Articles Posted in Car Accident

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When chain reaction accidents occur it can sometimes feel like mayhem on the highway.  One car hits another, then another one hits another and so on and so on.  But who’s at fault for all the injuries and wrecked cars?  The car that initially caused the accident?  The one after that which ran into another car that was trying to stop to avoid the accident?   The following case out of Avoyelles parish sheds some light on who’s at fault for what in multi-car pile ups.

Lacey Berthiaume was driving on a Louisiana highway when ahead of her a car entered the roadway without yielding to oncoming traffic.  The car in front of Ms. Berthiaume suddenly stopped.  Ms. Berthiaume successfully stopped her automobile within a foot of colliding with the car in front of her.  However, the truck behind Ms. Berthiaume was not able to stop, and the truck rear-ended her vehicle causing injuries to Ms. Berthiaume.  Ms. Bethiaume filed a lawsuit in the Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles, alleging the driver of the truck, Mr. Gros, was negligent and caused the accident.

In the trial court, Ms. Bethiaume filed a motion for summary disposition.  Ms. Bethiaume argued that Mr. Gros rear-ended her vehicle, and under Louisiana law, in a rear-end accident, the following motorists is presumed to have violated La R.S. 32:81(A), and therefore presumed negligent.  In summary, La 32:81(A) states a driver shall not follow another motorist too close to react to traffic and highway conditions.  Mr. Gros admitted he caused the accident, but he also argued that the motorist that entered the roadway causing Ms. Berthiaume, and the motorist in front of her, to stop short was also at fault.  In short, Mr. Gros argued that this other driver shared some of the fault underlying this accident.  The trial court disagreed with Mr. Gros and held he was solely at fault for this accident.

cash-money-1520773-1024x768The generally rudimentary question of “what is the ‘amount in dispute’” was anything but simple when Louisiana courts sought to determine whether settlement amounts should be considered “in dispute” in calculating jurisdictional limits. The Monroe Circuit Court sought to determine the “amount in dispute” in relation the subject matter jurisdiction of a City Court with a jurisdictional limit of $30,000. The issue to be determined was whether following the dismissal of the settling defendants, the City Court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim against her uninsured motorist insurer to the full extent of that court’s $30,000 jurisdictional limit. The implications of this case are that it will be easier for injured individuals to remain in City Court if they allege damages less than the jurisdictional limit, despite whether they have previously settled a portion of their claim for an amount exceeding the jurisdictional limit.

Holly D. Swayze (Holly) was involved in an automobile accident Brittany Miles struck her vehicle (Tortfeasor) on her passenger side door. Holly sustained injuries to her back and neck and sought recovery for her injuries in by filing a lawsuit in Monroe City Court, which had a jurisdictional limit of $30,000. She later amended her complaint for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits from her insurer, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter Insurance), after it was revealed the tortfeasor carried an insurance policy in the amount of $25,000.

The procedural posture of this case was quite convoluted. Holly sought and was granted transfer to district court, alleging her claims presented an amount in dispute that exceeded the $30,000 jurisdictional limit. Transfer was granted. Soon thereafter, Holly executed a settlement with the tortfeasors insurer for $25,000, filed a motion to dismiss the tortfeasor and her insurer from the underlying lawsuit, and filed a motion to vacate the transfer order. The motion to dismiss and the motion to vacate were both granted.

erasure-1237046-1024x768Courts are not perfect, and sometimes they do not always render the correct decision. When a court makes an error in their judgment it can be very frustrating for all of the parties involved. Error can be very costly especially when a major issue, like finding coverage for a victim of an automobile accident under an umbrella insurance policy, needs to be determined. Both the plaintiff and defendant wants the court to look in their favor, but it is also the responsibility of the court to make an error free and accurate decision that is fair and just to both sides.

