Articles Posted in Civil Matter

car-accident-1446905Being involved in an automobile accident or sustaining a serious injury can be very overwhelming.  This is especially true if the accident was someone else’s fault.  Although one may be disoriented after an automobile accident, it is pertinent that he/she follows all the necessary steps to ensure that the accident or injury is well documented.  One’s first instinct may be to try to minimize the gravity of the situation; however, it is important to understand that a personal injury may have been sustained even if the symptoms are not immediately visible.  One never knows if they will have a problem down the road from an injury sustained from the automobile accident, and therefore, a great attorney knows that their client will need proof and documentation to prove that the problem stems directly from the said automobile accident.  

Part of that documentation includes what will be considered “relevant evidence” and how to avoid using expert witnesses who may become impeached at trial.  The following case out of Monroe Louisiana discusses the standards courts use as the gatekeepers of allowable information that can be used at trial. On July 20, 2010, Michael W. Pratt (“Mr. Pratt”) was hit from behind by Brett O. Culpepper (“Mr. Culpepper”) while stopped at a red light on Desiard Street in Monroe.  Immediately following the accident, it is alleged that Mr. Pratt stated to the investigating officer that he was uninjured and did not require medical attention.  However, sometime after the accident Mr. Pratt begin to see a chiropractor for the various injuries he alleged were caused by the accident.

In July 2011, Mr. Pratt filed a lawsuit against Mr. Culpepper and his insurer for a variety of damages (i.e., past and future pain and suffering, medical expenses, loss of earnings, disability, etc.) associated with the alleged substantial injuries he sustained to his back, head, and neck in the aforementioned accident.  It was disputed amongst the parties as to (1) whether the force of the collision was significant enough to cause the alleged injuries and (2) whether or not the alleged injuries were from this particular automobile accident.  In 2014 the lawsuit was tried before a jury.  At the conclusion of the trial the jury found that Mr. Pratt failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident caused him to suffer physical injuries.  The plaintiff then appealed the juries verdict.  Mr. Pratt argued before the appeals court that that the trial court’s allowance of the  records into evidence of his chiropractor’s suspension by the Louisiana State Board of Chiropratic Examiners was an error that should cause the jury’s verdict to be overturned.

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A trial is supposed to finalize your case, it should be the beginning of the end of the litigation process. However, after a judgment is rendered the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure allows for a Motion for a New Trial which can allow for a second bite at the apple. For the most part those motions are denied and thus begins the appellate process. So what happens if after the conclusion of the first trial newly found witnesses show up? Will the Court allow a second trial and can those witnesses testify at that second proceeding? A recent case arising out of Abbeville Louisiana considers those questions and gives some guidance as to what is allowed under Louisiana trial procedures.

The original lawsuit arose from a boundary dispute between Bernard M. Boudreaux and family against Paul Cummings, all landowners of adjacent tracts of land in Vermilion Parish. In a possessory action and petition for injunctive relief and damages, the Boudreauxs alleged that they had peacefully possessed their property uninterrupted for over 60 years. However, the Boudreauxs claimed that possession was disturbed when Mr. Cummings drove large pipes into their property. There was some dispute also over whether the Boudreauxs had acquired property beyond the established section line boundary, per their alleged thirty-year acquisitive prescription.

At an original hearing, the trial court granted the Boudreauxs a preliminary injunction and established one particular survey as setting the boundaries of the Boudreaux’s property. Mr. Cummings then converted the matter into a petitory action, and after a trial on the merits, the trial court held instead that the Boudreauxs had not properly established the boundary line they sought possession of, and the trial court then set the boundary along the original title boundary. The Boudreauxs then filed a motion for a new trial. The Boudreauxs sought the new trial to permit them to enter two new witnesses, who the Boudreauxs alleged could not have been obtained by due diligence during the original trial. The new trial motion was granted, and after the second trial the trial court arrived at the ultimate decision to find in favor of the Boudreaux’s interpretation of the boundary line.

