Articles Posted in Civil Matter

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truck-on-hwy-1615510-1-1024x682Renting a U-Haul truck can be a necessary burden when you are tasked with moving a lot of stuff from place to place. During the rental process you might be asked whether or not you want supplemental insurance policies.  But who do you sue when an accident happens?  In the following case out of New Orleans, Louisiana one plaintiff finds out who definitely cannot be sued when a U-Haul and Fedex truck collide.

JR was driving a rented commercial truck (U-Haul), when his truck crashed into a delivery truck (Fedex)  in New Orleans. JR filed a lawsuit against the delivery truck and also named the insurer of the company he rented the truck from as a Defendant as well. JR named the company from whom he rented a truck as a Defendant because he claimed to have purchased “risk protection” from that company in the course of his rental agreement with the company.  JR believed that the risk protection insurance would provide him with uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiffs went on to add RW Insurance Company as another defendant, apparently believing that RW was the commercial company’s insurer.

However, RW insurance apparently is only a claims administrator for the commercial company and not an insurance company.  Upon receipt of the lawsuit RW wanted out as soon as possible.  To do so they filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ).  If RW could prove that there was no genuine issue as to the material fact that they were not an insurer for the commercial company and thus owed no coverage to JR they could be dismissed from the case.  See Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966.  They did just that and the trial court granted their motion.

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law-series-3-1467437-1024x769When attempting to bring a lawsuit in court, timing is everything. If a potential claim is brought too late your day in court may never come. However, Louisiana courts of law are generous in extending the deadline to file a lawsuit in instances of fraud.  In the following case out of Jefferson Parish Louisiana, a Plaintiff learned that the deadline to file a legal malpractice lawsuit can be relaxed when fraud is employed to hide negligent representation.

Ms. Michelle Myer-Bennett was primarily a divorce attorney, but represented clients in related matters: division of property, custody, and other family law matters. Ms. Myer- Bennett was hired by Tracy Lomont to represent her in her divorce. Ms. Lomont wished to receive her home in Jefferson Parish as a result of the divorce. Ms. Myer- Bennett followed standard protocol to draft this documentation, but failed to record this information in the mortgage or property records.

Sometime later in 2010, Ms. Lomont attempted to refinance her house, but was denied. After reviewing her application, Ms. Lomont discovered that her application was denied due to a lien on her property. Ms. Lomont found out that her attorney had not completed the proper paperwork. According to Ms. Lomont, she contacted her former attorney, Ms. Myer-Bennett who made no mention of her mistake in filing. In contrast, according to Ms. Myer-Bennett, she confessed her malpractice to her client and informed her of all possible proceedings including suing her for malpractice.

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dna-fingerprint-4-1163506-1024x724Imagine growing up with a genetic disorder and having to struggle with the difficulties that these disorders bring to people and their loved ones. Nobody chooses to have a genetic disorder, and if severe enough the disorder can cause major setbacks in a person’s life. Even with protections in place like genetic non-discrimination laws, many people throughout the country are denied health care coverage by their insurance providers because they have genetic disorders. Insurance companies do not want to provide coverage to these people because they are more of a “risk.” This can be very frustrating for the individual, especially because health care is so expensive today.

In New Orleans, Louisiana, Jane Doe (“Ms. Doe”) grew up as a dependent on her father’s Blue Cross insurance policy. At the age of eight, Ms. Doe went to her doctor and her doctor noticed that she had some of the physical characteristics of Marfan syndrome. Marfan syndrome is a genetic disorder of the connective tissue. It can have drastic affects on multiple systems in the body including the skeletal, cardiovascular, nervous, and respiratory systems. The doctor submitted claims to Blue Cross with the International Statistical Classification of Disease (“ICD”)-9 code of 759.82 (diagnostic code for Marfan syndrome), and from 1993 to the late 90s different doctors who treated Ms. Doe submitted claims to Blue Cross with the same diagnostic code. Blue Cross stated that the only information they received from the various physicians was the ICD-9 code 759.82. Blue Cross did not receive any other medical information surrounding Ms. Doe’s claims, so it was difficult for them to determine how exactly the physicians came to their medical conclusions. In November 1994 Ms. Doe was tested for Marfan syndrome, but the results were inconclusive. Ms. Doe was never diagnosed with Marfan syndrome, and she was only monitored for the disease because of the symptoms she already displayed.

