Articles Posted in Civil Matter

pills-pills-pills-3-1326912-1024x683In the aftermath of suffering injuries from medical malpractice, filing a suit might not be at the top of your list. However, in order to maximize your chance of recovery, it is imperative that you timely file your claim without delay. So what happens when you do not file a suit quickly enough?

Brian Snavely was a patient of Dr. Rice and her affiliated entities. Snavely sought care from Dr. Rice for chronic pain that started with an industrial accident in 1999. That care included being prescribed narcotics. In 2010, Snavely was involved with an automobile accident with Kayse Vincent. Following this accident, Snavely received further treatment from Dr. Rice. While Snavely was seeking damages against Vincent for that accident, he died of a drug overdose. The plaintiff, Linda Snavely, was Brian Snavely’s mother. Ms. Snavely first filed a Request to Convene a Medical Review Panel, which is an initial malpractice hearing against qualified healthcare providers, against Dr. Rice and her entities under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA), La.R.S. 40:1299.41-.49. Dr. Rice, as a licensed physician, could be subjected to a Medical Review Panel. However, her affiliated entities could not be. Dr. Rice responded to the Request to Convene a Medical Review Panel by filing an Exception of Prescription, which is a pleading seeking delay or dismissal of a lawsuit or other action because the time period to bring that action has expired. The exception and dismissal were subsequently granted. Ms. Snavely then sought damages against Dr. Rice’s entities as she alleged their treatment led to Brian’s death. The Rice entities filed an Exception of Prescription and it too was granted.

The exception of prescription is laid out in La. C.C.P. art. 927. The burden of proof lies on the requesting party. When Appeals Courts review it, they use a manifest error standard of review, which means no deference is given to lower courts. The time limit for filing claims is one year; which means an Exception of Prescription is proper if a lawsuit or other action is filed after one year. La. R.S. 9:5628(A). However, that rule is only valid from when damages are immediately apparent. See In re Medical Review Panel for Claim of Moses, 788 So.2d 1173, 1178 (La. 2001).

64-photo-3_26_19-1024x684If you believe you are eligible for retirement, disability, or other benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), it is imperative that you understand how prior events, including those that may have led to overpayment of prior benefits, can affect your ability to collect these benefits.

In 2010, Johnson applied for retirement insurance benefits with the SSA. He was then advised that he had been overpaid disability insurance benefits from 1974 to 1976 and that any retirement insurance benefits would be withheld until the $4,535.90 prior overpayment amount was satisfied. Johnson requested a hearing before an administrative law judge and testified that he didn’t receive disability benefits in 1976, 1977, or 1978. He did receive disability benefits in 1970, but those benefits were discontinued in 1974 or 1975 after advising the SSA that he had returned to work. He also specified that he didn’t recall getting a notice of overpayment and demanded that they provide proof of the alleged overpayments. The administrative law judge ruled against Johnson and ruled that he was liable for the full amount. Johnson requested a review of the decision but was denied by the Appeals Council.

Three years later, Johnson filed an action in the district court seeking a review of the decision made by the administrative law judge. The SSA moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation and recommended that the matter be remanded to the Commissioner of the SSA for a determination supported by substantial evidence regarding the overpayment allegedly made to Johnson. The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and ordered the case to be remanded. They further specified to Johnson that they were affirming the decision that Johnson received overpayments, but reversing the determination concerning the amount of overpaid benefits, and remanding for a determination of benefits owed with supporting evidence.

paper-family-1186206-1024x676Summary judgment is a legal standard many courts use when there are not enough facts in dispute to even proceed with a lawsuit. When applicable, this is a good strategy for a defense attorney to use because it purges claims that have no merit, saving time and money. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal demonstrated this principle within the context of an employment discrimination lawsuit. The following case demonstrates how an employer can use the Courts to deny a Family Medical Leave Act Claim.

