Articles Posted in Civil Matter

oil_oil_production_oil-1024x768Can a trial court’s approval of a settlement agreement in a property contamination lawsuit be upheld without determining remediation requirements and the deposit of funds into the court registry? This question lies at the heart of the following case, which features an appeal of the trial court’s judgment approving a settlement agreement regarding property contamination caused by historic oil and gas operations. The appeal raises issues of statutory interpretation and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. The resolution of this question has significant implications for the approval process of settlement agreements in similar cases governed by Act 312.

In this case, Certain Insurers appealed the trial court’s approval of a settlement agreement in a property contamination lawsuit. The insurers raised two issues for the court to decide: (1) whether the trial court erred by not determining whether remediation was required before approving the settlement, and (2) if remediation was necessary, whether the court erred by not ordering the deposit of funds into the court registry.

The litigation involved historic oil and gas operations in Jefferson Davis Parish, and the plaintiffs sued Riceland and BP for damages and remediation. Riceland, in turn, filed a third-party demand against Certain Insurers seeking coverage under applicable insurance policies. After years of litigation, the plaintiffs, BP, and Riceland reached a compromise to resolve all claims. The settlement agreement included provisions for remediation by state regulatory standards, and Riceland assigned its rights against Certain Insurers to the plaintiffs.

new_zealand_accident_insurance_0-1024x768Vicarious liability in the context of work-related accidents is a complex legal issue that necessitates careful analysis of the state’s code. The case of Sarah Barber serves as a compelling example of the potential consequences when a government employee causes an accident while performing their job duties. Understanding the nuances of vicarious liability and the specific provisions governing such cases is essential to determine the employer’s liability for the actions of their employees.

Sarah Barber (Barber) was driving her car with passengers on Highway 107 in Pineville, Louisiana, when her car collided with Larry Jeane (Jeane), heading northbound on the highway. The collision occurred when Jeane’s car crossed the median and hit Barber’s vehicle. Mr. Jeane succumbed to injuries, while Barber’s passengers sustained severe injuries. The passengers in Barber’s vehicle filed a lawsuit against the City of Pineville, its insurer, and several other defendants. 

The primary issue discussed in this case was whether the State was vicariously liable for the accident caused by Jeane because he was on the job as a state Marshal when the accident happened. The Plaintiffs claimed the state was vicariously liable for Jeane’s actions since Jeane’s job is directed by the State Legislature. For the passengers to be successful in their vicarious liability claim, they needed to show the state was responsible for the Marshal’s actions under La. C. C. art. 2320 and La. R.S. 42:1441.4.

time_take_time_cosmetics-1024x652When it comes to medical malpractice, time can be both a friend and a foe. Trusting doctors to safeguard the well-being of our loved ones makes the process of bringing a lawsuit challenging and emotionally charged. Yet, within the legal field, there exist specific time frames and procedural intricacies that can make or break a case. Once the clock runs out on a particular timeframe, a lawsuit is deemed barred, leaving individuals without recourse. In the midst of this intricate dance between justice and time, the story of Rita Foster and her family shines a light on the importance of understanding legal procedures and seeking qualified legal representation.

In August of 2012, Rita Foster was hospitalized, during which time Dr. Olisa, a physician at Ochsner Health System, ordered that Foster have a CT scan of her chest. When a 2-centimeter speculated appeared on her lung, Olisa recommended that Foster have a follow-up CT scan in three to six months. Foster’s children (plaintiffs) claimed there was no documentation of this recommendation in any medical records and thus contributed to Foster not obtaining the recommended follow-up for the CT scan of her chest. 

In the following days and years, Foster was treated for other issues by multiple physicians and healthcare providers working within and outside the Ochsner Health System, with no other communication to order a repeat CT scan.

accident_car_accident_car-1024x683Being involved in a car accident is unfortunate, especially when it leaves you with long-term pain and suffering. If your injuries are a direct result of a car accident, you may be entitled to compensation from those who caused them. Rather than risk representing yourself in the legal process and walking away with little to nothing, you need to be represented by a qualified attorney who can assist in getting you the damages you deserve. 

Brenda Brown was stopped at a red light when she was rear-ended. The driver of the other vehicle was Homer Sargent, who had been employed by Evans Environmental and Geological Science and Management. Both vehicles were rentals from Enterprise Car Rental. 

Brown claimed the car accident caused her numerous personal injuries, entitling her to compensation for not only past, present, and future physical pain and suffering, but also past, present, and future lost wages and earnings. Additionally, she argued she was entitled to damages for her diminished quality of life as well as for severe emotional and mental anguish. 

taiwan_shilin_district_court-1024x768Racial discrimination in the workplace is a pressing issue that demands attention and action within our legal system. However, bringing a claim of racial discrimination or a hostile work environment requires the ability to substantiate crucial factors. The following case highlights the significance of providing essential evidence when pursuing racial discrimination or hostile work environment claims.

 Bobby Whitlock was terminated by his Monroe employer, Lazer Spot, Inc. after it claimed he left the vicinity of a loading dock while the light remained red. Next, Whitlock filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Two years later, Whitlock, who is African American, filed a claim against Lazer Spot, Inc., alleging both a hostile work environment and racial discrimination. Lazer Spot, Inc. then filed to dismiss Whitlock’s motion, arguing that his challenges did not state a claim. Next, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted Lazer Spot, Inc.’s motion to dismiss and found Whitlock did not state a claim for either his discriminatory discharge allegation or his hostile work environment complaint. This appeal to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal follows.   

