Articles Posted in Business Dispute

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Creating laminated veneer lumber and I-Joists, which are used in residential and commercial construction, require toxic chemicals such as formaldehyde, phenol, and methanol. The chemicals also end up in the waste products of plants that produce these goods. In the Parish of Natchitoches, hundreds of individuals discovered the damage that these chemicals could cause. These individuals stated “that sawdust from the plant fell like snowflakes upon them, their children, their homes and their cars.” The plant admitted that accidental release of admissions were fairly common, and they were all observed and recorded.

As a result of this exposure, hundreds of plaintiffs joined to form a class action lawsuit. A class action lawsuit involves numerous individuals who have suffered in a similar manner, usually resulting from the same incident or series of incidents. Class action lawsuits allow individual people to get compensation for damages where they may not have been able to if they just sued by themselves.

The damages in this case not only included the obvious mess that sawdust would create in a home, but also included an array of medical issues. Some examples include conjunctivitis, difficulty breathing, wheezing, coughing, bronchial pneumonia, and asthma. The side effects of exposure to the chemicals in the plant were relatively the same as those claimed by hundreds of nearby residents.

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Our justice system puts a great deal of important decisions in the hands of juries. Criminal defendants and civil defendants often find their fates in the hands of some number, varying by jurisdiction, of people with no specific training whatsoever. Our system gives a great deal of deference to the trier of fact at the trial level. Nobody, save perhaps the actual participants in the case, is in a better position to determine exactly what happened in a given case. The jury hears all of the admissible evidence and at the end of the day they determine not only what happened in a civil trial but, once liability is conceded or established, how much the plaintiff is entitled to recover for their injuries. Once the jury renders a verdict, its findings will not be overturned absent a determination that they abused their discretion. The Louisiana Supreme Court has gone out of its way to stress just how much deference should be granted to jury verdicts on review. They noted that a jury finding regarding damages is entitled to “great deference on review” in Wainwright v. Fontenot, 774 So.2d 70, 74. The Louisiana Supreme Court further indicated that “an appellate court should rarely disturb an award on review” in Guillory v. Lee, 16 So.3d 1104.

In the case of Deligans v. Ace American Ins. Co., the defendant conceded the issue of liability. The trial in this case only concerned the amount of money to be awarded in damages. After the jury heard all of the evidence in that case, they awarded the plaintiff several dollar amounts for specific types of damages. The jury awarded Mrs. Deligans money for past physical pain and suffering, future physical pain and suffering, past mental pain and suffering, future mental pain and suffering, past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past loss of enjoyment of life and future loss of enjoyment of life. The jury did not award Mrs. Deligans any money in the areas of past disability or future disability. Ms. Deligans complained on appeal about the inadequacy of the award she was granted by the jury.

The appellate court found that the jury in this case had in fact abused its discretion. After explaining the deference due to such a finding at great length, the appellate court actually raised the award that the jury awarded Ms. Deligans. When an appellate court makes such a finding, it can only raise the award to the “lowest amount which is reasonably within the court’s discretion.” The appellate court looked to jury awards in similar cases when making this determination. The appellate court then awarded Ms. Deligans the lowest amount it felt was within the purview of the jury to have given without abusing its discretion. Even when the jury verdict is overturned, it is still given great deference.

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Black’s Law Dictionary defines a common carrier as “A commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee. A common carrier is generally required by law to transport freight or passengers . . . without refusal, if the approved fare or charge is paid.” Common carriers include vehicles such as buses, planes, trains, and even taxis. Generally, the individual who is driving or running the vehicle is unknown to the passengers and those passengers are, in effect, putting their lives in the hands of a complete stranger. As a result, a common carrier has special, heightened obligations to the people they are transporting. Therefore, if someone is injured, then the common carrier is more likely to be held liable.