Around the age of 23, Ms. Doe left her father’s insurance plan and applied for her own coverage with Blue Cross. Ms. Doe was required to take a medical questionnaire as a part of her application, and the questionnaire did not have any questions relating to genetic information. When Blue Cross reviewed Ms. Doe’s application the underwriting department reviewed her prior claims while insured under her father’s policy. Because there were multiple Marfan syndrome claims, Blue Cross denied Ms. Doe her health coverage.

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erasure-1237046-1024x768Courts are not perfect, and sometimes they do not always render the correct decision. When a court makes an error in their judgment it can be very frustrating for all of the parties involved. Error can be very costly especially when a major issue, like finding coverage for a victim of an automobile accident under an umbrella insurance policy, needs to be determined. Both the plaintiff and defendant wants the court to look in their favor, but it is also the responsibility of the court to make an error free and accurate decision that is fair and just to both sides.

One such case where the trial court made an error in rendering a final judgment comes from St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. On May 26, 2010, Gary Michael Brown (“Mr. Brown”) was driving a truck that was owned by his employer J&J Diving Corporation. While driving, Mr. Brown got into an accident with St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Deputy, Scott Jarred (“Mr. Jarred”). Mr. Jarred filed a lawsuit against Mr. Brown, J&J Diving Corporation, and Progressive Insurance Company. On May 22, 2012, Mr. Jarred amended his original complaint and added two more defendants. These defendants were XL Specialty Insurance Company and Valiant Insurance Company, and they provided a Marine Excess Liability Policy, or Bumbershoot policy, for J&J Diving Corporation. Two days later, Mr. Jarred entered into a Gasquet release. A Gasquet release is where the plaintiff settles all claims with the primary insurance provider for a smaller amount than policy limits, but does not settle with the umbrella policy insurer. Gasquet v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So.2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 921 (La. 1981). Mr. Jarred settled all of the claims against J&J Diving Corporation, Mr. Brown, and Progressive; but he reserved his claims against both XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance.

XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2013. Their main argument surrounding the motion, was that the Bumbershoot policy only provided coverage to J&J Diving Corporation for their commercial diving contractor operations. The accident between Mr. Jarred and Mr. Brown was not related to those commercial diving contractor operations. Because there was no relation, the Bumbershoot policy should not provide any coverage for Mr. Jarred’s accident. Mr. Jarred filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2014 and requested that the trial court should find coverage for him under the Bumbershoot policy provided by XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance. Mr. Jarred’s main argument was that because the policy contained the word “contractor,” the Bumbershoot policy therefore expanded the coverage and should be provided to him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jarred on June 5, 2014 and certified that their decision was a final judgment because there was no just reason for delay.

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old-truck-lublin-1449942-1024x658Has your business sought to avoid litigation over its insured business activities by negotiating an out of court settlement? Louisiana business Meyers Warehouse, Inc. (“Meyers) pursued this route assuming its insurer, Canal Indemnity Company (“Canal”), would join Meyers in settlement negotiations. However, to its surprise, Canal refused to participate in Meyers’s defense. Unfortunately for Meyers, it misinterpreted key terms within its insurance policy specifying when Canal’s duty to defend it against claims and lawsuits arises.

Meyers is the owner and operator of several trucks, trailers, and trucking operations in Louisiana. Like many businesses, it purchased insurance coverage to protect against liabilities stemming from core business activities. In November 2011, Meyers received notification that one of its shipments contained contaminated liquid sugar. The contamination caused significant damage to the client’s production line.

Meyers and the client reached a settlement agreement in lieu of pursuing litigation. The agreement transferred the liability for damages to the third party contractor responsible for cleaning Meyers’s tankers. Canal was not involved in the negotiation process. Meyers filed its lawsuit against Canal because Canal refused to participate in Meyers’s defense during the settlement negotiations arising out of the November 2011 notification. The primary dispute between the parties was whether or not Canal had a duty to defend Meyers during the settlement negotiations even though no lawsuit against Meyers was ever filed.