old-house-1224719-1024x811Under Louisiana civil procedure, it is well settled that “proper citation is the cornerstone of all actions.” If a party to an action is not served with process in the manner required by law, the result of that action is considered null and void. This requirement is intended to ensure that the defendant in a lawsuit is fully informed of the existence and subject of the plaintiff’s complaint. The concept of proper service is so essential, in fact, that even a defendant’s actual knowledge of a legal action cannot correct a defective citation and service of process. Therefore, a key skill of the attorney that you hire to represent you is a thorough understanding of the various and sometimes complex rules that control how process must be served on the defendant(s) in your lawsuit.

An attorney’s command of the requirements of process service is especially crucial in disputes over a deceased person’s property. The following case of Martin v. Martin  in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal is instructive. In that case, two of the adult children of John Martin, Sr. objected to his donation of his home in West Monroe to his third child, John Martin, Jr. By the time the lawsuit was filed, however, both John Sr. and John Jr. had passed away, leaving the title to the home in the name of John Jr.’s widow, Sharon Martin. The Martin siblings filed their action against Sharon personally and against the “unopened succession of John Alexander Martin, Jr.” for which no succession representative (also known as an executor) had yet been identified. Nevertheless, Sharon Martin answered “individually and as testimony [sic] legatee,” despite never being identified as the succession representative of her late husband’s estate. From there, the trial court considered the Martin siblings’ objections to John Sr.’s gift, including that John Sr. was not of sound mind and lacked the capacity to make the gift, and that the gift should be declared invalid because it left John Sr. without means of support. Ultimately, the trial court found in favor of the siblings.

On appeal, however, the Second Circuit focused its attention on a more fundamental question: whether Sharon Martin had standing to represent the unopened succession of her late husband. Under state law, one cannot bring an action against an unopened succession for which no representative has been appointed. See Minden Bank & Trust Co. v. Childs, 658 So. 2d 216 – La: Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1995. Accordingly, the court reviewed the formal requirements in Louisiana for appointing a succession representative — including furnishing a security and taking the oath of office — after which the clerk issues the representative letters of administration. And, although the law provides a specific procedure for filing a suit against a deceased person for whom no succession representative has been appointed, ( see La. C.C.P. art. 5091) the Martin siblings did not make use of it. Therefore, the court concluded, there was “no showing that Sharon was ever appointed as the succession representative,” as there was “no proof in this record that she had been recognized by any court of this state as the succession representative.”

old-truck-1451289-1024x768Buying a car is a huge endeavor for most people. Most of the time we do our due diligence and make sure we have a fair understanding of what we are purchasing. However, only so much information is under of our control. When buying a used car, we are often forced to go off of what the seller tells us about the vehicle. This can be nerve racking for many. It’s safe to say that the nerves tend to lessen when we are buying a used car from a certified pre-owned dealership, and the car is under warranty. Unfortunately, for two Louisiana men, a truck under warranty purchased from a reputable dealership caused more problems than were conceivable.

In March of 2005, Barnaby Martinez bought a 2004 Ford F-250 truck. In 2008, he began to experience problems with the engine. The problems were so severe that Mr. Martinez alleged that at times have to use both his feet on the break in order to prevent hitting other vehicles. Mr. Martinez asked his brother-in-law David Leija, a mechanic, to take the truck to the Ford Dealer. In July of 2008, Mr. Leija took the truck to Hixson Autoplex of Monroe.

Hixon replaced the EGR valve and injector on the truck and informed Mr. Leija that the problem was fixed. However, 5000 miles later, the same problem came about. Mr. Martinez continued to bring the truck to Hixon several times. He was told that the warranty would take care of the repairs. Hixon kept the truck days, weeks, and even a month at a time. After getting fed up with the truck and its issues, Mr. Martinez sold the truck to Mr. Leija, who was fully aware of the truck’s problems. In 2012, Hixon informed Mr. Leija that they could not fix the problem, and that because the truck was out of warranty, the cost of repairs was $3000. Mr. Leija never took the truck back to Hixon.

