Civil Matter

December 4, 2016

Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office Found Negligent in Causing a Woman’s Broken Arm in “Self Defense” Class

police-5-1572837-1024x768 It’s common sense that self defense class instructors should teach the students how to defend themselves and not inflict pain or broken bones while instructing. However some instructors can go overboard while trying to “teach” these skills. The following case out of Lafourche Parish highlights what can go wrong when simulations in a self defense course get a bit too real for one participant causing her a broken arm and other damages.

In 2010, plaintiff participated in a 3-day Rape Aggression Defense (RAD) self-defense course being taught by the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office. During the course, plaintiff and other participants received instructions for two days and on the third day, participants engaged in a series of exercises simulating attacks upon them by “aggressors”, at this time they were instructed to deploy the defensive techniques they had learned. During one of these simulated attacks, in which a Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Deputy played an “assailant”, plaintiff’s arm was broken. Plaintiff had to undergo surgery to repair the comminuted fracture, requiring two plates and 21 screws to be inserted into plaintiff’s arm.

At the initial bench trial, the recorded RAD simulations were played on video, showing the RAD instructor was close to plaintiff during the exercise and was constantly giving instructions to the plaintiff on how to properly perform defensive techniques. In the video, the Sheriff Deputy playing the “aggressor” pushes and hugs the plaintiff while the instructor tells the plaintiff how to defend herself. The trial court concluded after watching the video, it did not find the Sheriff’s Office or the Sheriff’s Deputy negligent, as the only way they could have prevented the plaintiff’s injury would have been to not engage physically with the participants, which would have defeated the purpose of the exercising teaching them to defend themselves against aggressive criminals. The trial court subsequently dismissed the defendants with prejudice, and plaintiff appealed.

December 3, 2016

Louisiana Supreme Court Allows Class Action for La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1871 (Balance Billing Act) Violations

by Berniard Law Firm

hospital-s-corridor-1631146-1-1024x765 Class action lawsuit certification is one of the most complex areas of the law to explain. The question of whether a lawsuit would be best as a class action or as individual lawsuits often comes down to a determination of what is the best method for fair and efficient adjudication for both the plaintiffs and the defendant.

Across the state of Louisiana, people are filing lawsuits against health care providers under the Health Care Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act, hereafter referred to as the Balance Billing Act. See La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1871 et seq. As a result of these lawsuits, the Louisiana Second Circuit had denied class certification for a group of plaintiffs while the Louisiana Third Circuit had approved a class certification in their jurisdiction. Thus a split of the circuits existed and therefore it was time for the Louisiana Supreme Court to weigh in.

Certain Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in 2011 claiming the Defendant, Minden Medical Center, “engaged in unlawful billing practices by billing them in an amount in excess of the agreed upon rate negotiated between the hospital and plaintiffs’ respective insurers.” As a result of that lawsuit a question was presented for review to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana whether these types of lawsuits (balance bill violations) would be better handled as class action or on an individual basis.

December 1, 2016

Non-parties Cannot Bring an Action for Sanctions Against a Party or Attorney for Violating Discovery Rules In Louisiana Automobile Accident Lawsuit

by Berniard Law Firm

law-education-series-3-1467430-1024x769 In litigation, “discovery” is the legal procedure by which parties obtain evidence from other parties or non-parties. Examples of common discovery tools include depositions (a witness’s out-of-court testimony) or requests to produce documents or other things. In Louisiana, attorneys must sign discovery requests, responses, and objections to discovery requests. This certifies that the request, response, or objection is consistent with the rules of discovery and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. ( See La. C.C.P. art. 1420.) It also certifies that the request, response, or objection is reasonable and not issued for an improper purpose such as to harass a party or to cause increases in litigation expenses. If a court determines that an attorney’s certification violates the rules of discovery, it will impose sanctions upon the attorney who made the certification and/or the represented party. A 2015 case from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal discusses discovery sanctions, holding that non-parties to lawsuits cannot bring actions for sanctions against a party or attorney for violating discovery rules.

