddo. Mr. Scott appealed.

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