Articles Posted in Class Action

The exception of prematurity determines whether a plaintiff has fulfilled a condition prior to filing suit. That is, in some occasions, Louisiana law requires a complaining party to bring the case somewhere else before they can actually file the case in court. Generally, that means that an administrative remedy exists elsewhere, and the complaining party should use that avenue first instead of the court.

There are two burdens involved in the exception of prematurity. The first is on the party raising the exception. The party raising the exception should prove that there is another remedy elsewhere available and that the complaining party failed to exhaust their administrative options before bring the case to court. Once the party raising the exception has satisfied their buren, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that he or she has actually exhausted all of the options before bringing the case to the courtroom. See Mosley v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, et. al., 07-1501 (La. App. 3d Cir. 4/2/08), 980 So.2d 836.

A case arising from Deridder Louisiana in the Parish of Beauregard shows an example of the exception of prematurity. In that case, the plaintiff was a patient at Westwood Manor Nursing Home following a surgery on his skull. While an attendant was moving the plaintiff, the plaintiff struck his head against a wall and had to have immediate surgery. It is alleged that one worker moved the plaintiff while the other watched, but the second person did not help the first when the first lost his balance, causing the plaintiff to hit his head against the wall. The plaintiff allegedly suffered permanent damage as a result of the collision with the wall.

You have probably heard the phrase “accidents happen.” But if you are in an accident, the first thing that you want to ask is who is at fault. With all of the chaos that can be part of an accident, sometimes the answer to this question isn’t always clear. This is when comparative fault, also known as comparative negligence, comes into play. In general, negligence refers to conduct that falls below the standards of behavior established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Comparative negligence is different from ordinary negligence in that ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonable person would exercise in similar circumstances whereas comparative negligence describes conduct that creates an unreasonable risk to one’s self.

In 1979, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2323 was amended to provide for a pure comparative negligence regime where a plaintiff’s own contributing negligence did not bar the recovery of damages, but merely reduced it by his or her own portion of fault. The Louisiana Legislature, in 1996, further amended the Code, making Louisiana a “true” comparative fault jurisdiction and the language of that amendment provided:

In an action for damages where a person suffers injury … the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury … shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action, and regardless of such person’s insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute …

A Saint Martinville, Louisiana, construction company, Cole’s Construction Crews, Inc., recently had a judgment against it reversed and remanded back to the trial court. Back in 2007, Cole’s had filed a lawsuit against J-O-B Operating Company. A few months after filing suit, Cole’s requested production of documents and sent interrogatories (or a list of probing questions) to JOB. Almost two years later, in July of 2009, JOB finally answered the requests. Then, in June of 2011, JOB filed a motion to dismiss the suit, claiming that Cole’s had abandoned the lawsuit. Ultimately, the motion to dismiss was signed, and Cole’s then attempted to get the motion set aside. The trial court denied this attempt, and Cole’s appealed the case to the appellate court to get it reviewed.

Cole’s claims that granting the motion to dismiss was an error that should be reversed. First, JOB had just answered the interrogatories less than two years earlier, and second, JOB did not file the requisite affidavit with its motion to dismiss. Ultimately, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling and decided that granting the motion to dismiss had been done in error. They came to this conclusion by considering the various aspects of the complex Louisiana abandonment law, which is discussed below.

In Louisiana, Article 561 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure imposes three requirements on plaintiffs in order for their lawsuit to not be considered abandoned. The first requirement is that the plaintiff has to take some sort of formal action before the court with regard to the lawsuit. Next, this action needs to take place during a court proceeding and must be in the suit’s record, unless it is part of formal discovery. Finally, this action has to take place in the requisite amount of time. If three years have passed without an appropriate action as described above taken by either party, then the suit is automatically abandoned. Even though abandonment is self-executing, defendants are encouraged to get an ex part order of dismissal, just like JOB did in this case, to make sure that their right to assert abandonment is not waived.

In a fairly publicized case, three people were killed in 2008 by a diving boat explosion off the coast of Louisiana. This case is still working its way through the courts and got a little further from resolution in Jillian Morrison, LLC v. Sonia because of an obscure legal concept: ripeness.

Lawsuits need several parts to get off the ground. There has to be a plaintiff with claim with a valid legal basis, you need to have defendant that is liable for the claim. There can’t be any successful defenses, there has to be a court with jurisdiction and finally, the claim must be “ripe.”