In 2011, Deadre Thiel and Germaine Dyer were involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought treatment from Dr. David Wyatt. Dr. Wyatt’s practice is conducted through a medical entity, Orthopedic Care Center of Louisiana (“OCCL”). OCCL was not a party to the initial lawsuit brought by Mr. Theil and Dyre against State Farm, David Podewell and Banu Gibson. After conducting initial discovery, State Farm became aware of evidence suggesting that Dr. Wyatt may have been improperly influenced by bias and financial motive in treating Mr. Thiel and Mr. Dyer. It then deposed Dr. Wyatt and determined that OCCL – a non-party to the lawsuit – was the only source of discovery concerning OCCL’s billing processes and any contingency fee relationship with the Womac Law Firm.

State Farm then issued a notice of deposition to OCCL and a subpoena duces tecum (a court order requiring the recipient to appear before court and produce documents or other evidence). In response, OCCL filed a motion to quash (void) the subpoena duces tecum. It also sought to have to have the Trial Court issue a protective order and award sanctions. The Trial Court granted OCCL’s motion to quash and awarded sanctions in favor of OCCL and against State Farm. State Farm then filed an application for a supervisory writ, seeking to have to the Court of Appeal reverse the Trial Court’s ruling.

November 30, 2016

Just the Facts: Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Articulates Summary Judgment Standards in Employment Lawsuit Out of Monroe

by Berniard Law Firm

the-bank-1469518-682x1024 Countless lawsuits are decided under the legal standard of summary judgment. Summary judgment occurs when lawyers request a court to decide whether there are enough facts in dispute to even proceed with a lawsuit. The party requesting summary judgment must show that there is simply no dispute of any material fact and that the person requesting summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In answering this question, judges determine whether there is enough evidence in a case that a jury would be able to side with the person not requesting summary judgment. As a tactical matter, good lawyers often request summary judgment to dispense with certain claims early on in a lawsuit thus saving their clients time and money.

A recent decision by the United States Court of the Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, demonstrates the principles of summary judgment within the context of an employment discrimination lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Western District of Louisiana (the lower court) determined that summary judgment was appropriate for all causes of action and thus dismissed the entire case. The Court of Appeals however only agreed with the lower court on certain claims thus providing guidance on surviving summary judgment in age discrimination, retaliation, disability, and defamation claims.

The case involves a lawsuit between Lloyd Flanner and his former employer JP Morgan Securities, L.L.C (JP Morgan). Mr. Flanner worked at JP Morgan at their branches in Monroe Louisiana from August 2003 to August 2010. In April 2010, Mr. Flanner underwent surgery and was granted medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Shortly after returning to work, Mr. Flanner was involved in an incident wherein he withdrew $25 from his personal bank account, purchased a money order, and gave it to his attorney’s assistant. Learning about the incident, JP Morgan investigated and subsequently fired Mr. Flanner. Mr. Flanner was replaced by two employees, aged 53 and 32. Mr. Flanner was 59 at the time of his termination.

November 19, 2016

Court of Appeal Describes How “Forced Heirs” Force Their Way into Inheritance

by Berniard Law Firm

estatehouse-1218427
In Louisiana, you cannot “disinherit” your children. What does this mean exactly? It means that upon death, Louisiana law will allow a decedent’s children to share in his or her estate, even if the decedent left those children out as beneficiaries. The left-out children are called “forced heirs,” and will take a portion of the decedent’s estate (called the “legitime” or “forced portion”) unless the decedent has a just cause for leaving them out. La. C.C. art. 1494. A recent case of the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal describes the rights of forced heirs to take in a decedent’s estate.

This case arose out of the death of Geronimo Ji Jaga, and the division of his annuity account at Western National Insurance Company. Mr. Ji Jaga had five children from various marriages: Shona Pratt, Hiroji Pratt, Nikki Michaux, Kayode Ji Jaga, and Tkumsah Geronimo Jaga. He named his eldest two children, Shona and Hiroji (“the Pratts”), as the beneficiaries to the annuity. After Mr. Ji Jaga’s death, one of his surviving spouses – Jojuyounghi Cleaver – filed a lawsuit in the Parish of St. Mary against Wester National alleging that her son, Kayode, should be considered a forced heir and entitled to share in the annuity.

In response, Western National filed asserted that the Pratts, the named beneficiaries of the annuity, should be joined in the lawsuit. After Mrs. Cleaver amended her petition adding the Pratts as defendants, the Pratts filed, among other exceptions, a peremptory exception of no cause of action. Tkumsah’s mother, Laila Minja, later filed a petition to intervene. She claimed that Tkumsuh was also a forced heir. The Pratts filed the same exceptions against Mrs. Minja as they did against Mrs. Cleaver. The Trial Court sustained the Pratt’s exception of no cause of action and dismissed Mrs. Cleavers’ and Mrs. Minja’s claims. The Trial Court considered the Pratt’s other exceptions as moot. Mrs. Cleaver and Mrs. Minja appealed the Trial Court’s judgment.