A few months after being in a car wreck, the unthinkable happens, and as a result of the accident, your loved one passes away. As you are mourning the loss, you also have to start thinking about your legal options that stem from the crash and the possible avenues you have as a “survivor” of your loved one in order to receive some damages from the liable person. While this seems somewhat callous to talk about, especially in light of the pain you are already in from losing someone close to you, it is necessary to begin thinking about this somewhat quickly if you are going to actually be able to bring a survival action.

First, though, what exactly is a survival action? In simple terms, a survival action is an action for damages (an award of money) for injuries incurred by the deceased right before dying. You can think of a survival action as a lawsuit for injuries incurred that the actual deceased would have been able to bring had he or she not passed away. Since the decedent is not able to bring the suit himself or herself, the decedent’s estate has to bring the suit. This is typically a child or other close relative. (States will specify exactly which family members are allowed to bring a survival action in that state.)

Along with deeming who can bring a survival action, states also specify during what timeframe individuals are allowed to bring such a lawsuit. This is not because the state or the courts do not want individuals to be able to recover, but rather because a timeframe has to be set so that the liable individual does not have an indefinite period of time during which to worry about the possibility of a lawsuit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judge’s dismissal of the People’s Republic of China and a Chinese company, Xiamen, from litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The appeals court agreed with the trial court that the federal judiciary lacked personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction over the Chinese company and the PRC, respectively. The result was that the district court could not enforce an arbitral award under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the New York Convention.

The underlying issue is a contract dispute between Covington Marine Corporation and Xiamen Shipbuilding. Pursuant to their contract’s arbitration clause, the dispute went to arbitration under the rules of the London Maritime Arbitration Association. The tribunal found neither side liable, but issued a separate award requiring Covington to pay 40% of the costs and Xiamen 60%. Xiamen then filed a petition in a Chinese court to have the liability award recognized and enforced. Covington did the same with the costs award.

Meanwhile, Covington appealed to the English High Court. The High Court found Xiamen liable, ordered Xiamen to pay 100% of the costs to Covington, and sent back the case to the tribunal for modification of the award. The arbitral tribunal changed their ruling and Covington petitioned the Chinese court to recognize the new awards.

A case arising out of a St. Martin Parish accident has shed light on the responsibility placed on drivers following behind another vehicle. According to Journet v. Mouton out of the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, a driver following another vehicle must exercise great care. The case arose out of an accident where a man and his family swerved to miss a slowing sheriff’s deputy, crossed the center line, and slammed into a ditch on the other side of the road. The driver of the vehicle was severely injured and was left quadriplegic.

Reports indicate the deputy was responding to an emergency call but had missed the driveway and was slowing to turn around in another drive. The driver of the following vehicle, who was driving without a license, knew the officer knew him and knew he did not have a license. Therefore, the following driver deliberately chose not to pass the deputy and claimed there were no brake lights and no turn signal used by the deputy. However, the plaintiff’s wife contradicted this testimony, stating that she did see brake lights and a turn signal. The defendants filed for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

To reach its decision, the court looked to relevant Louisiana statutes. Most pertinent amongst these is La.R.S. 32:81(A), which states a driver shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and shall have regard for the speed of the other vehicle. The court also looked to a Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation of the matter, which held that it is the duty of the following driver to exercise a great deal of care and to keep a safe distance behind the lead car.

A recent case arising from occurrences in West Carroll Hospital considers the Louisiana and federal antidumping laws. In addition, it also explains the requirements for a case under medical malpractice. Several hospitals were involved in the case, but only two were actually involved in the suit. A woman who had serious kidney and urinary problems was admitted to West Carroll Hospital; however, once the hospital realized that they did not have the specialized equipment to treat her, they desperately tried to find somewhere to transfer her that did have the ability to help her. After several days of miscommunications, the woman died because they could not transfer her fast enough to address her medical issues. Her six daughters then attempted to find some kind of remedy against the hospitals for the wrongful death of their mother.

