Articles Posted in Civil Matter

Under Louisiana law, if the owner of a defective ‘thing’ knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect of the ‘thing,’ if the damage could have been prevented by exercising reasonable care, and if the owner failed to exercise such reasonable care, he is liable for the unintentional harm caused by his negligence. Negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances.

In a recent case, sheetrock from the kitchen ceiling of a rental house owned by John F. Luck in Shreveport, LA, struck two visitors, knocking them to the floor. The injured pair brought the suit alleging that the negligent home owner, Luck, should have been aware of the condition of the ceiling in the rental home. The victims argued that since Luck should have been aware of the decrepit ceiling, he could have fixed the ceiling, thereby preventing the injuries now sustained by the pair. The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the decision of the district court, holding Luck liable for the personal injuries through a negligence theory of vicarious liability known as respondeat superior.

Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine which holds the employer liable for the actions of his employees, when performed within the course of their employment. In this case, Luck’s maintenance supervisor, Rodney Fleckenstein, worked for Luck as a repairman for almost five years and eight months. Fleckenstein had gone into the rental home on three separate occasions prior to the collapsing sheetrock incident, to repair and replace various utilities within the home. Both the district court and court of appeals found that Luck should have known of the disrepair of the kitchen ceiling through Fleckenstein’s casual observation of the home when he went in to do his repairs.

When a legal issue goes to trial attorneys on both sides must abide by the rules of evidence. These rules pertain to how witnesses may be questioned and which evidence may be admitted. An error in any of these areas may lead to an objection which may be upheld by the judge. However, sometimes the judge allows evidence that the Court of Appeal finds inappropriate. When this happens, the entire case may have to start over again. This is the situation for one case arising out of an accident in Lafayette.

In Cawthorne v. Fogelman, an accident occurred when the defendant turned right out of a drive and into the road’s outer lane, but struck the plaintiff’s vehicle. The plaintiff suffered severe neck and back injuries as a result of the collision. This lawsuit was subsequently filed. According to court documents, the defendant checked the road before turning out of the drive, saw no oncoming cars in the lane he was turning into, and saw no vehicles in the inside lane with their blinker on. After hearing testimony from expert witnesses the jury found for the defendant.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, the plaintiff asserted the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s deposition to be admitted into evidence in place of the defendant’s live testimony. In other words, a written transcription of the defendant’s statements was made available to the jury, but the defendant was not physically present to be questioned by the plaintiff and to be seen and heard by the jury.

Unfortunately, medical malpractice happens all too often. Doctors misdiagnose conditions, prescribe wrong medications, and make surgical errors. Victims of this negligence can face serious injuries including permanent disability requiring long-term care. In the worst cases, the victim dies. While these harms are physically painful, they can also be emotionally trying, throwing a victim into a tailspin of depression. Making matters worse, financial consequences bear down on these victims in the form of costly medical bills. Fortunately, a medical malpractice lawsuit can help these victims obtain compensation for their damages, but only if filed in a timely matter. However, strict rules exist as to how quickly such a suit must be brought. A recent decision by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in Louisiana addressed this issue.

In Davidson v. Glenwood Resolution Authority, Inc., a metal piece of a retractor was accidentally left inside a patient after a 2006 abdominal surgery. However, at the time, neither the doctor nor the patient was aware of the foreign object being left inside the patient. Three months after the surgery, the patient began to feel something sharp in his abdomen that he knew should not have been there. A month after that, the patient had a CT scan after an auto accident which showed the presence of metal within the patient. The doctor who conducted the original surgery was contacted and he, in turn, contacted the patient, but the patient said he felt fine and he did not want to mess with whatever was problematic. It was not until two years later, in 2008, after an MRI was conducted that the patient actually discovered the presence of the metal object. Within a year of that test, in 2009, the patient filed a medical malpractice lawsuit.