To be successful with a motion to dismiss claim, the Court of Appeal found, under law, that a complaint has to have adequate factual matter to bring a claim of relief that is facially plausible, including when a plaintiff pleads facts that permits the court to reasonably infer the defendant was liable for the alleged misconduct. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

tug_boat_barge_towing-1024x681The language used in insurance policies can hold immense significance when determining the resulting coverage and payouts. In a compelling case involving three tug boats, the M/V Miss Dorothy, the M/V Angela Rae, and the M/V Freedom, an unfortunate collision prompted a dispute over insurance claims. As insurers of the Miss Dorothy sought compensation from the owners of the Angela Rae, the crux of the matter revolved around the interpretation of key terms within the insurance policies. The court’s analysis focused on the definition of “tow” and the parties’ intent, underscoring the critical role that precise language plays in insurance contracts. This case serves as a powerful reminder to both drafters and signers of insurance policies that every word holds weight and can shape the outcome of a claim.

Three tug boats, the M/V Miss Dorothy, the M/V Angela Rae, and the M/V Freedom, plied the Mississippi River with a barge boat in tow. The Angela Rae and the Freedom were positioned behind the barge, and the Miss Dorothy was positioned in front. The Angela Rae was designated as the ‘lead tug’, with the other boats acting as ‘assisting tugs.’ 

In an unfortunate turn of events, the Miss Dorothy collided with a portion of the Sunshine Bridge’s fender. The Miss Dorothy subsequently sank, resulting in a total loss of the ship and its machinery on board. In the ensuing dispute over insurance claims, the insurers of the Miss Dorothy sued the owners of the Angela Rae in its capacity as the lead tug. The two insurers of the Angela Rae, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic Specialty”) and P & I Underwriters (“P & I”), both filed motions averring the insurance responsibility to the other, claiming that the other’s policy should be paid out instead of their own. 

table_wood_record_notebook-1024x681The 1985 murder of Denise Porter by stabbing was a horrific tragedy with life-altering ramifications for her husband, Joel, a Louisiana attorney. It also provides an example of how records from a criminal investigation can and cannot be requested.

In Louisiana, immediate family members (i.e., the surviving spouse, children, grandchildren, or siblings) of a person who died of unnatural causes are entitled to obtain, after ten years has elapsed, unlimited access to investigative records pertaining to the death. La. R.S. 44:3(F).

While the statute provides a straightforward answer to who can obtain these records and when they can be requested, the element of how the information can be accessed created complications for Joel Porter. Record requests must accord with the limitations defined in other applicable laws, for example, Louisiana Code of Evidence, articles 507 and 508, explaining how attorneys can be approached about privileged information.

roofers_job_people_roof-1024x683When accidents occur on a construction site, questions of liability and responsibility arise, leaving property owners wondering about their potential legal obligations. In a compelling lawsuit from Alexandria, Louisiana, the issue of whether a homeowner can be held liable for injuries sustained by a roofer while working on their property takes center stage. The case of Robert Schram v. Ronnie Waters provides valuable insights into this perplexing matter, shedding light on the factors determining a homeowner’s liability when a roofer falls from their roof.

Robert Schram, an employee of Dan Baker, slipped and fell while working on a tin roof. He fell while trying to catch a nail gun thrown from the ground causing him to break his ankle. He sued the property owner, Ronnie Waters, and his insurer Colony Specialty Insurance Company (Colony), claiming Waters was liable for his injuries because he was supposed to provide the necessary safety materials for the job. 

The trial court granted Colony’s and Waters’s joint motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, which found no genuine issue of fact on the question of Waters’s liability. Schram appealed, claiming the trial judge committed a legal error in his decision because there are three issues of material fact concerning Waters’s negligence.

court_justice_interior_architecture-1024x768Getting workers’ compensation from an employer is already difficult, but it is even more so when the claim is filed in the wrong court. Although employees are entitled to workers’ compensation, the claim has to be filed in the correct jurisdiction. The following case shows what happens when you are injured while working and attempt to file a claim for workers’ compensation in a state where you were not employed. 

Louisiana resident Lemcy Cortez was hired by Triple F Oil Field Service, LLC, to drive trucks in Oklahoma. The day after he arrived in Oklahoma, Cortez was involved in an automobile accident that allegedly led to elbow and back injuries. He filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation in the Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) against Triple F and its insurer for workers’ compensation benefits which he alleged his employer refused to pay. Triple F and its insurer claimed Cortez lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Triple F believed Cortez was hired in Oklahoma, and Cortez believed he was hired in Louisiana. 

Cortez claimed he was hired over the phone in Louisiana, but in his recorded statement to the insurance company’s interviewee, he stated he was hired by Triple F in Oklahoma. Cortez offered two affidavits to support his position that he was hired in Louisiana. In the first, he claimed he contacted Triple F about the job while he was in Louisiana. He claimed he was contacted by Triple F in Louisiana when he was offered the job and accepted it over the phone. In the second, he claimed the company’s Vice President called him to offer him the job, and he knew Cortez lived in Louisiana. In addition, he claimed he understood he had been officially hired by Triple F at that point, and the company had made living arrangements for his move to Oklahoma. 

school_bus_canada_highway-1024x1024It is well known that every court order contains a physical copy declaring what the verdict of the case is, otherwise known as a final judgment. However, the order must contain what we call “decretal language.” But what in the world does that mean?  The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal discusses this question and when a final judgment can be amended to contain all the necessary language crucial for the order.

Upon appeal, in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in the State of Louisiana, Cedrick Laundry alleged that his son, Sengal, was injured when the school bus he was riding hit a curb and ran into a pothole. Defendants (the School Board and others) filed for summary judgment as they believed they were not responsible for Sengal’s injuries.

Summary judgment is when there is no genuine issue of material fact as it pertains to the case. Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the School Board cannot prove its case, the court will dismiss it. The trial court granted their motion for summary judgment but did not state the dismissal of any or all of the claims against the School. The judgment simply stated:

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