Articles Posted in Civil Matter

Car accidents oftentimes are not simple, clear-cut events that lend a clear idea of who was right and who was wrong. Instead, many times it is left to a court to decide what the circumstances were that led to the collision and the amount of responsibility each party had for it occurring. As a result, because no court is perfect, individuals who have been harmed due to another party’s acts are left out in the cold because they could not prove their case. However, each year new technology comes out that provides a better opportunity for plaintiffs, and their attorneys, to prove their case and receive the compensation they deserve.

One firm, Advanced Research and Technology (ART) Corporation, works with the very technology required to prove cases. Utilizing Finite Element Analysis (FEA), commonly referred to as computer simulations, the company provides compelling engineering evidence to explain the cause of a crash-related case. FEA’s due this by calculating the kinematics of the investigated accident (speeds, relative motion, different parts of accident) and structural analysis (where the cars collided and relevant stresses, strains, failures, energy displacements, etc.). By analyzing this information, FEA can help plaintiffs win cases related to auto and motorcycle crashes, airbag and seatbelt related problems, structural analysis relating to accidents or blasts, slip and fall cases, fuel tank and pipeline pressure analysis and a variety of others.

FEA simulations are widely recognized by the engineering community as a reliable and advanced tool for solving structural dynamics, crash, blast and impact-related matters. Automotive companies often use FEA for car testing in the same way that highway safety systems are designed using the technology. The reliability of FEA comes down to the simulator being able to develop accurate formulations or equations to explain how the millions of small elements involved in a collision react when variables are at a certain set. Because of its ability to determine how a car will behave in a collision and the effects of a collision, technology experts are able to move backwards and determine what variables were in place to lead to the results suffered.

A power failure at Chalmette Refining LLC has led to a thin layer of white powder descending upon Southeast Louisiana, raising concerns about the toxicity and potential harm that could emerge from exposure. Citing a power failure for the reason that up to one ton of catalyst were released into the air and falling down atop cars, homes, businesses and other property, the company has attempted to assure the public that safety is not a concern. However, the care that the refinery recommends during clean-up tells a much different story.

Spreading across the communities of Arabi and New Orleans’ lower ninth ward, the powder used for refinery processes resembled simple dust or powdered sugar and alarmed many during a time in which little to no information can cause significant panic. Taking place on September 6th, many in these communities are left wondering just why chemical releases keep happening and what is being done to prevent them from happening.

Louisiana’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), already investigating the unapproved release of catalyst, has notified the public that, after photographic any and all damage the powder has caused to their property, they can move forward with clean-up. Yet, in their required notice to the DEQ, the Chalmette refinery warned that gloves and safety glasses should be used when cleaning up the material. St. Bernard Parish Fire Chief Thomas Stone warned that the powder could be an irritant to individuals with respiratory problems and that the powder should be cleaned in order to prevent extended exposure.

In November of 2005, Shane Kerry checked into the ER at West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital in Sulphur, Louisiana after fracturing the heel bone in his right foot. Kerry was examined by Dr. Charles Pearson, who discharged him later in the day with instructions to report for a follow-up at the LSU Medical Center in Shreveport the following week. As he was being transported back to his home, Kerry detoured to another ER, this time at the Christus St. Frances Cabrini Hospital in Alexandria. There, Kerry underwent surgery on his heel by a podiatric specialist. In September of 2008 Kerry filed a suit against Dr. Pearson, alleging that as a result of “delay, negligence, and deviations from the standard of care” on Dr. Pearson’s part, he suffered “extreme disability, loss of sensation, and tissue necrosis with loss of muscle, tendon, skin, and subcutaneous tissue” around his heel. Kerry argued in his complaint that Dr. Pearson was negligent in failing to immediately decompress his foot, perform surgery, call in an orthopaedic surgeon, or arrange for his immediate transport to a hospital willing to properly treat him.

According to Louisiana procedure in medical malpractice cases, Kerry’s complaint was submitted to a state medical review panel. On June 5, 2009, the panel returned a unanimous opinion that “the evidence [did] not support the conclusion that [Dr. Pearson] failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint.” Accordingly, Dr. Pearson filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court, requesting that the suit be dismissed on the grounds that Kerry could not establish that Dr. Pearson had failed to meet the applicable standard of care in his treatment of Kerry’s foot.