Michelle Calderone was an employee of TARC in Hammond, Louisiana. While she was employed, Calderone was involved in a car accident where she was initially diagnosed with a chip fracture to her ankle. Nine days after the accident, she returned to work. About a month later, Calderone was further diagnosed with a crack in her sternum and was instructed to remain on bed rest. TARC’s CEO, Kathleen Abels, gave Calderone permission to work from home. A month later, Calderone proposed splitting up her time equally at home and at work, and Abels agreed. Calderone submitted a doctor’s note allowing her to work the split schedule, which specified no lifting, climbing, or travel and warned of the injury’s existence for 6 months or more. After the split schedule began, Abels gave Calderone a document that characterized her split schedule as temporary and only in effect until March 31, 2012. She did not sign the document, but she submitted a written response opposing some aspects of the document, such as her disability characterization, the revocation of the split schedule, and the failure to inform her of FMLA rights. Abels denied Calderone request.

After Calderone’s doctor gave the release, Calderone returned to a full-time schedule. Calderone did not request any leave thereafter or object to resuming her split schedule. Seven months after returning to a full-time schedule, Calderone resigned stating that she cannot successfully complete her duties under Abels’ management but failed to mention any issues regarding her leave, injuries from the car accident, or timing of her return to work from those injuries.

to-sign-a-contract-2-1236630-1-1024x683Final judgments are usually final. However, not all civil judgments are actually final. In a legal malpractice lawsuit, the plaintiff can attempt to seek relief from a final judgment. However, this remedy is only available under a narrow set of circumstances where the losing party may request the court to reopen an otherwise final judgment.

Ms. Narissa Bradford hired certain attorneys (collectively as “GHW”) to represent her in an Italian civil suit. After the suit was unsuccessful, Bradford sued GHW alleging legal malpractice during the course of their representation. The Eastern District Court of Louisiana granted GHW’s motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment asks the district court to decide a case prior to it going to trial if no material facts are in dispute La. C.C.P. art. 966. Bradford’s claims were dismissed with prejudice, meaning she was prohibited from suing under the same claims in the future. On May 15, 2015, Bradford filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking relief from an earlier judgment, but the district court denied the motion. Bradford, disagreeing with the district court’s ruling, timely appealed. 

The district court has the discretion to grant or deny relief under FRCP 60(b) and will only be reversed for abuse of discretion. Bradford argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying her relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, fraud, and other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)-(3), (6) On the ground of newly discovered evidence, Bradford must show that she exercised due diligence in obtaining the information at the time of trial and that evidence is controlling enough to have clearly produced a different result if presented before the original judgment. Johnson Waste Materials v. Marshall, 611 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1980). Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion on three grounds.

school-yard-1550938-1024x682When someone reports misconduct, they might expect the wrongdoer to be reprimanded. They don’t generally expect to be punished themselves. That’s why Ronald Bias at Amite High School was not happy when he was retaliated against after reporting a colleague’s misconduct.  

Mr. Bias was a senior Marine Corps instructor for the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s junior ROTC program. When he overheard that fellow ROTC instructor Carl Foster was misusing funds to pay for a non-ROTC cross-country team trip in September 2009, he promptly reported it to the school’s principal. The principal approved the funding anyway. Mr. Bias reported a second misappropriation of funds in April 2010, which also had the principal’s stamp of approval.

During the same time period, Mr. Bias claimed that his colleague, Mr. Foster, though subordinate to Bias, worked with the principal, Michael Stant, to undermine Bias in his ability to perform his job duties. Together, they harassed and spread rumors about him in retaliation for his reporting of misappropriation. After Bias reported the second misappropriation of funds, he alleges that the two men convinced the Marine Corps to transfer him to another high school an hour away. He claimed this would have a negative impact on his career and place a strain on his family, so he decided to retire from the Marine Corps.

retro-clock-1422611-1024x919Generally, citizens are not held to criminal standards that do not yet exist. When a citizen takes action, he or she is held to the criminal standards in place at the time of the act. To retroactively apply criminal laws is impermissible because that application tends to violate principles of fairness and due process.

In one case out of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the issue was whether the Sledge Jeansonne Louisiana Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (“Sledge Act”) and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”) could be applied retroactively to a defendant’s misconduct occurring before the statutes were effective.