In Louisiana, La. R.S. 40:2113.4-2113.6, the “antidumping law,” requires hospitals to take patients who need emergency services and live in the territorial area regardless of whether they are able to pay for their care or if they have insurance. Federal law has the same type of requirement under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act even specifies that hospitals cannot turn away patients who have Medicare or Medicaid, and hospitals cannot discriminate based on race, religion, economic status, or national ancestry.

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act further defines “emergency” as a “physical condition which the person in imminent danger of death or permanent disability.” The definition of “emergency services,” then, is “those services which are available in the emergency room and surgical units in order to sustain the person’s life and prevent disablement until the person is in a condition to travel.” Louisiana law requires that the patient be stabilized before they are moved to another facility. However, the Louisiana antidumping law does not permit a private cause of action. That is, an individual cannot sue the hospital for a violation of this law. Even if they could, however, the first hospital, West Carroll, admitted her without incident, so there would be no claim under the antidumping law.

Doctors at the Women and Children’s Hospital in Lake Charles, Louisiana, botched Beverly Lebouef’s surgery in 2003. Eventually Lebouef sought legal advice and brought action against her surgeon. Much later in the pre-trial phase, arguably over a year later, she added a new doctor to his lawsuit who had helped perform one of the surgeries. The question is not about prescribed medication, but “prescription periods” and the accompanying rules.

In Louisiana, no action for damages for injury against any physician or hospital shall be brought unless filed within one year from the fate of the alleged act or negligence or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act or negligence. This period is considered a prescriptive period. Prescription begins when a plaintiff becomes aware of facts that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she suffered injury that could be remedied by law. Prescription starts even if the plaintiff does not have actual knowledge, but constructive knowledge, which is the minimum amount of notice required to make the injured plaintiff aware and allow for the injured plaintiff to inquire further. If the notice is enough to make reasonable victim aware, then prescription has begun.

A plaintiff’s apprehension that something is wrong does not start prescription except when the plaintiff knew or should have known through reasonable diligence that the plaintiff’s issues may have resulted from medical malpractice. The crucial issue is the plaintiff’s reasonableness in taking action or not acting, which considers the plaintiff’s education, intelligence, symptom severity and the defendant’s conduct.

Going to the hospital can be an unsettling experience. There are many ways treatment can go wrong and result in serious injury or death. Medical conditions can be misdiagnosed or wrongly diagnosed, wrong prescriptions or doses can be prescribed, and surgical errors can occur. When these mistakes happen and a medical malpractice lawsuit is filed against a doctor and hospital, the trier of fact must determine three elements in order to decide whether or not medical malpractice occurred, which often requires a careful examination of a doctor’s standard of care.

In a recent case heard by the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, Crockham v. Thompson, a woman filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against her mother’s doctor and hospital after her mother died from a brain hemorrhage induced by high blood pressure. According to the lawsuit, the mother had been paraplegic for 20 years and often suffered from bowel blockages. In this instance, the woman went to the hospital to have a blockage removed, but failed to get better after the operation was completed. The plaintiff took her mother back to the hospital where she was given oral medication for her high blood pressure, but she later suffered the stroke and her family chose to take her off life support.

In her wrongful death claim against the doctor, the plaintiff in this case claimed the doctor breached his duty of care to the deceased. The plaintiff claimed the blood pressure medication should have been given intravenously rather than by pill because the pill would have bypassed her mother’s non-functioning bowel. Also, the plaintiff suggested the standard of care had been breached because the doctor failed to make his daily round in the morning, failed to admit the patient to the ICU, and failed to develop a cardiovascular profile for the patient. The plaintiff supported her argument with the fact that the hospital’s medical board had found the doctor breached the standard of care. However, at trial, a jury found for the doctor and denied the plaintiff compensation. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

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