In support of his motion, Dr. Pearson included the written opinion of the medical review panel, the affidavits of two doctors who sat on the review panel and who held licenses to practice emergency medicine in Louisiana, the medical records from Kerry’s visit to the ER at West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital, and the discharge summary prepared by the podiatry specialist who treated Kerry at Cabrini Hospital. In his response, Kerry offered the affidavits of his mother and brother, both of whom suggested that there were clear indications that Kerry was in dire need of surgery when he entered the West Calcasieu Cameron ER, but that Dr. Pearson refused to perform it because Kerry lacked health insurance and couldn’t afford the procedure. Kerry also attacked the accuracy medical records from his stay at that hospital, alleging that Dr. Pearson prepared them and that they did not reflect the severity of his injury. The trial court granted Dr. Pearson’s motion and dismissed Kerry’s claim because it “did not find that the submissions at th[at] point [were] adequate to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the burden that is required under the unique specialization of medical malpractice.” Kerry appealed.

In June 2007, Chadwick Dukes and his daughter, Skylah, were driving on La. Hwy. 983 in West Baton Rouge Parish. Their car was struck by a vehicle driven by Paul Declouette and owned by Sheryl Rogers. The following May, Dukes filed a lawsuit on behalf of Skylah seeking to recover damages for the injuries she sustained in the crash. Dukes named as defendants Declouette, and the Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, which was Declouette’s as-then unknown insurance carrier.

Shortly thereafter, Imperial Fire was identifed and admitted that it had issued an auto liability policy to Declouette that was in effect at the time of the accident. Dukes added Imperial Fire as a named defendant and then signed an agreement to release Declouette and Rogers from the suit. As a result, on November 20, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment to dismiss Dukes’s claims against Declouette. Imperial Fire immediately filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it could not be found liable because Dukes released its insured customer (Declouette) by agreement without a reservation of rights. Imperial Fire relied on the language of the insurance policy, which obligated the company to pay damages for any injuries for which

An insured person becomes legally responsible because of an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered vehicle.

In the town of Duson, a mother of a child slain in a car accident is frustrated and discouraged by the legal system after years of delay in the prosecution of the responsible driver. What’s more, there now remains the possibility that charges may be lessened against the man charged in her son’s death. This situation is an extremely unfortunate one but does illustrate the differences between civil and criminal litigation, as well as the standards involved.

21-year-old Shawn Lancon was killed when the driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger drove their vehicle into oncoming traffic while attempting to make a left turn. The driver, the man charged in Lancon’s death, was under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the accident. This accident took place in 2007. Three years later, delays in going to trial are still anticipated and now the defense is trying to lessen the criminal charges from vehicular homocide to a first-offense OWI. The OWI charge comes with considerably less jail-time, leading to the anger being expressed in the community.

The reasons for all of these issues are varying. The defense is attempting to lessen the criminal charges by insisting that the blood alcohol level is not high enough for a vehicular homicide, and also that the positive drug test should be excluded because the drugs detected by the drug test does not prove that the drugs were “active” at the time of the accident. Procedural delay is slowing the calendar for trial, due to courts having to postpone cases in Lafayette, Acadia, and Vermillion parishes due to a legal dispute within the court system regarding the allotment of judges.

John C. Elliott, 26, of Zavalla, Texas was driving a 1999 GMC pickup east on LA.8 and he lost control while passing another vehicle in a curve. He collided with several trees before the truck stopped on La. 8 facing the other direction. Elliot was injured seriously and taken to Lake Charles Memorial Hospital. There were two passengers in the car.

As reported in the Leesville Daily Leader

His two passengers,19-year-old Susie Dixon and an infant, both of Zavalla, Texas, suffered minor injuries and were transported to Byrd Regional Hospital.

Lamar Richardson of Joyce brought an action against his employer, Kansas City Southern (KCS) Railway Company, for injuries he claims to have sustained on May 14, 1990 when he was working on a maintenance crew. While clearing debris off train tracks, Richardson was cutting limbs from a large willow tree on the track at mile post 149.8 in Winn Parish and claims he was struck with a large limb and injured.