The State of Louisiana argues that the principles of fairness and due process would not be violated here because Sledge does not target the underlying conduct but instead is triggered by the entering of a guilty plea. Further, the State argues that civil penalties sought under LUTPA were similarly permissible.

65-Email-3_13_19-1024x683A common litigation tactic for plaintiffs is to bring cases in federal court to obtain greater damage awards. However, a plaintiff must have a viable claim under federal law or their case will be dismissed by the federal district court for lack of jurisdiction.

Following a car accident in which Cheryl Price was hospitalized with injuries, she hired attorney ES to represent her. ES secured a settlement for approximately $4,000 from the at-fault driver’s insurance company, the check for which ES deposited into his firm’s trust account. A lien placed by the hospital prevented ES from immediate disbursement of the money to Price. ES stated that the check included “Medicaid Recovery” as a payee, and told Price that he could not release the money until the lien issue was resolved. Price filed a complaint against ES with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board who conducted an investigation and concluded that no disciplinary action was warranted. ES’s firm eventually endorsed the check and released the money to Price.

Price then filed a pro se motion against ES, the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, and the Louisiana Office of Risk Management claiming violations of due process under the 14th Amendment, violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and violations of state law. Price sought compensatory and punitive damages. All defendants moved to dismiss her claims.

agreement-blur-business-261621-1024x768Louisiana citizens interact with contract law every day, in many cases without even realizing it. Whether buying groceries at a supermarket with a credit card or installing a new iPhone app, countless purchases are governed by consumer agreements. What may be even less known to purchasers is that many of these agreements include an arbitration clause, which provides that any disputes arising out of that agreement must be handled by an arbitrator rather than a court. Arbitration is a form of “alternative dispute resolution” in which an arbitrator — typically a certified attorney —  evaluates the parties’ claims and renders a binding decision as to who should prevail. In general, companies prefer arbitration because it costs less than litigation. But because the rules of arbitration can vary significantly from the rules of court, the consumer does not always benefit from being kept away from the courthouse. The validity of arbitration clauses is a common point of contention. Although Louisiana generally favors arbitration, the legislature has enacted the Louisiana Arbitration Act (“LLA”) (see La. R.S. 9:4201) to ensure that arbitration proceeds fairly.

Arbitration is also common in commercial agreements. In 2013, a sales representative of UniFirst Corporation (“UniFirst”) approached the shop foreman at the Homer, Louisiana location of Fluid Disposal Specialties, Inc. (“FDS”). The shop foreman’s job title was Manager of Transportation Logistics. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss FDS’s entering into a contract with UniFirst to provide uniforms to FDS employees. After nearly six months of negotiation, a price was agreed upon and the FDS shop foreman executed a contract with UniFirst. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Later, FDS attempted to void the contract, citing that the shop foreman did not have the authority to bind the company. Unifirst argued that, based on the arbitration clause in the agreement, the matter should be settled by an arbitrator. FDS, preferring to avail itself of the court, argued that because the contract itself was invalid, any clauses within it — including the arbitration clause — could not be valid either.

The case eventually made its way to Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal, which applied a two-step analysis commonly relied upon by the courts. The first step is to determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; the second is to determine whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement. In applying the first step, the Court determined that the agreement was invalid because the FDS shop foreman lacked the authority to enter into a contract with UniFirst. In response to UniFirst’s argument that the foreman had apparent authority, a doctrine in which an innocent third party (Unifirst) could rely on the representations of an agent (the FDS shop foreman) when entering an agreement (see American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 850 So. 1112 (La. Ct. App. 2003)), the Court found that both the shop foreman’s job title and the six-month negotiation period should have indicated to UniFirst that the foreman was not in a position to enter into a contract for uniform services. For these reasons, the Court found that no agreement existed between the parties and therefore there was no need to apply the second step of the analysis. Arbitration cannot be compelled under an agreement that never came into being. The Court went on to note, however, that UniFirst could still proceed against FDS for any obligation or damages arising from FDS’s use of the uniforms that UniFirst provided the shop.

competition-1024x683A non-compete clause is a common feature in many employment agreements in Louisiana. The clause is a way for an employer to restrict an employee from going to work for a competitor and thus potentially harming the original employer. Most non-compete clauses, in order to be enforceable, must contain some limitation as to time and geographical location.