One such case where the trial court made an error in rendering a final judgment comes from St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. On May 26, 2010, Gary Michael Brown (“Mr. Brown”) was driving a truck that was owned by his employer J&J Diving Corporation. While driving, Mr. Brown got into an accident with St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Deputy, Scott Jarred (“Mr. Jarred”). Mr. Jarred filed a lawsuit against Mr. Brown, J&J Diving Corporation, and Progressive Insurance Company. On May 22, 2012, Mr. Jarred amended his original complaint and added two more defendants. These defendants were XL Specialty Insurance Company and Valiant Insurance Company, and they provided a Marine Excess Liability Policy, or Bumbershoot policy, for J&J Diving Corporation. Two days later, Mr. Jarred entered into a Gasquet release. A Gasquet release is where the plaintiff settles all claims with the primary insurance provider for a smaller amount than policy limits, but does not settle with the umbrella policy insurer. Gasquet v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 So.2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 921 (La. 1981). Mr. Jarred settled all of the claims against J&J Diving Corporation, Mr. Brown, and Progressive; but he reserved his claims against both XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance.

XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment on December 5, 2013. Their main argument surrounding the motion, was that the Bumbershoot policy only provided coverage to J&J Diving Corporation for their commercial diving contractor operations. The accident between Mr. Jarred and Mr. Brown was not related to those commercial diving contractor operations. Because there was no relation, the Bumbershoot policy should not provide any coverage for Mr. Jarred’s accident. Mr. Jarred filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2014 and requested that the trial court should find coverage for him under the Bumbershoot policy provided by XL Specialty Insurance and Valiant Insurance. Mr. Jarred’s main argument was that because the policy contained the word “contractor,” the Bumbershoot policy therefore expanded the coverage and should be provided to him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jarred on June 5, 2014 and certified that their decision was a final judgment because there was no just reason for delay.

crash-test-dummies-1251143-1-768x1024Car accidents are among the most common reasons for a lawsuit. An average car accident is often difficult to conclude which party is at fault. Issues are further complicated if insurance claims are involved. Who is truly at fault for the accident if a vehicle malfunctioned?  A trial becomes increasingly complex if a Plaintiff claims that a company is at fault for his injuries. Specific elements are required for a successful trial.

Recently, a multiple car accident occurred in near St. Tammy’s Parish. Mr. Bordelon allegedly caused the accident by swerving into multiple lanes and colliding with two vehicles. The second crash involved Mr. Reynolds who sustained serious injuries when his car landed in a ditch. However, Mr. Reynolds did not simply blame Mr. Bordelon for the accident, but additionally filled a lawsuit against Nissan- the company who designed and manufactured his vehicle under Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). Mr. Reynolds sued Nissan due to his air bags’ failure to deploy. The trial court denied Mr. Reynolds’ claim and granted Nissan summary judgment.

However, Mr. Reynolds appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court utilized a de novo standard- using the criteria as the trial court. Overall, the Plaintiff took issue with the trial court excluding certain evidence. According to the Supreme Courts’ analysis, the trial court properly excluded evidence. Largely, evidence was excluded due lack of verification. Mr. Reynolds presented pictures of the alleged accident, but no verification of the date, time or address to prove pictures where in fact of the accident.  See La.Code Evid. Art. 401. and La.Code Evid. Art. 803.

church-1442139-1024x768Suppose a pedestrian is hit by a driver who is leaving a poorly-maintained parking area in rural Louisiana that is little more than a partially cleared grassy area. The pedestrian sues the property owner and its insurers, among other defendants. Now suppose that this plaintiff, on being questioned in a deposition taken by the defendants’ attorneys, cannot articulate anything at all that the property owner did or did not do to cause this accident. Suppose also that the pedestrian fails to refute evidence that this type of unpaved, unmarked “clearing in the woods” parking area is common in rural Louisiana and that there have never been any parking problems or collisions in this particular lot before. Will the case go to the jury, or will the judge find for the defendants due to a lack of disputed facts for the jury to consider, leaving the injured pedestrian without a chance to prove she has suffered damages and deserves compensation from the property owners?

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has considered just this issue in several recent cases; the latest was Allen v. Lockwood, decided in 2015. In that case, the Wesley Chapel United Methodist Church which is located in a rural area of St. Helen’s Parish, off Louisiana Highway 448, was sued by a pedestrian who was hit by an elderly church member driving in reverse at a high rate of speed through the church parking area, an unmarked grassy clearing in the woods. In her deposition, the pedestrian said “not really” when asked if she could think of anything the church did wrong that caused the accident. The plaintiff also failed to refute evidence from a church member’s affidavit that parking areas in this condition are common in rural Louisiana and that there had never been any accidents in the church lot before.