In Louisiana, a medical malpractice lawsuit must be brought within one year of the alleged act or within one year from the date of discovery of the act, omission, or neglect. (La. R.S. 9:5628(A)) This means that once the victim obtains actual or constructive notice of the harmful act, the one year clock starts running. Constructive knowledge exists when facts indicate to a reasonable person that he is a victim of a tort. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Campo, constructive knowledge is whatever is enough to excite attention and puts the plaintiff on guard and calls for inquiry.

If you have ever been selected to serve as a juror, you know that the jury’s job in a trial is to hear the facts and arguments presented by both parties to a case and to make an informed judgment based on the evidence. In criminal cases, the jury is asked to assess the state or federal government’s case against the defendant and determine his guilt or innocence. In civil cases, the jury evaluates a dispute between two parties, and determines whether one party must compensate the other for damages caused.

Before a civil lawsuit reaches the trial stage, either party to the case may file a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is when the court dismisses the case and rules in favor of the moving party (the party making the motion), on the grounds that there were no triable issues of material fact presented. “No triable issues” means that all reasonable-minded persons would come to the same conclusion after weighing the evidence presented.

A verdict for summary judgment can be hard to overcome on an appeal, as the court will be reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the appeal. Additionally, Louisiana legislature expressly favors the summary judgment procedure, as it saves the time and cost of a jury trial. Nonetheless, there are certain types of cases that by their nature should not be settled by summary judgment. An example of such a case would be Bryan and Madison Manis’ wrongful death lawsuit, in which the Louisiana Fifth Circuit of Appeal overruled a verdict for summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The word prescription normally conjures up images of medicine and the slips of paper sometimes given to patients as they leave the doctor’s office. One thing people may be unaware of is that prescription carries an additional legal meaning in the state of Louisiana. In the legal field, prescription refers to the amount time within which a person may file a lawsuit. The beginning of this time period usually begins when the event associated with the claim occurred. In many states this limit is referred to as the ‘statute of limitations,’ but here in Louisiana that rule is called ‘prescription.’ One of the more confusing areas of prescription deals with whether or not the time limitation can be interrupted or extended.

La. C.C. art. 3462 sheds some light on this, and provides that “prescription is interrupted when . . . the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction.” This means that if someone brings a claim against a party, then the prescription period of any subsequent action against that same party is considered to have been interrupted. Further, La. C.C. art. 3463 provides that “[a]n interruption of prescription…continues as long as the (first) suit is pending.” This means that the interruption will continue until the prior suit is resolved. This seems clear enough, but another part of the Louisiana statute comes into play and places constraints on when an action is considered to have been interrupted. La. C.C. art. 3463 provides that “interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff abandons, voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter, or fails to prosecute the suit at the trial.”

Read altogether the Louisiana statutes seem to be saying that the filing of a lawsuit against a defendant will interrupt the prescription period of any subsequent actions against the same defendant, unless the first suit is voluntarily dismissed. If the first suit is voluntarily dismissed, then the second action’s prescription period will be considered to have never been interrupted, and will therefore prescribe within the normal allotted prescription period.

On February 21, 2009, Shreveport Fire Department Chief Tommy Adams fell from the top of a ladder while preparing a fire truck for service for the Gemini Mardi Gras parade. As a result, Tommy Adams sustained severe trauma to his spinal column and died ten months after the date of the incident. Chief Adams’ wife, Traci Lee Adams, filed suit on behalf of herself and her two minor children seeking compensation for her husband’s accident-related damages and contending that the City’s response to her husband’s injuries fell below the reasonable standard of care that should have been provided.

In response to Mrs. Adams’ petition, the City of Shreveport filed an exception of no cause of action and argued that the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy. The trial court granted the City’s exception, but allowed Mrs. Adams thirty days to amend her original petition. As a result Mrs. Adams submitted an amended petition stating that the City knew or should have known that Chief Adams’ injuries were substantially certain to occur as a result of the City’s actions. Ultimately, the City filed a motion for summary judgment and the trial court judge granted the City’s motion finding that neither the pleadings, depositions, nor briefs supported an exception to the exclusive remedies provided by the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Act.

The case went up on appeal.