The danger involving public transportation is especially apparent in situations where there are children involved. For example, in a recent case involving the Avoyelles Parish School Board, they were held liable for an injury that a child sustained on a school bus. In this case, a child was injured as a result of the bus driver backing up into a wet, grassy area and getting the school bus stuck in the mud. The school bus had to be hauled out of the mud while the children were on it. The child involved injured his knee; he suffered from bilateral knee contusions after he hit his knee on the back of one of the chairs.

The school bus is considered under the definition of a common carrier even though the children do not directly pay for their transportation as they get on the school bus. As a result, law surrounding the common carrier doctrine governs the school bus case. Although Louisiana generally relies on codes to make up their laws, the common carrier doctrine exists even in this state.

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A mother in Alexandria, Louisiana (“Williams”) recently sued AT&T on behalf of her three-year old due to an unfortunate accident in one of the phone giant’s stores. Johnathan Davis, then two and a half years old, was playing on the floor of an AT&T store as his mother was shopping. While playing under and around a sandwich board sign in the corner of the store, he knocked it closed against a window. When the boy leaned over to pick up something he had dropped, the sign fell towards him, striking his head and sending him to the ground. Since the accident, Johnathan has suffered at least two seizures, causing his doctors to diagnose him with post-traumatic epilepsy and some serious cognitive issues.

The jury ruled in favor of AT&T, finding that Johnathan’s mother (the plaintiff) had not shown any negligence by AT&T. Williams appealed the decision, questioning whether certain instructions and interrogatories should have been given to the jury on negligence law. Jury interrogatories are sub-questions that the jury will need to decide in order to conclude on the issue at hand. In this case, in order to prove negligence, the jury had to decide whether the accident was caused by an unreasonably dangerous condition in order to conclude whether negligence was present. Jury instructions, on the other hand, are a set of legal instructions given to the jury to aid them in coming to a verdict, such as “If you believe A, B, and C occurred, then you must find D.”

Johnathan’s mother first argued that the jury verdict form should have included an interrogatory on general negligence. She believed that the verdict form was too narrow, essentially turning her claim into a premises liability case (“Was there an unreasonably dangerous condition without which the accident would not have occurred?”). On this issue, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that the case was indeed a premises liability case since the plaintiff had not shown any negligence by the AT&T employees. Without any evidence of negligent conduct by the employees, the trial court was not required to put questions of general negligence on the verdict form. While his mother argued that none of the employees stopped the sign from falling on the child, the court found no evidence that the employees had even seen the sign falling. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling.

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In order to sue, there are certain rules and procedures you must follow. There are not only federal rules; there are also state rules and local rules. All of these rules should be combined in order to correctly deal with the court system. In many cases, if you do not comply with these extensive rules, then the court will not hear your case. Obviously, these rules are important, but can be very time consuming to follow.

A recent case provides us with an excellent example of following the rules to the letter. In this case, an individual was killed on Highway 90 near Iberia Parish. His accident occurred on a temporary road near a construction zone; he was the only person involved in the accident. As a result, his mother sued for wrongful death. She listed Toyota Motor North American, Inc., Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., and the Department of Transportation and Development.

One of the many procedures that must be followed is the service of process. Service of process involves giving the other party a letter or some kind of notification that they are being sued. Its purpose is obviously to inform the other party that they are being sued, but also let them know that they will need to respond and possibly go to court to defend the suit.

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Recently, the Vermillion Parish School Board sued various oil, gas, and mineral companies based on mineral leases that were established over a period of nearly 70 years. The companies included Union Oil Company of California, The Pure Oil Corporation, and ConocoPhillips Company. After the school’s argument was rejected at the lower level in separate lawsuits, the school filed to appeal the trial court’s decision. The State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s findings and its justification for doing so is quite interesting. That court addressed the mineral leases generally, the use of Section 16 lands, and the school’s role in the use of Section 16 lands.