Ripeness is a technical concept. For a case to be ripe it means that the cause of action being alleged has to have moved beyond the “abstract or hypothetical.” If the only question remaining is whether the law applies, you have a case. If there are still facts that need to develop to decide the case, then it will be determined to lack “ripeness.”

The Berniard Law Firm’s principal attorney, Jeffrey Berniard, recently taught an Introduction to Personal Injury course. Having been an active part of Continuing Legal Education (CLE), Mr. Berniard was selected to teach the topic due to the firm’s specialization in medical malpractice, first party insurance disputes, and premises liability claims. Some of the topics covered included: Personal Injury Protection and First Party Benefits in auto policies; medical records disclosure including mental health and substance abuse treatment records; recoverable personal injury damages.

Under many state’s no-fault insurance laws, a claimant’s insurance company will only pay for Personal Injury Protection, or the first $10,000 out-of-pocket expenses. The remainder of expenses must be recovered from the Defendant. Many auto insurance companies do offer First Party Benefits packages, an optional supplement that will cover all medical expenses in the event of an accident for the policyholder or anyone else listed on the plan. However, many auto insurance companies also use a computer program that performs a calculation to value the severity of a victim’s injury. The program does not take into consideration the stress, pain, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life that a victim may have suffered.

Medical records unrelated to a victim’s injury, but pertaining to his/her health, are discoverable if “good cause” can be shown. Both state law and the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) apply to a consent for release of medical records. The consent must contain ten items, including a statement that the health care provider cannot condition treatment upon the signing of the consent for release. However, because of the broadness of the item language requirements, HIPAA, and state law, a health care provider may refuse to honor the consent. If a consent cannot be obtained from the patient, HIPAA continues to allow health care providers to release information with a court order or a subpoena. If an attorney issues a subpoena without a court order, the health care provider will not release information unless certain assurances are made.

It is no secret that evidence and witness testimony are arguably the two most important aspects of injury litigation and the impact that each has on the outcome of an adjudication can either make or break your case. In order to understand these effects more fully, it is important to note that there is a difference between an ordinary and an expert witness. Ordinary, factual witnesses provide knowledgeable accounts of the facts of the case through either their direct participation or observation of the intricacies of the case, whereas expert witnesses hold specialized knowledge in a particular educational field and use this advanced knowledge to clarify or explain a piece of information. Ordinary and expert witnesses are viewed differently in the eyes of the court system and are governed under separate sections in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to this distinction.

Unlike an ordinary witness, an expert witness is only permitted to testify at trial once an expert report has been filed with the opposing party. This is necessary to alleviate any future misunderstandings concerning the nature and purpose of the expert’s review and this extra measure fosters preparation, awareness and allows the parties to put their best foot forward during trial. Harmon v. Georgia Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, a recent opinion handed down from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, illustrates the importance of complying with the mandatory standards regarding expert witnesses and the permissibility of their testimony and how not doing so can cause a party to conclude that it has insufficient evidence upon which to proceed to trial. This case involved injuries caused by an industrial accident in Westlake, Louisiana.

In this case, the Court held that Harmon did not properly comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) and therefore, it decided to uphold the exclusion of imperative expert testimony. In 2006 and 2007, Ms. Harmon and four others claimed to have been injured when toxic chemicals were released into the air due to a fire and an explosion at the Georgia Gulf’s chemical facility in Westlake, Louisiana. Before trial was set to begin, the magistrate entered an order requiring Ms. Harmon and the other four plaintiffs, respectively, to provide an expert report within a timely manner for each expert witness to both Georgia Gulf Lake Charles L.L.C. and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company.

In Louisiana, an employee can only be compensated for a work related injury through workers’ compensation. This means that if an employee is negligently harmed during the course of work, the only remedy available is what is provided through the workers’ compensation act. This is true unless the injury was as a result of intentional conduct. In the business world, many general contractors contract out work to subcontractors. Legally the issue in such a case becomes how to define who the employee is employed by in case of an injury. In Louisiana, there is a doctrine called the two contract theory. The basic outline of this theory is that in a situation where there are three parties in a contract which includes a general contractor, subcontractor, and subcontractor’s employee, the subcontractor’s employee is considered an employee of the general contractor. This mean that if the subcontractor’s employee is injured while performing work for the general contractor, the employee will only be able to receive workers’ compensation, not any damages based on negligence or any other branch of tort law. This may, at first glance, seem like a harsh result. However, in the modern business world, there are so many employment contractual relationships that liability must be limited to what is reasonable under the circumstances. The two contract theory should not be viewed as a way to protect business, but rather as a means for the judicial system to not be able to overreach.