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blacksmith-1500444-1024x768Accidents occur in daily life. Often, severe injuries result. However, prison accidents rarely are discussed. Prisoners who are victims of  accidents while serving time  are often provided with the same legal protections as an average person.

Mr. Fisher was serving time in Louisiana. During his time incarnated, Mr. Fisher worked within the prison where he was in charge of keeping the gas furnace running. On the day in question, Mr. Fisher followed the same procedure as he did daily for lighting the gas furnace. Unfortunately, upon lighting the furnace, an explosion occurred which caused Mr. Fisher’s severe injuries.

In his first trial, the Court concluded that Mr. Fisher did not meet the requirements to bring a lawsuit against prison officials for his injuries. In order to recover for this injury—much like an average person—Mr. Fisher was required to prove both of the following: vice or defect and actual or constructive notice. See La.R.S. 9:2800, La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967. The trial court held that Mr. Fisher did not meet his the standard for both elements. Therefore, the Court concluded summary judgment for the prison officials was appropriate. This decision dictated that Mr. Fisher could not recover for his injuries.

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truck-1422454-1-1024x683What happens if the trial court makes a mistake? The case can work its way through the court of appeals and even the state supreme court just to be sent back to trial court to begin again. This case involves a lawsuit filed in Louisiana court by a transportation company (“Star”) against another corporation (“Pilot”). Star is a national trucking company and Pilot owns a collection of truck stops that supply fuel to Star.

In 2014, the trial court decided to deny Pilot’s motion to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens, to grant Star’s motion in limine to exclude a certain promissory note from evidence, and to deny Pilot’s exception of prematurity and motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. Forum non conveniens is a power the court can decide to use to dismiss a case where another court would be better suited to hear the case. A motion in limine is a motion filed by a party to a lawsuit which asks the court for an order or ruling limiting or prevent certain evidence from being presented in the case. Pilot appealed these decisions as well as applying for a supervisory writ challenging the rulings. A writ of supervisory control is issued to correct an erroneous ruling made by a lower court either when there is no appeal or when an appeal cannot provide adequate relief and the ruling will result in gross injustice.

In 2015 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal denied Pilot’s writ application and Pilot sought a review of this decision in the Louisiana Supreme Court. The appeal was continued pending the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The issue was then sent back to the court of appeals for an opinion.

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Is  arbitration the best choice even if you don’t think you chose it? In this case out of Orleans Parish the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided on an appeal for a declaratory judgment action seeking a decision that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate in their contract. A declaratory judgment is a decision by the court resolving a matter that was uncertain for the parties. Delta Administrative Services (“DAS”) brought this action against Limousine Livery, Ltd. (“LLI)”) and they are seeking not only a declaratory judgment saying that they did not agree to arbitration but an injunction against LLI to prevent them from moving forward with the arbitration it had already begun. An injunction is an order by the court telling a party to stop or to keep from beginning an action that could be harmful to another party.

In 2010, DAS and LLI entered into a contract for DAS to provide payroll and human resources services to LLI. The contract was a basic contract that was being used by DAS in its business at the time it made the agreement with LLI. The owner and manager of DAS customized the contract to fit the agreement before sending it to LLI. Neither DAS or LLI discussed that dispute resolution clause in the contract. The dispute resolution clause in this contract required choosing between and “either/or” provision and neither party made any indication that a choice was made. Both parties had representatives sign the agreement making both provisions of the alternative dispute clause an effective part of the contract.

When the contractual relationship between DAS and LLI ended, both parties invoked the contract. LLI attempted to follow the provision of the alternative dispute clause by going to mediation before resorting to arbitration. Mediation involves both parties meeting with a neutral third-party in hopes of settling the matter. Arbitration is an out of court dispute resolution where the parties agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. DAS was aware and did not object to LLI’s attempt to set up mediation. LLI and DAS had two unsuccessful mediations, both of which DAS participated in without objection. LLI then filed for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). At this point, DAS objected, stating that it had never agreed to arbitrate. AAA decided that the dispute met the requirements for them to move forward with the arbitration. DAS then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a preliminary and permanent injunction. The basis for this petition is that DAS believed the “either/or” provisions that had been made a part of the contract were in conflict with each other and that because no choice was made there was never an agreement to arbitrate. The parties agreed to wait on the arbitration until the court could come to a determination. The District Court of Orleans Parish decided that DAS showed consent to arbitrate by signature and by participating in the mediation as a step of the arbitration agreement.