Katie Urban-Kingston was hired by Billedeaux Hearing Center (“Billedeaux”) in Lafayette in May of 2014. Urban-Kingston and Billedeaux entered into an employment agreement containing a non-compete clause that applied to certain areas of Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Mississippi, and allowed for the collection of any costs incurred by Billedeaux for legal enforcement of the clause. Less than a year later, Urban-Kingston left Billedeaux and became employed by Williamson Hearing Center (“Williamson”), just outside of Baton Rouge. Billedeaux sought and was granted a temporary restraining order in February 2015 to enjoin Urban-Kingston from working for Williamson, and a show-cause hearing for a preliminary injunction was set for early March.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated that Urban-Kingston was trained by Billedeaux, that she left Billedeaux’s employ and worked for Williamson at the time of the trial, and that Williamson is in direct competition with Billedeaux. Urban-Kingston claimed as a defense against the issuance of a preliminary injunction, however, that the non-compete clause in her employment agreement with Billedeaux was too broad. The trial court determined that the only issue to decide based on Urban-Kingston’s defense was whether the two hearing centers were actually in competition. But since the parties had already stipulated that point, the court rejected the defense, issued the preliminary injunction in Billedeaux’s favor, and ordered Urban-Kingston to pay Billedeaux’s attorney fees of approximately $6,000.

back-to-school-1416942-1024x681People seek assistance from the courts for a number of reasons. Some may demand a monetary payment after suffering a loss due to another’s wrongful conduct. Others may aim to prevent harm resulting from the wrongful conduct of another by petitioning the court for protective action. In Louisiana, a court has several ways to prevent harm. One way is the injunction, a court order requiring a person or entity to act in a certain way or to avoid specified conduct. This is generally in the form of a permanent injunction, issued after a formal trial. However, before or during such a trial, the court may hold a hearing to consider a preliminary injunction, which acts to achieve the petitioner’s objective temporarily, until a full judgment can be made. Another way is a temporary restraining order. This order is similar to a preliminary injunction but is utilized in emergency situations where the delay due to a hearing could result in irreparable harm to the petitioner.      

Michael Delesdernier and Cedric Floyd were both elected to membership of the Jefferson Parish School Board in 2014. At a meeting of the board in July of 2014, the school board’s attorney offered a legal opinion on a matter before the board. Apparently disagreeing with the attorney’s statement, Floyd responded in an aggressive manner using strong words. Delesdernier advised Floyd to calm down, which suggestion Floyd did not well. Floyd began yelling and shoved Delesdernier against the wall. Multiple board members intervened to separate Floyd from Delesdernier, who did not fight back. Following this altercation, Delesdernier filed a petition for an injunction and temporary restraining order from the Jefferson district court.  He asked the court to prevent Floyd from coming within three feet of him and to order him not to threaten or intimidate him. In the interval before the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court issued multiple temporary restraining orders, which Floyd opposed. In October of 2014, the district court conducted a hearing to consider issuing a preliminary injunction. After considering the testimony of eyewitnesses to the altercation, the court dismissed Floyd’s motion opposing the temporary restraining order and issued the preliminary injunction. Floyd appealed this decision to Louisiana’s Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.

Under Louisiana law, a party cannot appeal a decision involving a temporary restraining order. La. C.C.P. art. 3612.  However, a preliminary injunction is subject to appellate review. For an injunction to be issued by the court, the petitioner must prove that without it, he would be irreparably harmed. La. C.C.P. art. 3601(A).  Irreparable harm is an injury or loss that a money judgment would not remedy. However, there is an exception to the requirement of irreparable harm:  if the petitioner can show that the conduct he seeks to prevent is unlawful, then he no longer must prove irreparable harm. Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So.2d 597 (La. 1999). Here, Floyd’s threatening and violent conduct during the school board altercation would be considered unlawful assault under Louisiana law. La. R.S. 14:36. The same unlawful conduct is what Floyd sought to prevent through his petition. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court had acted properly in granting the preliminary injunction, and affirmed the judgment.

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