This case involved several unique concepts under the law. First, the dispute centered around mineral leases, which are an curious concept themselves. Basically, mineral leases allow another person or company the ability to mine or take the minerals that are on or underneath a portion of land. In order to take those minerals, the person or company has to pay for their use as if they are renting the entire property. The land above ground might also be used for another purpose that is completely unrelated to mining of minerals, oil, or gas underneath the surface. In addition to a specified rent, many times the person or company who owns the land may also require that they receive a portion of the profits that the land produces. This profit portion is commonly referred to as royalties. These royalties are the topic of discussion in the Vermillion Parish School Board case.

In this case, a school owned lands that they had leased to various oil, gas, and mineral companies. The school was situated on Section 16 land. This concept is also unique and deserves some historical explanation. The State of Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provides some background on the status of this land. It explains that in 1806, the United States government set aside some land for the use of public education. Therefore, when Louisiana joined the Union in 1812, the land that was set aside was passed to the State to establish public education. These lands are separate from other public lands because they are completely under the control of the state school authorities; therefore, they are held in trust for the benefit of Louisiana school children. The court further explains that although the school authorities control the use of the land, the land is actually owned by the State of Louisiana.

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Anyone with experience in the court system knows that seeing a lawsuit through to completion takes time. While the wheels of justice may turn slowly, the plaintiff in certain cases may require urgent action to put a stop to the defendant’s behavior that gave rise to the litigation in the first place. In those situations, a plaintiff can turn to the courts for help in the form of a petition for an injunction.

Under Louisiana law, an “injunction shall be issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result” The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “injunctive relief” is designed “to prevent the occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss or damage to the applicant.” The issuance of a permanent injunction requires the court to assess the merits of the request, which may itself require time; the court can issue a preliminary injunction–which only requires a prima facie (on its face) showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief–to maintain the status quo while the permanent injunction is pending. Key to the success of a plaintiff’s petition is that the court’s compulsion or prohibition of some conduct is required to stave off harm. An injunction cannot be issued for monetary damages. In addition, there is an exception to the requirement that the plaintiff show irreparable harm. The courts disregard this element when the conduct at issue “constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law or a constitutional right.” In other words, if the defendant’s conduct is illegal, harm is implied.

The Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit provided a useful analysis of the requirements for an injunction in the recent case of Desselle v. Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc.. The trial court granted of a preliminary injunction against Acadian to prevent it from collecting any amount in excess of the reimbursement rate it had negotiated with Keisha Desselle’s health insurance provider. Desselle disputed that any amount was due to Acadian, and was in litigation with her health insurance company over the matter. The court reversed the issuance of the injunction, stating that the case “[ran] afoul of [Louisiana law] insofar as [Desselle] did not demonstrate that “irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result” to her. First, Desselle has “already been subjected to the complained-of billing procedure.” Further, “any alleged injury, loss, or damage is monetary is nature. It is unclear how the anticipated injury, loss, or damage is irreparable insofar as “Desselle’s] suit is one for monetary damages.”

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Four workers who were employed by the Prairieville-based Proserve Hydro Co. were working on at a Honeywell International facility when a hose carrying chlorine gas ruptured, causing them injury. The workers sued Triplex, Inc., the company that had sold the hose to Honeywell, under the theory that it was liable for their injuries as the manufacturer of the hose. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, applying the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), granted summary judgment in favor of Triplex, and the workers appealed.

In its review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified four elements that a plaintiff must establish in a products liability suit under the LPLA. It focused particualrly on the requirement that the defendant must be the “manufacturer” of the product according to the state’s definition. The lower court’s summary judgment was based on Triplex’s position that it was not a manufacturer of the hose within the meaning of the LPLA. The hose in question was a “Resistoflex Chlorine Hose Part # HB30HB30HB-1560.” It consisted of a Teflon inner-core surrounded by a braided material jacket. The core and jacket were assembled by the Crane Resistoflex Company and shipped in bulk to Triplex for distribution. Upon receipt of an order from Honeywell, Triplex cut the hose to the requested length, installed Resistoflex-approved fittings to either end, and pressure-tested the hose. Triplex recorded the specifications of this work on an assembly test certificate which listed “Resistoflex” as the manufacturer of the hose.