Richardson sued KCS under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq for medical expenses, mental anguish, and lost wages that resulted from the alleged injury. He contended that his employer failed to provide a safe workplace and was negligent in not adequately supervising the clearing of trees or training personnel in how to cut trees. Richardson claimed his injuries kept him from working and eventually led to a need for cervical disc surgery. The case went to trial in 1994 and 1995. Judgment was entered in June 1998 in Richardson’s favor and he was awarded medical expenses of $3,869.75, general damages of $150,000, and lost wages of $525,435.00. The major contention presented during the trial was Richardson’s report that he visited the emergency room Jackson Parish Hospital on May 15th after the pain in his neck intensified. Hospital records do not confirm the report but rather show he visited the ER three days prior to his alleged injury on May 11, 1990 where he complained of, among other things, neck pain that had lasted about a week. The emergency room had no record of a visit on May 15. Richardson claimed that he drove his son to a basketball event in Hammond on May 11 and therefore could not have gone to the emergency room. Witnesses at trial corroborated his testimony and the jury found his account more convincing than the hospital records which Richardson claimed had been made in error.

KCS appealed, and in their April 1, 1999 decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed. The court found that the Richardson failed to show that the date in the hospital records was inaccurate and that the idea that the records were created in error is implausible and not supported. The court also found that Richardson’s claim that he was treated by a particular doctor and nurse when he visited the hospital on May 15th was impossible given the testimony of those individuals. Finally, Richardson made no claim that the hospital intentionally falsified medical records or provide a motive for them to do so. The court found the hospital records to be accurate and reliable. Medical records are typically considered to be inherently reliable given that health care providers rely on them in making life and death decisions. As such, the plaintiff sought medical treatment for neck pain prior to his alleged injury and was not entitled to damages from his employer.

In November 2000, Debra Anne Addis of Addis, Louisiana filed a request for review with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund alleging that Mary Eschette M.D. of LSU Medical Center acted negligently in changing her prescription medications and violated the appropriate standard care in failing to properly diagnose a problem with her left wrist. The medical review board entered their decision in September 2003 and concluded that Ms. Addis failed to show that the defendant’s did not meet the applicable standard of care in her treatment. Two and a half years later the defendant doctor and medical center filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted the medical review panel opinion, asserting that the plaintiff Ms. Addis failed to name an expert despite almost six years of discovery.

The Louisiana Court of Appeals (first circuit) entered their decision in March of last year in favor of the defendants. The court found that the record of the case showed Ms. Addis failed to submit any evidence to counter the medical review panel’s opinion or show she could meet her burden of proof should the case go to trial. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and ordered the Plaintiff to pay all costs associated with her appeal.

The granting of a summary judgment motion means that a case will not proceed any further because the plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing sufficient issues of material fact that can be decided by a jury. Therefore the decision is decided by the court as a matter of law. Summary judgment motions can be granted for the plaintiff or defendant. Here, the motion was granted for the defendant, effectively dismissing Ms. Addis’ case.

In certain situations, a person that witnessed another get physically injured has a legal claim against the person that caused the physical injury—even when the witness suffered only mental anguish, without any direct physical injury. The rule allowing this recovery is known as the bystander recovery rule.

Louisiana’s bystander recovery is governed by Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.6 and the Louisiana Supreme Court case of Trahan v. McManus. As stated in Trahan, the bystander recovery rule does not “compensate for the anguish and distress that normally accompany an injury to a loved one under all circumstances.” Rather, the bystander recovery rule is more limited and has four requirements in order for a bystander to recover damages for his mental anguish from witnessing another’s injuries.

Those four elements are:

In a tort case based on negligence, a plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that the defendant breached that duty, resulting in harm to the plaintiff. In some circumstances, though, it can be difficult for a plaintiff to obtain clear evidence of the defendant’s breach of duty.

The concept of “res ipsa loquitur,” which is Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” can be employed in certain situations to establish the defendant’s breach of duty in the absence of direct evidence. Under this doctrine, the mere occurrence of an accident raises the inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. When res ipsa loquitur is applied, the defendant bears the burden to put on other evidence to dispute the presumption of negligence.

There are two essential elements for applying res ipsa loquitur in a particular situation:

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