November 16, 2016

Slidell Hospital Not at Fault in Lawsuit for Independent Contractor Worker’s Alleged Negligence

by Berniard Law Firm

hospital-s-corridor-1631146-1024x765 If your unlucky enough to slip and fall at a business the first person you would think about suing is the business itself. However, businesses today contract out many aspects of cleaning and other maintenance and in doing so also alleviate their responsibility for negligence on their property. The following case out of St. Tammany Parish discusses the concept of who might be at fault for a slip and fall when the cleaning of floors is contracted out to another party.

In 2005, Joy Smith was visiting a friend who was a patient at Northshore Regional Medical Center (Hospital) in Sidell, Louisiana. As Ms. Smith was walking down the hall, she slipped and fell in some water near where the floors had just been buffed. Ms. Smith filed a lawsuit against the Hospital alleging they were negligent in failing to properly warn her of the hazard that caused her fall. The Hospital answered the lawsuit and filed a third party demand, adding as third party defendants Hospital Housekeeping Systems (HHS), and the employee of HHS who had just buffed the floor. The Hospital had a contractual relationship with HHS to provide the Hospital with housekeeping services for the hospital.

The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment in the lower court seeking to have Ms. Smith’s claim against the hospital dismissed. The Hospital alleged that it was merely the property owner, and it should not be held liable for conditions created by HHS as they contracted with them to clean the floors. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 969. Within the contractual obligations of the Hospital and HHS, HHS was responsible for maintaining the area where Ms. Smith had fell. The lower court agreed, and granted the summary judgment.

November 11, 2016

The Plight of the Luddite: Increasing Concerns for Plaintiffs of Age Discrimination Claims

by Berniard Law Firm

technology
A Luddite is a person who is opposed to technological innovation. A Luddite will refuse to learn about new technology and will not incorporate it into their skills, either at work or at home. Having this mindset has obvious drawbacks for workers in today’s world, but what happens to the individuals who do not necessarily avoid technology, but are slow to catch up?

In 2015, a 52-year old employee of Jefferson Parish fell into this unfortunate cohort. This employee had been working for Jefferson Parish for over twenty years of service. When it came time for Jefferson Parish to choose who to promote to the position of Executive Assistant, there were two options: Maria Cooper, a young 28-year old employee with technological know-how, or the 52-year old, an experienced and loyal employee.

To Jefferson Parish, the choice was obvious. Since the essential job requirements of the position of Executive Assistant included working knowledge in the maintenance and updating of all computers, servers, and wiring of the computer network, as well as experience in setting up Excel spreadsheets, Ms. Cooper seemed like the best fit. But what about the 52-year old? She was left in the dust. After being passed up for the position, the 52-year old filed a lawsuit against Jefferson Parish, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.

November 10, 2016

Louisiana Appeals Court Defines “Employee” in Sexual Harassment Lawsuit From Iberia Parish

by Berniard Law Firm

Employees Only
In the law, it is common for a case to turn on the definition of one word. A word that ordinarily may conjure a single image can explode with possibilities, nuances, and sometimes disastrous consequences during a lawsuit. For Mr. D that word was “employee.” In a recent case, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal helped define the term “employee” as regards workers’ compensation law and employment discrimination law.

In this case, Mr. D was hired by Lofton Industries, Inc., a staffing services company, that assigned Mr. D to work with National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”). While at NOV, Mr. D alleged that he suffered both verbal and sexual harassment from coworkers. The harassment lasted until Mr. D was fired by NOV. Mr. D filed a lawsuit for sexual harassment against his harassers and NOV, as well as a separate negligence claim against NOV for the negligent hiring and supervision of its employees. This is where the definition of “employee” becomes important and interesting.

In order to maintain his claims against NOV, Mr. D had to meet the definition of employee under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”) but avoid being considered an employee under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”). Confusingly, the District Court dismissed both Mr. D’s claims, finding that he was both an employee (for LWCA purposes) and not an employee (for LEDL purposes) at the same time.