The court looked to the LPLA to determine whether, based on its cutting the Resistoflex hose and installing the end fittings, Triplex fit the definition of “manufacturer.” It noted that the workers’ expert conceded that the hose rupture occured a significant distance away from any end fitting and did not appear to result from the modifications Triplex performed. It also affirmed the point that “the simple act of testing a product after modifications,” as Triplex did, “does not transform a seller into a statutory ‘manufacturer.’” The court was not persuaded that Triplex exercised any “control over… a characteristic of the design, construction or quality of the product,” given that Honeywell specified the exact Resistoflex part number and the end fittings it required. Accordingly, the court concluded that Triplex was not a manufacturer under the state law definition, and therefore could not be found liable for the workers’ injuries under the LPLA.

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In 1960, Hunt Petroleum Corporation (“Hunt”) entered into a surfaces lease with the Reynolds family. In 1997, Kinder Gas Processing Corporation (“Kinder Gas”), one of Hunt’s successors in interest, notified the Reynolds of an environmental study “that showed a few things [Kinder Gas] wanted to clean up,” and that it was “in the process of cleaning them up.” Over several years, Kinder Gas discussed with the Reynolds the possibility of buying part of the property and cancelling the entire lease. On January 14, 2008, the Reynolds (through a real estate appraiser) offered to sell the entire property to Kinder Gas. The offer referred to environmental problems on the property caused by Kinder Gas or its predecessors.

In 2010, Kinder Gas brought suit for a declaratory judgment against the Reynolds to avoid liability for damage to the Reynolds’ property. In turn, the Reynolds sought damages against Kinder Gas and other successors (“the Gas Companies”) in connection with toxic wastes that were spilled or disposed on the property. The Reynolds relied on theories of strict liability, nuisance, continuing trespass, and breach of contract. They asserted that the lease was cancelled as a result of the Gas Companies’ breach of contract. The Gas Companies countered that the tort claims had prescribed, and that the breach of contract claim was premature.

The Kinder Gas v. Reynolds trial court agreed with the Gas Companies, finding that the Reynolds’ had constructive knowledge of possible contamination prior to the real estate agent’s January 14, 2008 offer. Citing Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. and Hogg v. Chevron USA, the court held that the Reynolds’ failure to file their tort claims within a year from this date resulted in prescription. The court also found that the lease was still in effect. Relying on Dore Energy Company v. Carter-Langham, Inc., the court held that the Reynolds’ contract claim for restoration of land on which operations were ongoing was premature.

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In Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, the State of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board brought suit against Union Oil Company of California (“Unocal”) and other oil companies for remediation of polluted state property in Vermilion Parish. Unocal admitted that it was responsible for environmental damage on the property and filed a motion to refer the case to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR) pursuant to Act 312 of 2006, La.R.S. 30:29. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that such a referral could not take place until all Defendants admitted responsibility and the private claims were tried to the jury. The trial court agreed with Plaintiffs.

Unocal filed a motion for partial summary judgment limiting Plaintiffs’ remediation damage claims to the amount determined by LDNR to be “the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental damage” under La.R.S. 30:29(c)(3). Unocal argued that this language served as a cap on remediation damages resulting from a tort or the implied restoration obligation of a mineral lease. The trial court agreed.Plaintiffs appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued a decision on the case on February 1, 2012.

In considering whether La.R.S. 30:29 limited Plaintiff’s recoverable remediation damages to the cost of a “feasible plan,” the appeals court first looked to the language of the statute. The court quoted the first sentence of La.R.S. 32:29(H): “This section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section.” The court found that this language clearly contemplated the landowner receiving an award in addition to that provided by the feasible plan.

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