Put simply, summary judgment is a decision rendered by a court for one party and against another without the litigation of a full trial. According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, summary judgment is appropriate when all relevant facts are brought before the court, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the sole remaining issue relates to the legal conclusion to be drawn from the facts. As you can probably understand, arguing for or against a party’s motion for summary judgment is not only a complex process, but also one that carries much risk.

On September 2, 2008, Daniel Milbert fell off of a roof and broke his ankle. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Milbert received surgery to repair his ankle at the Lafayette General Medical Center and was placed on a pain pump. After speaking to one of his doctors about an increase in pain following his discharge from the hospital, Mr. Milbert was instructed to call if the pain worsened. After attempting to contact doctors at the medical center, Mr. Milbert and his wife were required to leave messages with Dexcomm, an answering service in Lafayette. After Mr. Milbert was diagnosed with compartment syndrome and had to undergo surgery, he and his wife filed suit against Dexcomm on December 23, 2009. Accordingly, Dexcomm filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the right of recovery had expired. At trial, the court agreed with Dexcomm and granted the motion for summary judgment.

Mr. Milbert and his wife appealed.

In May 2004, an employee (Dauzat) of the City of Marksville backed an emergency fire department vehicle into another car containing Daisy Marcile and multiple passengers. Ms. Marcile and her passengers were injured and filed suit against the City of Marksville for damages.

Per La. R.S. 13:5105, a political subdivision of Louisiana cannot be tried by a jury unless it waives this prohibition and either the plaintiff or political subdivision requests a jury trial in the time provided by law. According to Arshad v. City of Kenner, any waiver must be a blanket waiver covering all cases, not a specific suit.

This statute has come under fire before. In Beauclaire v. Greenhouse, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that the waiver provision (section D) of La. R.S. 13:5105 met the standards of the equal protection clause of the constitution, “as the statute allowed either party to demand a jury trial in accordance with the law once the political subdivision waives the the prohibition” and denied either party from seeking a jury trial when the prohibition had not been waived.

On July 12, 2006, Raymond Alex, Sr., a structure carpenter for the BNSF Railway was driving a company boom to a work site in Mermentau. Around 3 p.m., Mr. Alex stopped at an intersection, was rear-ended by a large tractor-trailer rig driven by Edward Zenon, Jr. As a result of the accident, Mr. Alex alleged he suffered injuries to his neck with radiating pain down his right arm and hand. He was given injections in his neck at first, but ultimately required cervical spine surgery.

In July 2007, Mr. Alex sued Mr. Zenon, the lessor of the tractor/trailer, PACCAR Leasing Company, and his employer, Creole Fermentation. After some initial discovery, Mr. Alex settled with the defendants.

Two years after his previous suit, Mr. Alex decided to sue his employer, BNSF, under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). In his petition, Mr. Alex alleged that BNSF was negligent for failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work, failing to warn him of dangerous conditions and providing a poorly designed truck for him to work in.

On August 14, 2008, James Turner was admitted to Willis Knighton Medical Center, located in Shreveport, Louisiana, for a kidney transplant. James Turner passed away six days later on August 20, 2008. James Turner’s wife then brought a medical malpractice lawsuit against the medical center and several doctors, alleging their negligence caused the death of her husband.

Section 40:1299.41-49 of the Louisiana Revised Statute set forth the requirements that Mrs. Turner must follow to successfully bring her medical malpractice suit before a Louisiana court. In Louisiana a medical malpractice complaint must be filed within one year from the day the alleged act of negligence occurred, or one year from the day the negligent act was discovered. Mrs. Turner did this, filing her medical malpractice claim exactly one year after her husband’s death.

However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court states in Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center, no lawsuit against certain health care providers may be commenced in any court before the claimant’s complaint has been presented to a medical review panel. The medical review panel is made up of an attorney chairman and three healthcare providers and acts as a source of inquiry for the parties, collects evidence, and comes to a decision regarding the merits of the claim. Mrs. Turner timely requested a medical review panel by filing her original complaint with the Commissioner of Administration.

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