November 6, 2016

Court of Appeal Discusses Louisiana’s “Lemon Law” Regarding Used Automobile Sales

by Berniard Law Firm

Buying an automobile can be an exciting experience regardless of whether one is trading in an old gas-guzzler for a newer, more efficient model or buying brand new. However, the process of buying an automobile can be a hassle if one happens to purchase a “lemon.” In Louisiana, a “lemon” is defined as a new automobile that has a defect that is significant enough to severely impair the automobile’s use and/or market value. With this being said, it is surprising that even with the abundance of information readily available via Internet, many individuals hastily purchase automobiles, rather than taking the time to gather information and make an informed decision. It is important to remember, as the buyer, that you should be in control throughout the entire process by (1) knowing the style of automobile you desire; (2) calculating the price you can afford; (3) researching the safety, quality, expert opinions, and owner opinions of the automobile you are planning to purchase; and (4) investigating the types of warranties readily available. In the event that one finds his/herself in the aforementioned situation, it is pertinent to retain an attorney, who specializes in Redhibition Law (i.e., Lemon Law) who will file a redhibition claim (i.e., lemon law claim) on your behalf.

The following redhibition action out of Houma, Louisiana discusses the conditions that must be proven by the buyer in order to obtain a favorable judgment. On September 3, 2013, Ms. Melissa Cadiere purchased a 2000 Lincoln LS with 199,684 miles from Wholesale Autoplex, L.L.C. Ms. Cadiere drove the Lincoln for thirty-seven days before her Lincoln failed to start, at which time she contacted Wholesale Autoplex. Wholesale Autoplex advised Ms. Cadiere that her Lincoln would need a new engine. After Wholesale Autoplex failed to repair or replace the engine, Ms. Cadiere filed a petition for redhibition.

Redhibition, in the context of automobiles, is the avoidance of a sale of some vice or defect in the automobile, which renders the automobile either absolutely useless, or severely compromises the function of the automobile in a matter that if known by the buyer at the time of purchase, the buyer would have chosen not to purchase the automobile. See La. C.C. art. 2520. In a redhibition claim, the buyer (i.e., plaintiff) must prove (1) that the seller (i.e., defendant) sold the good in a manner that renders the good absolutely useless for its intended purpose or its use is compromised in a manner that if known at the time of purchase, a reasonable person would have chosen not to purchase the good; (2) the good contained a hidden defect at the time of purchase; and (3) the seller was provided the opportunity to repair the defect. Crow v. Laurie, 729 So. 2d 703, 705-06 (La. Ct. App. 1999).

November 5, 2016

Father of Color Guard Member Unable to Prove Negligence after MLK Parade Injury

by Berniard Law Firm

When bringing a negligence lawsuit to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of another person’s failure to act with due care, it is important to ensure that that sufficient evidence has been gathered in advance of the trial. A good lawyer knows that in order to properly safeguard against the tactic employed by the opposing party, one must be prepared to back up one’s claim. A case from the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal highlights exactly this point.

In this case, Robert Lee Iles brought a lawsuit on behalf of his minor daughter, Jannah, who was a member of the color guard at Northshore High School (“NHS”) until she sustained an injury. As a member of the NHS color guard, Jannah attended a two-week band camp during the summer. At band camp, she practiced for two hours, two to three times a week after school, and worked alongside her color guard teammates in a daily one-hour class. She and her teammates received between nine to ten hours of instruction each week. Additionally, she received special training sessions to prepare for the Martin Luther King, Jr. (“MLK”) parade. According to Mr. Iles’ petition, Jannah sustained an injury while marching as a member of the NHS color guard while performing alongside the band at a MLK parade in Slidell, Louisiana.

Iles petition claimed that his daughter’s injury entitled the family to damages. The petition named a number of defendants, including: St. Tammany Parish School Board, NHS Band Boosters, Inc. and its insurer, the band director, the color guard director, the school principal, and the parents of her fellow NHS color guard member, Gabrielle Haley. Iles claimed the School Board was liable for the actions of its employees, thus justifying the inclusion of the band director, and that the Boosters paid the color guard director, so his inclusion was justified as well. Iles’ lawsuit further posited that the School Board and Boosters had failed to properly supervise or train the color guard students, giving rise to this action. Iles also sought additional damages from the defendants for failing to properly administer medical attention.