Most personal injury cases are tried under a negligence theory. To prove that the defendant was negligent, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had a legal duty toward him or her and caused the accident or injury by failing to fulfill that duty. When a court grants summary judgement in a case, the case does not go to the jury. Instead, the judge decides the case on the basis of the law because he or she has determined that there are no disputed issues of fact for the jury to consider. In its recent personal injury cases involving summary judgement, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided that the question of whether the defendant had a legal duty toward the plaintiff is a question of law that the judge decides. If the judge decides there was a legal duty, the case goes to the jury, who decides, based on the evidence, whether the defendant fulfilled the duty. If the judge decides that there was no legal duty toward the plaintiff because the dangerous condition that caused the accident was “open and obvious,” the defendant can be granted summary judgement, which is an “automatic win.”

car-crash-1451085-1024x686Insurance policies can be difficult to understand. Litigating disputes arising from insurance policies can be even more difficult because the court must look not only at the policy itself to decide the case but must also consider which state’s law to apply to the case. The complexity of insurance cases makes it important to seek the services of an attorney familiar with the nuances of insurance litigation.

Monica Rios was a passenger in a car, driven and owned by Mr. Eddy Reyes, that was involved in an accident in New Orleans, Louisiana. The other car involved in the accident was being driven at the time by an excluded driver for that car’s insurance policy. The insurance provider for that car, Gramercy Insurance Company, pointed out that not only was the driver of the vehicle a named excluded driver that also the policy had lapsed due to non-payment prior to the accident. As a result, Gramercy was released from any liability.

Ms. Rios had also filed a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage under Mr. Reyes’ insurance policy issued by United Automobile Insurance Company. UM is intended to compensate the insured customer when the driver who caused the accident is either uninsured or their insurance does not cover the damages. In this case, since Gramercy had been released from liability by the court, Ms. Rios looked to United, Mr. Reyes’ insurer, for relief.

car-accident-2-1449295-1-1024x681A rear-end collision in Opelousas has led to a demonstration on how complex lawsuits concerning insurance companies can be. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s decision regarding damages suffered in the accident, focusing on the amount owed to the plaintiffs by two different insurance companies.

The facts of the case are as follows: a vehicle operated by Ms. Rodgers, insured by Allstate Insurance, and owned by a Ms. Kennerson, rear-ended a vehicle operated by Ms. Bell, insured by Progressive Insurance, and owned by Compass LLC. The vehicle operated by Ms. Bell had an additional five passengers in the vehicle, while Ms. Rodgers was the sole occupant of the vehicle she was operating. Three of the passengers in Ms. Bell’s vehicle filed a Petition for Damages alleging entitlement to Uninsured Motorist Coverage (UM), naming Progressive as a defendant in its capacity as the UM insurer of the vehicle Bell was driing when the accident occurred. The other two passengers in Ms. Bell’s vehicle filed a Petition for Intervention, also naming Progressive as a defendant. Finally, Ms. Bell filed a Petition for Intervention, naming Rodgers, Allstate, and Progressive as defendants.

Compass LLC had purchased a combined single limit (CSL) auto insurance policy from Progressive which provided liability coverage in the amount of $1 million. In 2007, a Compass representative executed an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury (UMBI) Coverage Form issued by the Commissioner of Insurance in compliance with La. R.S. 22:680. The representative would testify he did not recall executing the form but identified his initials and signature on the form as his own. The form declared the representative selected UMBI Coverage to compensate for economic and non-economic losses with limits lower than any Bodily Injury Liability Coverage limits. Additionally, the term “$100,000” was inserted in a black preceding “each person”, with the word “person” scratched out and replaced by “CSL”.

adam-s-apple-1161808-1024x575Plaintiff Richard Reynolds sustained injuries in a multi-vehicle accident on March 15, 2008, in St. Tammany Parish. Reynolds alleged, amongst other counts, that his insurer, Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange (ACE) and Insurance Auto Auctions Corporation (IA) failed to preserve Reynolds’ vehicle for inspection purposes to determine whether any defects existed, despite being put on notice of the need for preservation. ACE and IA defended themselves by stating there was “no cause of action” for what Reynolds was attempting to sue for, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari, or an order to review the decision of the lower court, to definitively rule on the viability of negligent spoliation of evidence as a cause of action in Louisiana.