In a recent case, Mason v. Waste Management Inc. Et Al., the law concerning employee rights is discussed in such a circumstance. Lamare Kindle and Wallace Bradley, were employed by Waste Management Inc. Mr. Bradley was employed directly by Waste Management. Mr. Kindle was employed by CPST Inc. CPST was a subcontractor which had contractually agreed to supply Waste Management with employees in an effort to help Waste Management collect trash it was required to contractually pick up. Waste Management had agreed to pick up trash in a contract with the Morehouse Parish Police Jury. So the contractual relationships are broken down as follows: Morehouse Parish Police Jury needed a company to come pick up trash in its area. Waste Management agreed to pick up the trash and signed a contract with Morehouse Parish to do so. Mr. Bradley was employed by Waste Management. In an effort to fulfill its obligation to Morehouse Parish, Waste Management needed to hire temp workers. CPST contractually agreed to supply Waste Management with employees. Mr. Kindle was employed by CPST.

Mr. Bradley was driving a truck registered to Waste Management. Mr. Kindle was a passenger in the truck driven by Mr. Bradley. Upon coming to a train track Mr. Bradley made the tragic mistake of crossing over the tracks as a train passed the intersection. Both Mr. Bradley and Mr. Kindle was sadly killed as a result of the collision with the train. Mr. Kindle’s parents sued Waste Management alleging that it was liable for any negligence that was attributed to Mr. Bradley while he was driving the garbage truck. The police report stated that the accident was likely the result of Mr. Bradley’s inattentivness. Waste Management argued that under the two contract theory, Mr. Kindle was its employee and because there was negligence and not intentional conduct, the only remedy available was workers’ compensation. Because Waste Management held a position as a general contractor in relation to Morehouse Parish, and CPST held a relationship with Waste Management as a subcontractor, the circumstance of the contractual relationships fell under the definition of the two contract theory. Therefore, Mr. Kindle was considered an employee of Waste Management and the only remedy available was workers’ compensation.

The Berniard Law Firm is proud to be a New Orleans-based organization and nothing says NOLA better than Mardi Gras!

We wish all of our readers a happy, and safe, Mardi Gras holiday!

A recent case within the Kentucky Court of Appeals demonstrates very extremely the need for quality counsel in all court proceedings. Regardless the subject or reasons you may find yourself in court, it is important that the lawyer you hire is not only able to represent you well in the courtroom and past it. While you would like to think the courts have the rule of law well established in the minds of their judges, a qualified attorney will also review the matters at hand to make sure all ‘facts’ are correct in the proceedings.

In the case of Bramer Crane Servs., LLC v. Structure Builders & Riggers Mach. Moving Div., LLC, a lien issue was reviewed by the superior court of the state. While the actual facts of the case are not important for this post, what is important is that the findings of the court were inherently flawed. Cited in the case was a fact that was severely outdated, as much as 20+ years and two revisions.

As the blog Zlien notes, instead of a clean finding, the court had lapsed in its research and failed to note updated law. The issue was that the ruling relied on judicial precedence rather than a review of legislation passed during this time. While one would like to consider the issue a simple lapse in judicial research, the fact remains that this unpublished decision could very easily have gone unnoticed without people stepping up.

In nearly all cases, sand on a beach is enjoyable and safe. Sand used for sandblasting, however, creates dust that, upon being inhaled by an unprotected worker, increases the risk of lung disease or other lung-based medical concerns. The Louisiana Court of Appeal decided in Bates v. E. D. Bullard Co., that the possibility of problems does not make the sale of a product like sand unreasonable, especially when that use is outside the normal, non-technical purpose.

Wilbert Bates worked for the SBA Shipyards during the 1980s doing tasks that included cleaning and sandblasting. Both types of duties exposed him to silica dust — pieces of sand so small that he inhaled them and they stuck in his lungs that led to silicosis. Silicosis is an industrial disease that leaves its victims short of breath due to small sand particles becoming lodged in the lungs. The presence of particles encourages the growth of fibrous tissue in the lungs, reducing lung capacity. A lifetime of work can result in wheezing and body strain in an attempt to get air.

Bates and his wife sued Specialty Sand Co. and Southern Silica of Louisiana, Inc., which provided sand to the shipyard. The Bateses claimed that the sand was unreasonably dangerous or defective because the sand companies failed to warn and instruct him and the shipyard of the potential hazards.

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