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openly-sky-1227535-1-1024x768In  Louisiana, the objection of prescription extinguishes a legal right of recovery when a party fails to exercise it over a given period of time. It is essentially a time limit on a claim, which can be raised in a couple of ways. Typically, it is raised by a peremptory exception, but it can also be raised by way of a prescriptive motion for summary judgment. One defense to the objection of prescription is the doctrine of contra non valentem. This doctrine is used to “soften the occasional harshness of prescriptive statutes.” Carter v. Haygood, 892 So.2d 1261, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 2005). A 2015 case from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal discusses the operation of contra non valentem when pleaded in opposition to a peremptory exception or prescriptive motion for summary judgment.

The dispute in this case arose out of a construction project in which Plaquemines Parish sought to rebuild a parish-oriented drainage pumping station damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Shortly before the project’s completion, M.R. Pittman Group, L.L.C. filed a lawsuit against Plaquemines Parish and several of the parish’s engineering firms. Plaquemines Parish answered, bringing a reconventional demand (or counterclaim as it is known in other states) against Pittman, alleging a tort-based property claim for damages to the pumping station’s wing wall, and a third-party direct action claim against Pittman’s insurer, Gray Insurance Company. Both Pittman and Gray sought to have Plaquemines Parish’s tort claim dismissed on the basis of prescription. Gray filed a peremptory exception of prescription while Pittman filed a motion for summary judgment adopting the reasons put forward by Gray in support of its exception. Plaquemines Parish argued that the doctrine of contra non valentem should apply to toll the one-year prescriptive period.

According to the Fourth Circuit, Louisiana recognizes four situations where contra non valentem applies to prevent prescription: “1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff’s action; 2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; 3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; and 4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though this ignorance is not induced by the defendant.” In determining whether any of these categories apply, Louisiana courts will look at the individual circumstances of each case. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 245 (La. Ct. App. 2010).

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build-4-1213636-1-768x1024Insurance companies are coming under increasing pressure due to the recent proliferation of natural disasters in the United States. For an insurance company, navigating the boundary between legitimate and bad faith denial of claims can be a very risky business. However, courts are providing more and more guidance for insurers of companies who find themselves targeted by disaster. Recently, in Citadel Broadcasting Corp. v. Axis U.S. Insurance Co., 2014-CA-0326, the Fourth Circuit  Court of Appeal in Louisiana clarified the requirements a claimant must meet in order to receive payment  through an insurance plan.

Citadel Broadcasting (“Citadel”) was based in New Orleans at the time it sustained crippling damage from Hurricane Katrina. Prior to the incident, Citadel was insured by Axis U.S. Insurance (“Axis”) for physical damage and business interruption (“BI”) losses, including contingent business interruption income. This means that in addition to physical damage, Axis covered the loss of profits suffered by Citadel while it was restoring its locations and broadcasting capabilities. This BI coverage was to extend for 365 days from the date of the incident. Axis denied coverage to Citadel relying on “exclusion k”, a loss of market exclusion. Loss of market means that the coverage would be denied because Citadel had lost the opportunity to market their broadcasting to their listeners. A jury returned a verdict against Axis in the amount of $11,813,976, and this amount was mostly affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Louisiana law imposes a relaxed burden of proof showing  that a particular catastrophic event actually caused the damage. Damages must be proven to a reasonable certainty, and the proof of loss must only be as precise as circumstances allow. See La Louisiane Bakery Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co, 09-825, p. 28 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/8/11) The court is given broad discretion over these questions due to the imprecise nature of the calculation of lost profits. The formula examines a company’s actual loss by comparing expected performance prior to the incident with actual performance after the incident, and does not require direct proof of loss of customers. For example, Citadel satisfied this requirement by demonstrating a loss of market share at the expense of an increased market share of its competitors, and by calculating actual loss according to Axis’ insurance coverage provisions.

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