Reynolds claimed that both ACE and IA did not preserve Plaintiff’s car despite the fact that they knew of the lawsuit.  Reynolds stated that the defendants knew a lawsuit was going to be filed and therefore had a duty to retain the vehicle in the condition in which they received it.

Negligent Spoliation of evidence, as argued by the Plaintiff, Richard Reynolds, is a claim for recovery due to defendants owing the plaintiff a duty to preserve, maintain, and to refrain from any alienation or destruction of Plaintiff’s vehicle for purposes of his litigation.

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When seeking legal relief, plaintiffs will face procedural hurdles during litigation. Defendants can and will often use procedural mechanisms to avoid liability for claims brought against them. This is the nature of the game, and skilled attorneys are masters of the rules governing the conduct of civil trials. Procedural law differs from substantive law (i.e. torts, contracts, property) in that the former provides the rules for applying substantive law for live disputes. Procedural mechanisms set guidelines for what evidence the court may hear, how evidence should be interpreted, and burdens of proof. One such procedural mechanism commonly used by litigants is the “motion for summary judgment.” A recent decision of the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal discusses the motion for summary judgment and the requisite burdens of proof for parties filing or opposing such motions.

On March 11, 2006, a tanker truck belonging to John Williams was delivering fuel to Mr. Preston Payton’s dredging operation near Independence, Louisiana when it picked up a cable securing the dredge in the gravel pit. The dredge sunk beneath the murky water. Mr. Payton filed a lawsuit against named defendants Mr. Williams; Republic Vanguard Insurance Company, Mr. Williams’ insurer; Texas General Agency, Republic Vanguards adjusting agency; and Randy Anny, who leased the gravel pit where the accident took place. Mr. Payton’s Petition claimed that the defendants entered into a settlement agreement with him and agreed to pay him $256,714.86 as replacement for his dredge. Mr. Payton’s Petition also claimed that instead of paying him directly, Republic Vanguard and Texas General made the settlement check payable to Mr. Anny, who was obligated to pay Mr. Payton. According to Mr. Payton’s petition, the check used by Mr. Anny to pay him was drawn from an account with insufficient funds.

The Trial Court granted Republic Vanguard’s and Texas General’s motion for summary judgment which alleged that Mr. Payton failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that Mr. Anny acted as their agent. Mr. Payton appealed.

new-orleans-streetcar-1230694-1024x768Car accidents can be an alarming ordeal. Especially, where there has been a fatality involved. Generally, when a vehicle has been physically involved in an accident, the driver can expect to have some liability. However, liability can also be involved where a driver requires a passenger to exit a vehicle, and the passenger is subsequently struck and killed by an unknown driver, hours later.

This horrific circumstance was an all too real reality for John Cefalu, when the trial court found Mr, Cefalu and his insurer USAA Casualty Insurance Company, (USAA), partially liable for the death of Piero Larrea.   Mr. Cefalu was driving Mr. Larrera and some other friends back from a night of celebrating Mr. Cefalu’s birthday in New Orleans. Mr. Larrera allegedly became belligerent and Mr. Cefalu eventually pulled the car over on the side of the interstate and asked Mr. Larrera to exit the vehicle. Mr. Larrera was eventually hit and killed by an unknown phantom driver.

A lawsuit and subsequent trial followed that series of events.  After three days of testimony a jury verdict was returned.  The trial court accepted the jury’s verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff, the father of decedent, and the jury’s assignment of fault. The assignment of fault was as follows: Mr. Larrea, 54% at fault for his own death, Mr. Cefalu 28% at fault, and the hit and run driver 18% at fault.  Mr. Cefalu and USAA appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing that improper jury instructions resulted in the adverse verdict. Mr. Larrea’s father answered the appeal seeking a modification or reversal of the judgment with respect to the allocation of fault to the unknown driver.

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